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- The 1999 NPT PREPCOM
By Tariq Rauf and John Simpson,
- The Nonproliferation Review: Winter 1999, Volume 6 - Number 2
- (reprinted with author's permission)
-
- On Monday, 10 May, 1999, the third two-week session of the Preparatory
Committee (PrepCom) for the 2000 Review Conference of the Treaty on the
NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is scheduled to convene at United
Nations headquarters in New York.[1] On the one hand, this meeting is unlikely
to remove any of the specific proliferation threats that currently confront
the international community. On the other, however, it will be an important
indicator of the health of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime,
and of the issues that may need to be addressed in the future if political
support for the Treaty from the majority of NPT parties is to be sustained.
The outcome of the meeting will therefore be of concern to all of those
seeking to strengthen this regime to meet the challenges of the next century.
-
- The content and nature of this PrepCom session are a direct result
of decisions taken in 1995 to make the NPT review process more effective,
in particular more forward-looking and product-oriented. These decisions
were linked politically to a concurrent decision to give the Treaty an
indefinite duration. An important method of sustaining political support
for the regime and persuading parties that it is in their interests to
back its further strengthening is thus to ensure that the changed review
process for the Treaty is fully implemented. Unfortunately, events at the
1997 and 1998 sessions of the PrepCom suggest that this is far from being
achieved, and that disagreement exists among the parties on how to strengthen
the review process and on the substantive objectives they should seek through
it for promoting nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament.
-
- Unless substantial progress can be made in both of these areas in 1999,
the parties will go into the 2000 Review Conference with little to show
for their participation in the changed review process. This will place
great pressure upon that conference to produce a positive, forward-looking
result. At the same time, the core of the Treaty may have been weakened.
Because the NPT lacks a permanent executive organization, the review process
has become its functional equivalent. If this process is discredited in
the eyes of the Treaty parties, the credibility of the Treaty itself, and
its related regime, may also be undermined. Much therefore rides on the
outcome of the 1999 PrepCom session. A positive product from the session,
in the form of a set of clear recommendations, will be an indicator that
the reform and strengthening of the Treaty and the regime, initiated in
1995, is back on track; a negative outcome may be perceived as undermining
the common interests that underpin both the Treaty and the regime and promoting
a fragmentation of the political support so necessary for them to survive.
-
- The primary aim of this report is to help parties prepare for the 1999
NPT PrepCom and the next-the sixth-Review Conference of the Parties to
the NPT, which will be the first under the strengthened review process.
It is organized in four parts: background-what happened in 1995-1998; procedural
and organizational matters for the 1999 PrepCom; substantive issues for
the 1999 PrepCom; and conclusions-what are the prospects for a positive
outcome and what may need to be done to secure such a result.
-
- BACKGROUND
-
- The NPT, signed on July 1, 1968, is the bedrock of the post-World War
II global nonproliferation regime. With 187 states parties, this Treaty
is the most widely adhered to and the most successful multilateral arms
control treaty in history. At present it has more members than the United
Nations,[2] and only four states are non-parties: Cuba, India, Israel,
and Pakistan.
-
- The NPT created the precedent of periodic reviews to assess the implementation
of multilateral arms control agreements.[3] Article VIII.3 specifically
provided for the first Review Conference to be held in Geneva in 1975,
five years after the Treaty's entry into force in 1970, and left open the
option for subsequent quinquennial reviews thereafter if requested by a
majority of states parties. As a consequence, NPT review conferences were
held every five years after 1975 to review the implementation of the Treaty
in the preceding five-year period.
-
- In the negotiations from 1965 to 1968 on drafting the NPT, the leading
industrial non-nuclear weapon states were reluctant to accept a nonproliferation
instrument of indefinite duration. As a result, Article X.2 of the NPT
stipulated that a conference on the future of the Treaty would be held
25 years after its entry into force.[4]
-
- In accordance with this provision, the NPT Review and Extension Conference
(NPTREC) was convened at the United Nations in New York, from April 12
to May 12, 1995. On May 11, 174 states parties gave the Treaty an indefinite
duration by agreeing without a vote to a package of interlinked decisions.
Decision 1, on "Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty,"[5]
elaborated a framework for an enhanced and a more substantive process of
reviewing the implementation of the NPT and forwarding recommendations
on future steps to the quinquennial NPT Review Conferences. Decision 2,
on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament,"[6]
set out substantive guidelines and indicative targets designed to promote
greater accountability regarding the full implementation of the Treaty.
Decision 3, on "Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons,"[7] taken in accordance with the provisions of Article
X.2, emphasized the two preceding decisions adopted by the NPTREC and reaffirmed
the provisions of Article VIII.3. Its main function, however, was to provide
a vehicle for confirming in a legally binding form that the Treaty was
to have an indefinite duration. In addition, a resolution on the Middle
East[8] was also adopted which inter alia endorsed the ongoing peace process
and called upon all states in the region to accede to the Treaty and to
establish an effectively verifiable zone free of weapons of mass destruction
and their delivery systems.
-
- In the four years that have elapsed since the indefinite extension,
and after two sessions of the PrepCom for the next NPT Review Conference
in 2000, progress has been made on certain procedural issues. However,
significant differences have emerged over the nature and interpretation
of the NPTREC decisions as well as on their implementation.
-
- The original concept of linking a "strengthened review process"
to the extension decision was first elaborated in a Canadian "non-paper"
in early 1995.[9] Its ideas found their way into the South African draft
on the enhanced review mechanism, and through the process of the President's
Consultations at the NPTREC were eventually elaborated in the decisions
on the extension package. The outcome was a political compromise between
those who feared that, in indefinitely extending the NPT, the non-nuclear
weapon states (NNWS) would lose their leverage on the nuclear weapon states
(NWS) with respect to the latter's nuclear disarmament obligations, and
those who preferred a simple extension of the Treaty without any collateral
measures to assist in the future implementation of the NPT. This compromise
made all states parties accountable for full compliance with the provisions
of the Treaty, including the NWS with respect to the Article VI requirement
to pursue nuclear disarmament. Ambassador Dhanapala, the President of the
1995 NPTREC, in his closing statement emphasized that the final decision
involved both permanence and accountability regarding the future of the
Treaty. In his present capacity as UN Under-Secretary General for Disarmament
Affairs, Ambassador Dhanapala recently reiterated this view succinctly:
-
- I believe that it is important to recall that with the decision in
May 1995 to strengthen the review process for the NPT, States parties had
underlined their willingness to accept greater accountability of their
actions and to ensure that the undertakings contained in the Treaty and
in the decisions adopted at the Review and Extension Conference will have
greater prospects of being achieved.[10]
-
- Decision 1 on "strengthening the review process" comprised
seven operative paragraphs, of which five dealt with review conferences
(1, 2, 5, 6, and 7), while two (3 and 4) related to the PrepComs for these
conferences. The meaning and scope of some of the paragraphs may be better
understood if read in conjunction with others.
-
- Decision 1 institutionalized the past practice of five-yearly reviews
by regularizing quinquennial review conferences. Furthermore, the PrepCom
would meet in sessions of 10 working days, instead of the previous five.
This doubling of the working days was intended to facilitate a full and
frank exchange of views on Treaty implementation, as well as make possible
the negotiation of recommendations for transmission to review conferences.
