Nuclear Weapons
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- Anarchy In Action: Western Policy On Weapons
Of Mass Destruction
By Daniel Plesch, BASIC, April 2000
The year 2000 will see much debate on nuclear weapons. New objectives
for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament will be debated
in New York in April and May 2000 at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) Review Conference. The US and Russia will discuss
arms reductions and ‘anti-missile-missiles.’ Conservatives
in the US regard possible arms control progress in these areas
as undermining US security.
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- However, nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament policy
is of vital importance to international security. Western policy
makers highly value their own nuclear weapons but seek to prevent
other countries from procuring them. The question of linking
non-proliferation with disarmament is one which governments should
review. Is the “Do as we say, not as we do” strategy
sustainable?
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- The structure of global non-proliferation and arms control
is impressive, but the political foundations that underpin the
structures are being destroyed. Nuclear proliferation has accelerated
since the end of the Cold War, with the actions of India, Iraq,
Iran, North Korea and Pakistan. With increased focus on creating
a national missile defense (NMD) system, the United States is
no longer a reliable leader in the area of international legal
controls on nuclear and other armaments. Its actions reinforce
a steadily strengthening view against relying on mutual nuclear
deterrence in national strategy.
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- In recent months there has been much ‘sabre-rattling’
with nuclear weapons. Last winter, then-President Boris Yeltsin
used Russia’s nuclear status as a warning to the West to
keep its distance as Russian forces rolled into Chechnya, and
in February the US and China exchanged scarcely veiled threats
over Taiwan.
All the while, India and Pakistan continued their rivalry.
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- It is necessary to rebuild the foundations of non-proliferation
and disarmament policy. Open global negotiations at the UN on
a verifiable multilateral ban on nuclear weapons should involve
India, Pakistan and Israel and create a new and positive momentum.
The NPT conference will discuss a new five-year agenda of benchmarks
and objectives. It should include the opening of such negotiations,
the full implementation of START III, and a discussion in the
UN Security Council of nuclear weapons doctrines.
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- Another avenue for advancing a nuclear policy shift has opened
as NATO discusses a new arms control strategy. This process is
designed to stem proliferation through arms control and deserves
as much political support as military counter-proliferation measures.
US support for NMD is itself a radical change in nuclear policy,
requiring a thorough review by NATO of its own nuclear strategy.
If mutual deterrence is no longer to be at the heart of the strategy,
what are the implications? Does negotiated threat elimination
offer benefits that a combination of offensive and defensive
systems does not?
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- Nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament policy
is of vital importance to international security. This
assumption is based upon the idea that the more states possess
nuclear weapons, the more likely nuclear war becomes, and that
such a war would either directly or indirectly have disastrous
results for the world in general as well for those states directly
involved.
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- Modern proliferation policy was created in the 1960s.
At its heart is the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT). Based on a resolution sponsored by Ireland in the UN General
Assembly, negotiation of the NPT resulted from an initiative
by the United States. This initiative in turn arose from an internal
review of US policy towards nuclear proliferation. The US at
that time rejected the view that extensive proliferation was
acceptable and also rejected the idea of creating a considerable
number of client nuclear powers. The result has been a policy
of “Do as we say, but not as we do.” For the West,
nuclear weapons are regarded as a source of instability when
in the possession of other states, but a source of stability
when in the possession of Western states and their allies.
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- The structure of global non-proliferation and arms
control is impressive. The NPT is supported by the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZs).
Each NWFZ is further strengthened by its own treaty and set of
protocols tying it into the broader non-proliferation regime.
Bilateral reductions of the Russian and US arsenals have been
brought about under the aegis of the Strategic Arms Limitation
Treaty (SALT) and Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) talks
and this process is projected to continue for years. In addition,
there are global conventions banning biological and chemical
weapons, and a new verification protocol to the Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) is being negotiated. Many nuclear weapons states also
participate in data-exchange and information-sharing arrangements.
Four groups regulate the transfer of sensitive technologies:
the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia
Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime.
Oceans and outer space have been denuclearized by the
Seabed Treaty and Outer Space Treaty. A burgeoning list of regional
and technical security regimes and secretariats contribute to
the maintenance of strategic stability.
