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On April 5, 1999 the New York Times published an interview with a former Soviet military scientist Kanatyan Alibekov, the author of Biological Threat, which was to be published soon by Random House publishing house. In his work Mr. Alibekov, an active participant in the Soviet biological weapons' development program from 1975 to 1991, argues that Soviet scientists tried to convert HIV into a weapon. Moreover, it allegedly happened when the Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev was trying to resume peaceful contacts with the West while at the same time making the order to expand research on converting lethal bacteria and viruses into WMD. According to Mr. Alibekov, the USSR several times employed biological weapons in Afghanistan, attacking rebels' positions with glanders viruses and developing biological warheads for cruise missiles. What is more, the Soviet Union managed to acquire gene rearrangement technology, providing for decreased vulnerability of pathogenic microbes to the external environment and medical treatment. Despite the sensational potential of the book in the USA, the New York Times really doubts the trustworthiness of mentioned facts. To this end, the newspaper cites its own sources of information in the CIA, who have had contact with Alibekov since 1992, immediately after his defection to the United States. The newspaper emphasizes that although they consider him a reliable source of first-hand information, when it comes to political and military issues of which he only has second-hand knowledge, he is less reliable. To dot all the "i's", PIR Staff Writer Dmitry Litovkin met Lt.-Gen. Valentin Yevstigneyev, Deputy Chief of the Ministry of Defense's Radiological, Chemical and Biological Defense Forces. Gen. Yevstigneyev also heads the MOD Biological Defense Department, hence he is considered the most reliable source of first-hand information on the Soviet germ warfare program and of the activities to prevent this type of war. YADERNY KONTROL: Valentin Ivanovich, chemical and biological weapons (BW) have been outlawed. International agreements prohibit these kinds of weapons and Russia has made similar commitments. This year we'll begin the destruction of 40 thousand tons of chemical weapons but there is no information about a similar process for the elimination of BW. The Biological Defense Forces (BDF), which you are heading, are left without any changes in the MOD structure. What is their mission today? VALENTIN YEVSTIGNEYEV: I would like to start by clarifying some terms. "Biological defense" appeared in 1992 after the first stage of military reform. My department was established on the authority of the 15th MOD Directorate, which in the Soviet era was in charge of developing a means of protection from BW and undertook projects to adequately respond to foreign BW development programs. In March 1992, President Yeltsin declared that Russia would give up its biological offensive programs and the 15th Directorate was disbanded. A new structure included only a small part of the former Directorate staff, who made up the core of the Biological Defense Department within the Radiological, Chemical and Biological Defense Forces. I would like to point out that all officers in the new BDF have always worked solely on the development of BW defense systems. For instance, I'm an expert on various plague vaccines. In comparison with past years, nowadays our department is very small. Its staff includes 30 officers, of which only 8 are biologists, while others have engineering backgrounds and work on the creation of technical methods of medical defense. These are chiefly diagnostic systems to detect infectious disease agents and toxins, means of emergency and specialized prophylaxis of these diseases, gammaglobulins, new antibiotics, chemical substances, disinfectants, and disinsectants. All of these tasks are the focus of activities of the MOD Scientific Research Institute of Microbiology in Kirov. The Institute's structure includes two scientific centers: the Yekaterinburg Center for Military Technical Problems of Antibacterial Defense and the Sergiev Posad Virology Center. Only these three institutions are engaged in MOD biological programs. Q.: However, foreign mass media often argue that the Russian MOD has some civilian academic subcontractors. For instance, the New York Times has recently published an article implicating a number of Russian civil facilities in the carrying out of biological offensive programs, the Moscow Institute of Bio-organic Chemistry (IBKh) in particular. A.: We have gotten used to such allegations. However, I have to admit that there were such contacts in Soviet times. At present, due to the low funding of biological programs in the MOD framework and the limited scope of projects, we have practically discontinued all contact with civil academic institutions as we cannot pay for the accomplishment of certain tasks. And, in fact, nowadays there aren't any problems that we can't solve ourselves. Of course, some projects are still being carried out, but their scope is so paltry that they don't even approach the substantial share of the Department's activities aimed at the development of biological defense systems. Q.: Could you name specific civil institutions collaborating with the Biological Defense Department and the tasks they are