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State Department Fact Sheet on the Enlargement of NATO: Why enlarging NATO strengthens U.S. security

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USIS Washington File

February 11, 1998

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Washington -- The State Department issued a document February 11 on the enlargement of NATO explaining in detail "why adding Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to NATO strengthens American national security."

 

President Clinton had just spoken in the Benjamin Franklin Room at the department prior to signing the NATO Enlargement Protocol which will now be transmitted to the U.S. Senate. The protocol will officially initiate the process of accession that will add Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to NATO.

 

Quoting from comments by Secretary of State Albright made last year on why NATO enlargement "is good for the United States," the February 1998 State Department document carries these explanations:

 

"NATO enlargement will make America safer. Europe remains vital to American interests, and NATO is the most effective institution for protecting the security of the transatlantic area. Adding Poland,

Hungary, and the Czech Republic to the Alliance will extend NATO's stabilizing influence to more of Europe and reduce the chances of aggression or conflict in Central Europe -- a region that helped spawn both of this century's World Wars and the Cold War.

 

"NATO enlargement will make NATO stronger. The three new members will add approximately 200,000 troops to NATO's ranks that can help NATO carry out its missions; indeed, these three states already are contributing over 1,000 troops to the NATO-led mission in Bosnia. NATO has added new members three times since its founding in 1949; now, as then, enlargement will make NATO stronger.

 

"NATO enlargement will help consolidate democracy and stability in Central Europe. To join NATO, states must be solid market democracies and have good relations with their neighbors. Just the prospect of NATO enlargement has encouraged states in the region to conclude nearly a dozen major agreements to settle border and ethnic disputes; Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have settled all border issues with their neighbors.

 

"Enlargement will help erase the Cold War dividing line. It would be wrong to exclude qualified Central European democracies from Western institutions simply because they were held behind the Iron Curtain against their will. By admitting these three states, and holding the door open to other new members in the future, NATO enlargement will help to erase the outdated and illegitimate Cold War dividing line."

 

Following is the State Department text:

 

(begin text)

 

The Enlargement of NATO

 

Why Adding Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO Strengthens American National Security

 

Released by the Office of the Secretary, Office of NATO Enlargement

Ratification

 

February 1998

 

"The bottom line is clear: Expanding NATO will enhance our security. It is the right thing to do."

 

"We must not fail history's challenge at this moment to build a Europe peaceful, democratic, and undivided, allied with us to face new security threats of the new century -- a Europe that will avoid

repeating the darkest moments of the 20th century and fulfill the

brilliant possibilities of the 21st."

 

President Clinton

May 31, 1997

 

"A larger NATO will make us safer by expanding the area in Europe

where wars simply do not happen."

 

Secretary of State

Madeleine Albright

October 7, 1997

 

Why Is NATO Enlargement Good for the United States?

 

NATO enlargement will make America safer. Europe remains vital to American interests, and NATO is the most effective institution for

protecting the security of the transatlantic area. Adding Poland,

Hungary, and the Czech Republic to the Alliance will extend NATO's stabilizing influence to more of Europe and reduce the chances of

aggression or conflict in Central Europe -- a region that helped spawn both of this century's World Wars and the Cold War.

 

NATO enlargement will make NATO stronger. The three new members will add approximately 200,000 troops to NATO's ranks that can help NATO carry out its missions; indeed, these three states already are contributing over 1,000 troops to the NATO-led mission in Bosnia. NATO has added new members three times since its founding in 1949; now, as then, enlargement will make NATO stronger.

 

NATO enlargement will help consolidate democracy and stability in Central Europe. To join NATO, states must be solid market democracies and have good relations with their neighbors. Just the prospect of NATO enlargement has encouraged states in the region to conclude nearly a dozen major agreements to settle border and ethnic disputes; Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have settled all border issues with their neighbors.

 

Enlargement will help erase the Cold War dividing line. It would be wrong to exclude qualified Central European democracies from Western institutions simply because they were held behind the Iron Curtain against their will. By admitting these three states, and holding the door open to other new members in the future, NATO enlargement will help to erase the outdated and illegitimate Cold War dividing line.

 

Preface

 

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the most successful alliance in history. For almost 50 years, it has been the primary

shield for protecting peace in Europe and the principal institution

uniting America and Europe in defense of our common interests. Now, in order to make Europe even more stable and our own country more secure, the United States and its NATO allies have decided to invite three

additional states to join the Alliance -- Poland, Hungary, and the

Czech Republic.

 

This proposal requires ratification by the United States, including a

two-thirds vote in the U.S. Senate, which is expected to vote on the measure in early 1998. The decision is one of great consequence and demands careful and bipartisan consideration by the Congress and the American public. The North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, upon which NATO is based, involves solemn security guarantees. The inclusion of additional states will entail additional costs to all of the Alliance's members -- current and new. The enlargement of NATO will benefit American security in a number of ways but has a range of implications for many aspects of U.S. foreign policy that merit

attention.