-
- Earlier PrepComs had focused primarily on procedural, logistical, and
legal matters. Decision 1 formalized the inclusion of substantive matters
in the work of the PrepCom, by specifying that:
-
- The purpose of the Preparatory Committee meetings would be to consider
principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation
of the Treaty, as well as its universality, and to make recommendations
thereon to the Review Conference. These include those identified in the
Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and
Disarmament adopted on 11 May 1995. These meetings should also make the
procedural preparations for the next Review Conference.[11]
-
- In many ways this is the crux of the strengthened review process, in
that the Preparatory Committee is now specifically mandated to consider:
(1) principles; (2) objectives; and (3) ways, in order to promote the full
implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality. In the 1997
and 1998 sessions of the PrepCom, these issues have become a source of
controversy and conflict as competing interpretations of Decision 1 have
emerged.[12]
-
- While endorsing the existing structure of three Main Committees (MC)
at review conferences, Decision 1 (paragraph 5) also empowered their General
Committees to delegate responsibility for review and subsequent reporting
on each specific issue to only one of the MCs, thus removing any overlaps
between them. It also discussed setting up subsidiary bodies within the
MCs. This procedure was not entirely new as, at previous review conferences,
informal working groups had been created within the MCs, to try to resolve
certain clusters of issues and to draft language for the MCs' reports on
the review of the Treaty. After 1995, however, the task of recommending
the establishment of subsidiary bodies was assigned to the PrepCom. Decision
1, in building upon informal past practice, formalized the role of subsidiary
bodies in providing for a focused consideration of specific issues relevant
to the Treaty. In so doing, it left open several questions about such subsidiary
bodies (e.g., would they continue to function between review conferences;
could the PrepCom set up its own subsidiary bodies; would their mandate
be confined to a single issue; and how many of them would be created?).
-
- The final paragraph of Decision 1 enjoined states parties attending
review conferences to look back at the period under review, as well as
forward to the future, and to make recommendations on the areas where further
progress was required and identify the necessary means for its achievement.
Future Review Conferences were charged with specifically addressing ways
to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty and to achieve its universality.
This suggested that at least two products were expected from future review
conferences: an assessment of the operation of the Treaty in the five-year
period under review (i.e., 1995-2000); and a set of goals to promote the
implementation of the Treaty in the next five-year period (i.e., 2000-2005).
-
- THE 1997 AND 1998 PREPCOMS
-
- At its 1997 session, the PrepCom for the 2000 NPT Review Conference
was formally tasked with both making procedural preparations for that conference
and implementing Decision 1 by addressing substantive matters. The 1997
PrepCom therefore established an important precedent for future Treaty
reviews as well as for the interpretation and implementation of the NPTREC
decisions. At its first meeting, on April 7, 1997, the PrepCom adopted
a nine-item Agenda. This sought to create a qualitatively different review
process by addressing "specifically what might be done to strengthen
the implementation of the Treaty and to achieve its universality."
Accordingly, the PrepCom engaged in a substantive, four-and-a-half-day
discussion on Agenda item 4, "Preparatory work for the review of the
operation of the Treaty in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, taking
into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review
and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons."[13]
-
- Early actions of the 1997 PrepCom included assigning chairs and setting
dates for the 1998 and 1999 sessions and the 2000 Conference. The Group
of Non-Aligned and other States (NAM) was assigned the 1999 and 2000 chairs.
Ambassador Andelfo Garcia Gonzalez of Colombia, who was the nominee of
the NAM to Chair the 1999 PrepCom, was reassigned in late 1998, and Ambassador
Camilio Reyes Rodriguez of Colombia will now replace him. The NAM has yet
to formally nominate its candidate for the Presidency of the 2000 Review
Conference, though unconfirmed reports suggest that Ambassador J.S. Selebi
of South Africa may be a leading candidate for that post.
-
- With one exception, the PrepCom at its first session in 1997 decided
to use the three sets of issues (or "clusters") contained in
annex V of the Final Report of the Preparatory Committee to the 1995 Review
and Extension Conference[14] as the basis for structuring its discussions.
This comprised: Cluster 1 (MC. I issues)- nonproliferation, nuclear disarmament,
and security assurances; Cluster 2 (MC. II issues)-safeguards and export
controls; and Cluster 3 (MC. III issues)-peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
The one exception was nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ), which in 1995 were
discussed as an MC. II issue, but in 1997 as a Cluster 1 matter. Universality
or universal adherence to the Treaty was also to be discussed by the PrepCom,
together with a reaffirmation of the commitment of states parties to the
preamble and articles of the NPT.
-
- The 1997 PrepCom decided to make every effort to adopt its decisions
by consensus. In the event that consensus could not be reached, the PrepCom
would then take decisions in accordance with the rules of procedure of
the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, which would be applied mutatis
mutandis. The PrepCom at its second session considered the 1995 rules of
procedure as the basis for the conduct of the 2000 NPT Conference, but
agreement could not be reached on one aspect-whether in Rule 34 the term
"subsidiary bodies" (used in Decision 1) should be substituted
for "working groups."
-
- The PrepCom also decided to follow past practice and to permit non-NPT
states, as well as NGOs, specialized agencies, and regional intergovernmental
organizations, to attend the open sessions as "observers." Accordingly,
Brazil, Cuba, Israel, and Pakistan attended the 1997 session as observers,
but in 1998 Pakistan was not present. The South Pacific Forum and the Organization
for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
(OPANAL) also attended, as did more than 100 NGOs in 1997 and 76 in 1998.
-
- On the question of the report and recommendations from one session
to the next session of the PrepCom, intense discussion and controversy
remains. In 1997, it was agreed (on the basis of a Canadian suggestion
to produce a "distilled compilation" of proposals, not necessarily
based on consensus, in order to promote accountability and continuity)
that the PrepCom would produce a "rolling" progress report or
text that could be updated at each of its subsequent sessions. Ambassador
Pasi Patokallio of Finland, chair of the 1997 session, proposed a report
comprising three sections: (I) an introduction, giving logistical details;
(II) a factual or technical report prepared by the Secretariat on the work
of the PrepCom and the 2000 Review Conference, comprising substantive and
procedural issues and official documents submitted by participating delegations;
and (III) recommendations to the next session of the PrepCom, with an annex
containing summary records, another annex (Chairman's Working Paper) consisting
of points of general agreement, subject to review and updating (paragraph
3), and an inventory or rolling list of proposed recommendations for consideration
at subsequent sessions of the PrepCom (paragraph 4).
-
- Originally, the Chairman proposed language for part III of the report
that included the PrepCom's recommendation that in its second session the
PrepCom should allocate time for the consideration of: (a) security assurances
for NPT parties (proposed by South Africa); (b) the 1995 NPTREC resolution
on the Middle East (proposed by Egypt); and (c) a fissile material cut-off
treaty (FMCT, proposed by Canada and Germany). This particular categorization
of items for special consideration at the second session of the PrepCom
was perceived by Mexico as having the consequence of downgrading the relative
priority of nuclear disarmament, and also of giving priority to the Chairman's
paper over proposals made by national delegations and regional groups.
The rationale for this was that both security assurances and a fissile
material cut-off treaty were already included under cluster 1 (MC. I) issues,
as was nuclear disarmament, and that allocating specific time for them
could be perceived as diluting the importance that states parties attached
to nuclear disarmament. In addition, Mexico and some other delegations
appeared to be concerned that it was premature for the PrepCom to determine
the items for discussion at its future sessions or at the Review Conference
itself.