fulfilling? A.: We cooperate with Novosibirsk NPO Vektor based in Kaltsovo. The Director General of this scientific research center, Lev Sandakhchiev, is helping us to create a recombinant vaccine against Hepatitis B. This virus is transmitted through the use of unsterilized medical equipment and tools. This problem concerns blood transfusions, dental procedures, etc. As a result of infection, the patient may suffer from cancer or cirrhosis or the liver. The remedy is called Revaks and is currently undergoing pre-clinical testing. As for our other contacts with civil facilities, we have signed a contract with Moscow State Scientific Antibiotics Center, which is creating a new antibiotic - fluorquinolone, or pefloxacin. However, the success of this joint project depends on financing. If we get enough funding, the Army will receive this multipurpose antibiotic by the year 2000. It's a good antibiotic, although it is not the latest nor the most effective. But, in our opinion, it will meet the Army's entire demand for a means of protection against infectious diseases. As to our military subsidiaries, the Yekaterinburg Center has been designated for technical and design projects relating to development of a technical means of BW defense. It also undertakes technological activities to provide for the production of some vaccines, and develops new antibiotics. In Sergiev Posad they are working on vaccines against the most widespread viral diseases. As I have already said, the MOD military biological program is aimed at developing general and medical means of defense. General purpose means of defense include vehicles and devices for biological intelligence, biological situation estimates, forecasts of the epidemiological situation, and the elimination of the effects of BW warfare and natural outbreaks of infectious diseases. This issue is the most urgent for us since the Russian Armed Forces are equipped with obsolete biological intelligence systems. For instance, current automatic biological attack indicators have already been in operation for more than 30 years. Nowadays our institutes are working on a new modification of this device in close cooperation with the Institute of Biological Instrument Making, a strictly civilian institution. The device is at the stage of regular official testing. It provides for the application of new physical principles of the system, new elements, and modern computers. Unfortunately, low financing has delayed the progress of its development. The experiments have been already conducted for eight years, and even if we complete them this year or the next, there will be problems with its delivery to the end-user. The Defense Ministry lacks the money to order such equipment for the Armed Forces. Q.: Defense industries in the past were unlikely to perform the entire range of design activities. Huge consortiums of various scientific research institutes were set up and each of them solved its limited number of problems within a general framework. We can presume that the lack of financial means today forces MOD to work independently in developing methods of BW defense. Is that correct? A.: I must say that even in the past we had to follow the principle of self-reliance. This is accounted for by the fact that our institutes were the only holders of the State collection of microorganisms, which were potential BW agents. Now, we are the owners of these pathogenic organisms and we have to create vaccines and means of defense against them. It's a standard collection registered with the State, and we use the microorganisms to verify the efficiency of our defense mechanisms. We have more than 100 different cultures of anthrax in our collection. In addition, we possess cultures of plague, glanders, brucellosis, tularemia, cholera, botulism, Ebola and Lassa hemorrhagic fevers, spotted fever, etc. These are different cultures with different characteristics; that's why I find it difficult to estimate the number of viral species. To do so, we must fetch the head of our museum and check his files against the number of ampoules containing each kind of biological substance. The collection is rich but not large: from one to five ampoules of each agent. If there is a need to work with any of the agents it is extracted from the collection to multiply and use. Thus, we not only solve our routine problems, but enlarge the collection. The quantity of stored biological substances is no more than one gram but if we take into consideration nutrient medium it would be about one kilo of materia.. There is no need to have an amount larger than that. To make a reliable antidote for each virus we have to test a number of methods to enable us to detect it in an external environment. We have to take a sample of the substance and find out its nature (bacteria, viruses, or rickettsia) and type in accordance with its classification. If we succeed in defining the substance the next stage would be emergency prophylaxis. In the case of plague it would be an additional specific vaccination and prophylaxis. That's why we create various vaccines. If biological agents are found in the external environment (on a uniform, on other objects or in the air) there is an urgent need for disinfection. If the agent transmission comes from insects (ticks, fleas, louses, or mosquitoes) the primary task will be to destroy them with disinsection. Or the pathogenic organism could