 

This pamphlet is designed to explain what NATO is, how it plans to add

these new members, and why this step, combined with other current

policies, will advance the security interests of the United States and

all of Europe.

 

NATO Members

 

Belgium Germany Luxembourg Spain

 

Canada Greece The Netherlands Turkey

 

Denmark Iceland Norway United Kingdom

 

France Italy Portugal United States

 

Introduction: Changes in Europe; Challenges for NATO

 

The end of the Cold War transformed Europe and the context in which

NATO operates. The Berlin Wall has fallen. New democracies with

thriving market economies have emerged across Central Europe. Germany has been reunited. The Soviet Union has dissolved; a democratic Russia and more than a dozen other independent states have taken its place. Such changes in Europe were unimaginable less than a decade ago.

 

These changes hold great promise for the United States. The dangerous

nuclear-armed superpower standoff of the Cold War is over. The

imminent threat of massive land invasion in Europe is gone. The

subjugation of European states has ended. The end of bloc-to-bloc

confrontation creates opportunities for nuclear and conventional arms

control, as well as for improved cooperation on a host of common

challenges from trade, to international crime, to the environment.

 

The rise of free market democracies in the place of the former Soviet

bloc also serves our interests. Democratic countries are less likely

to attack us and other democracies, and the blossoming of free market

economies creates opportunities for U.S. businesses and workers. The

interest of the United States lies in consolidating these trends and

helping to build an undivided, democratic, peaceful Europe for the

first time in its history. Both the current and preceding

administrations have relied on a variety of means -- bilateral

relations, arms control accords, and a number of multilateral

institutions -- to work toward that goal.

 

Even with the end of the Cold War, NATO remains the vital link in our

security relations across the Atlantic. The 16-member Alliance is

helping to build a new Europe. It has streamlined its command

structure and reduced its force levels, with U.S. troop strength in

Europe down from more than 300,000 during the Cold War to about

100,000 today. NATO has taken on new missions, such as the one in

Bosnia, where troops from the U.S. and other NATO countries are

working side by side with those from Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Hungary,

the Czech Republic, and other non-NATO countries. They have succeeded

in stopping the killing in Europe's worst conflict since World War II.

 

NATO also has reached out to other nations. In 1994 NATO launched the

Partnership for Peace. This program, which now includes 27 non-NATO

states, is open to all the countries of Europe and the former Soviet

Union and enables peaceful military-to-military cooperation, such as

joint training exercises and the exchange of information. In May 1997,

President Clinton and the other NATO leaders signed the NATO-Russia

Founding Act, reflecting the desire to build a new and constructive

relationship with a democratic, peaceful Russia. NATO also has

established a charter with Ukraine and formed the Euro-Atlantic

Partnership Council to enhance political discussion between NATO and

its partner states.

 

The most important change NATO has undertaken is the addition of new

members. At the Madrid summit in July 1997, President Clinton and the

other NATO leaders unanimously decided to invite Poland, Hungary, and

the Czech Republic to begin the process of joining NATO. NATO also

declared that the Alliance would keep its door open to other candidate

states as well. Meeting in Brussels on December 16, 1997, Secretary of

State Madeleine Albright and her NATO counterparts signed the

documents to add the three new members to the Alliance. This addition

of new members requires ratification by all 16 current NATO members,

including the approval of two-thirds of the U.S. Senate. The Senate is

expected to vote on the addition of these first three states in the

coming months. Members of both parties and both chambers in Congress

already have examined questions regarding NATO enlargement in great

depth. The Senate alone held 10 hearings on this issue before four

different committees in 1997, and more hearings are anticipated in

early 1998. NATO's goal is that all member nations ratify the

Alliance's enlargement by April 1999, the date of the next NATO

summit.

 

Why Is Europe Important to the United States?

 

Why should we consider Europe's security to be "vital" to the United

States? What interests do we have there?

 

These are fundamental questions. In the early days of our nation,

George Washington warned against entangling alliances, and as a

relatively new and weak state we steered clear of being tied to an

alliance with any of Europe's quarreling powers.

 

But with the rise of the United States as a major economic, political,

and military power in this century, it became clear that standing

aloof from Europe's problems was neither possible nor desirable. After

being drawn into World War I, the U.S. tried to retreat into

isolation, rejecting the League of Nations and undermining the Treaty

of Versailles. But bitter experience demonstrated that Europe's

problems soon become our own. Adolf Hitler proved that an aggressor

bent on European domination also would threaten U.S. interests and

shores. American involvement in World War II produced combat losses of nearly 300,000 of our own people and tens of millions more worldwide.

