THE CENTER FOR WAR, PEACE AND THE NEWS MEDIA AT NEW YORK UNIVERSITY December 16 - 23, 2003

Ralph A. Cossa: on Taiwan's brinkmanship

Yu Bin: on Win Jiabao's U.S. visit

 

New York University

 

 

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U.S. State Department's
Report on Patterns of Global Terrorism for 2002

The US State Department's Report on Patterns of Global Terrorism for 2001

 

 

 

WITH SADDAM IN HAND, WHAT NOW BECOMES THE BENCHMARK OF U.S. VICTORY?
The capture of Saddam Hussein marks a decisive closure of more than two decades of bloody history in Iraq, with such immediately vexing questions as where and how to try and punish him ultimately amounting to little more than footnotes to the Saddam chapter. What remains to be settled, however, is the course of Iraq's immediate future -- and that's a chapter that remains as contentious as ever. Even without Saddam at large, it is the question of the future of Iraq, and the place in it of the traditional Sunni elites that have dominated throughout Iraq's modern history, that animates the insurgency raging in the Sunni Triangle. And, as the prospect of his ever returning to power is graphically debunked, so too will Shiite caution likely give way to a more assertive challenge to the occupation authorities for mastery over the political transition. Managing the contending claims of these forces, and others, poses the major challenge ahead for the Bush administration. But having ousted Saddam and satisfied itself that Iraq represents no weapons-of-mass destruction threat, the U.S. now faces the challenge of defining a benchmark of success, or at least a series of imminently attainable goals that would allow a satisfactory exit.
(Washington Post, December 15, 2003)

  • Council on Foreign Relations President Richard Haass warns that while Saddam's capture is much-needed welcome news from Iraq, it does not mark a turning point for the U.S. mission there. "I don't think there is any evidence that it will get necessarily any safer for our troops or for Iraqi civilian officials," says Haass. "And it is not necessarily going to make any simpler or easier the questions of the political transition."
  • Lebanon's Daily Star writes that Saddam's capture has "radically altered the equation in Iraq and the rest of the region," changing the options before all the players. But how the various players choose to respond will determine whether his capture will exacerbate or ameliorate the crisis in Iraq.
  • Jordan's King Abdullah tells the Washington Post's David Ignatius that the U.S. priority now should be to ensure a greater accommodation of Sunni interests in the new Iraq . He warns that "de-Baathification" has alienated the Sunnis, and that this is stoking the insurgency.
  • Jordan's King Abdullah tells the Washington Post's David Ignatius that the U.S. priority now should be to ensure a greater accommodation of Sunni interests in the new Iraq . He warns that "de-Baathification" has alienated the Sunnis, and that this is stoking the insurgency.
  • Ambassador J. Paul Bremer's remarks following Saddam's capture certainly appear to suggest an overture to the Sunni rebels. "With the arrest of Saddam Hussein, there is a new opportunity for members of the former regime, whether military or civilian, to end their bitter opposition," Bremer said. "Let them come forward now in a spirit of reconciliation and hope, lay down their arms and join you, their fellow citizens, in the task of building the new Iraq."
  • Asia Times suggests that while Saddam's capture lifts a psychological cloud over Iraq and allows Iraqis to begin to accept that Saddam will not return to power, the same fact may embolden the Shiites to become more assertive in their challenge to the U.S. over the terms of the political transition, no longer having to fear that Saddam would be the beneficiary of such actions.
  • Ehsan Ahrari suggests the most powerful aspect of last weekend's events was not Saddam's capture itself, but the humiliating images of the disheveled dictator undergoing medical examination by U.S. personnel, which demoralized his supporters and thrilled most Iraqis. Those images have created a propitious window of opportunity for the U.S. to ease its own path in Iraq by widening international and Iraqi participation in the transition process.

