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Marcus Corbin currently heads the Center for Defense Information's Military Reform Project. He co-authored a national defense review published by CDI entitled "Reforging the Sword: Forces for A 21st Century Security Strategy," and during 1996-2000 he was Director of Defense Investigations at the Project On Government Oversight, where he focused on procurement, defense industry, and military reform issues. In 1995-96, Corbin was a Senior Research Analyst at the Federation of American Scientists in Washington, D.C. where he worked with the Military Analysis Network, a project principally focused on analyzing U.S. military strategy, forces, and spending.
Corbin has also worked at the World Bank and the National Security Archives. The Global Beat interviewed Marcus Corbin on his assessment of the dramatic changes that have taken place recently in U.S. defense policy and strategy.

The Global Beat: The administration has presented some radically new ideas about defense policy. Do you think they are working?

Marcus Corbin: On the military side, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has been pushing the idea that technology and hardware have revolutionized combat, and that you can do more with fewer ground troops.
We saw that in the Iraq War. He was pushing the war with a much smaller ground force than many in the military would have liked, and it worked quite well in the end. The war only lasted three weeks.
The problem really comes in the fact that peace- keeping operations are very different from combat operations. What we saw especially after the war, was that to maintain security and to run a country, you need a lot of "boots on the ground."  During the war we saw a little bit of it when the military forces were stretched thin in protecting their supply lines, but overall they did the job. However, since we won the war, it has become clear day after day that we don't really have enough people to occupy and police Iraq properly.
Broadly, I think that his military transformation has been on the right track as far as traditional combat, but it is really not addressing the needs for the broader role  of  the U.S. military now and in the future, which is likely to include more complex, political and difficult operations involving peace keeping, security and even nation building.

The Global Beat: Do you consider the War in Iraq to have been a success? 

Marcus Corbin: Well, I think Iraq has to be divided into two areas. One is the war, which was undeniably quite successful. There were relatively few Iraqi civilian casualties. There were very few American casualties and the war was over very quickly, so I think that the military phase was quite successful. I think since then, it has been fairly disastrous in terms of looting, lack of security and a vacuum of authority, lack of restoration of basic supplies, medical needs, electricity, power and clean water. When kids are dying of cholera, it is a bad situation. I think that the overriding issue now is popular Iraqi support for continued American presence in Iraq. If I were in the Administration's shoes, I'd be very concerned about that. Right now it looks as though support is very lukewarm among some Iraqis, and among many others it is non-existent. There seems to be an awful lot of resistance to a continued U.S. presence, which may be a little surprising considering that U.S. forces did remove the dictator. But the attitude of the Iraqi people seems by and large to have been: Thank you, now we will take over our own affairs again.  So, I think this is going to pose some really serious challenges for the administration if they do intend to try to run Iraq as a colony, essentially, for the next months, or years.

The Global Beat: Do they have a choice?

Marcus Corbin: They may not be given a choice. It is going out on a limb to say this now, but I don't see that the current policy is sustainable. I think that these wishes among so many different factions in Iraq and among the Iraqi population for independence will only grow. So I think that the pressures will become intense.  That doesn't mean that Iraqis themselves can necessarily prevent further disorder, violence and factional fighting, but that does not keep them from wanting to run things themselves.

The Global Beat: Do you see a growing U.S. Military presence, or can we drop this to a sustainable maintenance level?

Marcus Corbin:   A key issue is whether the rate of casualties inflicted on the U.S. forces can be maintained.  The past few weeks have been terrible for the U.S. forces. People are being killed at the rate of almost one a day. We obviously can't maintain that level of casualties without the whole policy being brought into question.  The problem is that when you get to low-level urban guerrilla war, you don't have good options. You can ramp up your forces and make them more aggressive and assertive, and make them go into homes looking for weapons, and do sweeps and round-ups and so on. You may catch a few people, but you further alienate the population, and this population seems hypersensitive about some of these issues of intrusions by Americans in their private lives. On the other hand an almost-as-bad option is to not take an aggressive posture.  If you try to limit your visibility and the weight of your presence, you will probably end up taking more casualties, at least in the short term. So the forces really don't have any good choices. I think everybody will hopefully be looking at a third option, which in an ideal world would be bringing in more appropriate police-type personnel from allies, the U.N. and other Arab nations, as well as building up Iraqi capabilities as quickly as possible.

The Global Beat: Do you think that the war was necessary?

Marcus Corbin: That goes to the core of the issue! Personally, No, I think that the war at best was premature. At the time, many argued that Saddam did not have weapons of mass destruction and designs to use them against us any time soon. Now, as the days pass and none are found it, it seems ever more likely that that was the case. I would say that it is certainly clear that when the administration was ramping up for this war, the Palestinian conflict was a higher profile issue. It was spiraling out of control, and we weren't doing much about it while we were focusing on Iraq.  Some people say that the Iraq war has helped the process because both sides are talking now, but I think that that is really a very short term view. The Iraq war really made the Israeli Palestinian situation worse.

