..CENTER FOR WAR, PEACE, AND THE NEWS MEDIA, April 26 - May 3, 2006
Department of Journalism, College of Communication, Boston University


 



BROOKINGS: IRAQ INDEX

INDEX OF RECENT TORTURE DOCUMENTS

 

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DIPLOMATIC TENSION

At Odds: Secretary of State Condi Rice greets her Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov. Washington and Moscow remain at odds on whether the Security Council should act against Iran

Iran: Waiting for the Real Diplomacy to Begin
The International Atomic Energy Agency last Friday reported to the UN Security Council that Iran had failed to halt uranium enrichment and to answer outstanding questions over its nuclear program, setting up a confrontation with the U.S. and its European allies. Iran's decision to aggressively pursue enrichment experiments during the 30-day period of the Security Council ultimatum suggested Tehran is confident of prevailing in the coming diplomatic showdown. And that confidence will have been boosted by the U.S. failure thus far to secure the necessary backing for tougher Security Council action on the matter. The U.S. would like to see economic sanctions imposed on Iran to pressure it to comply, but China and Russia remain staunchly opposed. Recognizing that opposition, Washington is concentrating instead on seeking consensus for the Security Council to reiterate its demand, but this time as a binding resolution in terms of Chapter VII of the UN Charter -- that would deem questions over Iran's nuclear activities as a threat to global security, and would legally oblige Tehran to comply with Security Council demands or face sanctions or even military action. But precisely because that potentially leads to the same place, Russia and China are opposed. Indeed, U.S. officials have already begun talking about operating outside the UN, seeking a "coalition of the willing" to isolate Iran -- although the level of enthusiasm for such action will necessarily be limited, given Iran's centrality to the global economy as its fourth largest oil producer.

President Bush maintains that military action remains an option for dealing with Iran's program, although he repeatedly stresses that he favors a diplomatic solution. The problem Washington faces on the diplomatic front, however, is that some of its key European allies -- and also a number of senior U.S. senators from both parties -- believe that the only way to achieve a diplomatic solution would be to talk directly to Tehran. Iran's leadership has discreetly been pressing for wide ranging talks that address all issues of concern between the two sides, and the Europeans believe that no diplomatic solution will be possible unless Tehran is offered security guarantees, i.e. if Washington is willing to rule out attacking the regime. But the Bush administration's continued preference for a policy of regime change in Iran precludes such engagement, dimming the prospects for a diplomatic outcome. Still, as the crisis escalates, the prospect of confrontation -- and the consensus in the international community that the consequences of confrontation are unacceptable from a security or economic point of view -- will leave the U.S. isolated if it continues to shun direct diplomacy. Moreover, it is becoming increasingly clear that Tehran plans to escalate its efforts to seek a compromise solution on its own terms, for which conditions may be favorable if Washington continues to reject direct negotiations in principle. (TIME, April 28, 2006)