 

After World War II, the United States took a better course. The U.S.

made a decision to remain engaged in Europe's security. In 1947

President Truman launched the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe and

prevent its postwar poverty from becoming a breeding ground for new

instability. The U.S. and European states also launched a series of

economic, political, and security institutions -- including the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization --ÿ20designed to help pull European

countries closer together, to remove the sources of conflict, and to

deter future aggression.

 

The establishment of these institutions and America's new commitments

to Europe reflected the unique nature of our transatlantic bonds --

bonds of history, heritage, culture, commerce, shared security

interests, and shared values. A half-century later, these bonds remain

strong. Europe, taken as a whole, is America's largest economic

partner, accounting for $250 billion in annual two-way trade, and

another $250 billion in investment. Our commerce with Europe accounts

for millions of American jobs.

 

Similarly, Europe's states have worked with us in worldwide security

efforts, from the Gulf war, to the sanctions that helped end apartheid

in South Africa, to today's NATO-led mission in Bosnia, where almost

three-quarters of the troops are European. It is inconceivable for the

U.S. to approach the security challenges or commercial opportunities

of the next century without European states as our core partners and

allies.

 

What Is NATO?

 

One of the boldest international steps taken by the United States

after World War II was the signing in 1949 of the North Atlantic

Treaty and its creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

This step represented an acknowledgment on both sides of the Atlantic

that it was essential for the United States to stay engaged in

European security, and that a military alliance represented an

indispensable way of doing so. NATO, originally formed with 12 states,

has become the most successful alliance in history. Subsequent

expansions have brought the Alliance to 16 members.

 

The security obligations of NATO members to one another are described

by the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 (sometimes called the "Washington

Treaty"). NATO provides a mechanism for its members to discuss common security concerns, coordinate their security policies in mutually

beneficial ways, and prepare for common security challenges through

participation in an integrated military command structure. Each NATO

country retains sovereignty over its own troops, yet works with the

other allies to designate which of its forces are available to

cooperate with allied counterparts, and then to coordinate necessary

planning and training. Although NATO's existence and operations are

consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, it is not a part of

the United Nations organization.

 

NATO makes all of its decisions by consensus. All 16 members must

agree on any action before it is taken. This requirement gives each of

its members, including the U.S., a veto over any NATO decision. Thus,

NATO never deploys forces or enters into an operation without American

approval, and American forces are never deployed as part of a NATO

operation without the review, approval, and direct orders of the

President and his military chain of command. The Alliance's top

military officer in Europe -- the Supreme Allied Commander Europe --

has always been an American general, reflecting America's substantial

military contribution.

 

NATO enlargement is critical to protecting and promoting our vital

national security interests in Europe. If we fail to seize this

historic opportunity to help integrate, consolidate, and stabilize

Central and Eastern Europe, we would risk paying a much higher price

later.

 

Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen

April 23, 1997

 

The heart of NATO is its mission of collective defense of the soil of

NATO's members. This commitment is embodied in Article 5 of the North

Atlantic Treaty (for the full text of the treaty, see the Appendix at

the end of this document) which states in part:

 

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in

Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them

all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs,

each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective

self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United

Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking

forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such

action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to

restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

 

This is the strongest security commitment in the Treaty and has been a

primary basis for the mutual confidence that has evolved among NATO

allies over the past half-century. While Article 5 is a solemn

political and military commitment, it does not specify any particular

response by the United States to a specific situation, and does

nothing to diminish the role of Congress in the use of force abroad.

Indeed, under Article 11, all provisions of the Treaty, including

Article 5, are subject to the "constitutional processes" of its member

states -- a phrase specifically requested by the U.S. Senate to ensure

that the Treaty did not undermine Congress's constitutional role in

such decisions.

 

(NATO) will create a shield against aggression and fear of aggression

-- a bulwark which will permit us to get on with the real business of

government and society, the business of achieving a fuller and happier

life for all citizens....

 

President Harry S. Truman

April 4, 1949

 

NATO, headquartered in Brussels, Belgium, is at its core a military

alliance, but it always has served broad political functions. It is

the key forum for maintaining consensus among its members as they

pursue common interests. It also has helped to deepen cooperation

among its members, promote common values, and temper tensions and

disputes, such as those that have existed between Turkey and Greece.

 

Although NATO's security challenges have changed with the end of the

Cold War, enlargement will do nothing to dilute NATO's focus or drag

it into more disputes.

 

-- The Alliance's core mission will remain the collective defense of

NATO soil, and the addition of new members will improve its ability to

carry out this mission.

 

-- Enlargement reduces the chances of conflicts like the one in

Bosnia; the prospect of joining NATO has encouraged Central European

countries to settle border and ethnic disputes. The three new members

have settled all outstanding border disputes with their neighbors.

 

-- Once these states have joined the Alliance, the likelihood of

conflict diminishes even further; no NATO state has ever come under

major attack.