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- Accelerating nuclear proliferation since the end
of the cold war is destroying the political foundations that
underpin the structures of non-proliferation. In the
1970s and 1980s there was little change in the number of states
having or believed to have nuclear weapons. In the last decade
two non-NPT states have acquired nuclear weapons capability:
India and Pakistan. The Indian government maintains that
prolonged and failed attempts to engage the Nuclear Weapon States
(NWS) in disarmament talks led to its decision to pursue nuclear
weapons testing. Western policy makers dismiss this, and often
state that their nuclear policies do not encourage proliferators.
However, the similarity of Indian and Pakistani nuclear doctrines
to NATO policy provides additional contrary evidence. Little
action has been taken by the West or the broader international
community to change these states’ policies. This stance
fits the long-term pattern of US-led policy, which is to oppose
proliferation until it happens and then reach an accommodation
with the proliferator after the fact. Indian and Pakistani actions
have neither resulted in new disarmament initiatives that include
them, nor in significant penalties being imposed against them.
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- These two states sought to acquire nuclear status after the
NPT was made permanent in 1995, an action which they felt allowed
NWS to keep their arsenals indefinitely.
India in particular had long declined to accept permanent
‘second class status’. Their decisions also came after
the CTBT imposed upon them the responsibility of signing the
Treaty for it to enter into force, resulting in extra pressure
on their political processes. They regard the CTBT as discriminatory
since the existing NWS are pursuing new methods of testing including
computer modeling and simulation, above ground tests, and laser
fusion to continue the development of new weapons. These methods
are not available to India and Pakistan, or only to a limited
degree. Israel is the other nuclear armed state outside the NPT,
and no attempt has been made by the NWS to bring Israel into
international regimes.
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- Two NPT members, Iraq and North Korea, have made partially
successful attempts to become nuclear powers; Iran is widely
believed to be pursuing a similar path. The NPT has played an
important role in providing the basis for constraining them.
The experience with Iraq has strengthened the view of some that
Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) proliferation cannot be
controlled, and that there is no international will to do so.
The early spectacular successes of the UN Special Commission
(UNSCOM) were based upon an unprecedented consensus in international
affairs at the end of the Cold War. The early UNSCOM experience
remains an example of the tangible security benefits that result
from a political investment in achieving international consensus.
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- Western policy makers give a broad positive value
to their own nuclear weapons. The US bases its sense
of security on them, as reinforced in the Defense Secretary’s
annual report for 2000: “Nuclear forces and missile defenses
are critical elements of US national security and will remain
so into the future […] serving as a hedge against an uncertain
future and as a guarantee of US commitments to its allies.”
- The 1999 NATO Summit made clear that nuclear weapons were
not merely for use in response to a nuclear attack on the Alliance.
Its Strategic Concept stated: “Nuclear weapons make a unique
contribution in rendering the risks of aggression against the
Alliance incalculable and unacceptable. Thus they remain essential
to preserve peace. […] They demonstrate that aggression
of any kind is not a rational option.”
[Emphasis added] NATO also described the Alliance’s strategic
nuclear forces as “the supreme guarantee of the security
of the Allies,” and noted: “Nuclear forces based in
Europe and committed to NATO provide an essential political and
military link between the European and North Atlantic members
of the Alliance.”
It is often asserted that without nuclear weapons the UK would
no longer be able to claim any special reason for holding onto
its permanent seat on the UN Security Council.
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- Western states actively prevent other countries from
procuring nuclear weapons. Every country except Cuba,
India, Israel and Pakistan has now joined the NPT.
Its value to non-nuclear states was recently described by John
Holum, State Department Senior Advisor for Arms Control and International
Security, as being the prevention of regional nuclear arms races.
The vast majority of the world’s states, as represented
by the Non-Aligned Movement and the New Agenda Coalition, take
the view that the NPT is mainly a very different sort of bargain.
In their opinion, they have agreed never to obtain nuclear arms
providing that the states with nuclear weapons agree to carry
out nuclear disarmament, as stipulated in Article VI of the NPT
and the Principles and Objectives of the 1995 Review Conference.
The NWS repeat their commitment to nuclear disarmament but generally
regard it as an ultimate goal.
They have not agreed to begin discussions on how to achieve
it, arguing that interim steps must be achieved first. The
question of linkage of non-proliferation with disarmament is
one which governments should review. Is the “Do as we say,
not as we do” strategy sustainable?