-
- As a consequence of the decisions made in 1997, the 1998 PrepCom had
to consider and decide on several items of business, including:
-
- (1) confirming the dates and venues of the third (and last) session
of the PrepCom and of the Review Conference;
-
- (2) nominating and confirming the Chair of the third session of the
PrepCom and confirming the President of the 2000 Review Conference;
-
- (3) finalizing the PrepCom report on substantive and procedural issues
and recommendations to the Review Conference;
-
- (4) preparing the provisional agenda of the Review Conference;
-
- (5) financing of the PrepCom and of the Review Conference;
-
- (6) establishing rules of procedure; and
-
- (7) preparing and considering background documentation.
-
- In addition, the PrepCom at its second session had to allocate time
for the consideration of the three substantive items noted in the Chairman's
statement, the other parts of the Chairman's Working Paper, and the official
documents submitted by delegations at the first session. The documentation
alone involved more than 100 pages, with states submitting at least 27
official documents. This documentation and inventory of proposals remained
"subject to review and updating" with no possibility of reaching
agreement on recommendations to the Review Conference "pending final
agreement on all draft recommendations at the last session."
-
- On procedure, the 1998 session confirmed the dates and venue of the
1999 session and the NAM's chairmanship, as proposed at the 1997 session.
Although the other items listed above were discussed to a greater or lesser
extent, no agreement could be reached on them.
-
- The cluster discussion on substantive matters, including the three
special issues identified in 1997, consisted mostly of a series of national
statements of position, rather than an interactive debate. In contrast
to 1997, the Chairman's consultations in 1998 produced major disagreements
over "enriching" the 1997 "Chairman's Working Paper"
through consideration of and agreement on a streamlining of the text contained
in paragraph 4. Some delegations submitted additional new text and refused
to delete previous text that in many cases was repetitive or redundant.
The NWS for the most part went into a holding strategy, which thwarted
most efforts by various NNWS to develop consensus text on nuclear disarmament
and other issues. Continuity of process in this situation was not helped
by the absence of the 1997 Chairman, Ambassador Patokallio, and the fact
that the 1998 Chairman, Ambassador Eugeniusz Wyzner of Poland, although
a highly experienced senior diplomat, had not been present in 1997.
-
- In addition, a new issue emerged in 1998 following a proposal by Canada
that the PrepCom should pursue a two-track approach. Track 1 was to enrich
the Chairman's Working Paper by building upon the agreed recommendations
from 1997, while track 2 was to draft a short document reflecting the views
of NPT states on issues of current interest or concern, such as security
assurances, the Middle East, a fissile material cut-off treaty, nuclear
disarmament, and safeguards.[15] The rationale was that NPT parties should
be able to express views on promoting the full implementation of the Treaty,
as well as on agreed issues of concern, at the PrepCom, rather than having
to wait for a Review Conference. Furthermore, this track 2 document was
to lead to the production of a text that could provide language on substantive
issues for the Report of the PrepCom under heading "II: Procedural
and Substantive Issues" of the 1997 report, which was split into headings
"II. Procedural Issues" and "III. Substantive Issues"
in 1998. The text that Canada proposed was for insertion under paragraph
21 of the draft report from the PrepCom session, which stated: "The
Committee [PrepCom] held an in-depth consideration of all three issues
[security assurances, the Middle East resolution, and the FMCT] during
which a number of proposals were made. In this connection, the following
documents were issued:...."[16]
-
- The purpose of this Canadian document was not fully understood, and
hence was opposed by some states from the Western Group that argued that
it could undermine the Chairman's Working Paper and would in certain cases
duplicate material in it. Even though it had been drafted as a result of
intense consultations with South Africa, Egypt (and the Arab group), and
others, the United States indicated that it opposed the "track 2"
concept in principle. Thus, as the Report of the PrepCom was being discussed
paragraph by paragraph for adoption, on the final day of the meeting, the
United States objected to the inclusion in it of the Canadian proposal.
Canada then called for a show of support, paragraph by paragraph, for its
proposals, and again the single objection was voiced by the United States,
which rejected first the proposed text on security assurances and then
the text on the resolution on the Middle East. The rejection of the compromise
text on the Middle East resolution triggered the collapse of negotiations
on the Report from the PrepCom session, following a blunt statement by
the Chairman-designate of the 1999 PrepCom, speaking on behalf of the NAM,
that his group would not agree to any part of the Chairman's Working Paper
unless it contained this compromise Middle East language. Yet, while the
Middle East text provided the catalyst for the failure of the 1998 PrepCom,
it was the deep-seated differences over the meaning and content of the
strengthened review process that lay at the heart of the disagreements.
For earlier, led by the United States, the NWS had opposed in the Chairman's
Consultations any attempt to structure the debate at the 1999 PrepCom by
adding the three special issues to the cluster debate, or to consider a
similar setup for the 2000 Conference.
-
- In the end, a stunted report on the work of the session was finally
adopted late on May 8, 1998.[17] This five-page report summarized the particulars
of the meetings held at the second session and addressed several procedural
issues. But the report made no mention of any aspect of the substantive
deliberations at the 1998 PrepCom, neither the "cluster debate"
nor an additional one-and-one-half days spent discussing security assurances,
the resolution on the Middle East, and the FMCT.[18]
-
- Furthermore, the status of the 1998 version of paragraph 3 of the "Chairman's
Working Paper"[19] remains unclear, as it was not formally or even
provisionally adopted and consequently the report of the PrepCom makes
no reference to it, even though it was listed as a conference document
in the 1998 report. As compared to the 13 sub-paragraphs of provisionally
agreed draft recommendations in the 1997 version, the 1998 draft was expanded
to 27 sub-paragraphs and the structure changed somewhat. The 1998 version
of paragraph 4 of the Chairman's Working Paper remains repetitive in places
and is poorly drafted. Yet, although the list of specific proposals put
forward by delegations is larger than in 1997, it could still form part
of the raw material for inclusion in the final version of the Chairman's
Paper containing recommendations for the Review Conference. It also remains
uncertain whether paragraph 3 of Annex II of the Chairman's Paper would
form the basis for a new version of the "principles and objectives"
or a similar decision document to be adopted at the 2000 Review Conference.
-
- PROCEDURAL ISSUES AT THE 1999 NPT PREPCOM
-
- The third session of the PrepCom in 1999 will face a range of challenges
from its outset. Unless states parties go into the third session already
prepared and with a clear sense of intent to reach agreement on both procedural
matters and substantive recommendations, the 1999 session is likely to
be as inconclusive as the 1998 one. Only 10 working days are now available
to the Preparatory Committee, assuming that a fourth session in 2000 will
not be held, and a number of key items need to be finalized before the
start of the Review Conference in 2000. These include:
-
- (1) nominating the President of the 2000 Review Conference;
-
- (2) finalizing the PrepCom report on both procedural and substantive
issues, as well as recommendations to the Review Conference;
-
- (3) preparing the provisional agenda of the Review Conference;
-
- (4) establishing rules of procedure; and
-
- (5) preparing and considering background documentation.