  • Hugh Porter reports that there is a discreet consensus in Tehran's corridors of power on the need to negotiate a compromise on the nuclear issue. This consensus extends even to President Mahmoud Ahmedinajad, who dominates Western headlines with his hardcore rhetoric although he does not actually set the country's defense, foreign and nuclear policies. The Iranians want discreet talks on all issues of concern, he writes, and they are willing to accept some form of compromise on the enrichment issue if they can achieve normalization of Iran's diplomatic status and security guarantees against attack. (Asia Times, May 2, 2006)
  • Michael Levi offers a different take on why the U.S. should negotiate with Tehran: He's pessimistic about the prospects for a diplomatic solution, but believes that Iran may tragically misunderstand and underestimate the threat the U.S. is trying to communicate right now largely through the media. If the U.S. wants Tehran to understand that the failure to achieve a diplomatic solution will bring a military response, that message, he argues, needs to be conveyed directly if it is to be taken seriously. (Council on Foreign Relations, April 28, 2006)
  • Kaveh L Afrasiabi argues that there is no basis for a Chapter VII resolution against Iran, because passing one would require showing that Iran's program is a threat to international security. But the IAEA report presented last Friday by Dr. Mohammed ElBaradei makes clear that all of Iran's nuclear activities "are covered by Agency Safeguard containment and surveillance measures". This, he says, and the fact that the IAEA also attests that all nuclear material has been accounted for, makes the case for a Chapter VII resolution more difficult. After all, the Russians have said that the basis for action against Iran must be based on proof (Asia Times, May 2, 2006)
  • Edward Walker suggests that the Bush administration is not following a comprehensive strategy on Iran, a fault that has deepened the trauma of Iraq for both Iraqis and Americans. The current saber-rattling on Iran might be effective if it were part of a coherent strategy, but without a comprehensive plan it could bring about unintended tragedies. (Middle East Institute, April 27, 2006)
  • David Isenberg warns that the intelligence on Iran is hardly conclusive, which poses a prohibitive challenge not only to making a legal case for international action, but also to the efficacy of the threatened "surgical strikes" that would supposedly hobble Iran's nuclear capability. (Center for Defense Information, April 27, 2006)
  • Joshua Muravchik explains the rationale among Washington's hawks for an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities: Bombing Iran would set back the nuclear program and buy time for the Iranian people to overthrow the regime. "The U.S. could conduct a bombing campaign that would destroy much of Iran's nuclear facilities," he writes. "It would not have to destroy it all to set back by years Iran's acquisition of nuclear weaponry. Perhaps that would buy enough time for the Iranian people to take their country back from their despotic rulers." This is same muddled delusion that preceded the Iraq war among neocon ideologues such as Muravchik, a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. He appears not to have noticed that the Iranian people, by all accounts, actually back "their despotic rulers" on the nuclear issue. (Daily Star, May 1, 2006)
  • Der Spiegel reports that Germany is pressing hard for Washington to talk directly to Tehran, and won't let the matter rest. Conservative Chancellor Angela Merkel has personally appealed to President Bush on this score, and she is also warning Washington against antagonizing Moscow, saying Russia's cooperation is essential solving the problem in Iran. (Der Spiegel, April 20, 2006)
  • Background Material on Iran
  • Zbigniew Brezinski offers a cogent summary of the reasons why attacking Iran would be a monumental act of strategic folly for the U.S. -- its consequences would be so calamitous, he argues, that they may even prematurely end the era of American dominance on the global stage. He also warns that such an act would be illegal both under U.S. and international law. Brezinski argues that negotiations with Iran remains the best way to achieve U.S. Goals, including liberalization of Iran's domestic politics. (LA Times, April 23, 2006)
  • Seymour Hersh reports on U.S. military planning for an attack on Iran and explains the reasons that advocates of such a course of action are winning teh debate inside the Bush administration. (The New Yorker, April 10, 2006)
  • The Center for Strategic and International Studies offers a detailed technical assessment of Iran's nuclear program, and also parses the strategic options available to the U.S. if diplomacy fails. (Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 7, 2006)
  • The Center for Defense Information has posted extracts from the IAEA report on Iran which is to be discussed by the Security Council. (CDI, March 6, 2006)
  • Iran's UN ambassador Javad Sarif, in a New York Times op ed, sets out sets out Tehran's negotiating position on the nuclear issue. Iran has no intention of building nuclear weapons, he insists, and is willing to negotiate on the basis providing new guarantees to win Western confidence in this assertion, including expanded inspections and the creation of an international consortium to supply Iran's reactor fuel. (New York Times, April 7, 2006)
  • Christopher de Bellaigue offers a comprehensive analysis of the Iranian regime's nuclear intentions and its strategy for handling the standoff with the U.S. (New York Review of Books, April 27, 2006)
  • The Oxford Research Group assesses the effectiveness of military options against Iran, and concludes they are unlikely to restrain Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons but will promote chaos and instability. (Oxford Research Group, February, 2006)
  • Ray Tayekh explains the factional disputes at the heart of the Tehran regime, suggesting that the path of confrontation is preferred by a new generation of conservatives hardened during the Iran-Iraq war, and that the current atmosphere of crisis strengthens their hand domestically. (The National Interest, Spring, 2006)
  • Henry Sokolski suggests that the current debate over how to stop Iran going nuclear is fruitless. Instead, he offers a long-term strategy for managing Western rivalry with a nuclear-armed Iran. (Transatlantic Institute, March 16, 2006)
  • Previously on Iran:
    -- 04.19.06: U.S. Fails to Prevail in Iran Diplomacy

    -- 04.12.06: March to War or Smoke and Mirrors?
    -- 04.05.06: Military Action Against Iran?
    -- 03.29.06: Bush Iran Strategy Hits a Wall
    -- 03.22.06: Has Britain Put U.S. on the Spot?
    -- 03.15.06: Regime Change or Normalization?
    -- 03.01.06: Nuclear Standoff Escalates
    -- 02.21.06: Dangers of a Military Option
    -- 02.28.06: Tehran Raises the Stakes


    Partitioning Iraq?