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- Over several decades the application of political power has
helped sustain the Western policy of denying access to nuclear
weapons to new states. There have been failures – France,
China, India, and Pakistan were all pressured by the US not to
go nuclear. A series of arrangements designed to control exports
of dual use nuclear and chemical items has been created. For
example, they prohibit missile transfers to specified states
whilst permitting them among Western allies. These kinds of discriminatory
arrangements are resented by non-Western states, and this resentment
contributes to demands for the NWS to fulfill their NPT Article
VI obligations to negotiate nuclear disarmament.
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- A key element of preventing proliferation in US policy has
also been to offer to use its nuclear weapons on behalf of allies
such as Japan, South Korea and its partners in NATO, partly to
persuade them that they need not develop their own nuclear weapons.
In the cases of Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands
and Turkey, this ‘nuclear umbrella’ allows them to
use US nuclear weapons in wartime.
This ‘sharing’ of nuclear weapons is an arrangement
to which South Africa and many other states have taken exception.
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- China, France and Russia, the other acknowledged nuclear
powers, have also participated in an arms control process of
denying others access to nuclear weapons and other weapons of
mass destruction to varying degrees. They are parties to the
BWC, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the NPT and the CTBT.
Russia has bilateral agreements with the US on nuclear arms reductions
and to prohibit a national ‘anti-missile-missiles’
system through the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. However,
where national interest was thought to require it, the existing
nuclear powers have played a role in creating others.
The US assisted the UK and France after they had shown
they could develop their own weapons. France assisted Israel
and Iraq, China is thought to have assisted Pakistan, and Russia
is assumed to have given limited assistance to India. Non-proliferation
goals were, in these cases, simply ignored.
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- The United States is no longer a reliable leader
in the area of international legal controls on nuclear and other
armaments. The rejection of the CTBT by the US Senate
and the wider desire to withdraw from the ABM Treaty are not
aberrations in US politics. Neither the US President nor his
Secretaries of State or Defense exerted themselves to ratify
the CTBT. The political leaders in Congress and the Administration
who supported the Treaty while it was being negotiated are no
longer in office.
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- The Clinton Administration has shown little interest in pursuing
strategic arms control with Russia. Whereas President Bush had
concluded the START II Treaty before START I had been ratified,
the present Administration and Congress have been content to
wait on the lengthy ratification processes for the first two
treaties before moving to START III. This Administration did
not continue the process of reciprocal unilateral arsenal reductions
pioneered by President Bush. It can only be hoped that this is
changing. There is some political momentum behind the idea of
mutual ‘de-alerting’ of strategic forces.
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- The growing rejection of arms control prevented US adherence
to the anti-personnel landmines treaty and the International
Criminal Court, created damaging amendments to the ratification
of the CWC, and is currently leading the US to reject an effective
verification protocol to the BWC. The ‘anti-arms control
view’ in the US assumes that Russia has violated the BWC
and the START Treaty, that Iraq and North Korea have shown the
uselessness of non-proliferation regimes, and that controls only
place limits. There is some truth in these views. However, arms
control does not have to be perfect to be useful. Military force
is a limited and sometimes counter-productive policy tool but
these limitations do not result in abandoning military force
altogether.
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- There is a steadily strengthening view in the US
against relying on mutual nuclear deterrence in national strategy.
The idea that Americans must not be threatened with any kind
of missile has led the Administration to consider deployment
of NMD within five years and many within the Republican Party
to reject the ABM Treaty out of hand.
It is important to note that the rejection of mutual deterrence
does not indicate any desire by US policy makers to attack any
other state, merely that the US should not be inhibited in politico-military
action that it may be wish to take.
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- It should also be noted that there is considerable evidence
that ‘rogue’ missile threats have been grossly exaggerated.
France and the UK, the other NATO nuclear powers, simply do not
accept that there is any credible threat. Geoff Hoon, the UK
Defence Minister, recently told the House of Lords: “Our
current assessment is that there is no significant ballistic
missile threat to the UK at present, but developments continue
to be monitored closely.”
French Defence Minister Alain Richard noted recently:
“Ballistic proliferation is a concern for us as it is for
you, even though the domestic debate here is far more intense
on this issue and even if we do not draw the same conclusions
from similar threat analyses.”
Governments may wish to examine the nature of these threats
and consider whether exaggerating threats only serves to strengthen
the hand of potential adversaries.
