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On 8 July, 1998 the British Secretary of State for Defence, George Robertson, announced the outcome of the Labour Government's Strategic Defence Review, launched on 28 May 1997. The Review, intended to examine Britain's defence needs to the year 2015, has been published as a White Paper with a separate appendix of essays covering the various issues. The Acronym Institute has reproduced excerpts from the SDR and related documents and speeches relevant to nuclear disarmament, proliferation and arms control. The full texts may be obtained from the Ministry of Defence. After identifying that today there is "no direct military threat to the United Kingdom or Western Europe", the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) notes that risks to international stability are more likely to come from "ethnic and religious conflict; population and environmental pressures; competition for scarce resources; drugs, terrorism and crime." To deal with the multiplicity of more diffuse tasks envisaged in the post-Cold War world, the SDR proposes a reshaping of the British armed forces, shifting towards greater mobility and rapid response capabilities and more efficient cooperation (among the forces and jointly with other countries). On launching the Review, Robertson had already made it clear that neither NATO nor Britain's possession of the Trident nuclear weapon system would be questioned, although changes in role and operations could be considered. The SDR described NATO as the "cornerstone" of Britain's defence planning and reiterated that British nuclear weapons were "a necessary element of our security". This Strategic Defence Review was not merely a Treasury-driven exercise in cost-cutting, but nor was it the root and branch strategic analysis of security, defence and international relations that some had hoped for. The main focus of the SDR was on force structure, resulting in a fairly comprehensive set of proposals to rationalise and re-organise the armed forces, upgrade their equipment and technology, reaffirm the importance of logistics coordination, and prepare them more efficiently for rapid deployment and joint actions with other countries, including NATO's combined joint task forces and UN missions. Relatively small sums of money are saved here and there, but the main claw-back is achieved by selling off some of the prime Ministry of Defence real estate sites in London, including regimental barracks. In hardware terms, the planned configuration of Britain's forces to 2015 may be summarised as follows (pre SDR figures/plans in brackets): * Trident submarines 4 (4); * Trident missiles 58 (65); * Maximum nuclear warheads per Trident submarine 48 (96); * Attack submarines 10 (12); * Aircraft carriers 2 very large (3 smaller); * Destroyers/Frigates 32 (35); * Roll-on roll-off container ships 6 (2); * Minesweepers 22 (25); * Offensive air support 154 (177); * C-17 heavy airlift planes 4 extra; * Tank regiments 6 larger (8); * Engineer regiments 13 (11). In addition, the government pledges to go ahead with the controversial order for 232 Eurofighter aircraft (another sacred cow that was exempted from SDR scrutiny), and will shortly be bringing into service a fleet of new Apache helicopters, 'smart' weapons and improved intelligence and reconnaissance equipment. From across a spectrum of defence correspondents and military analysts, the force reorganisations and commitments to better integration, flexibility and cooperation were generally evaluated as 'sensible'. The conservative Daily Telegraph described the SDR as business as usual, but dressed in more persuasive language. Finding Labour decked out in traditional Tory defence clothing and with the SDR well supported by the armed services Chiefs, the Opposition Conservative Party gave a perfunctory response. Their main accusation appeared to be that Labour might not carry through its expensive plan to commission two 21,000 tonne aircraft carriers. These proposed carriers, central to the 'force projection' concept which the SDR embraced, were the subject of tough exchanges between the Treasury, which questioned their necessity and expense, and the Ministry of Defence. For the purposes of the SDR, the MOD won. But the proposal will next be subjected to a drawn-out planning process and costings, and other considerations, most importantly cost, could enable the Treasury to win the next round.
