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Arms Control Letters is a monthly newsletter of the PIR-Center for Policy Studies in Russia, sent to the e-mail boxes of the world leading experts in the field of arms control, nonproliferation and international security. In early September 2000, President Putin set forth his initiative in the area of nuclear nonproliferation at the Millenium Summit. The document calls for gradual exclusion from peaceful nuclear energy production major weapons-usable material (enriched uranium and plutonium), and urges states to refrain from stockpiling plutonium separated in the process of irradiated fuel reprocessing (existing stockpiles should be returned to nuclear fuel cycle. According to public data, stockpiles of Russian weapons-usable fissile material (in tons) contain the following amount of uranium and plutonium: For military use: Plutonium - 131 ± 25; Uranium - 1050 ± 315 For civilian use: Plutonium - 26; Uranium - N.A. Beside solving nonproliferation problems, the proposed technologies of nuclear material management are to promote sustainable energy development of mankind and environmental protection of the Earth. At the same time, President Putin emphasized that it would be difficult for one state to solve all those problems and suggested that all countries concerned should join their efforts under the IAEA auspices within the framework of the international project. The question is what was the reason for putting forward such an initiative in the current situation? It is worth noting two recently published documents: the Development Strategy for the Russian Atomic Energy Sector for the First Half of the XXI Century (approved by the Russian Government on May 25, 2000) and the Agreement Between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation (signed on August 29 in Moscow by Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov and on September 1 in Washington by Vice President Al Gore). Key provisions of Putin's statement (closed nuclear fuel cycle, radiation equivalence of wastes and natural uranium) were previously reflected in the aforementioned Development Strategy. The Agreement provides for only one method of plutonium disposal for Russia - burning it in nuclear reactors. This fully corresponds with Minatom's Strategy based on the introduction of a closed fuel cycle with the use of plutonium. The document states that "the disposition of weapon-grade plutonium should be regarded as the first step in developing the technology of a future closed fuel cycle". The implementation of measures to eliminate plutonium mentioned in the Agreement should also serve as a basis for the transition to a new model of fuel cycle, since reliance on weapons-usable plutonium as a fuel resource for entire the nuclear energy sector can be economically unreasonable. The major obstacle for Russia's fulfillment of its commitments under the Agreement is the lack of funding for the aforementioned activities. According to the Agreement, the current budget is limited to $200 million. Other funds may be appropriated in accordance with the Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the United States of America on Scientific and Technical Cooperation in the Management of Plutonium That Has Been Withdrawn from Nuclear Military Programs, of July 24, 1998. Within the framework of the Russo-Franco-German working group, there is also a tentative agreement on the investment of $800-million in the construction of an industrial plant for MOX fuel fabrication. Another source of financing can be Russian-Japanese cooperation in promoting the disarmament, nonproliferation, and disposal of nuclear weapons to be eliminated by the Russian Federation. An appropriate resolution of the Russian Government authorizing such cooperation was approved on September 12. The problem of a possible lack of funds was mentioned in the Agreement. Article 9, paragraph 5 states that the activities of each Party under this Agreement shall be subject to the availability of appropriated funds, whereas disposal should start no later than December 31, 2007, with a minimal rate of 2 tons per year in case of foreign assistance regulated by a multilateral agreement. Bearing in mind the aforementioned issues, one may presume that Vladimir Putin addressed all states concerned to gather international financial support for the disposal of excessive weapons-usable plutonium and the restructuring of the Russian nuclear energy sector. If Russia procures no assistance, it will hardly be able to implement its commitments under the Agreement. There may be another explanation for Vladimir Putin's initiative, which does not run counter to the aforementioned assessment, but is more independent from the program of plutonium disposal. This explanation is based on some ideas of the Development Strategy document. The initiative points out that policy of constraining nuclear technology transfer to other states and of strengthening international controls have practically failed to prevent nuclear proliferation. Under these circumstances, the initiative can be regarded as a new approach to ensure nuclear nonproliferation. The document places special emphasis on technological obstacles to hamper the development of nuclear weapons from fissile material used in the energy sector. This concept was described in detail in the White Book of Nuclear Energy published in 1998 and edited by Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeny Adamov. The book was a basis for the Development Strategy of 2000. The essence of the approach is as follows: A basis for the approach is that the current technologies of radiochemical reprocessing of irradiated fuel were initially designed for plutonium separation and, hence, do not meet modern nonproliferation standards.
At the same time, nuclear fuel cycle facilities will be placed at the nuclear power plants to prevent dangers normally emerging during the transportation of fuel. Fast breeder reactors do not need enriched uranium. Hence, in the future, it is possible to eliminate enrichment technology, which would reduce the risk of proliferation. For the initial loads in fast breeder reactors, one can use already separated plutonium and plutonium separated from irradiated nuclear fuel. Plutonium separation and the production of the first loads can be carried out at the power plants of nuclear club members or in international science and technology centers. Eventually, this technology should not allow for the fission of uranium and plutonium at any stages of nuclear fuel cycle. The aforementioned concept is proposed to ensure energy production and prevent proliferation not only inside Russia, but at the global level, whereas the suggested approach was invented to convince the international community that there were no threats on the part of major Minatom's buyers. However, this concept of nuclear energy development is even more distant from actual implementation than measures envisaged by the plutonium disposal program. It is noteworthy that all possible explanations for Putin's initiative are based on Minatom's proposals reflected in the Development Strategy and in the Agreement on Plutonium Disposal. Since there was no clear agenda at the Millenium Summit, Putin's statement got no particular response. Perhaps, a reaction will come at the IAEA General Conference beginning September 18, where these issues make the core of Yevgeny Adamov's agenda. Presumably, one can hardly expect specific proposals in response to Putin's initiative. Any particular results can be achieved only in connection with the US-Russian Agreement on Plutonium Disposal. In accordance with one of its appendices, by 2009 the parties plan to begin the operation of the MOX fuel fabrication plant and the production of the first industrial consignment of fuel for VVER-1000 reactors. At present, there are two proposed ways to implement this plan. First is the abovementioned cooperation among Russia, France, and Germany in constructing a MOX fuel fabrication plant or transferring the Siemens-made plant from Germany to Russia, which may be financed in accordance with the G-8 arrangements. The most probable place for the installation of the plant is Zheleznogorsk (Krasnoyarsk-26). Specialists of the Mining-Chemical Combine have experience in working with MOX fuel and have developed one of the technologies for its fabrication. Another technology, which is planned to be used under the Agreement, was developed in the State Scientific Center NIIAR (Dimitrovgrad). It will serve for the production of MOX fuel for the BN-600 reactor. In the course of experiments in 1998-1999, NIIAR reprocessed 50 kg of weapons-usable plutonium and obtained the first amount of fuel which is currently being tested at the BOR-60 research reactor and at the Beloyarskaya nuclear power plant. The industrial phase of the BREST reactor project will be probably postponed. Despite Minatom's statements concerning the advisability of using this technology for plutonium disposal, the technology was not mentioned in the Agreement. Commercial prospects of this project can be assessed only when Russia gets a response from the IAEA and the world community. Russia will hardly be able to implement this project alone due to the lack of funding and insufficient testing of the reactor in industrial conditions. Recent developments make us presume that Minatom's foreign
and domestic policy enjoys the support of the president and the
Government and will continue to receive this backing in the near
future.
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