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NATO Expands, Horizons Contract

By Michael Moran, international editor of MSNBC
March 3, 1998

The American-led effort to expand what used to be known as the "Western alliance" into what we used to call "Eastern Europe" is short-term, opportunistic thinking. It is very Clintonesque, a kind of "foreign policy of inclusion." But it is also dangerous. Rather than making nuclear armed Russia the centerpiece of its European security policy, Washington has opted instead to erect a new wall providing false security for some while strengthening the darkest elements of vanquished Soviet society.

It's the Economy Stupid!
These words are true today in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union to a far greater extent than they ever were in George Bush's kinder, gentler America. Yet nearly a decade after the Berlin Wall collapsed, the NATO alliance - its relevance already in question - may yet manage to manufacture a security threat in the bedraggled, shattered remnants of its former rival. NATO is expanding its borders, its membership as well as its internal problems. All the while, it is shrinking its horizons. For five years now, the United States has been pressing to expand the world's most successful military alliance to include the Czechs, Poles, Hungarians into the fold. Eventually, NATO would extend membership to many other former Warsaw Pact states. Even the Russians themselves, it is whispered rather disingenuously, may someday join.

The debate reaches a final milestone in the U.S. Senate this month, where Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright hopes to prevail over (mostly Republican) opponents who see the endeavor as an enormous waste of money.

Right Position, Wrong Reason
Trust the Senate to be right in opposing this but doing it for all the wrong relevance in reasons. As Albright and other officials have pointed out, if a thing this big is worth doing, it's worth paying for. But even most alarmist estimates of the financial security threat costs of NATO expansion pale in comparison with what the decision might cost in terms of bedraggled, European stability and long-term U.S. interests.

The benefits of this policy are fairly easy to spell out. Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary will tether themselves to the West in a more significant way, increase the efficiency of their armed forces and stop worrying about the Russians someday returning. Other Central and Eastern European countries, slightly miffed at missing the first NATO bus, will strive to get on the next one, providing a useful check on their less savory instincts.

Those are not small issues. Franklin Roosevelt's signature on the Yalta treaty, which essentially left those nations and others in Soviet clutches after World War II, is a weighty historical debt. But wait. Before we make good on the debt, or at least before we decide this is the way to pay it, let's consider the costs.

Expand NATO, Diminish Yeltsin
As Russian President Boris Yeltsin warned last year, expanding NATO to include former Soviet allies in Eastern Europe will be interpreted by many as an action directed against Russia. Yeltsin accompanied these observations with his now familiar Chicken Little act, "new Cold War," "World War III," and (God forbid!) a Russian alliance with Belarus.

But his words were only partly bluster. As is often the case with Yeltsin, between the lines was a far more serious message. Yeltsin and his aides told Washington last year that expanding NATO would deliver an enormously damaging blow to those in Moscow who hope to integrate a peaceful, democratic Russia into Europe in the next century. By inflaming the Russian right, they warned, you risk putting one of their number in the Kremlin after Yeltsin dies.

Why do we care? After all, didn't the Soviet Union run roughshod over the concerns of all around them for 50 years?

Perhaps. But the 10,000 nuclear warheads that Soviet Union built in that half century still remain buried in the country's silos and tucked away in its submarines patrolling the high seas. These weapons have lost their psychological impact on Americans since the days of Mikhail Gorbachev. Yet it only takes a simple change of leadership to undo all that has been accomplished since Gorbachev. An alliance of the Russian right and its wounded but still dangerous communists cannot be ruled out. Not surprisingly, behind all of Mother Russia's problems these types see the hand of that evil corporate capitalist, Uncle Sam.

Already, the NATO decision has cost the West dearly with regard to Russia. The gestures to his Russian military has used it to block a wise Iraqi counterpart campaign aimed at downsizing the bloated army and navy. More relevant in the short term, Yeltsin has been unable to protect his pro-Western cabinet members from assault by the right- and communist-dominated Duma. He was forced to sack his pro-Western international foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, installing opposition to in his place the old Soviet spymaster - and U.S. policy in Friend of Saddam - Yevgeny Primakov. Anyone who has followed the crisis in the Gulf knows how this change already has affected U.S. interests.

Delusions of Security
There also is a bit of a confidence game going on here. For a moment, let's assume the Russian military is capable of something other than leveling Chechen villages. Here's the scenario: A mad colonel takes control in Moscow and immediately declares the dissolution of the Soviet Union illegal. By midnight, Russian tanks are moving toward Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia - the Baltic states freed when the USSR expired.

Few Americans know this, but under the terms of the "Baltic Charter" signed in December with these states, the United States may or may not be bound to come to their defense. This strategic ambiguity is useful for the Clinton administration because it keeps Moscow guessing and allows them to dodge specifics about what circumstances would result in American troops being sent to fight.

But in the Baltic states, the ambiguity is curiously absent. An Estonian foreign ministry official tells me he expects Washington would come to his country's rescue in the event of trouble with Russia. A Latvian embassy official here in the United States said "the Russians now know we will have the U.S. on our side."

But is it really honest of the United States to promise to send American troops to defend Tallinn or Vilnius? Or, for that matter, Warsaw, Budapest or Prague?

Luckily, I think these scenarios are absurd because of the prostrate state of Russia's military. But the lack of long-term thought being put into these agreements is disturbing.

Packing the Pact
All of this is easy to dismiss as hypothetical, of course, so let's deal with the real world for a moment. Well, not quite the real world: let's deal with the world of planet NATO.

Currently, NATO includes two members (Greece and Turkey) in a perpetual state of near-war. Another member (France) whose national pride requires it to refrain from full military participation; yet it still has the gall to demand that one of its officers be put in command of NATO's Mediterranean fleet - which, by the way, is also known as the U.S. Sixth Fleet.

The Italians, British and Germans have severely reduced the size of their armed forces since the Cold War ended. Many of them bristle at U.S. efforts to impose economic embargoes on states like Iran, Libya and Cuba - all lucrative markets for European firms.

Faced with this discord, the U.S. has apparently chosen to do what Roosevelt tried to do in 1937 when he proposed expanding the Supreme Court from nine to 15 members. Roosevelt, of course, like the United States in the expansion of NATO, would choose the new members. The Roosevelt plan was wisely abandoned. Let's hope NATO expansion meets the same fate.


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