Nuclear Policy There were a few noisy jeers from Labour back-benchers when Robertson underlined the government's commitment to the Trident nuclear system. In fact, the announcement on nuclear policy contained little that was unexpected, as the main proposals had been floated in the press for months. In a section entitled 'Deterrence and Disarmament', Labour confirmed its pre-election pledge to cut Trident warheads to Polaris numbers, but chose to use the early Polaris figures of 48 per submarine rather than the later Polaris-Chevaline deployment of 32 per boat. The overall stockpile was announced to be below 200 warheads. (Since removal of the last WE-177 free-fall bombs earlier this year, Britain no longer possesses tactical nuclear weapons.) If the SDR had based its figures on the later Polaris deployments, the warhead complement could have been brought down to around 128. The remaining seven Trident D-5 missiles on order from the United States were cancelled, leaving Britain with 58 rather than the planned 65 missile bodies. Fewer nuclear weapons are of course better than more, but at around 192 warheads of around 100 kt, Britain's nuclear forces still pack a potential explosive power of more than 19 megatons, over 1500 times the size of the Hiroshima bomb. The SDR especially underlined that the new policy represents a reduction of more than 70 percent in the potential explosive power of Britain's nuclear forces since the end of the Cold War. Explosive power, however, does not necessarily equate with potential damage: single large bombs or lots of nuclear artillery shells used on a battlefield would kill fewer people and wreak less havoc than Trident-type medium-sized (100 kt) multiple warheads independently targeted as part of a strategic strike force. Significantly, Labour announced that its nuclear forces were on a "reduced day-to-day alert state", not targeted, and normally at "several days 'notice to fire'". Such a level of de-alerting provides a welcome protection against accidental, hair trigger or unauthorised firing. It falls a long way short of the kind of confidence-building measures and operational marginalisation of nuclear weapons that had been called for by many citizens' groups and analysts. Despite the MOD's actual failure to provide continuous 24-hour patrols during the past decade, Labour confirmed the aim of having at least one Trident submarine at sea at all times. The argument for mothballing the fourth submarine was rejected. All four will be brought into service, with the intention of having two in port while one is on patrol. The implication is that deterrence requires continuous readiness, if not hair trigger alert. Relying on arguments about 'surprise attack' and potential misunderstandings, the SDR rejected proposals for 'de-weaponising' Trident by separating and storing the warheads on land. On the contrary, it pledges to "ensure that we can restore a higher state of alert should this become necessary at any time." Stating that the "credibility of deterrence also depends on retaining an option for a limited strike that would not automatically lead to a full scale nuclear exchange", the SDR proposes a 'sub-strategic' role for Trident, but fails to say what that might look like. Although the SDR states that "the Government wishes to see a safer world in which there is no place for nuclear weapons", it clearly does not envisage Britain giving them up any time soon: "while large nuclear arsenals and risks of proliferation remain, our minimum deterrent remains a necessary element of our security". Elsewhere, the SDR refers to nuclear deterrence as "longer term insurance" for NATO. The SDR underlines British support for nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear arms control and expresses the hope that the START process will be revived and that Russian shorter range weapons will also be reduced. As far as the UK is concerned, however, the policy is clear: "Our own arsenal, following the further reductions described..., is the minimum necessary to provide for our security for the foreseeable future and very much smaller than those of the major nuclear powers. Considerable further reductions in the latter would be needed before further British reductions could become feasible." Arguing that "greater transparency about nuclear programmes also adds to international trust and security", the SDR takes the significant step of announcing Britain's holdings of fissile materials for military purposes: 7.6 tonnes of plutonium; 21.9 tonnes of highly enriched uranium and 15,000 tonnes of other forms of uranium. The MOD also pledged to put 0.3 tonnes of 'surplus' weapon grade plutonium under international safeguards, for the first time accepting that Britain has such surplus stocks. Moreover, the UK would cease to exercise its 'right' under the NPT to withdraw fissile material from safeguarded stocks for nuclear weapons. All planned reprocessing would henceforth be carried out under safeguards and an initial report would be published by the year 2000 on past production for military purposes. The SDR also provides more open figures on the nuclear stockpile and on the aggregate costs associated with Trident and the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE). In offering such information, Labour is responding to appeals for greater transparency, both for confidence-building and to help prepare the ground for banning the production of fissile materials (in a multilateral cut-off treaty or fissban). Previous governments have always hidden behind the Official Secrets Act and claims about 'national security'. This transparency initiative, therefore, should be welcomed as a positive step forward and a genuine attempt to facilitate the start of negotiations on a cut-off treaty, even though it does not yet go far enough.