 

-- If a minor or internal dispute were to break out, the North

Atlantic Treaty would not automatically require U.S. military

involvement. The North Atlantic Treaty's core security guarantee is

triggered by "armed attack" on a state, and under the treaty the U.S.

still makes its own decisions about how best to respond.

 

Why Is NATO Enlargement Good for U.S. Security?

 

As the U.S. considers ratifying the addition of Poland, Hungary, and

the Czech Republic to NATO, the most fundamental question is: Why is

this in our own national security interest? There are four principal

reasons.

 

First, NATO enlargement will make America safer by helping to prevent

future conflicts in Europe. Both World Wars and the Cold War had their

roots, in part, in Central Europe. It is in our own interest to

prevent and deter conflicts in the region that ultimately could draw

in American forces. Even though Europe is now relatively peaceful, all

danger has not disappeared, as Bosnia proved. A larger NATO can bring

more states into the cooperative process of security planning that has

built confidence and stability among NATO members. It also can help

deter a variety of real and potential threats, including regional

conflicts, threats from rogue regimes, such as those with weapons of

mass destruction, and the unlikely possibility that Russia's

democratic transition might falter and give way to the patterns of

behavior demonstrated during the Soviet period.

 

While enlarging NATO requires that we extend security commitments to

the region, doing so actually reduces the chances that our forces will

ever have to fight again in Europe. As Secretary of State Albright has

noted: "This is the productive paradox at NATO's heart -- by imposing

a price on aggression, the Alliance deters aggression."

 

Second, NATO enlargement will make the Alliance stronger and better

able to address future security challenges. The inclusion of Poland,

Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO will add approximately 200,000 troops to the Alliance, along with a proven commitment to European

security. The three countries already are contributing more than 1,000

troops to the NATO-led operation in Bosnia, and Hungary has provided

the military base at Taszar that has enabled U.S. forces to deploy

safely and effectively. Similarly, the Czechs and Poles served with us

in the Gulf war, and all three states have been active participants in

NATO's Partnership for Peace program. Having so recently regained

their own freedom, these three democracies are likely to be energetic

allies in helping us to defend freedom in the future. All three states

also have made clear commitments concerning their willingness to bear

the costs of modernizing their own military forces, so that they can

be "security producers" and not simply "security consumers." NATO has

enlarged three times in the past -- adding Greece and Turkey in 1952,

Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982 -- and there is no reason to

believe that adding these three states will diminish the ability of

the Alliance to continue reaching consensus on its plans and actions.

 

Third, NATO enlargement will help consolidate democracy and stability

in Central Europe. NATO established in 1995 that states wishing to

join the Alliance would need to be stable market democracies, and

would need to have resolved outstanding disputes with their neighbors.

These requirements were essential to ensure that enlargement

strengthens the Alliance rather than weakening it. Because many

Central European states are eager to join the Alliance -- 12 in all

have indicated such an interest -- just the prospect of the Alliance's

enlargement has encouraged many to strengthen their recent reforms and

conclude agreements with neighboring states. For example, in recent

years states such as Poland have deepened civilian control over the

military, while states such as Romania have increased protections for

ethnic minorities. Similarly, there have been 10 major agreements

among states in the region during this decade settling border and

ethnic disputes; the prospect of NATO's enlargement helped encourage

negotiations on many of these agreements. All these actions removed

seeds of possible future conflicts that might otherwise have affected

U.S. security and economic interests.

 

A larger NATO will make America safer, NATO stronger, and Europe more peaceful and united. That is the strategic rationale. But ... I see a

moral imperative as well. For this is a policy that should appeal to

our hearts as well as our heads...

 

Secretary of State

Madeleine Albright

October 7, 1997

 

Fourth, NATO enlargement will help erase the Cold War dividing line.

With the Cold War over, there is no justifiable reason for permanently

excluding from Western institutions the countries that were held

behind the Iron Curtain against their will. One reason the U.S. waged

the Cold War was the belief that Central European states should be

free to choose their own governments and security arrangements. Now

that these states have regained their freedom and established market

democracies, we should welcome the opportunity to reintegrate them

into the transatlantic community. One way we can continue to erase the

outdated and illegitimate Cold War dividing line is to bring states

from Central Europe into the Alliance, as they prove their readiness

to assume the burdens of NATO membership and to contribute to the

security of the transatlantic area. The Alliance's commitment to keep

an "open door" for other states interested in joining NATO membership

and prepared to shoulder the responsibilities of membership, and its

range of efforts to reach out to non-NATO states, will help ensure

that the process of enlargement does not create a new dividing line in

Europe.

 

In our committee hearings, the vitally important issues of cost and

NATO's relations with Russia were examined in great detail. We are

persuaded that the overwhelming weight of testimony on these points

reinforces the argument for NATO enlargement.... We believe that NATO

enlargement, arguably the most important foreign policy initiative for

our country in many years, is an issue that transcends partisan

politics. Both of us are firmly convinced that enlargement is squarely

in the American national interest.