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- The rationale for missile defences against ‘rogue states’
rejects the idea that they should be permitted to threaten the
US. The acceptance of such threats was the basis of the deterrence
idea of ‘Mutual Assured Destruction.’ US policy makers
reject the idea of being deterred by ‘lesser’ states
such as Iraq or Libya. It is also thought that where an opponent
is deemed irrational, a deterrence which relies on rationality
and insight into one’s opponent’s mind-set is not a
reliable tool. Some, such as General George Lee Butler, Commander-in-Chief
of US Strategic Command from 1992-1994, believe that deterrence
was always a false basis for policy throughout the Cold War,
and was “a conversation we had with ourselves”.
The word ‘deterrence’ became an unassailable brand
name that could sanctify any policy.
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- Less clearly stated by NMD proponents is the rejection of
mutual deterrence with respect to Russia and China. The combination
of ready nuclear missiles and missile defences in the US arsenal
may provide a counter-force or first strike capability. Limited
missile defences in this case have only to manage a few forces
which may survive after they have been attacked with precision
conventional weapons and nuclear weapons. Today, land-based mobile
missiles alone constitute a Russian assured ‘second-strike’
deterrent and under START II they will be confined to single
warheads.
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- The US position in the present START III and ABM discussions
with Russia provides a useful insight. So far, the US refuses
to go below a floor of 2,000-2,500 ready long-range warheads,
although Russia prefers a level of 1,500 or even fewer. Thus
the US is prepared to see Russia retain twice as many warheads
as it wishes to. One reason is that the US has little confidence
that Russia will be able to field such a force. The other is
that the US Single Integrated Operational Plan requires some
2,000 warheads to target all Russian nuclear forces and key national
capabilities. China has a force of around 20 long-range missiles
and is so far only slowly increasing them. Against China, US
missiles and defences offer an even more powerful combination.
There have been some reports that US nuclear weapons are also
needed to target ‘rogue states;’ however, even if there
were any credible targets, the numbers involved are tiny.
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- Policy discussion about the value of nuclear weapons in mutual
deterrence or counter-force rarely examines how they might be
used. The failure to think through nuclear targeting may result
in the West basing its policy on an instrument which in the end
is unusable.
US Generals Butler, Charles Horner, and Colin Powell, who were
responsible for nuclear planning in the Gulf War, all found no
way they could be used effectively, and yet the Gulf War is routinely
cited by those who had no such responsibility as being the type
of occasion when nuclear weapons are useful.
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- States must move to rebuild the foundations of non-proliferation
and disarmament policy. A business as usual approach
to non-proliferation policy has been ineffective, and unchanged
policy is unlikely to be any more effective. Further nuclear
proliferation in Asia and the increasing deployment of missile
defences are the likely next phases of a familiar action-reaction
cycle. The military axiom that defensive capabilities always
develop more slowly than offensive ones will only fuel this new
arms race.
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- It may be argued that missile defences will not work, will
create an arms race and are too expensive. These arguments are
less and less influential in Washington. Similarly, Western leaders
believe that there is no political cost if they do not act more
swiftly to fulfill disarmament obligations.
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- The lack of support for the International Atomic Energy Agency’s
new safeguards regime and the Indian and Pakistani actions are
not regarded by US policy makers as resulting from lack of action
on disarmament by the nuclear weapon states. On the issue of
‘anti-missile-missiles’ it can be argued
that eliminating the threat through arms control and disarmament
is a far better option than last-ditch defence or relying on
an ineffective defence and an unusable response. On one critical
point disarmament advocates and missile defence advocates agree:
Mutual Assured Destruction is not a rational policy. Ronald Reagan
compared it to Russian roulette. Governments may also wish
to reassess the value of the idea of mutual deterrence.
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- Governments should consider whether to support measures
that would change or scrap the ABM Treaty. In the spring
of 2000, many states urged Moscow to make a decision on START
II and ABM adjustments.
However, the issue of missile defences should not be left
to the Russians and Americans alone to decide; events across
Asia, from the Middle East to China, will be impacted by this
new military technology as well.
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- A full review of non-proliferation policy should also consider
the impact of the rise of humanitarian intervention as a principle
overriding state sovereignty.
If the application of the principle is seen to be arbitrary
and without legal authority, it may lead to states fearing that
they may be attacked and increase the demand for WMD. While such
concerns may seem remote to Western analysts, perceptions are
different in countries which have experienced only half a century
of freedom from colonialism after a century or more under one
empire or another.
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- The disarmament approach may not be the only solution but
it is clearly the Cinderella of international policy at the present
time. If disarmament policies are thought to have any significant
chance of improving national and international security, they
need immediate and strong reinforcement.