be found in rodents, who are plague carriers. In the course of these activities we have to monitor the individual and collective protection of personnel. We have to know how safe our means of protection are (i.e. L-1, OZK), and how well they protect the skin from various aerosol mixtures of infectious pathogens. Then we should know the ability of a standard gas mask to protect personnel from various aerosols. We have to inspect all containers for material and military equipment in order to prevent the penetration of these aerosols inside a tank, an armored personnel carrier or any other combat vehicle, closed fortification or bomb shelter. In addition, all individual and collective protection should be adapted to sustain a possible biological attack and to ensure personnel's protection from infectious diseases. We need to select the correct means of disinfection so that indoor treatment would not impair the normal functioning of electronic devices. What's more these means should produce no corrosion, should be safe and personnel-friendly. To avoid the inhalation of chlorine, we need to create special compounds to disintegrate admixtures. Q.: You said that one of the missions of the 15th Directorate was the development of adequate offensive weapons. What does that mean? At present we are speaking about weapons we are going to defend ourselves from. But your words imply that we had our own offensive systems. What was the Soviet Union producing? A.: The thing is that based on numerous sources (they are really numerous), we created a special list of biological weapons we should be afraid of. This list of biological agents was compiled from intelligence data we got from the KGB and GRU [Main Intelligence Directorate, Russian military intelligence - Ed.]. We also used popular books on biological warfare as well as the results of SIPRI research. Hence, we managed to create an extensive index of biological agents, containing about 37 pathogenic organisms of various diseases. They become the basis for development of means of protection. The most dangerous are agents causing plague, tularemia, anthrax, brucellosis, melioidosis, smallpox, encephalitis, spotted fever, cholera, yellow fever, botulism toxins, and enterotoxin B. To develop means of protection it was necessary to make a copy, a model of offensive methods. That's why we had to learn to cultivate pathogens, to augment the technology of its accumulation, to create some stabilizing nutrient medium to make it stable in an external environment. The next step was to create BW delivery systems, to produce vaccines, to check our biological intelligence equipment, and to determine the density of dispersion necessary in the use of such weapons. This cycle was the offensive part of the MOD program of adequate response, and in 1992 it was banned and eliminated. Q.: These facts prove that the USSR disposed of at least 37 kinds of real BW prototypes. Today we face the problems of CW destruction and arms reduction but this does not concern biological munitions since they don't exist. How did it happen that the USSR didn't start the mass production of such weapons, although it had all necessary prerequisites? A.: Right you are. Till 1992, thanks to our foreign intelligence, which procured real specimens of US biological munitions and their technical drawings, we could design real munitions: one-, two-, three-, and four-pound air bombs. We even made individual models in our laboratories, conducted natural tests on animals at a special test range on Vozrozhdeniya Island on the Aral Sea. But after 1992 these activities were forbidden, and now we infect animals only with inoculations, and monitor the efficiency of our means of protection in the same manner. If we need to test biological intelligence equipment we have to do it not outdoors but in laboratory conditions with the help of modeling and simulators, i.e. vaccine cultures or non-pathogenic microorganisms. As to your question about mass production, there is only one explanation. Biological weapons differ from chemical weapons since they contains bio-organisms, which cannot be stored for a long time. That's why they were not stockpiled, because there were no strategic reserves, except those for toxins. The Soviet leadership had no ideological basis for such experiments and tests; hence, the program was of a minor scale in comparison with nuclear and chemical weapons production and development. All experiments were conducted just to be on the safe side. To a certain extent it was a mere bluff on the part of our leadership. There was an order to create such weapons but they were never taken seriously as a real offensive means and there were no plans for their use. Q.: But you mentioned real BW tests, including human beings, at a certain testing facility, didn't you? A.: Yes, there was such an experiment. But in the entire history of the 15th Directorate it was the only one. It involved 15 men and some animals. However, the main objective was to test the reliability of gas masks and protective suits and not BW effectiveness on the offensive side. We could certainly have produced a biological arsenal of toxins but we didn't stockpile them because there were no political instructions on the matter. That's why the USSR didn't possess BW stockpiles and why now we have nothing to destroy. We had only one problem: to dismantle laboratory and testing equipment