    The failure of the U.S.-authored transition in Iraq to create a stable post-Saddam polity, much less one capable of advancing U.S. objectives in the wider Middle East, periodically reopens discussion in Washington foreign policy circles of the idea of partitioning Iraq. Last Sunday, the Washington Post reported that top analysts within the military community now believe that Washington faces but two choices in Iraq: to allow a civil war to rage until the protagonists have exhausted their sectarian impulses; or to break Iraq into three separate ethnic political entities. Naturally, the first option seemed far too grim to contemplate for an American society not given to Machiavellian empire-management, but the second was given further elaboration by Senator Joseph Biden and Leslie Gelb in New York Times op ed arguing that the battle to reverse the centrifugal tendencies is lost, and that partition may be the only way to avoid a bloodbath. Juan Cole agrees with the principle that new political arrangement must accommodate the reality that the democratic political process has returned leaders far too sectarian in inclination to achieve a genuine national unity compact, although he argues that instead of three states, Iraq should be divided into five superprovinces, each enjoying a high degree of autonomy but bound to the central state through its control over the distribution of oil revenues among them. But Anthony Cordesman provides a succinct negation of the arguments for partition:

  • There are no neat geographic dividing lines between Iraq's major ethnic and religious groups -- its population is almost 40 percent urban, meaning that partition would necessarily set off a wave of brutal ethnic cleansing in Baghdad, Mosul, Kirkuk and other major population centers;
  • the Iraqi security forces would split on ethnic and confessional lines making the country even more dependent on a foreign military presence, and making the mission of foreign troops that much more complex and dangerous;
  • the distribution of Iran's oil reserves privileges the Shiite south and the Kurdish north, leaving the Sunni center -- and perhaps even the largely Baghdad-centered Shiite movement of Moqtada Sadr -- with an incentive to fight to overturn the new order;
    and
  • the regional powers would have every incentive to expand into the new post-Iraq political entities, possibly setting off a regional war. Moreover, as Cole points out, dismembering Iraq in this way would be unforgivable in the eyes of Washington's Arab allies, and would likely result in a precipitous loss of U.S. influence throughout the region.

    Writes Cordesman: "The US has made serious mistakes in Iraq, and Iraq may well divide on its own. A strategy of dividing Iraq, however, is virtually certain to make things worse, not better, and confront the US with massive new problems in an area with some 60% of the world’s proven oil reserves and 37% of its gas. Even if one ignores the fact that the US effectively broke Iraq, and its responsibilities to some 28 million Iraqis, a violent power vacuum in an already dangerous region is not a strategy, it is simply an abdication of both moral responsibility and the national interest." (Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 1, 2006)

  • Asia Times reports that Turkey is increasingly angry at the U.S. for tolerating cross-border activity by Kurdish separatist guerillas operating out of Iraqi Kurdistan. Turkey's government has not been placated by assurances from Secretary of State Condi Rice, and has moved tens of thousands of troops into border areas, and has even reportedly fired on positions of Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) insurgents inside Iraq. The discord between the U.S. and Turkey over events in Iraqi Kurdistan is also offering Iran an opportunity to make common cause with Ankara -- Iran has reportedly been shelling PKK positions inside Iraq, too. (Asia Times, April 29, 2006)
  • Der Spiegel reports that Iraq's oil industry is on the verge of collapse. And the engineers working its richest reserves, in the Shiite south, believe the only way to fix it is to give them the same autonomy to negotiate directly with foreign investors that the Kurds have in the north. But it's unlliekly that Baghdad would comply. (Der Spiegel, April 28, 2006)
  • Daniel McGrory reports that Iran's security forces are losing recruits to sectarian militias, but not because of sectarian passions -- the pay's better, and the risks are fewer. (The Times, April 29, 2006)
  • Previously on Iraq:
    -- New Government, Same Problems

    -- Political Paralysis in Iraq
    -- The Magnitude of Failure in Iraq
    -- A Generational American War?
    -- What's Left of Iraq?
    -- Civil War and the Region
    -- Is Sadr the Key to Avoiding Civil War?
    -- Mounting Anger at Coalition Forces in Iraq
  • Financial Blockade Will Destroy the Palestinian Authority, Not Hamas
    It was always something of a long-shot given the restrictive terms on which Israel's Gaza pullout worked, but former World Bank chief James Wolfensohn was appointed last year by the international Middle East Quartet (the U.S., EU, Russia and the UN) to oversee economic development in Gaza. His appointment was an optimistic attempt to use Sharon's unilateral withdrawal to build the socio-economic infrastructure of Palestinian statehood. Wolfensohn resigned last weekend, his job having become impossible once the U.S. and EU forbade him from working with the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority. (And on current indications, it looks as if he wont' be replaced.) The U.S. if anything appears inclined to tighten the economic screws on the Palestinians: After the Palestinian government managed to secure funding from Arab states for emergency payment of salaries directly into the bank accounts of Palestinian Authority employees, the banks involved declined under pressure from the U.S. to handle such payments.