-
- In addition, the PrepCom will have to consider whether to allocate
time for the consideration of certain substantive items separately from
any cluster debates. It will also have to decide whether to further develop
the 1997 (and 1998) Chairman's working paper(s) and the official documents
submitted by delegations at the previous two sessions, or to start anew
in drafting a report and recommendations. An efficient way of dealing with
these documents and proposals might be to divide them by subject matter
under the appropriate articles of the Treaty, or failing that within the
appropriate clusters, and to discard duplicate proposals. Working groups
could be established to deal with material falling within clusters of Treaty
articles or the existing PrepCom clusters, in order to speed up the consideration
of the various issues and to facilitate progress in drafting the recommendations
of the PrepCom to the Review Conference. To promote efficiency in its work,
the PrepCom could decide to focus its deliberations on producing a forward-looking
"distilled compilation" of recommendations for the 2000 Review
Conference. In this regard, it would be encouraging if the general debate
could be dispensed with altogether in the third session, and for the PrepCom
to start with a short series of cluster debates to reflect developments
since 1998, and then move rapidly into a drafting mode to finalize its
report and recommendations to the 2000 conference.
-
- It may also be essential to devote some effort toward developing common
ground on the meaning, interpretation, and implementation of the concept
of the "strengthened review process." In this regard, much will
depend upon the skill, preparation, and leadership demonstrated by the
Chairman.
-
- The PrepCom should adopt the rules of procedure for the 2000 conference,
and thus find a way of finessing disagreement on the wording of Rule 34.
For example, the PrepCom could state in its report that "working groups"
subsume "subsidiary bodies." Regarding background documentation,
given the short time available prior to the Review Conference, it might
be advisable to follow precedent to charge the Conference Secretariat,
the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Argentine-Brazil Agency for
Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, and the Agency for the Prohibition
of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean to prepare appropriate
brief but factual documentation covering the period 1995-2000, and for
this documentation then to be considered in a special one-day session of
the PrepCom to be convened in the margins of the 1999 UN General Assembly,
rather than at a fourth full session of the PrepCom.
-
- ROLE OF THE TREATY AND THE NPTREC DECISIONS AT THE 2000 NPT REVIEW
CONFERENCE
-
- The traditional view of states regarding the scope of previous NPT
review conferences was that it was the implementation of the Treaty that
was being reviewed. The Treaty was the source of legally binding commitments
on the part of signatory states and, therefore, the Treaty should be the
heart of the review process-in terms of "assuring that the purposes
of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized"-as
noted in Article VIII.3. At the 1997 PrepCom, the United States stressed
that "It was essential to bear in mind that the obligations of the
States parties stemmed from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which should,
therefore, be considered the primary source of guidance."[20] An alternate
view, held, for example, by China, Canada, and New Zealand, was that the
Treaty had been enhanced by the decisions of 1995 and therefore future
reviews must take into account not only the Treaty but the decisions and
resolution agreed at the 1995 NPTREC.[21] Canada emphasized that "...while
the review process should focus on the Treaty itself, work should be guided
by the conclusions of the 1995 Conference of the Parties, specifically
the recommendations contained in the principles and objectives and in the
decision on strengthening the review process...."[22] New Zealand
noted that "The decisions adopted...[in 1995]... had placed the Treaty
and its subsequent reviews within the framework of an enhanced multilateral
nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament process."[23]
-
- The preceding statements reveal that states parties still have not
come to a common understanding on the scope of the strengthened review
process and of the role of the Treaty and the NPTREC outcomes in that process.
Jayantha Dhanapala thus recently cautioned: "The success of the [2000
Review] Conference will ultimately depend on the evolution of fresh consensual
approaches transcending political divisions and the abandonment of rigid
postures or complacent attitudes over the `done deal' of the Treaty's indefinite
extension."[24]
-
- Decision 1 of the 1995 NPTREC on "strengthening the review process
for the Treaty" provided only limited clarity on the scope of future
review conferences. It included the provision that
-
- ...Review Conferences should look forward as well as back. They should
evaluate the results of the period they are reviewing, including the implementation
of undertakings of the States parties under the Treaty, and identify the
areas in which, and the means through which, further progress should be
sought in the future. Review Conferences should also address specifically
what might be done to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty and to
achieve its universality.[25]
-
- Given the context of the negotiation in 1995 and the decisions adopted
by that Conference, it can be asserted that future reviews will need to
focus not only on the implementation of the Treaty but also on that of
the NPTREC outcomes. As an expression of general principles as well as
key goals to be achieved, the 1995 principles and objectives provide an
important context and touchstone for assessing the implementation of the
Treaty in the period under review.
-
- The two sessions of the PrepCom to date have reinforced the concepts
of "permanence with accountability" (outlined in 1995) and of
a qualitatively different review process. In this context, it can be asserted
that the 1995 decisions on "principles and objectives" and on
a "strengthened review process" are politically binding, whereas
the extension decision is legally binding. Under customary international
law, politically binding decisions could become equally as binding as those
taken under specific treaty law. Failure to honor the 1995 NPTREC decisions
could thus dissolve commitments to the Treaty's permanence. As such, it
may be argued that the scope of future review conferences is: (1) to review
the implementation of the Treaty per se as well as of the decisions and
resolution adopted at the 1995 NPTREC; and (2) to make specific recommendations
on strengthening the implementation of the Treaty (including achieving
its universality) through a new principles and objectives document.
-
- The first task would involve a product, i.e., a final report, comprising
several elements. First would be an assessment of the implementation of
the Treaty, plus the 1995 NPTREC decisions and resolution, from 1995 to
2000. In addition, the report would identify the areas in which further
progress should be sought in the full implementation of the Treaty over
the next review period-e.g., nuclear disarmament, strengthened safeguards,
nuclear-weapon-free zones-as well as the means through which these goals
might be reached-e.g., ratification and implementation of START II; negotiation,
ratification, and implementation of further nuclear arms reductions involving
the participation of all five NWS; negotiation, ratification, and implementation
of an FMCT involving the five NWS, India, Israel, and Pakistan; negotiation
and implementation of additional safeguards protocols by all NPT NNWS;
negotiation of an NWFZ in Central Asia; and entry into force of the CTBT
and the Bangkok and Pelindaba NWFZ treaties. This final report of the 2000
Conference could be structured either along traditional lines, based on
the reports of the three Main Committees, comprising both an evaluation
of past implementation and recommendations for future progress; or it could
be based on an article-by-article review of the Treaty factoring in the
1995 NPTREC decisions and resolution.
-
- The second task would involve the drafting and adoption of a Year 2000
"Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament"
(Y2KP&O), comprising specific recommendations and milestones directed
at strengthening the full implementation of the Treaty and the 1995 NPTREC
decisions and resolution. This Y2KP&O could either emulate the structure
of the 1995 P&O, or alternatively it could reflect the articles and
preambular paragraphs of the Treaty with the addition of sections on universality
and security assurances. Such a document should strive to reflect the structure
of the Treaty and in this context to lay out the preferred goals and strategies
for the next five-year period.
-
- Adopting both products either by consensus or without a vote would
be a worthy goal to strive for in 2000. However, given the present penchant
of the NWS to minimize the scope of the 1995 NPTREC decisions and resolutions
and that of some members of the NAM to push grandiose disarmament schemes,
it is unlikely that harmony will prevail at the 2000 Review Conference.