    A CHALLENGE FOR THE INSURGENCY
    There's little doubt among Iraq-watchers that the insurgency against U.S. troops there will continue -- and even intensify -- in the wake of Saddam Hussein's capture. There is considerable evidence to suggest that the insurgency is made up of a far wider group of Iraqis than simply Baathists looking to reverse the tide of history. But the Baathists have clearly played a major role, and Saddam has been a critically important symbol to at least a section of the resistance and its wider civilian support base. His capture will force them to intensify their activities as if to prove their resilience, but also to clarify their own objectives. In short, it's a moment that will test the hypothesis that the resistance is simply the last dance of Baathist "bitter enders."
    (Christian Science Monitor, December 15, 2003)

  • Saddam's capture is unlikely to deter al-Qaeda from the fight in Iraq -- if anything, the circumstances of his capture and humiliation will simply confirm their jaundiced view of a corrupt, decrepit secularist who had no claim on the mantle of "jihad." Newsweek reports that Osama bin Laden's network has begun diverting fighters and funds from the ongoing war against U.S. forces in Afghanistan to the Iraqi "jihad," where they see a more target-rich environment.
  • One area the coalition will be hoping Saddam's capture turns things around is the effort to transfer more security responsibility onto Iraqis themselves. Last week it was reported that almost half of the recruits to the first battalion of a new Iraqi army set up by the U.S. have quit, claiming that the meager salary does not justify the risks of being killed by the insurgents.

    THE POLITICS OF TRYING SADDAM
    For the U.S. to put Saddam on trial would raise legitimacy questions, but the Bush administration is typically hostile to international judicial institutions such as the Hague Tribunal. And an international trial would open the doors to a wider, and more complicated range of plaintiffs, ranging from Iran to Israel, each with its own political agenda. The preference of the U.S. may be to heed the demand by the Iraqi Governing Council that Saddam face justice in an Iraqi court. But Iraq's own legal system is corrupted by its Baathist past, and the involvement of outsiders in bolstering the process will have to be handled delicately. Despite the complexity of the legal challenges, however, the politics of a trial dictate moving swiftly to convict Saddam in the eyes of Iraqis and avoid keeping him in a legal limbo of the Guantanamo variety.
    (Independent, 16 December 2003)

  • The Guardian writes that despite the pressure to resolve the legal questions, their complexity may mean a long delay in bringing Saddam before a court.
  • The penalty phase of any trial of Saddam Hussein is sure to sharply divide the international community. President Bush has indicated his belief that Saddam should face the death penalty, an option fiercely rejected by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, who probably speaks for much of the international community which has dispensed entirely with capital punishment.
  • The BBC warns that Saddam could use a trial to embarrass the West, particularly leaders such as French President Jacques Chirac and U.S. Defense Secretary Don Rumsfeld, both of whom had dealings with the Iraqi dictator in the past.
  • Indeed, a precedent might be the trial of former Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic, who continues to use his own trial as a political platform from which to attack his enemies.

    SISTANI: U.N. CAN BREAK THE STALEMATE OVER IRAQ ELECTIONS
    The U.S. plan to install a sovereign Iraqi government by next July have been imperiled from the get-go by the insistence of Iraq's most influential leader, Shiite Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, that such a government be directly elected by Iraqis. The U.S. response is that elections are not feasible by Washington's deadline for a hand-over, although there's plainly also some concern over who would be the likely winners if a poll were held right now. The Ayatollah is the spiritual leader of Iraq's approximately 15 million Shiites, and by denying his blessing to a new government installed by the U.S.-favored process of selection via handpicked caucuses he could prevent it attaining the legitimacy necessary to bring stability. Now, however, Sistani has said he may be willing to accept that elections are impractical -- but only if he's told that by a United Nations investigation. The message from the Shiite leader is plain: The UN has the legitimacy that the U.S. lacks in Iraq, and the international body must be placed in charge of the political transition.
    (LA Times, 15 December 2003)

  • The Washington Post's Robin Wright warns that ignoring Sistani would be a dangerous mistake.
  • The BBC reports that UN Secretary General Kofi Annan says his organization is ready to return to Iraq, but only if its role in the transition is clearly defined.

    BAKER REPAIRS U.S.-EUROPE TIES ON IRAQ
    The very fact of sending former Secretary of State James Baker to negotiate over debt relief for Iraq may have been taken in Europe as a signal of the Bush administration's desire to mend fences. Baker, after all, is the consummate multilateralist who organized the broad coalition that waged the Gulf War, and France and Germany appear to have responded positively to his overture by agreeing to unspecified amounts of debt forgiveness. But the French are making clear that they'll write off the debt only once a sovereign Iraqi government is in place.
    (Washington Post, 16 December 2003)

  • Asia Times suggests that Baker's mission signals a revival of the fortunes of State Department "realists" in the Bush administration, and will be seen as a blow to the neoconservatives.
  • Still, the shift is far from clear. On the question of awarding reconstruction contracts only to coalition partners, Knight Ridder suggests, the President is following his established tradition of rewarding friends and punishing foes.
  • Still, the shift is far from clear. On the question of awarding reconstruction contracts only to coalition partners, Knight Ridder suggests, the President is following his established tradition of rewarding friends and punishing foes.
  • And, suggests Siddharth Srivastava, in the case of India it is bringing new corporate pressure to bear on the government to reverse its refusal to send troops.