    But Wolfensohn issued a dire warning to the West and Israel over the likely consequences of their financial blockade of the Palestinian territories in the hope of forcing Hamas to recognize Israel and embrace existing peace agreements, or alternately of squeezing the Palestinian population to the point where they might vote Fatah back into power if President Mahmoud Abbas orchestrated a constitutional putsch. Western governments are deluding themselves, he warns, that Palestinian society can be sustained by beefing up NGOs and making other emergency financial infusions that bypass the government. Indeed, he notes, that even if Israel simply persists in withholding tax revenues owed to the Palestinian Authority and maintains its restriction on the movement of Palestinian goods and services, three quarters of the population of the West Bank and Gaza will be living in poverty within two years. The collapse of the government, he warns, will actually destroy the institutions created by the Oslo Accord, and turn back the clock by more than a decade. In fact, the collapse of the PA would essentially restore Israel's administrative responsibilities as the occupying power over all of the West Bank and Gaza.

    And if the Hamas government collapses under Western and Israeli financial strangulation, a number of regional analysts have warned, the political beneficiaries will not be Mahmoud Abbas and Fatah, but al-Qaeda and Iran. (The Times, May 2, 2006)

  • Geoffrey Aronson warns that the U.S. strategy of mounting a 'soft' coup in the Palestinian Authority using financial power rather than tanks is disastrously misguided, not only because it believes good can come of collective punishment of Palestinian citizens, but also because it clings to the illusion that Fatah can, in the near future, be restored to power with the consent of the Palestinian electorate: "The Bush administration, by embracing Palestinian insecurity and penury as policy objectives, is not alone in abandoning guidelines it once championed," he writes. "Israel, by withdrawing from Gaza and pursuing similar policies in the West Bank, and the Palestinians, by electing Hamas, have chosen paths inconsistent with past practice. Each in its own way is looking forward, however, while the U.S. alone assumes there is an advantage in looking backward. Washington is making a fool's bet that its interests can best be served by exacerbating the economic disaster wrought by the occupation, in the hope of restoring publicly discredited and unreformed Palestinian leaders to power." (Foundation for Middle East Peace, April 2006)
  • Ori Nir reports that despite their concern that a Hamas government collapse could destroy the PA, the governments of Egypt and Jordan are supporting the U.S.-led effort to topple Hamas from power. That's because even though they risk destroying prospect of a two-state solution for the foreseeable future, the leaders of Egypt and Jordan are more concerned about the example that a successful democratically elected Islamist government would send to those who live under their own authoritarian regimes. (Forward, April 28, 2006)
  • Zvi Barel suggests that the pressure on Hamas's PA government is forcing its Gaza and West Bank leadership to rein in the more militant Damascus-based wing. For example, when Damascus-based Khaled Meshal publicly accused President Mahmoud Abbas of treason, sparking off violent clashes between Fatah and Hamas activists on the ground, it was the threat to resign by Hamas leaders in government that forced him to retract. (Haaretz, April 30, 2006)
  • Hamas leaders are clearly feeling the pressure from the Arab League to move towards embracing its Beirut principles, i.e. recognizing Israel and negotiating peace on the basis of Israel agreeing to withdraw to its 1967 borders. Haaretz reports that Khaled Meshal now says Hamas will consider negotiations based on the Beirut principles if Israel is willing to accept them -- but that may simply be an elegant dodge, because he predict that Israel is unlikely to accept those terms. (Haaretz, May 2, 2006)
  • Israel, meanwhile, is moving rapidly towards completing the "security fence" that will essentially accomplish Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's aim of setting Israel's final borders in the next four years. Gershom Gorenburg argues that the reason for Olmert's haste is the hands-off policy of the Bush administration -- Israel's leader recognizes that the remainder of the Bush presidency is a window of opportunity to implement a unilateral redrawing of borders without any significant restraint from Washington. (Forward, April 21, 2006)
  • Previously on Israel and Palestine:
    --The Politics of Terror
    --Reality of Hamas Power Forces Strategic Reassessments
    --Hamas Inherits a Policing Dilemma
    --Israel Hopes to Negotiate its Borders with U.S.
    --Jericho Raid Humiliates Abbas
    --Hamas and Israel: An Unspoken Peace?
    --Rice Fails to Secure Hamas Blockade
    -- Is the U.S. Trying to Reverse the Palestinian Election?
  • Qaeda's Return to the Airwaves Shows Tension With Local Islamists
    Two video appearances by al-Qaeda icons this week may have been significant mostly for what they revealed about a growing rift between the "carpetbaggers" of the self-appointed leaders of the global jihad, and nationally-based Islamist groups such as Hamas. First, Osama bin Laden issued an audiotape that restated his movement's perspective of a protracted global insurgency against the U.S. that folds in all local struggles by Muslims. The implication was that al-Qaeda is the leader of this struggle, and he reiterated his movement's of-stated opposition to Islamist movements entering democratic politics -- as Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood have done -- or engaging in dialogue with the West, for which he says there is no basis since the West refused his offer of a truce. He paid special attention to the plight of the Palestinians, noting that Western boycotting of Hamas illustrated that the West's agenda was inherently hostile to the Muslim ummah.