In the event that neither consensus nor agreement without a vote is achievable,
it might be worthwhile for the Chair, in consultation with an extended
bureau and the "Friends of the Chair," to find an appropriate
mechanism for capturing the views of an overwhelming majority of states
present, rather than risk yet another failed NPT meeting.
-
- SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES FOR THE 1999 PREPCOM
-
- The substantive issues which have in the past played a central role
in determining the outcome of NPT conferences and meetings fall into two
categories: matters that are linked to the inherent nature of the Treaty
and the commitments contained within it, and issues that arise out of contemporary
events, often taking place in parallel with these conferences and meetings.
The impact of the former upon an approaching NPT meeting can be predicted
with some certainty; the consequences of the latter are much more problematic.
Examples of the first are the debates over the progress towards nuclear
disarmament made by the NWS, which have occurred in virtually every NPT
review meeting that has been convened. Examples of the second include the
May 4 deadline for completion of the Oslo Peace Process in the Middle East,
just after the 1999 PrepCom session is scheduled to conclude; the 50th
anniversary summit of the North Atlantic Alliance in Washington, DC, which
might witness some controversy on the issues of non-strategic nuclear weapons
and no-first-use of nuclear weapons in the context of the review of NATO's
Strategic Concept; and the dynamics at the 1999 session of the Conference
on Disarmament as it resumes its deliberations on the negotiation of an
FMCT and consideration of sensitive subjects such as nuclear disarmament
and security assurances.
-
- The task of identifying the key substantive issues inherent in the
Treaty and likely to confront the 1999 NPT PrepCom session has been made
slightly easier by the existence of the 1995 decision document on "Principles
and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" and
the outcomes of the PrepCom sessions in 1997 and 1998. As a consequence,
these substantive issues are most conveniently discussed using the "principles
and objectives" headings of Universality, Nonproliferation, Nuclear
Disarmament, Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, Security Assurances, Safeguards,
and Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. However, since there was no agreement
at the 1998 session on the agenda for the 1999 session, in particular on
whether the concept of structuring debate around clusters of issues should
be retained, it remains unclear how the way the meeting is structured might
shape the salience of these substantive issues in determining the outcome
of the session.
-
- Universality
-
- In both the 1997 and 1998 sessions, there was agreement on the desirability
of achieving universal membership in the Treaty, and that the then-five
states not party to it (Brazil, Cuba, India, Israel, and Pakistan) should
accede to it.[26] However, in 1998 the PrepCom became deadlocked by disagreement
between Arab states and the United States on whether more specific recommendations
for action should be made in the context of the Middle East, and in particular
whether Israel should be named in them as the only remaining state in the
region outside the NPT. This was the overt cause of the failure of that
session to agree any recommendations to the 1999 session or the 2000 Review
Conference, as discussed in an earlier section. In recent weeks, Egypt
has again raised the issue of Israel's nuclear weapon capability and the
level of its own commitment to the NPT in the absence of Israel's membership
in the Treaty as a NNWS.
-
- The issue of Israel and the implementation of the Resolution on the
Middle East will therefore almost certainly loom large in discussions at
the 1999 PrepCom session. The new elements in this situation in 1999 are
the proximity of the session to the May 4 deadline for completing the Oslo
Peace Process-the threat from the Palestinians to declare themselves an
independent state at that date if the process has not been completed on
time-and the elections for a new Israeli prime minister and government
due to start in mid-May. Whether the Arab states and the United States,
the two chief protagonists in this context, are prepared to compromise
on this issue is likely to depend upon starting discussions on the matter
very early in the session, and upon the evolution of political attitudes
and actions within Israel and Palestine in the period before and during
the PrepCom session.
-
- Until 1997, the issue of universality in general lacked a clear focus,
as several significant states still remained outside the Treaty. By early
1998, only five states remained in this category, and in practice the issue
revolved around the three states, India, Israel, and Pakistan, that were
known to have unsafeguarded facilities capable of producing fissile material
that could be used to make nuclear devices. Arguments had occurred at previous
NPT meetings about the desirability of naming all states that were in this
position, but non-aligned solidarity had tended to militate against any
naming of India and Pakistan.
-
- The nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998, and India's overt
declaration of being an NWS, significantly changed this context. They suggested
that these two states were unlikely to accede to the NPT through the route
taken by South Africa, namely by dismantling their covert nuclear explosive
capabilities and then joining the Treaty, while the wording of the Treaty
itself precluded them joining it as nuclear weapon states.[27] This situation
was compounded by the strong reactions to the tests from many significant
NNWS, whose original decision to seek membership was heavily conditioned
by an assumption that no more nuclear weapon states would be created beyond
the initial five.
-
- While there is likely to be little, if any, support for the tests from
NPT parties, it is unclear how they will choose to react to these events
at the 1999 session. It is likely that time will be devoted to denouncing
the two rounds of nuclear detonations conducted by India in mid-May, and
the retaliatory tests by Pakistan. Some parties will undoubtedly wish to
condemn the actions, but whether agreement can be reached on specific moves
that all parties should take is less certain, particularly if any agreements
brokered by the United States[28] to limit the consequences of the tests
appear to be rewarding, or at least not penalizing, the two states for
their actions. However, the international community has already spoken
authoritatively on the South Asian tests and has elaborated benchmarks
as stipulated in Security Council Resolution 1172 and the Group of Eight
Industrialized States (G-8) statement, and in the sentiment expressed in
the statement of the NAM Summit in Durban. Thus, the parties could settle
for registering condemnation of the tests and restating these existing
benchmarks.
-
- More profoundly, the actions of the two states have challenged the
assumption that a norm of nonproliferation had been created and was being
sustained in appearance, if not in fact. In this context, it would be useful
to recognize that India's and Pakistan's nuclear tests cannot change the
nuclear nonproliferation architecture. Neither India nor Pakistan, nor
Israel for that matter, can be recognized as NWS under the NPT. Their status
continues as threshold states, and thus pariahs as regards the NPT regime.
At the same time, these recent developments attest to the need for uniform
and harmonized anti-proliferation strategies to be devised and implemented
in South Asia and the Middle East. In addition, although the states were
not parties to the NPT or constrained by any legal commitments from conducting
their nuclear tests, their actions have generated a perception that the
NPT should have been able to prevent their activities and, by its inability
to do so, has in some ill-defined manner failed. This perception may need
to be refuted by the PrepCom, and emphasis placed on more positive developments,
such as Brazil's accession to the NPT in September 1998.
-
- Nuclear Nonproliferation
-
- The core issue in this context is compliance with the Treaty, particularly
Articles I and II. If past NPT meetings are a guide, this could result
in three sets of issues being aired in 1999. The most prominent of these
would be alleged breaches of Article II of the Treaty[29] by NNWS, through
actions designed to facilitate the production of nuclear devices, in particular
by North Korea and Iraq, and possibly by Iran. Much will depend on how
events on the Korean peninsula and the fate of UNSCOM and the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring activities in Iraq have evolved.
A second, more controversial issue is the legitimacy of storing or stationing
nuclear weapons belonging to one of the five NWS on the territory of an
NNWS. Finally, there is the question of whether the NWS have breached their
nuclear disarmament commitments under Article VI of the Treaty.
-
- Events in Iraq at the end of 1998 make it probable that the general
issue of how to respond to cases of alleged noncompliance with the NPT
will play an increasingly significant role in debates surrounding the NPT.