 

Senator Jesse Helms (R, NC), Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations

Committee and Joseph R. Biden (D, DE), Ranking Minority Member

 

What Will Enlargement Cost?

 

Security is not free, and NATO enlargement, like every other aspect of

America's security, will carry costs. Adding members to NATO will

require the United States and its allies to extend solemn security

commitments to additional nations, and NATO members must provide the capability to back them up. The President and his advisers are

confident, however, that the costs of NATO enlargement will be

affordable, equitably shared with our current and new allies, and well

worth the investment.

 

The cost to the United States will be modest. In February 1997, the

Pentagon estimated that the total costs of the first round of

enlargement -- costs for the U.S., for other current allies and for

the first group of new allies -- would be about $27 to $35 billion

over 13 years, with the U.S. share totaling about $1.5 to $2 billion,

spread over a period of about 10 years. (The addition of other members

in the future would likely carry additional costs, but these could not

be estimated without knowing which states might be invited to join.)

In the fall of 1997, NATO authorities examined the military

requirements and the impact of enlargement on the common-funded

budgets of NATO in greater detail, including on-site visits to

military facilities in the three invited states. Partly because these

facilities were in better condition than previously assumed, they

concluded that at least one portion of the estimated costs -- those

funded directly by NATO through its common-funded budgets -- would be less than the Pentagon's earlier estimates. The United States concurs

with NATO's assessment of $1.5 billion and now expects the U.S. share

of the costs of enlargement to be about $400 million over the coming

decade.

 

Has it not been established beyond doubt that even the most costly

preventive security is cheaper than the cheapest war? Well, such an

investment will hardly generate any return in the next elections, but

it will be more appreciated by generations to come.

 

Vaclav Havel

President of the Czech Republic

October 3, 1997

 

Our current and new allies will pay their fair share. At the Madrid

summit in July 1997, the NATO allies agreed that the costs of

enlargement would be manageable. At the North Atlantic Council Defense

Minister's meeting in December 1997, all 16 allies reaffirmed this

view, stating that

 

(C)osts associated with the accession of the three invitees will be

manageable, and that the resources necessary to meet these costs will

be provided in accordance with our agreed procedures under which each

ally bears its fair share.

 

Moreover, both our current allies and the three proposed new allies

are investing in the modernization of their militaries, at their own

expense, in ways that will better enable them to contribute to NATO's

missions.

 

There would be greater costs and risks to not enlarging NATO. If the

U.S. and its allies fail to help integrate and stabilize Central and

Eastern Europe, it could lead to far higher costs later. Polish,

Hungarian, and Czech officials have all stressed that it would cost

more to pay for their defense outside NATO than inside. Not only would

they feel more insecure and thus want to spend more on their own

defense outside the Alliance, they would not have the benefit of being

able to pool their defense resources with those of other like-minded

states. The United States also benefits from having Poland, Hungary,

and the Czech Republic in the Alliance. Bringing new states into NATO

will help prevent conflicts that could cost the U.S. more in the

future, and will add new allies that are ready and willing to share

the costs of security.

 

Some estimates produced by both public and private sector

organizations have projected higher costs than those produced by the

Department of Defense. Those estimates, however, are based on a much

higher threat level, and a much higher level of readiness than

political conditions in Europe warrant now and are likely to warrant

for the foreseeable future. The U.S. General Accounting Office in a

report from August 1997 stated,

 

Our analysis of DoD's cost estimate to enlarge NATO indicates that its

key assumptions were generally reasonable and were largely consistent

with the views of U.S., NATO, and foreign government officials.

 

Are Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic Ready To Become NATO

Members?

 

When President Clinton made the decision to favor the admission into

NATO of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, he did so because he

believed those three nations represent the very strongest candidates

among the 12 states in the region that had expressed interest in

becoming part of the Alliance. At the July 1997 Madrid summit, there

was unanimous agreement to invite those three because, of all

potential members, they were strongest politically, economically,

militarily, and in their foreign policy outlooks.

 

Political readiness. All three countries have had seven years of solid

records as stable democracies. Since 1989, Poland and the Czech

Republic have each held three free parliamentary elections and

Hungary, two. Just this past September, Poland held free elections

that led to another peaceful change in government and once again

demonstrated the vitality of that country's democracy.

 

All three candidates for membership have taken numerous steps to

underscore their political maturity, pluralism, tolerance, and respect

for human rights. The groundwork laid by bold leaders such as Vaclav

Havel and Lech Walesa has become the foundation for strong and stable

democracies. As these countries have emerged from the yoke of

communism, they have made tremendous progress in fostering tolerance

for Jewish and other religious minorities and ethnic groups. Property

restitution laws have been passed to restore to their rightful owners

assets stolen by communist regimes. The people of these countries are

ready to embrace the Atlantic community, and polling in all three

states shows strong support for NATO membership. In November Hungary held a national referendum on whether to join NATO; more than 85% of

those voting said "yes."

