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The Lebanese daily al-Nahar Oct. 26 quoted "informed Syrian sources" as saying that a unilateral Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon could lead to glitches in the peace process. They emphasized that Israel would not be able to contain Hezbollah after a withdrawal, which would increase the likelihood of conflicts along the Israeli border. This in turn might induce Israel to follow through on earlier threats to strike at the Lebanese infrastructure, which ultimately would cause Syria to call off the peace process. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak promised Syria that Israel would unilaterally pull out of southern Lebanon by July 2000 as a token of goodwill in his peace-making efforts. Why would Syria warn Barak not to deliver his promise? The answer lies in the increasingly delicate balance of power among Israel, Syria, Lebanon and Iran. The balanced is threatened by Iran's involvement in the region and the succession struggle inside Syria. Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon will leave a power vacuum in the region, which Israel wants Syria to fill. This would leave Syria with the responsibility of curbing Hezbollah activity - a major Israeli condition for furthering the peace process. The Oct. 26 statements made it clear that Syria, which would certainly like to take charge in southern Lebanon, is unable to do so. Syria is unable to take charge for two interrelated reasons. First, Damascus cannot commit additional forces while there is potential for a domestic move against Syrian President Hafez Assad and his potential successors. Second, the faction challenging Assad for power may be allied with Iran. It is even possible that Iran instigated the Syrian power struggle in response to Assad's decision to cut off aid to Hezbollah. Directly challenging Hezbollah would only intensify Iranian support for opponents of Assad. Even now, Syria is finding it difficult to curb current Hezbollah activity, since Iran is now directly supporting Hezbollah through Beirut rather than Damascus. Further complicating the issue, Iran may also be supplying the guerrillas via Syrian bases and ports controlled by Assad's domestic opponents. Pressure from Lebanon's major power broker, Syria, would not be effective in curtailing Hezbollah activity. We have noted that Iran could be a key influence in the Syrian power struggle hampering the peace process [ http://www.stratfor.com/meaf/specialreports/special16.htm ]. It is becoming increasingly clear that any chance of an Israeli-Syrian peace deal directly depends on Assad's ability to maintain control. If Assad's hold is loosening due to failing health and the succession issue, he will be particularly reluctant to draw any additional internal opposition by going up against Hezbollah. Thus, it is better for Assad if Israel maintains its current presence in Lebanon. Barak may be open to keeping troops in Lebanon for a while, but not indefinitely. On Oct. 21, Israel's Haaretz newspaper reported that Barak is "flexible" on the date of a pullback. Barak has also been quoted in private conversations as saying he would not "jump off a tower" if the withdrawal is delayed a few months. However, the prime minister may already be searching for a solution. On Oct. 27, U.S. CIA Director George Tenet made a secret visit to Israel and discussed "the prevention of acts of terrorism and the Iranian threat" with political and military leaders, Yediot Aharonot reported. If Barak proceeds with withdrawal, Damascus will face a choice between committing troops to the region and confronting Hezbollah or abandoning south Lebanon to the guerrillas. The former threatens to weaken Assad domestically. The latter threatens to increase Hezbollah's strength. This would have the effect of upping Israeli counterattacks on the Lebanese infrastructure, which could damage Syrian interests in the country. Syria hopes to convince Israel that neither option benefits the peace process.
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