On the one hand, an overt inability of the nuclear nonproliferation regime
to respond to cases of noncompliance in an effective way seems likely to
bring the regime into disrepute and weaken support for the NPT. It may
also undermine belief in the goal of nuclear disarmament, if the international
community is seen as incapable of controlling Iraq's weapon of mass destruction
programs despite the sweeping inspection powers nominally possessed by
the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM).[30] On the other hand, the
NPT lacks internal mechanisms for dealing with such allegations: unlike
the Chemical Weapons Convention, it does not even have a permanent secretariat.
This has led to suggestions in the past for creating ad hoc mechanisms,
such as a compliance committee. Thus both specific cases and the general
issue of how to deal with noncompliance seem likely to be central to any
debates on the matter in 1999.
-
- Nuclear Disarmament
-
- Disagreements over whether progress has occurred toward the goal of
nuclear disarmament have been a perennial feature of past NPT review meetings.
Their significance derives from several factors. One is that the NPT, through
Article VI, is the only legal document in which NWS have committed themselves
to "pursuing negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating
to...nuclear disarmament." Its significance in this context was highlighted
by the use made of it by the Judges in the International Court of Justice
in 1996 in delivering their advisory opinion on nuclear weapons, when they
argued that this committed the NWS to not just negotiate on nuclear disarmament,
but also to conclude agreements on it.[31] Thus the NPT is seen as a valuable
context within which NNWS can pressure NWS for more action on nuclear disarmament.
A second factor is that implicit in the NPT text is the proposition that
the possession of nuclear weapons by the NWS is not a permanent situation,
and that the NPT is thus both a nuclear disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation
treaty, with the latter being a contributing condition for achievement
of the former, and vice versa. Thus, politically and from a security perspective,
nuclear disarmament is regarded as an important method of strengthening
both the NPT and the nonproliferation regime.
-
- The "principles and objectives" of 1995 emerged in the context
of a debate between two perspectives upon the nuclear disarmament process:
that it had to be driven by a "time-bound framework" for achieving
disarmament, or that it should be seen as an interactive process where
actions would change perceptions, and permit further actions to occur,[32]
and thus only the initial actions could be specified in detail and have
time-targets attached to them.
-
- The decision document was based on this second set of ideas. It specified
a "programme of action" containing three specific measures: an
immediate objective, the completion of negotiations on a Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by the end of 1996; a follow-on objective, the "early
conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable
convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons
or other nuclear devices" (otherwise known as a Fissile Material Cut-Off
Treaty or FMCT); and the "determined pursuit by the nuclear weapon
States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons
globally."[33]
-
- By January 1999, three developments had taken place in this context.
One was that a CTBT had opened for signature in September 1996, but with
a provision[34] that made entry into force dependent upon ratification
by all 44 states operating research reactors. In the event that these ratifications
had not been forthcoming three years after its opening for signature, a
conference of those states that had ratified it would be held to consider
how to expedite entry into force, and repeated annually thereafter. This
conference is being planned for late September 1999. In addition, only
two NWS, France and the United Kingdom, have currently ratified the Treaty.
Three of the 44 still have not signed: North Korea, India, and Pakistan.
It is unclear whether this issue of entry into force of the CTBT will be
left to the September 1999 conference, or will figure in discussions in
the April 1999 NPT PrepCom session.
-
- A second development was that after two years of deadlock in the Conference
on Disarmament (CD) over whether negotiations on an FMCT and discussions
on a future program for disarmament should proceed in parallel, the South
Asian tests inspired the creation of an ad hoc committee on an FMCT based
on the mandate contained in the March 1995 report of the Special Coordinator.[35]
The substantive issue that had been preventing progress on this matter
had been whether the treaty should cover existing stocks of nuclear materials,
or only prohibit new production. The decision to proceed suggested that
this conflict will in future be conducted within the negotiations, rather
than before they start. The significance of the FMCT for the 1999 PrepCom
session may thus depend on how negotiations within the CD on this matter
evolve in early 1999.
-
- A third development has been the increasing frustration felt by representatives
of many NNWS at the lack of any agreed new international vision for nuclear
disarmament. The so-called "decalogue," or agenda for the work
of the CD, had its origins in the 1950s. Given the vastly different international
environment of the 1990s, there has been an increasing perception that
this needs to be revisited and a new agenda created to reflect current
realities. This was seen on June 9, 1998 in the announcement of an eight-nation
initiative "Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: The Need for a New
Agenda."[36] The eight states came from all the existing main UN caucus
groups,[37] and they later sponsored Resolution L.48 at the First Committee
and Resolution 53/77Y in the UN General Assembly. What was notable was
that 12 NATO states abstained rather than voting no, as urged by the three
Western NWS, thus hinting at a major change in their nuclear policy. This
group will undoubtedly wish to develop this issue further in the 1999 NPT
PrepCom session, while the five NWS may wish to produce a further joint
statement on this issue, as they did in 1997 and 1998.[38]
-
- In reality, however, not much has changed on the nuclear disarmament
front since 1995: START II still remains to be ratified by Russia and has
not entered into force for either party to that agreement; the protocols
to the Bangkok NWFZ treaty still need to be ratified by all five NWS and
the Pelindaba NWFZ protocols by three of the NWS; and the CTBT has not
been ratified by three NWS. Both Russia and China are modernizing strategic
nuclear forces, and the United States is repackaging certain existing warheads
and formulating new missions for its nuclear forces. More negatively, on
January 20, 1999, US Defense Secretary William Cohen announced that the
United States was restructuring its missile defense program for a decision
point in June 2000 that would allow for the deployment of a limited national
missile defense.[39] This would require amending the 1972 Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty, or if the Russians were not amenable to this, could
lead to the United States renouncing the ABM Treaty. Not surprisingly,
the responses from China and Russia to this announcement were not encouraging,[40]
thus potentially setting the stage for fractious discussion at the PrepCom
and further delaying if not scuttling any hopes for Duma ratification of
START II. It must be recognized that with imperilled top leadership both
in Moscow and in Washington, together with a right-wing- dominated US Congress
which is fundamentally opposed to nuclear arms reductions and a nationalist
Duma struggling to maintain some semblance of respect for Russia as a great
power, the die is cast. Significant new movement in nuclear disarmament
may now be impossible before 2001.
-
- The issue of a new disarmament agenda is closely linked to a further
internal NPT question, namely whether in 2000 the Review Conference should
attempt to formulate a listing of measures constituting a "programme
of action" similar to that generated in 1995. While an FMCT might
take the place of a CTBT as an immediate objective, there is no obvious
agreed follow-on objective even though a number of intermediate steps can
be identified. The 1999 PrepCom session may therefore see debate on the
range of alternatives that exist in this category, and some attempt to
identify those around which a consensus might be created.
-
- Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones
-
- In 1995, the NPT Review Conference set itself a target of creating
an additional nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) by 2000. In fact, two additional
zonal agreements were reached: the Southeast Asian NWFZ opened for signature
in December 1995 and entered into force in 1997; the African one opened
for signature in April 1996 but has yet to enter into force. Substantive
issues are currently arising in relation to these zones. In the case of
the zone in Southeast Asia, the problems arise from difficulties that some
of the NWS perceive with specific aspects of the Treaty, including the
method of delineating the zone and whether their commitments are towards
the zone as a whole, or the individual states that have ratified the Treaty.