 

Economic readiness. During the 1990s, Central and East European

countries have had the fastest economic growth rate in Europe, and the

economies of the three NATO candidate states led the way. In eight

years, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have undertaken

sweeping privatization programs. Currently, over two-thirds of

Poland's and more than 70% of Hungary's and the Czech Republic's

economies are held by the private sector. Business is expanding

steadily in these countries, which have become growing markets for

American goods and services. Major U.S. companies have invested

billions of dollars in the region.

 

If we wish to ensure that we build a stable Europe, a stable and

undivided Europe, it's right to enlarge NATO and offer the Central and

East European countries the same opportunity that Western Europe has,

while at the same time building a special relationship with Russia.

 

Gen. John Shalikashvili

Then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

June 16, 1997

 

Military readiness. The three new NATO members will add approximately 200,000 troops and a range of airfields, ports, and lines of

communication to the Alliance's collective defense capabilities.

Together, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary are already

contributing more than 1,000 troops to the NATO-led mission in Bosnia.

These countries' contributions to our security are nothing new. As far

back as the 1700s, General Kosciuszko of Poland was one of the heroes

of the American Revolutionary War and played a key role in the victory

at Saratoga. Free Polish and Czech soldiers fought alongside our

troops in World War II and all three states joined forces with us in

the Gulf war. The three countries also have established firm civilian

control of their militaries and have solid records of reliability in

handling sensitive information, both important factors in their

readiness to join NATO.

 

Foreign policy readiness. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have

signed agreements to settle all major ethnic and border disputes with

their neighbors and are deepening cooperation with these states on a

range of common challenges. These countries are playing an important

role as models for other countries in Central and Eastern Europe that

seek to join NATO of the types of political reforms needed to become

members of the Atlantic Alliance. They also have contributed

peacekeeping forces to operations in Asia and the Middle East and

stood with us in efforts to combat weapons proliferation. In these and

other ways, their behavior suggests they will be good allies.

 

What Will Be the Impact of Enlargement on Relations With Russia?

 

The goal that motivates NATO enlargement is the creation of an

undivided, democratic, and peaceful Europe. That goal cannot be fully

realized unless our efforts also include Russia. The continued

development of a democratic Russia, satisfied within its borders and

at peace with its neighbors, offers one of the most important

improvements in the security environment of the entire transatlantic

area, and especially for the states of Central Europe.

 

NATO expansion means peace and stability, not a drive at confrontation

with anybody. This is not a question of aggravating Russia. It is a

question of peace in the world.

 

Lech Walesa

Former President of Poland

March 11, 1997

 

The United States and its allies have taken a wide range of steps to

encourage the continuation of democratic developments in Russia. The

extent of our bilateral efforts with Russia ranges from cooperation in

space, to the involvement of Russian troops with our mission in

Bosnia, to working together to eliminate the means of delivery for

strategic nuclear weapons and to clean up the environment. We also

work with Russia in multilateral settings such as the 1997 Denver

"Summit of the Eight," which brought Russia together with the top

seven industrial countries to discuss a range of economic and

political issues. In the past five years, more than 20,000 Russians

have visited the United States through official exchange programs.

 

In order to further such constructive ties with Russia, the Alliance

crafted and signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act in May 1997, which

institutionalizes a broad and constructive relationship between the

Alliance and Russia. One of the key features of the Act is the

establishment of the Permanent Joint Council which provides a forum

for senior NATO and Russian leaders to discuss security issues. This

council has already held several productive ministerial meetings in

which Secretary Albright or Secretary Cohen met with NATO and Russian counterparts.

 

Of course, Russia's future is not certain, and it is possible Russia's

democratic and economic transition could falter. One of the

contingencies the Alliance must prepare for is the unlikely

possibility that the Russian transition might fail and that Russia

might return to the threatening behavior of the Soviet period. But

U.S. policy, including NATO enlargement, the NATO-Russia Founding Act, and the Permanent Joint Council, is designed to create the greatest

possible likelihood that Russia will be able to play a full and

constructive role in Europe's future.

 

Despite this record of intensifying cooperation between Russia with

both the U.S. and NATO, many in Russia oppose NATO enlargement.

President Yeltsin, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, and others have

criticized it. Some in Russia's parliament, the Duma, have cited it as

a reason for delaying ratification of the START II nuclear arms

reduction treaty. Some observers have expressed concern that

ultranationalists could use the issue to fan popular resentment in

Russia and thereby strengthen the hand of hard-line political leaders.