that could cause suspicions of continuing biological experiments and a readiness to produce a large amount of biological agents. That's why this equipment was destroyed at the outset of perestroika, before 1989, in compliance with Gorbachev's order. It was the time of beginning trilateral negotiations between Great Britain, Russia and the USA regarding on-site inspections at BW development and production facilities. We visited the suspected US and British biological facilities. As for Russia, the then CPSU Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev decided to dismantle all devices and equipment that could raise doubts about our intentions. Together with the equipment we destroyed retorts with biological ferments (about five liters). Thanks to this prudent political move, we pose no threat to anyone and there are no traces of our BW offensive program. We can be suspected solely on the basis of intention. Q.: What do you mean by 'intention'? A.: We still have no final agreement with the West on what to call biological weapons, what equipment and technology should be regarded as potentially capable of BW production, or what should be banned under future Conventions. As to the level of information transparency about current activities of our laboratories required by foreign inspectors, no solution has been found yet. And it's not a matter of Russia maintaining an uncompromising position or Russia's unwillingness to make concessions. I would denounce the US position as they are the ones who haven't agreed to many proposals that could substantially contribute to a mutual understanding between the countries and provide for strict control over activities of scientific laboratories. After the collapse of the Soviet Union we closed our only biological testing facility on the Aral Sea, as it became the property of Kazakhstan and there was no need for its further use. When we closed this test range we had to conduct a complete disinfection of the territory. We exterminated all test animals and buried them in special burial grounds. Some scientific equipment was moved to Russia. We monitored the entire territory of the island where we had conducted natural testing of biological weapons. So, in terms of environmental protection, we left Kazakhstan an absolutely normal island. As soon as we left Vozrozhdeniya Island, it was overcrowded with US biologists who were to find out the essence and details of Russian activities. Americans dug up our burial grounds, analyzed animals' tissues and made the conclusion that we had tested technologies of anthrax for use in combat. This fact speaks for itself. Unless we have agreements, specifying the classification of "biological weapons", we'll never trust each other sincere intentions. That's why we urgently need to elaborate on the code of international agreements to control BW development, to set up an international verification mechanism and to determine the list of documents that should be submitted. Unless it is done, the USA and other states may suspect us of bad intentions. Nevertheless, I can take the responsibility for stating that we developed offensive biological weapons but we didn't have mass production. In 1989 we started to destroy them and in 1992 we stopped all laboratory research activities relating to development of biological weapons of mass destruction. Q.: You said that there had been attempts to imitate US biological munitions. Does that mean that the USA had a specific mass production sample of a BW carrier? A.: You are absolutely right. Q.: We must have had an opportunity to examine German and Japanese captured munitions? A.: Perhaps. During the Soviet military operation in Manchuria in 1945 there were captured samples of Japanese biological weapons. These facts are kept in archives, there is evidence from witnesses. All this was loaded on a ship and should have been transported to the USSR. It may seem strange but the ship vanished. In my opinion, it might have become a victim of the Japanese Navy or been sunk by Soviet sailors. Unfortunately, history remains silent about this fact. Hence, we received nothing from the Japanese in terms of biological weapons. Americans, on the contrary, captured the commander of the Japanese BW development squadron and continued fruitful work with him after the war. And the International Tribunal convicted only rank and file participants in the program. As for German biological weapons, there isn't any specific data on them. There were rumors that German scientists did experiments on prisoners of war. However, the Third Reich biological program didn't leave behind scientific laboratories due to the fact that Hitler was a bacteriophobe and was afraid of catching a virus. That's why we have so little knowledge of the German biological program. As a result, Soviet BW became a completely indigenous product of Russian scientists. We didn't have to steal viruses or cultures somewhere; we had enough of them. Most of the 37 biological agents listed in the index of offensive BW methods are endemic diseases in Russia. Our biologists have been studying them since long before the revolution of 1917. Q.: What else, besides the political will of state leadership, impaired the mass production of biological munitions? A.: We acquired US bombs in the early 1950's and we used them till early 1980's. It was enough to create and improve our means of defense and to