The Global Beat: In what way?

Marcus Corbin: Particularly with the intense feelings against the U.S. which were raised by the U.S. attack on Iraq.  There was the feeling that the U.S. could no longer be a trusted, honest broker. Suspicions were raised that it was hostile to Arab interests.

The Global Beat: What do you think of the Middle East now? What are president Bush's options?

Marcus Corbin: The administration has made a political choice not to push hard. That is my read. They have the option, but they don't want to seize it.

The Global Beat: What is the option?

Marcus Corbin: The option is to put more pressure on prime minister Sharon over the fundamental issue, Israeli settlements in Palestinian areas. That is the bottom line. I don't think Sharon feels that the United States will put the screws to him. He is very wily, and he understands the game he is playing exactly, and he is playing it very well, giving some impression of continuing the peace process. But at bottom he isn't serious, because he doesn't have to be. The extremists on both sides are doing provocative attacks, because neither extremist faction wants the process to succeed. So the process is extremely vulnerable. It appears to me that that is part of the problem. The roadmap appears to be a series of small steps. The problem is that as soon as someone interrupts the step, the whole process comes to a halt.  We have had this kind of setup for years, and it is always vulnerable to extremists. The more promising approach is to get the big issues settled, and then you are not so vulnerable to making sure that every little step happens correctly. Getting the end goal right, negotiated, is the only way of proceeding at this point, because the extremists have refined the art of sabotaging the process.

The Global Beat: Do you see an ultimate resolution?

Marcus Corbin: I don't see any positive signs in the short term. On the ultimate issue of how much of the occupied territories are restored to the Palestinians, and in what shape -- I don't see the Israelis abandoning their settlements at this point.

The Global Beat: What do you think about the wall?

Marcus Corbin:   If it is really just a tactical defense measure, then no doubt there are things that can be done along those lines.  If it is an Iron Curtain to separate two peoples, then it is different thing.  I don't think that Israel even wants that, given the integration of their economies and labor. If they do want it, it will be a tough military challenge, given the dispersal of settlements across the area.

The Global Beat: What is your overall grade for the administration?

Marcus Corbin:   I think their record in international affairs is disastrous in the long run, although they have some short-term successes. I say it is disastrous in the long run, because their bottom line, that the United States can achieve its foreign policy goals without anyone else's help, essentially, cannot work, does not work, and will not work. That is really the fundamental issue. The administration is wedded to the notion that we can and should do things by ourselves and that we don't need allies to join in military or non-military initiatives. My assessment is that that is fundamentally wrong. This approach is generating  tremendous resentment overseas among neutral nations, and it is losing the support of our allies, Britain notwithstanding -- even the prime minister did not have the support of his own people in going to war.

The Global Beat: Do you think that this can be remedied?

Marcus Corbin: I think that it could be remedied relatively easily with a different approach -- that would probably mean a different administration. I don't think that there is lasting, irretrievable damage being done, but it all depends on what administration policies come next.  I think there is certainly in the Arab and Muslim world some extraordinarily negative attitudes taking hold. It will take a lot to dilute those over time.  But I think we can do it.

The Global Beat:   And what about preemption?

Marcus Corbin:   The National Security Strategy had a lot of good words about diplomacy and a balanced policy involving economic, political and diplomatic interaction with the world, and working with our allies, but it really looks as though deeds not words count here.  If, as in Iraq, we are going to do whatever we want, regardless of what other nations think, then those nice words in the National Security Strategy are not going to count. And I think that despite what the document says, the perception overseas is really that the United States is getting ready to attack anyone at any time without much overt threat. I think people are going to be worried about that, and oppose it strongly. I think we will have to keep a close eye in the future on how much emphasis is on the words, as opposed to the military confrontational approach to the world.

The Global Beat: What do you think about the Pentagon taking over  American diplomacy?

Marcus Corbin: Pentagon "empire building" is a natural thing, that most departments try, but the White House has let it go to extraordinary lengths, particularly in Iraq. The Pentagon is set up to win wars, but not run countries. I am a little surprised that it has been allowed to take over the running of Iraq.  Although the viceroy there, Paul Bremer, is not a general, it is pretty clear that the Pentagon is calling a lot of the shots. The continuation of a low-level insurgency scenario aids that, but really I think the Pentagon's job is well done, but now it should be time to pass it over to other entities that are more adept at nation building, if that is what the administration intends, and it appears that it does.
     

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