Conclusion The Strategic Defence Review was the product of wider consultations than ever before, but in the end offered little more than rationalised business as usual, with the promise of better management and coordination. If it had been truly strategic it would have been prepared to examine the arguments for and against NATO, Trident and the Eurofighter on their merits. NATO expansion and British and NATO nuclear policies carry the risk of fuelling or precipitating the dangers that they are presented as defences against, namely a renewed Russian threat and nuclear proliferation. By not examining such commitments, each of which carries very high financial costs and political implications, the SDR leaves the impression that it lacked confidence that NATO, Trident and the Eurofighter would survive the scrutiny of a truly strategic look at future security and defence requirements. There is a disconnect between the assessment of 'tomorrow's threats' and the over-reliance on traditional military responses, even if the forces are to be restructured to provide more flexible, cooperative and mobile 'quick response' capabilities. Despite the rhetoric, the SDR appears to have been 'foreign policy led' only to the extent that it justifies far larger military forces than would be warranted by the actual defence needs of such a relatively small population in a group of islands at the Western end of the European continent (albeit with residual colonial interests in far-flung places). In particular, the nuclear weapons and large aircraft carriers for 'force projection' have to do with 'punching above our weight', a means of maintaining a prominent role in international affairs and reinforcing Britain's usefulness to the United States as 'best buddy' in the Atlantic Alliance. The underlying doctrine of power projection was dressed as international responsibility and 'defence diplomacy'. Within the context the SDR outlined, many of the proposals for rationalising and reconfiguring the armed forces were sensible. This was, however, an opportunity also to promote a larger understanding of collective international security and on that test, the SDR must be counted a failure. For example, instead of reinforcing its public message to India and Pakistan that they do not need nuclear weapons for their security, Britain has, by its statements on nuclear policy, proclaimed the opposite. The cuts to Trident are welcome, but must be put into perspective. If a man weighing 300 kilos reduces down to 150 kg, it is perhaps necessary to congratulate him on losing half his weight, but that should not obscure the reality that he will still be terribly and life-threateningly obese. As expressed in the SDR, Britain's nuclear policies continue to present an advertising billboard for proliferation. Not unsurprisingly, in view of its past history, Labour has avoided the real nuclear questions about utility and legitimacy. With its transparency initiative on fissile materials, the MOD has taken a laudable step to facilitate negotiations on banning the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for weapons. At the same time, however, the SDR also reiterated justifications for Britain to stay out of nuclear disarmament negotiations for a long time. If the Government believes that Britain still needs nuclear weapons for security, what arguments can it make to convince India, Pakistan, Iraq, North Korea, Iran and others that they do not?
Quotes and Reaction "After the defence review we need coherent restatement of our foreign policy to justify its recommendations." Lord Wallace, Liberal Democrat Spokesperson, 'Spent Force', The Guardian, 9 July 1998. "... what the review does generally makes good sense. What it does not do raises more difficulties... no-one should be surprised that this governmenta has not questioned [the] strategic fundamentals." The Guardian, 9 July 1998. "... business as usual ...the review merely finds new and neater ways of presenting the functions that the Armed Forces already carry out; announces sensible changes in the control of those functions; introduces the next generation of equipment necessary to their performance, and provides assurances that the money will be found, within a slighter tighter budget, to fund them all." Daily Telegraph, 9 July 1998. Click here for The Acronym Institute. Return to Global Beat Home Page Nuclear Watch | East Asian Security | Economic & Monetary Union | NATO Expansion | Nuclear Weapons and Proliferation | U.S. Defense Policy | Publications | Events | |