develop our offensive technologies in theory. What's more, in my opinion, there was a certain competition between various types of WMD. The attention was focussed on nuclear arms development since they were the most efficient means to ensure unacceptable damage for the enemy. We were the first to test hydrogen bomb, before the USA. That's why all our financial and scientific resources were used in this direction. The successful development of CW led to 40 thousand tons of stockpiled weapons. And BW were hard to store, difficult to employ and had a contradictory effect: by attacking the enemy, you could later infect your own troops with your own viruses. All these factors prevented the construction of a real BW carrier and impeded the development of its theoretical employment. And in order to bluff, it was enough to have the scientific potential and to imitate at least some actions in this area. In fact, this is the current strategy of Iran and Iraq. These states have a real modern biological industry, whose foundation was created by the USA itself with supplies of technological equipment and personnel training. Now the USA and NATO member states are apprehensive of the use of biological weapons on the part of these rogue regimes, although they themselves contributed to BW development. I can assess this situation as a typical bluff aimed at blackmailing the international community. It is most likely that Iran and Iraq do not have any biological weapons but their political hierarchy is well aware of the benefits of making a stir about this issue. Q.: We said that the USSR had had no reason to create real models of biological weapons. But let's imagine that such a necessity emerged. How long would it take to start mass production of biological weapons? A.: Thanks to geneticists, it became possible to change the characteristics of a pathogen with a help of genetic manipulations and to obtain a biological agent that would be less vulnerable to external conditions and more efficient in making its way through the human immune system. In the early 1970's the Government issued a decree on the expansion of genetic research and a serious study of bio-technologies. Biological weapons, with all their tactical drawbacks, are the cheapest kind of WMD in terms of production. The introduction of these technologies promised a tangible economic effect with minimal investment. That's why Bioprom was established as a special ministry to explore these opportunities and to advance our scientific technical achievements to the level of possible mass production. Later Bioprom was given a new name - the Ministry of Medical Industry. And in cooperation with our institutes a number of scientific research institutes were set up in Obolensk (Moscow region), in Serpukhov (Institute of Immunology), and in Kaltsovo (Novosibirsk NPO Vektor or Institute of Viral Rickettsia). The possibility of creating an industrial structure for the production of offensive biological agents and their carriers was considered, but this program didn't reach its fruition. The reason for that was political situation in the country. If it hadn't been for Gorbachev and his advisors we would have had some industrial enterprises capable of initiating mass production of BW components. We can only be relieved by the fact that this program was discontinued and wasn't fully implemented. And RAO Biopreparat, which was established later on the authority of the Ministry of Medical Industry and received enormous state funding, has become the most advanced pharmacological civil facility in Russia, solving solely non-military medical problems. This turn of events is welcome, although I somehow feel sorry for our military institutions, which as always have given impetus to the development of civil industry and are now without modern equipment and appropriate funding. Q.: When we speak about biological offensive means, you mention aerosols, liquids and powders. But from my childhood I remember the most famous poster on civil defense, showing a man with a broom who was sweeping away bugs and cockroaches. Why have the researchers chosen liquid aerosol BW forms? A.: You know any weapon designer wants to get a quick effect from its use. In our opinion, the most reliable means of the dispersion of pathogens was aerosol, each particle of which contained a pathogenic organism. A person, inhaling such air, would be immediately infected. You can use disease carriers but the probability of desirable effect will be much lower. The carrier may die or may not find a soldier. Moreover, a sting is always less dangerous than the inhalation of contaminated air. Japan used to employ plague-infected fleas in its projectiles, and I presume that's the reason why these insects are associated with biological weapons. There is another reason. You disperse a powder or a liquid and it will become airborne. And since louses are heavy, they won't fly in the air. It's difficult to cover the area with mosquitoes and louses. You can disperse them but they will fall somewhere and the zone of damage will be small. However, we do have suspicions about the mass emergence of Colorado beetles in Russia, a species known for damaging potatoes. Last year in the Saratovskaya region, we fought against locusts and managed to save the harvest, nearly destroyed by these insects. When we started to determine the type of these insects, it turned out that