As a result, the NWS have yet to ratify the Protocol attached to the zone
providing the states within it with negative security assurances. In the
case of the African Zone, the slowness of those states within the zone
to ratify the Treaty, and thus produce the 28 ratifications necessary to
bring it into force, has resulted in the mechanisms for implementing the
Treaty not yet being created. So although two additional zones are in existence,
neither is yet fully in force. Some discussion on how this might be achieved
can thus be expected to occur in the 1999 PrepCom.
-
- Four other NWFZ proposals are also at various stages of development.
One concerns Mongolia, which is seeking to declare a single state NWFZ,
and sponsored a resolution to that effect at the 1998 UN General Assembly.[41]
A second is for an NWFZ in Central Asia, where the text of a treaty is
in the process of being drafted.[42] The third concerns an NWFZ in the
Middle East,[43] whose aims were mentioned in the context of a zone free
of weapons of mass destruction in the Resolution on the Middle East adopted
at the NPTREC in 1995. In addition, several states put forward a resolution
on a Southern Hemisphere NWFZ at the UN General Assembly in 1998.[44] In
all these cases, some attempt to encourage development of these zones can
be expected to emerge from the discussions in 1999.
-
- Security Assurances
-
- Security assurances are regarded by many NPT NNWS parties as interim
measures for their security pending the complete nuclear disarmament of
the NWS. Their provision is seen by many NNWS states as part of the "bargain"
inherent in the NPT. Two types of security assurances have been discussed
in this context, negative and positive. The former involves the NWS providing
assurances that they will not use nuclear weapons against an NNWS in any
circumstances; the latter that they will come to the aid of any state that
is threatened with nuclear weapons, or upon which nuclear weapons are used.
Two further issues have impinged on this debate: whether the assurances
should be given to NPT parties only, and whether they should be in the
form of a "legally binding instrument," as against a unilateral
declaration.
-
- In 1998, an ad hoc committee was formed in the CD to discuss the issue
of nuclear security assurances, but there have been perceptions that some
NPT parties would also like to see a "legally binding instrument"
providing security assurances negotiated within an NPT forum and applying
to those parties alone. At the same time, the United States, which provides
conditional negative security assurances to NPT NNWS parties (the conditions
being that they should not attack the United States, its territories, its
troops, its allies, or a state towards which it has a security commitment
in association or in alliance with an NWS) has indicated an unwillingness
to go beyond such a unilateral commitment except in the case of states
that are party to an NWFZ treaty. The potential number of NPT parties in
this position now numbers more than 100.
-
- One issue which has been seen to be closely associated with security
assurances is that of no-first-use agreements. This idea has been strongly
advocated by China, on the basis that such an agreement would provide negative
security assurances to NNWS, as well as generating greater stability in
relationships among the NWS.
-
- The issue of security assurances has been on the agenda of NPT meetings
since 1975, and it is unclear under current circumstances how significant
it remains for NNWS. However, it seems likely that both negative and positive
nuclear security assurances will remain on the agenda of the 1999 PrepCom,
arguments will continue to be advanced for the negotiation of no-first-use
agreements, and actions will be taken to encourage movement towards a negotiation
which transforms the existing unilateral declarations into a multilateral
legally binding instrument.
-
- Safeguards
-
- The negotiation of an INFCIRC/153 agreement with the IAEA for the implementation
of safeguards on all the fissile material within a state is mandatory for
all NPT NNWS. However, many states have no nuclear materials under their
jurisdiction, and have not negotiated such an agreement. Thus one standard
item of business at NPT meetings is to encourage them to do so for the
sake of universal compliance with the Treaty.
-
- Until 1990, few raised questions about the adequacy of the existing
safeguards regime, but in that year the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, an
NPT party, led to the revelation of the existence of the latter's clandestine
nuclear weapon program. As a consequence, a process of strengthening the
IAEA safeguards system was implemented, culminating in what was known as
the 93+2 programme. This involved items that could be implemented using
existing authority contained in the INFCIRC/153 agreement, as well as others
that could not. To cover the latter, an "Additional Protocol"
was negotiated to add to existing INFCIRC/153 agreements. States have now
started to ratify this new agreement-INFCIRC/540 (corrected)-and the IAEA
has started to implement it, but one consequence is that two IAEA safeguards
systems are emerging, one applicable to those states that have signed the
Additional Protocol and the second to those that have not. Thus it can
be expected that at the 1999 PrepCom session efforts will be made to encourage
all parties to ratify the Additional Protocol, so as to create a unified
system once more.
-
- Three other issues are usually addressed under this heading: conditions
of supplying nuclear items to non-parties, the disposition of fissile material
from weapons, and physical protection of nuclear material. One issue in
relation to the first of these that is likely to be raised in the 1999
PrepCom session is whether any supply of nuclear material, or equipment
to produce it, from an NPT party to a non-NPT state should be conditional
upon the latter accepting IAEA safeguards over all fissile materials within
its jurisdiction, as against solely the items in question. This is essentially
an argument about the export policies of China and Russia, with the latter
taking the position that sales to India are "grandfathered" by
earlier agreements. A new issue that is arising is whether such safeguards
should also include acceptance of the Additional Protocol.
-
- Negotiations have been taking place for some time between several advanced
industrial states on transparency of plutonium stocks, and between Russia,
the IAEA, and the US on methods of placing fissile material surplus to
weapon requirements under some type of international safeguards or supervision.
Agreement has been reached between nine states on plutonium management
guidelines, and in November 1998 the IAEA published data on holdings of
certain types of civilian plutonium in these states.[45] In addition, all
the NWS have agreed to implement appropriate elements of the Additional
Protocol. Encouragement of these developments can be anticipated in 1999.
-
- Furthermore both in the context of the IAEA and the NPT review, an
effort is underway to promote the implementation in all states possessing
fissile material of criteria on the physical protection of nuclear material
(as set forth in INFCIRC/225/Rev.3) as well as of strengthening these controls.
There is also a need to sustain standards of physical security and safety
within nuclear plants, to prevent nuclear smuggling and deter attacks on
nuclear facilities. In addition, an effort is being made to prevent nuclear
terrorism. These issues are also likely to surface at the 1999 PrepCom.
-
- Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy
-
- Other issues that may emerge in 1999 relate to the tension between
the exercise of the "inalienable right" of all the parties to
the Treaty to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, enshrined in Article
IV of the Treaty, and the duty of exporting states not to assist nuclear
proliferators, and thus to exercise close control over their exports. This
arises in particular over the case of Iran, an NPT party in good standing,
where the United States has been attempting to constrain other states from
exporting nuclear equipment to it. It also centers upon the alleged lack
of information available to states outside the Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG) on the guidelines used by its members in implementing their national
export controls, and the need for greater transparency over these guidelines.
In this context, the NSG is planning to hold its second international seminar
on the role of nuclear export controls in nuclear nonproliferation just
prior to the April 1999 PrepCom.
-
- CONCLUSIONS
-
- The failure to agree on anything other than a formal report from the
1998 PrepCom session means that no recommendations are available for participants
in the 1999 session concerning its agenda or schedule of activities. This
makes prior consultations on these matters among the parties, and vigorous
leadership from the chairman of the session, essential elements in ensuring
that time is not lost at the start of the meeting debating and attempting
to reach an understanding on them. If this has not been achieved by the
time the session commences, it will offer a discouraging precedent for
achieving agreement on the procedural and substantive issues that will
need to be addressed during the session.