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- Non-proliferation and disarmament policy is being discussed
in a number of international negotiations. Western states should
reassess their own nuclear doctrines and state that they will
only use nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear attack on themselves.
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- The world’s foremost disarmament negotiating body is
the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva. The vast majority
of states support opening multilateral talks aimed at agreeing
a Convention banning nuclear weapons worldwide. Support for commencing
such talks now would not require any action by the nuclear weapons
states affecting their forces since a nuclear disarmament convention
will take many years to negotiate. Many states have argued that
the lack of progress in disarmament incites proliferation and
reduces international political will to act against it. The opening
of nuclear disarmament talks would provide a useful test of this
proposition. There is nothing to lose and much to gain from starting
the process.
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- A final agreement may involve a succession of stages. The
verification regime and the need for action against states breaking
out of the Treaty are but two of the issues which need to be
explored. Bringing India, Israel and Pakistan into a dialogue
with the other nuclear powers on banning nuclear arms would help
reduce tension and particularly act as a safety-valve in South
Asia. Holding such a dialogue in the UN’s CD would involve
a broad range of non-nuclear states and not give the ‘newcomers’
any special status.
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- The Conference on Disarmament is attempting to begin talks
on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. The Treaty under consideration
at present is far too limited in scope either to be effective
or to receive sufficient political support. It must include all
types of fissile material in all states. However, the present
logjam should not be permitted to delay progress in other areas.
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- The NPT conference will discuss a new five year agenda
of benchmarks and objectives for non-proliferation and disarmament.
Governments should examine the commitments made in 1995 to the
Enhanced Review Process, the Principles and Objectives, and the
statement on the Middle East. New NPT benchmarks and Objectives
already favoured by many states include:
- 1. Accepting as authoritative the Advisory Opinion of the
International Court of Justice concerning Article VI, adopted
unanimously, which states that: “There exists an obligation
to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations
leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict
and effective international control;”
- 2. Urging that the Russian Federation and the United States
bring the START II Treaty into force without delay,
to commence negotiations on START III with a view to its
completion by 2005, and to work with the P5 towards a statement
at the Review Conference that these negotiations are an important
step on the road to implementation of Article VI obligations;
- 3. Seeking a UN Security Council discussion of the nuclear
weapons doctrine of its permanent members; and,
- 4. Reaffirming the central role of the CTBT as a disarmament
treaty by stating that research and development on qualitative
nuclear warhead improvements will not be undertaken, either alone
or in partnership with other nuclear weapon states.
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- NATO has begun a comprehensive policy review of confidence
and security building measures, verification, arms control and
disarmament. NATO members should consider proposing
a range of measures, additional to those already mentioned, including:
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- 1. Beginning a formal review of nuclear strategy. The US
unilateral consideration of moving away from mutual deterrence
towards relying on offensive and defensive missiles fundamentally
alters the Alliance’s nuclear strategy. If mutual deterrence
is not to be acceptable, perhaps threat elimination through arms
control should be examined at least as seriously as defences.
In addition, the concerns of the international community over
the compatibility of NATO strategy with Negative Security Assurances
and Articles I and II of the NPT need to be addressed.
- 2. Affirming that NATO will never be the first to use a nuclear
weapon in any circumstances, that the Alliance will cease to
prepare the wartime transfer of nuclear weapons to its non-nuclear
members and nuclear weapons are no longer needed to link Europe
and North America since this link is based upon shared values.
Facilitating NATO-Russia negotiations on eliminating remaining
tactical nuclear weapons since these weapons are a source of
considerable concern to both parties.
- 3. Discussing measures to fully implement the NPT as described
above. The Alliance successfully led the way in 1993 in calling
for the NPT to be made permanent in 1995. It has a collective
responsibility to implement the agreements that made the 1995
decision possible. A common Alliance position on implementing
the NPT is needed.
- 4. Preventing the Alliance from being split by the United
States over the issue of missile defences. The Alliance should
not endorse changes to the ABM Treaty or become engaged in the
use of facilities in European member states for strategic missile
defence.
- 5. Evaluating why the Alliance is less engaged in arms control
of all kinds at present than during the Cold War. Little is currently
taking place in the NATO internal discussion on arms control.
Governments may also wish to consider why there is so much more
momentum to the military aspects of countering proliferation.
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- Daniel Plesch is Director of BASIC.
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- Click here for BASIC.
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