they originated on the Apennine peninsula (a very distant place from the Volga). So, it's up to you to decide whether it was a gift of nature or a secret form of diversion, especially with regard to recent developments in Cuba. The USA was accused of dropping a container with insects destroying sugarcane on Cuba. Cuba even appealed to the UN for an investigation. Sometimes carriers of diseases may be used as a diversionary tactic but they aren't suitable for large-scale germ warfare. Q.: But, in my opinion, even in the era of global confrontation no one seriously considered the possibility of launching a large-scale biological war A.: I agree. It is more likely that the possibilities of demonstrative diversion were considered. That's why nowadays the problems of biological defense have a different meaning than several decades ago, at the outset of these experiments. Modern laboratory equipment enables you to produce the most dangerous pathogens even in the most maladjusted conditions. And the result is a growing risk of biological terrorism. For instance, in the USA several groups of biological terrorists have been detected. One group inserted Salmonella into the food at a small roadside cafe. As a consequence, about 200 people were hospitalized. One lunatic was caught in his attempts to buy plague pathogens. Anyway, even in Russia one of the Chechen warlords threatened to use biological weapons, and we can't underestimate this menace. Q.: In your opinion, what is the most probable development of this scenario? How would such a terrorist act be performed? A.: It wouldn't be a big problem for a biologist who is a real specialist. You only have to possess some specific traits of character. It's not difficult to procure a biological agent for a weapon and then to act. For instance, let's take the case of the 201st division in Tajikistan. A warlord from Afghanistan (I don't remember well but he might have been trained in Pakistan) got acquainted with a nurse in a hospital. She collected the urine of a patient suffering from hepatitis for him. The urine was used to wash melons and watermelons; sometimes it was put inside the fruit with a syringe. Then the infected melons were sold at a very low price to divisions of marching Russian soldiers. Our soldiers of course bought the fruit with pleasure and, as a result, were infected with hepatitis. It all happened in 1995, but it may be regarded as a classical example of biological terrorism. Now let's take another situation. Who can prevent a terrorist from coming to an agreement with the staff of hazardous laboratories engaged in work with pathogens? It would be enough to procure one gram of the biological agent, multiply it in a nutrient medium and the weapon is ready. The thing is that even beef broth may serve as a nutrient medium. And then when you have a multiplied agent, you can use it in public places, on fruit and stationery, on door handles or you can spray it into the ventilation system. This would be terrorism. Q.: If this is really so, then there must be a list of the most probable biological threats for the Russian population? Especially if we take into account that at present your potential is little used in the Armed Forces. What are your primary responsibilities? A.: First of all, we are preparing to defend against such terrorist attacks. We are not pioneers in this area, we study corresponding foreign literature, translate articles on possible economic damage to the country in the case of terrorist BW employment. The USA has calculated and modeled the use of biological weapons against a town with a population of 100,000 people. Americans did these calculations to assess the amount of insurance fees on creating a stock of BW defense mechanisms. They understood that it would be more cost-efficient to have stocks of vaccines (which could be annually replaced with fresh ones) than to conduct liquidation activities later, trying to localize the consequences of a terrorist act. After studying this work we came to the same conclusion and decided that it would be reasonable to take similar precautions. And we are capable of solving this problem since we have already developed methods of detection, identification and protection from biological weapons in the Armed Forces. Q.: What will be the core of this program? A.: It is comprised of components similar to those we have just discussed. Q.: But we live in Russia! A.: I must say here that the USSR started a special program. Its implementation involved 15 ministries and agencies and about 100 scientific research institutes. And all of these organizations developed means of defense. Today we don't have such a state program. We are required to report to the UN that this program is underway and we have reported that we have it. But, in fact, only one military institute carries out such a program. Civilian institutes are working on such banal infections as flu, tuberculosis, and AIDS. But if someone uses a pathogen in combat, the only hope will be the military. And we'll find the means to defend people. We are the only facility exclusively working with pathogens of hemorrhagic fevers (Ebola, Lassa, Marburg). Anthrax can be also added to this list since the civilian institutes work with it but the vaccine is produced only in Yekaterinburg by our military institute. We supply the Russian Federation with all necessary means and even export some