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NATO expansion will plant a permanent seed of mistrust between the United States and Russia. It will worsen existing differences on everything from nuclear-arms control to policies in Iraq and Iran. It will push Moscow into alliances with China, India and rogue regimes. And it will move America towards unilateral actions, disregarding the interests and positions of other states. The recent crisis over Iraq and rising U.S.-Russia tensions over the use of force to ensure Baghdad's compliance with United Nations weapons inspections speak to more than just differing responses to problems in the Gulf region. The reasons for the widening U.S.-Russia gap are of a broader nature and deal with the architecture of the whole post-Cold War security system and the relative roles of major powers in its operation. The first serious crack in this architecture was created with a decision at the 1997 NATO Madrid summit to extend the alliance to the East by inviting Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to join NATO. There is no doubt that the Iraq crisis was just the first big issue, affected by the growing mistrust between Russia and the West. Others will follow, if the issue of NATO enlargement is not quickly and efficiently resolved by a mutually acceptable compromise. There is a broad political consensus in Russia that NATO expansion is not just against Russian security interests, but also violates some commonly accepted rules on which the Cold War was ended. Moscow had agreed to the reunification of Germany and its staying in NATO; to disbanding the Warsaw Pact and then the very Soviet Union; to deeper reductions on nuclear and conventional forces than reductions in the West; and on hasty withdrawal of 500,000 troops from comfortable barracks in Central Europe to tent camps in Russian fields. But nobody took the trouble to warn Russians that as a result of all these concessions and sacrifices, NATO - the most powerful military alliance in the world - would start moving towards Russian borders. To the contrary, Moscow was repeatedly told by the West that it would be accepted as an equal and genuine partner, and that no major decision on international security would be made without it. Well, the NATO summit in Madrid came as a clear manifestation that such decisions may and will be made and that Russia's opinion really matters only so long as it is in line with Western position. It's not that Russians are against NATO as it is, but they would prefer this great military alliance to find other functions, rather then to extend to their borders without any plausible explanation for doing so. In the aftermath of Paris and Madrid, the fundamental question in Russian minds remains unresolved: if NATO expands as a superior military alliance, what is the threat to the new member-states that would warrant such an expansion - apart from "historic grievances", of which there is no shortage in Russia? If, on the other hand, NATO extends in a new role - as a foundation of a new European security system for peace-keeping why the haste? Why is Moscow's objection dismissed? If there is a reason to hurry, why is Russia not seriously regarded as a member of such a system in the foreseeable future? Why, instead, is it offered only a role in the "Partnership for Peace" and yet another consultative committee? And why are those roles, while good enough for Russia, considered insufficient for new members and aspiring states? At best, NATO expansion to the east is regarded in Russia as a mistaken policy, prone to complications and new controversies. At worst it is regarded as the consummation of a "grand design" to encircle and isolate Russia, establishing strategic superiority and finally destroying Russia, ending once and for all Russia's role as a European power. That reaction in Russia to the Madrid decision was mute should not be a reason for complacency. Summer is a dead season for Moscow politics. The issue of NATO expansion would soon surface in politics with a triple force, around the defense budget; ratification of arms control treaties; military reform and the management of regional crises like Iraq. In all these cases, the expansion of NATO has been a major stumbling block. One notion accepted in the United States is that the "man in the street" in Russia doesn't care about NATO expansion. But ask a person who is at all interested in foreign affairs and you discover a great deal of concern. There are millions of pensioners, who remember horrors of the World War II. There are millions of soldiers, workers in defense industries, intellectuals, mass media professionals, federal and regional government workers and political elites. These kinds of people - who show up in large numbers to vote or directly conduct election campaigns, form public opinion and elaborate practical policy decisions - they care very deeply about the proposed expansion of NATO. Another risk involves arms control. Chances for ratification of the next phase of the START II treaty were quite high just a few months ago. However, the political tensions over NATO enlargement may be used by opponents of the treaty in Russian Parliament to block it once again. Personally, I'm fully committed to the ratification, but it's worthwhile to keep in mind that the treaty envisions much larger cuts, at much higher costs to Russian forces, than to U.S. nuclear forces. And it should be remembered that when President Boris Yeltsin agreed to that in 1992, he could not have imagined that NATO would start moving towards Russian borders. Still less could he have imagined that this would happen against his clear objections to his "friend" Bill Clinton, his "friend" Helmut Kohl and other pals in the West. It's surprising, even now, as the entire Moscow political kitchen is open to mass media, that some people in the West fail to recognize, that Russia, like the United States, is not a politically homogeneous entity. Most Russian political actions are results of tough domestic infighting, while foreign and domestic events shift internal balances of forces and thus affect the resulting policy decisions. Those who are against START II and any cooperation with the United States will use NATO expansion to justify their case. Many of those, who have been trying to persuade the West not to expand NATO and who were striving for some compromise on START II, are the people who have staked their careers (and probably more than that) on Russia's close and fair cooperation with the United States. I would never claim that Russia has been faultless in its relations with other nations and in addressing its domestic issues. However, the Madrid summit and the ensuing NATO movement to the east would make improving those policies much harder, and in some cases impossible at all. NATO expansion will not topple Russian democracy, but it certainly will make the goals of Russian democrats much harder to achieve. Madrid is universally perceived in Russia (by some with grief, by others with malevolence) as a major defeat of Moscow's policy of broad partnership with the West. It is considered a great setback for Russian democrats, whose domestic political positions, commitments and reform plans are largely predicated on such cooperation. NATO expansion will remain a permanent seed of mistrust, controversy
and deadlocks on a broad range of international issues, from START II to
Iraq; and from transfers of nuclear and missile technology to the Caspian
Sea pipelines. Madrid's policy course will greatly strengthen the hand
of opponents of cooperative relations between Russia and the West on both
sides. It will push Moscow into various endeavors with China, India, with
anti-Western agendas and rogue regimes. And it will move the United States
towards unilateral actions, disregarding interests and positions of other
states and towards arbitrary use of force in the world. Contact GRN for reprint information on this article. Return to The Great NATO Debate Return to Global Beat Home Page Nuclear Watch | East Asian Security | Economic & Monetary Union | NATO Expansion | Nuclear Weapons and Proliferation | U.S. Defense Policy | Publications | Events | |