 

However, partly because of the cooperative efforts initiated with

Russia by the U.S. and NATO, there are strong reasons to believe that

NATO enlargement is not undermining Russian reform or strengthening

hardliners. Many recent developments argue to the contrary, including

the re-election of Boris Yeltsin and the presence of reformers in

positions of power, the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act,

ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and Russian

participation in NATO programs such as the Partnership for Peace and

the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. Nor is there significant

evidence that NATO enlargement has been successfully used as a

rallying cry by hardliners.

 

The reasons are straightforward. NATO, a purely defensive alliance,

does not threaten Russia. Moreover, since the end of the Cold War,

NATO greatly reduced troop levels and declared that it does not view

Russia as an adversary. NATO also has stated that in the current and

foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will carry out its

collective defense and other missions by ensuring the necessary

interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather

than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces.

NATO also has stated that it has no intention, no plan, and no reason

to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members.

 

U.S. interests are served by both NATO enlargement and a more

cooperative relationship with Russia, and there are strong signs that

the U.S. and its European partners can successfully pursue both. Even

so, there are some in the United States who worry that the new

arrangements with Russia -- the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the

Permanent Joint Council -- might weaken NATO by giving Russia too much influence in the Alliance or relegate the new members to second-class status. Yet the Founding Act and Permanent Joint Council were carefully designed to enable a constructive relationship with Russia

without undermining NATO's strength or effectiveness.

 

Although the NATO-Russian relationship is growing deeper, there are

important provisions built into the NATO-Russia founding Act.

 

-- It gives Russia a voice, but not a veto, in European security

issues.

 

-- Russia will not be part of the North Atlantic Council, the

Alliance's supreme decision-making body, and will have no control over

its deliberations or actions. Nor will Russia be part of the committee

that sets NATO's nuclear policy, its defense planning process, or

other internal Alliance decisionmaking bodies.

 

-- Because the Permanent Joint Council can only act on the basis of

consensus, each NATO member, including the U.S., retains an effective

veto over its decisions.

 

-- The statements in the NATO-Russia Founding Act concerning NATO's

nuclear and conventional posture policies were unilateral NATO

statements of policy, explicitly premised on the current and

foreseeable security environment, and based on NATO members' own

self-interest, not extended as a favor to Russia.

 

-- The Permanent Joint Council is not something that only benefits

Russia; NATO can use this forum to raise its own concerns with Russia.

 

What Does Enlargement Mean For States Not Initially Invited Into the

Alliance?

 

Given its motivating goal of an undivided, democratic, peaceful

Europe, NATO enlargement is intended to benefit all of Europe, not

just the three states that initially have been invited to join. NATO

has undertaken a number of steps to ensure that the process of

enlargement helps increase security throughout the region.

 

-- At the Madrid summit, NATO's leaders adopted an "open door" policy

that ensures other countries wishing to enter the Alliance and

prepared to share its burdens will be considered in the future.

President Clinton has stressed that NATO's invitations to Poland, the

Czech Republic, and Hungary will not be the last.

 

-- NATO and its partners have established the Euro-Atlantic

Partnership Council which provides a forum for intensified political

and security consultations for countries on both sides of the

Atlantic.

 

-- NATO signed a charter with Ukraine as well as its Founding Act with

Russia.

 

-- The U.S. is taking bilateral steps to enhance the security and

advance the integration of the Baltic states. In the Charter of

Partnership with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, recently signed by

President Clinton and the Baltic leaders, the U.S. welcomes the

aspirations and supports the efforts of these states to join NATO.

 

Still, there are some who worry that NATO enlargement will draw a new

dividing line in Europe that will cause new tensions and reduce the

security of those states not invited in. Again, this is an important

concern. Yet there is strong evidence to suggest that NATO enlargement

is not having this effect.

 

Worries that those countries not initially invited to join, such as

Romania and Slovenia, would feel isolated or be destabilized by the

enlargement process have not materialized. In fact, President Clinton

received a clamorous welcome when he traveled to Romania two days

after the Madrid summit. Leaders throughout the region have expressed

support for the decisions taken at Madrid -- even if their own states

were not invited -- and support for the broader process these

decisions represent. Nor have states not invited at Madrid become more

vulnerable. During this period, Russia has increased its cooperation

with Estonia and Ukraine and has signed a border agreement with

Lithuania, the first of its kind with a former Soviet republic.

Meanwhile, Poland is strengthening its ties to the Baltic states and

Ukraine.

 

Why Not Rely on the European Union or Other Existing Programs?

 

NATO enlargement is just one aspect of Europe's post-Cold War

adaptation. Economic challenges remain pivotal for Central European

states. Most of these states need to advance and deepen aspects of

reform -- from privatization, to improved regulatory regimes, to

efforts against corruption. This is one reason we support the

enlargement of the European Union (EU) to include Central European

states.

 

While the role of the EU is crucial, there is no reason to insist on a

choice between EU enlargement and NATO enlargement. Both are

important. Each contributes to European prosperity and security.