medicines abroad. Q.: That is very interesting. As far as I know when we were creating a vaccine from the Ebola virus, we didn't have infected blood samples and the USA (failing to gain the victory over this disease for many years) refused to help us. How did you solve this problem and manage to create a vaccine and even export it? A.: To be frank, we developed not a vaccine but a gammaglobulin. The thing is that in recent years migration has significantly increased and it concerns our population as well. And now Africa is visited not only by diplomats and tourists but by a number of specialists who work there on a permanent basis. That's why the threat of infection and transmission of exotic diseases like hemorrhagic fevers (Ebola, Dengue, Marburg) has grown several times in comparison to the Soviet era. Our direct responsibility is to know how to detect and classify these diseases. We must be sure that a person has Ebola fever and not the flu. At the same time, these diseases and their symptoms should be familiar to civil physicians and not only to the military, which is already well aware of such diseases. In 1997 we had such a case. Two pilots came from Zaire to Stariy Oskol and fell ill with an unknown fever. Local doctors had an suspicion that it was Ebola fever for at that time Africa was suffering from its epidemic. When they started to look for a specialist capable of curing such an exotic disease, it turned out that we had them only in the Army. Major-General Alexander Makhlai, head of the Sergiev Posad virology center (by the way, also a Hero of Russia for his invention of the gammaglobulin against Ebola fever), and another institute employee went to Stariy Oskol. They diagnosed the patients and found out that the pilots had malaria. In addition, they had the chance to train personnel in the infectious diseases department to work in the emergency department of hazardous viral diseases. And when they came back we decided to take measures to prevent such cases in the future, bearing in mind that we had the Ebola culture. Q.: Where did you get it? The pilots had malaria and the USA refused to give you the Ebola culture? A.: Right you are. The Ebola culture came to us from confidential sources Q.: That means that our foreign intelligence gets the job done, doesn't it? A.: In a way I would agree So, we had the Ebola pathogenic organism and decided to make a gammaglobulin. But we had to start from the very beginning because we didn't know what sort of pathogen it was, how to work with it and what precautions should be taken, what its nutrient medium was. Then we completed the cycle of these dangerous activities. To test the efficiency we had to vaccinate horses with the virus. It is difficult to describe working with a horse infected with Ebola. Under normal conditions this animal is difficult to manage and we had to work in special protective gear. One false step, one torn glove and the consequences would be grave. One of our employees died in the course of experiments. She tore her protective gloves but concealed it from the leadership since it happened just before the New Year holidays. As a result, by the time she turned to a doctor for help it was too late. Later we got the blood of Ebola-infected horses, sterilized it and singled out the gammaglobulin. Then we learned to make the immunoglobulin not from a pure virus but from immune systems. First we tested this medicine on animals, then on volunteers, made sure that it had normal pharmokinetics and could protect not only monkeys and small laboratory animals from the fever. In the end, we decided to present our invention as a full-fledged pharmaceutical. When in Africa there was a new outbreak of Ebola fever we offered 150 doses of our drug to the World Health Organization. It shared our medicine with the USA and the latter confirmed that it was a real gammaglobulin possessing all necessary characteristics for prophylaxis but not capable of curing the disease. The thing is that when the fever has developed it is useless. However, at the initial stage when the possibility of infection is suspected it can fully protect a person from the lethal Ebola virus. Q.: Your department finds itself in such a gloomy financial state with so many promising achievements! In my opinion, it's a paradox. I remember how before "Desert Storm" the US Army command turned to you with a request to sell them all of your anthrax vaccine. I guess there are some other proposals A.: Yes, there are but we cannot complete all of them. Q.: You denied the USA the anthrax vaccine? A.: It's a rather usual thing. The USA was our potential enemy during the Cold War and the issue of supplying them with samples of our military vaccines was long decided by various state structures. As a result, the USA, having a clear deadline for beginning "Desert Storm", purchased the vaccine in China. However, in my opinion, the main reason was not bureaucratic obstacles but an unwillingness of the state to share its military secrets in such a sensitive area as biological weapons development for the state has a great future. And, frankly speaking, the 37 aforesaid items of the biological list are just the first generation of biological weapons. Today in many parts of the world the development of the third generation is underway Click here for the full issue of Yaderny Kontrol
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