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The following excerpts are from a presentation to the Moscow International Non-Proliferation Conference on October 7 by Dr. Pervez Hoodbhoy, Professor in the Department of Physics at Pakistan's Quaid-I-Azam University. For a complete transcript of his remarks please visit The Moscow Conference page at our web site: www.ceip.org/npp
In the decade before 11 May 1998, many strategists in India
and Pakistan argued that their respective countries should go
overtly nuclear. They promised us a Nuclear Nirvana. It is amazing
how similar were the hymns they sang, how close their arguments.
These are people who hate each other's guts, but they had almost
exactly the same arguments for nuclear nirvana. Let me go over
their promises and the reality today. Nuclear Promises First, they said, once our nuclear weapon comes out of the closet and we have tested it and demonstrated that it works, then we shall not need to spend on conventional arms because our security will be guaranteed. Perhaps just a little more to pay the soldiers' salaries, but that's it. Then we can concentrate on development. Second, they said we are not like the United States and the Soviet Union and the other three nuclear weapons powers; we only want minimal deterrence. Just enough, so that the other side sees what we have. We don't need to go beyond that. An arms race is impossible, forget it! Third, they said we would not fight wars with nuclear weapons. We would just need a few weapons for high-value targets, for strategic sites -- cities only. These would not be used to take out tank divisions and not to fight tactical nuclear wars. Finally, they said, we will not even use nuclear weapons against
cities because we don't want to kill people. Look, they argued,
how we fought the wars in 1965 and 1971. We never bombed each
other's cities. We fight "gentleman's wars." So, being
gentleman we shall not attack each other's cities. Some were
carried away by Francis Fukuyama's End Of History. This is the
end of war, they said, and there shall be better relations between
India and Pakistan in the years to come. Nuclear Reality What has happened to that great dream, that nuclear heaven which they promised us? Number one: India increased its defense budget by 28%. Pakistan would love to match it, except it's bankrupt and it was only able to squeak through an 11% increase. But just in the last 8 weeks the rupee has dropped by 12% against the dollar and since most purchases are made in dollars that amounts to completely washing away that increase. Domestically, we will have to see what it does to inflation and the state of the economy. Incidentally, during President Vladimir Putin's visit, India signed a 3 billion-dollar conventional weapons deal. All this flies in the face of what was promised. There is also a complete refusal both in India and in Pakistan to define what "minimal" means. When [Deputy Secretary of State] Strobe Talbott went to New Delhi, he asked what "minimal" meant. They said "None of your business. Go back." Pakistan also refuses to apply any kind of constraint. Dr. Ekuhan, the father of Pakistan's atomic program, has said that we have enough bombs, enough missiles to take out every Indian city all the way from Amritsar to the other end of Madras, or Calcutta to Bombay. You name it, we've got it. There is a full-scale race in progress. Nothing minimal about that. Conflict Persists Finally, the nuclear hawks used to say that nuclear weapons would make both sides so secure that there would be no more war. One year ago, the Kargil conflict proved that contention utterly false. In fact, for the first time in history, perhaps, one could argue that nuclear weapons actually made possible the war (even while also playing a role in limiting it). While Pakistan wishes to liberate Kashmir, Islamabad did not want a war with India because of the relative conventional military imbalance. However, a nuclear shield emboldened Pakistan to engage in covert operations and therefore, the country launched a war on the sly, exacting great casualties among the Indians. Ultimately, Pakistan lost diplomatically, although it may have scored a military victory. Contrary to conventional deterrence theory, the Kargil conflict indicates that nuclear weapons can actually aggravate the situation -- can actually cause wars.
The Moscow International Non-Proliferation Conference co-sponsored by the Carnegie Moscow Center and the PIR Center for Policy Studies in Russia drew over 200 participants from 24 countries. Government officials met with NGO representatives, discussing issues such as nuclear safety and security, missile proliferation and nuclear arms reduction. Participants included representatives from the U.S., India, Pakistan, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Japan and Cuba. For more information, including transcripts of presentations,
please visit the Project web site at: www.ceip.org/npp Return to Global Beat Home Page Nuclear Watch | Balkan Conflicts | East Asian Security | EU Integration & Enlargement | Middle East | NATO Expansion | Nuclear Weapons and Proliferation | South Asian Security | U.S. Defense Policy | Publications | Events | |