Moreover, EU enlargement alone is not sufficient to secure our

nation's security interests in post-Cold War Europe. The EU lacks the

kind of advanced, integrated military capability which remains the

heart of NATO's strength, and which continues to be needed to preserve

European security. Moreover, the U.S. is not a member of the European

Union, which is one reason why NATO remains our nation's most

important and effective link to transatlantic security.

 

Similarly, there are other existing programs that focus on Central

Europe that will complement NATO's enlargement but cannot by

themselves accomplish the same objectives. NATO's Partnership for

Peace program, for example, has provided an excellent means for

Europe's NATO and non-NATO states to develop deeper ties through

military-to-military cooperation and to enable states that aspire to

NATO membership to improve their readiness. Partnership for Peace,

however, does not entail mutual security commitments as does actual

NATO membership, nor does it provide the same incentives and benefits

of integration as NATO's enlargement.

 

Conclusion: Building Another Half-Century of Security and Peace The

20th century has been the bloodiest in history, and much of the

conflict and warfare it produced was on the European continent. The

United States paid a heavy price in those conflicts, measured in both

financial and human cost. One of the great challenges of this time is

to find ways of preserving and strengthening the relatively peaceful

security environment that we now enjoy in Europe after the end of the

Cold War.

 

The enlargement of NATO is a key part of the strategy to meet that

challenge, and it builds on the central lessons that have emerged from

this century's experiences.

 

-- Europe's security is vital to our own, and NATO enlargement will

help make Europe more stable and secure.

 

-- The period between the two World Wars revealed the futility of

American retreat from European security challenges, and NATO

enlargement will help our nation continue to play a leading role in

European security -- for our sake as well as Europe's.

 

-- The two World Wars and the Cold War point to the key role Central

Europe plays in Europe's conflicts, and adding new members to the

Alliance will enable NATO to do for Europe's east what it has done for

Europe's west.

 

-- The success of NATO in deterring Soviet aggression and deepening

European integration during the Cold War -- and its success more

recently in stopping the fighting in Bosnia -- testifies to the

effectiveness of this Alliance; adding new members will make the

Alliance stronger and better able to carry out its mission.

 

-- Our experiences across this century -- from the World Wars to the

Gulf war -- highlight the value of reliable allies that are willing to

help shoulder the burdens of security; NATO enlargement will give us

three new allies that are ready to share those burdens and have done

so in the past.

 

In all these ways, the enlargement of NATO will advance American

interests, prevent future conflicts, deter future threats, and help

consolidate the gains of democracy and stability that have come with

the end of the Cold War. It will help build a Europe that is

undivided, democratic, and at peace -- and by doing so, create a more

secure foundation for the United States in the 21st century.

 

Appendix: The North Atlantic Treaty

Washington, D.C.

April 4, 1949

 

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and

principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to

live in peace with all peoples and all governments.

 

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and

civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy,

individual liberty and the rule of law.

 

They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic

area.

 

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and

for the preservation of peace and security.

 

They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:

 

Article 1

 

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United

Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be

involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace

and security, and justice, are not endangered, and to refrain in their

international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner

inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

 

Article 2

 

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful

and friendly international relations by strengthening their free

institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the

principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting

conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate

conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage

economic collaboration between any or all of them.

 

Article 3

 

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty,

the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and

effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their

individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

 

Article 4

 

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of

them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of

any of the Parties is threatened.

 

Article 5

 

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in

Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them

all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs,

each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective

self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United

Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking

forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such

action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to

restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

 

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall

immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall

be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures

necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

 

Article 6

 

For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the

Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

 

-- on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America,

on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or

on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the

North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;

 

-- on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in

or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which

occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date

when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the

North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

 

Article 7

 

This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as

affecting, in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of

the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary

responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of

international peace and security.

 

Article 8

 

Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in

force between it and any other of the Parties or any third state is in

conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to

enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

 

Article 9

 

The Parties hereby establish a council, on which each of them shall be

represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this

Treaty. The council shall be so organized as to be able to meet

promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies

as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a

defense committee which shall recommend measures for the

implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

 

Article 10

 

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European

state in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to

contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to

this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by

depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the

United States of America. The Government of the United States of

America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such

instrument of accession.

 

Article 11

 

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the

Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible

with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify

all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into

force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the

ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the

ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,

the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and

shall come into effect with respect to other states on the date of the

deposit of their ratifications.

 

Article 12

 

After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time

thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult

together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for

the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic

area, including the development of universal as well as regional

arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the

maintenance of international peace and security.

 

Article 13

 

After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may

cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been

given to the Government of the United States of America, which will

inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each

notice of denunciation.

 

Article 14

 

This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally

authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the

United States of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by

that Government to the Governments of the other signatories.

 

Note:

 

Article 6 of the Treaty was modified by Article II of the Protocol to

the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey

(1952).

 

(end text)

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