-
- The issues that will need to be decided in these preliminary discussions
are whether there should be a plenary session; whether there should be
cluster debates; whether time should be allocated for discussion of specific
issues; and how the production of recommendations to the Review Conference
should be scheduled. Although the shortage of time suggests that the session
should focus on the last of these tasks, it is probably inevitable that
more open-ended discussions will take place, if only to offer the nuclear-weapon
states an opportunity to account for their actions over the last year in
the area of nuclear disarmament. Provision for some type of plenary session
therefore appears necessary, whether in the form of an open-ended discussion
or a more structured one involving clusters and specific topics. It will
also be necessary to create the maximum opportunity for negotiating the
text of recommendations to the Review Conference, either in a chairman's
consultative group or in a number of working groups tasked with handling
specific sets of issues. The precise format in which these two sets of
activities are to be undertaken may be less significant than making sure
that they take place, and in particular making sure that adequate time
is allocated to negotiating texts on the recommendations from the PrepCom
to the Review Conference. If the session fails to produce such recommendations,
and thus any agreed product, it will be interpreted by many parties as
proof that the strengthened review process has failed to materialize, and
thus that part of the decisions agreed in 1995 in association with the
indefinite extension of the Treaty has not been implemented.
-
- Two types of recommendations should emerge from the PrepCom session
to the Review Conference: procedural and substantive. The four main procedural
decisions that need to be taken are the nomination of a President for the
2000 Review Conference; the drafting of a provisional agenda for the conference;
agreement on its rules of procedure; and the commissioning of background
documentation for parties attending it. Rapid and early progress on these
matters at the PrepCom session would enhance the prospects for an agreed
product from the substantive discussions.
-
- The central issue in relation to the substantive recommendations that
may emerge from the PrepCom session is how they will relate to the activities
of the Review Conference itself. A short document developed at the 1997
PrepCom containing possible agreed recommendations (Annex II, Para. 3),
and a longer one containing a collation of individual state proposals (Annex
II, Para. 4), formed the focus of the drafting work of the two previous
PrepCom sessions. While the purpose of these documents was never formally
clarified, there was some expectation that the possible agreed recommendations
should form the basis for a 2000 version of a forwardlooking, 1995-type
Principles and Objectives document, and that the collation of proposals
could contribute to any evaluative Final Declaration produced in 2000.
These expectations implied that in 2000 the Review Conference would attempt
to produce agreed versions of both types of document. In practice, it remains
unclear whether all the parties remain committed to these objectives, but
on the assumption they will seek to produce both documents, rather than
concentrate as in 1995 on agreeing on the forward-looking one, the PrepCom
session will need to organize itself to undertake two tasks: to produce
recommendations for specific objectives the parties might seek to achieve
by 2005, and to remove overlaps from and streamline the collation of proposals
accumulated from the two previous sessions. These tasks might be allocated
to two different negotiating groups.
-
- While the task of streamlining the proposals from previous sessions
is likely to be time consuming, but in the main largely a mechanical editing
operation, discussions on the content of the forward-looking document are
likely to be more controversial. They will almost certainly focus on several
specific issues. One will be universality of the Treaty, with its associated
questions of implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East,
and the consequences of the South Asian nuclear tests and possible responses
to them over the next five years. A second is specific allegations of noncompliance
with the Treaty, and whether revised mechanisms can be agreed to handle
such allegations. A third is progress toward nuclear disarmament, and in
particular the impact of the South Asian tests upon this and the need for
a new agenda for disarmament. More specific issues include whether a time
target should be set for completion of an FMCT and what options should
be considered for the next incremental step to take once this treaty has
been agreed. A fourth issue is whether a target should be set for additional
NWFZs, and a fifth whether a negotiating timetable might be proposed for
a Treaty on Security Assurances. Finally, there is the issue of how to
handle the tension between the desire to implement effective national export
controls in order to prevent states inadvertently assisting nuclear proliferators,
and the concerns of many NNWS that this will deny them access to a valuable
and necessary energy source. Moreover, what may be crucial is not only
how debates evolve over individual issues, but also how those individual
debates interact with each other.
-
- All the indicators are that the 1999 NPT PrepCom session will be very
problematic in its outcome. Many issues will have to be resolved in an
orderly manner if it is to move forward and produce useful substantive
recommendations for the 2000 Review Conference. Prior consultations and
discussions may be essential to facilitate such an outcome, as will a willingness
to limit negotiation and recommendations to those objectives that will
be directly relevant to discussions at that Review Conference. Yet despite
the difficulties inherent in achieving such a result, the alternative of
not having any agreed product emerge from the session will lead the NPT
regime into unknown waters, as many may conclude that the strengthening
of the review process has failed, and that at least one of the decisions
adopted in 1995 has not been implemented. April 1999 will therefore truly
be a testing time for the NPT.
-
-
-
- Notes:
-
- [1] While these dates were provisionally agreed at the 1997 PrepCom
and subsequently confirmed at the 1998 PrepCom, a proposal is under consideration
to shift the PrepCom to May 3-14 (or April 26-May 7 in the event the UN
Disarmament Commission is cut back to two weeks). While the dates were
still subject to finalization at the time of writing in late January, this
issue does not have any material bearing on the issues and questions discussed
here.
-
- [2] See, "Worthwhile NPT Review outcomes in the lead-up to the
2000 NPT Review Conference," Peace and Disarmament News (August 1998),
p. 90.
-
- [3] Ben Sanders is probably the first analyst to make this observation.
See Ben Sanders, "NPT Review Conferences and the 1995 Extension Conference:
Working Towards Consensus," in Tariq Rauf, ed., Extending the NPT:
Perpetuating the Global Norm, Aurora Papers 27 (Canadian Centre for Global
Security, 1995), pp.43-44.
-
- [4] "The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,"
Treaty Series, Vol. 729 (United Nations, New York).
-
- [5] 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document: Part I - Organization
and Work of the Conference, Decision 1, "Strengthening the Review
Process for the Treaty," (United Nations, New York: 1995), Annex,
p. 8.
-
- [6] Ibid., Decision 2, "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament," Annex, pp. 9-12.
-
- [7] Ibid., Decision 3, "Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons," Annex, pp. 12-13.
-
- [8] Ibid., "Resolution on the Middle East," Annex, pp. 13-14.
-
- [9] Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Department
of Foreign Affairs (Canada), A Non-Paper on Strengthening Review Conferences
(Ottawa, March 1995).
-
- [10] See, Jayantha Dhanapala (Under-Secretary General for Disarmament
Affairs, United Nations), "The NPT Regime: External and Internal Challenges,"
statement at The Seventh Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference,
Washington, DC, January 11, 1999, <http://www.ceip.org/programs/npp/dhanapala.htm>.
-
- [11] NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I), Decision 1, paragraph 4.
-
- [12] See, for example, NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/SR.2, the statements by the
Netherlands (on behalf of the European Union), China, Canada, South Africa,
and Japan at the 1997 session, pp. 2-16; and NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/SR.1 (April
30, 1998), the statement by South Africa, and NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/SR.3
(May 4, 1998), statement by Mexico, Sri Lanka, and Egypt.
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