    AFGHANISTAN'S LOYA JIRGA: A CRISIS IN THE MAKING?
    The International Crisis Group warns that the draft constitution for Afghanistan currently being discussed by a 'Loya Jirga' assembly in Kabul is not the same document that evolved over months of public consultation. It has been revised by the government to strengthen the hand of President Hamid Karzai, while making important concessions to religious leaders. The ICG warns that the changes come at the expense of democracy and inclusiveness.
    (International Crisis Group, 12 December 2003)

  • The Institute for War and Peace Reporting reports on the extraordinary gathering of Afghanis at the Loya Jirga.
  • President Karzai hopes a new constitution will strengthen the power of Kabul over the regions, but as Le Monde Diplomatique warns, he may have trouble subduing the "Emirate of Herat", whose warlord leader Ismail Khan has his own ideas about how power ought to be divided.

    MUSHARRAF'S BRUSH WITH DEATH
    In an incident that went almost unnoticed in the Western media in the storm of coverage of the Saddam capture, Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf narrowly escaped being killed when terrorists bombed a bridge within seconds of his convoy passing. Unlike Saddam Hussein, of course, President Musharraf has some 40 to 50 nuclear weapons at his disposal, and his country's growing internal instability will be cause for concern throughout the region and beyond.
    (Asia Times, 16 December 2003)

  • The Pakistani paper Dawn editorializes that Musharraf's problem is that Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan over the decades has produced domestic effects that are difficult to control.

    ELSEWHERE ON THE 'AXIS OF EVIL'...
    Arms control expert Joseph Cirincione tells the Council on Foreign Relations that diplomatic efforts, spearheaded by the Europeans, have made considerable headway in resolving the standoff over Iran's nuclear program, and while the road ahead remains complex and contentious, it is less likely now to lead to confrontation. The same can't be said, unfortunately, for the stalemated nuclear negotiations with North Korea.
    (Council on Foreign Relations, 15 December 2003)

  • Asia Times notes that six-party talks on North Korea planned for December have been postponed, and suggests it may be many months before the parties are back at the table.

    WAITING FOR SHARON
    By failing to agree among themselves to a cease-fire, the Palestinian factions have left the strategic initiative in the Middle East once again in the hands of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, writes Graham Usher. But Sharon is under growing domestic pressure to provide a political solution to the conflict. Even his own party is now caught in a swirl of rumors over just what Sharon plans to offer.
    (Al-Ahram, 11-17 December 2003)

    BRAZIL'S LULA HAUNTED BY EXPECTATIONS
    Brazil's socialist President Luis Ignacio 'Lula' DaSilva was always going to have a tough time of it, taking the reins of power at a point when the international lending community had set clear limits on how any Brazilian government could manage the economy if it intended to remain solvent. Lula, as it turns out, has done a great job of reassuring Wall Street and international lenders, but the impoverished rural peasants and urban working class that brought him to power are growing increasingly impatient to have their own desperate needs addressed.
    (Le Monde Diplomatique, December 2003)


    • DynCorp International/IPM personnel
    subcontracted by the State Department

    Time to Regulate the 'Dogs of War'

    Privatization of services previously undertaken by government has been the vogue internationally for the past decade, and warfare has not remained immune. Scores of private security companies, usually staffed and run by veterans of the U.S. and British armies as well as officers from smaller countries, have taken on a substantial portion of the security duties associated with reconstruction in both Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as assuming responsibility for anti-terror training in countries such as Saudi Arabia. Often these companies can play a useful role not easily fulfilled by government forces. But deploying small groups of armed and dangerous men with very little oversight and the traditional structures of accountability common to the military forces of nation states carries a number of dangers. Raenette Taljaard, a South African member of parliament, suggests that regulation and oversight of the industry has become essential, and warns that national legislation has for the most part proved inadequate. Instead, she writes, tighter international regulations may be required to avert the dangers inherent in the privatization of warfare.
    (YaleGlobal, December 9, 2003)


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