    Hamas lost no time in politely rebutting Bin Laden, just as it had done a couple of months earlier when Ayman Zawahiri had presumed to warn Hamas against compromise. The message, on both occasions, from Hamas was that the Palestinians have their own national interests and concerns, that al Qaeda does not speak for them, and nor do the Palestinians need advice from Bin Laden and company. The following day, when three bombs were detonated in the Sinai resort of Dahab (the authorship of these remains a mystery, although such mass casualty attacks on tourists has become a hallmark of the Qaeda franchise), Hamas quickly condemned the attacks -- all the more remarkable since when an Islamic Jihad bomber had struck in Tel Aviv the previous week, Hamas had expressed sympathy for the motivations of the attack.

    Then, on Wednesday, Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian Islamist responsible for some of the gruesome beheadings of Western hostages and mass-casualty bombings of Iraqi Shiites, appeared unmasked in an online video (upstaging Bin Laden, who had only issued an audio tape) exhorting his followers to fight on. But Zarqawi has reportedly seen his role in the Iraq insurgency downsized as other Islamist groups have sought to put an Iraqi face on the campaign, and also move away from tactics that alienate many Sunni Iraqis. And some of the key elements of the insurgency -- the neo-Baathist and nationalist groups -- have actually been holding talks with U.S. officials, on the premise that they share an antipathy to both Iranian and al-Qaeda influence in Iraq.

    Tension is now palpable between the global aims of those who have styled themselves leaders of the fight against "the far enemy" (the U.S.) and those engaged in a local politics where entry into democratic institutions offers real possibility for advancing their agenda. Al Qaeda leaders are devoting much of their increasingly precious air time to warning the likes of Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood against the democratic road, and it's not hard to see why the Qaeda leaders would find that threatening: If there is, indeed, a democratic option available to Islamists on the ground, al-Qaeda becomes irrelevant. Which is exactly what Hamas is saying, in the Palestinian context. The danger, of course, is that if the doors are shut on the democratic option because Western powers don't like the outcome of Arab elections, al-Qaeda will have won this particular debate among the Islamists. (TIME.com, April 25, 2006)

  • Rami Khouri warns that winning the real war on terrorism requires a dramatic shift in Western responses to the Hamas election victory. "Throughout the Middle East and other Islamic lands, citizens who seek to become politically involved to change their world have ... three options," he writes. "Two of them - Al-Qaeda terror and Iranian-led defiance - are being fought fiercely by the West, and also by some in the region. The third option of democratic electoral politics is at a major crossroads now, following the Hamas victory, Hizbullah's strong governance role, and the recent solid performance by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

    "If the Hamas-led government is crushed by a combination of American, Israeli, Fatah and Arab pressures, and other Arab Islamists in government are squeezed further, this single largest, mostly Sunni, constituency in the world of "political Islam" will become disillusioned and probably give up on politics. Those who preach robust defiance against the West or who attack it with bombs are likely to gain new adherents, which will only intensify the cycle of violence, defiance, occupation and resistance that now defines and often plagues much of the Middle East. "Should mainstream, peaceful political Islamism be killed and buried, the subsequent landscape could very well see a coming together of five powerful forces that until now generally had been kept separate: Sunni Islamic religious militancy, Arab national sentiment, anti-occupation military resistance, Iranian-Persian nationalism, and regional Shiite empowerment among Arabs and Iranians. Anyone who thinks that we've seen the end of history should hold on to their pants and think again." (Daily Star, April 26, 2006)

  • Aluf Benn illustrates the same point in the converse, by pointing out that the U.S. response to the Hamas election and other Islamist gains has actually reinforced a status quo with which Washington had professed dissatisfaction. "With (Hamas's) Ismail Haniyeh in power, Israel can continue its unilateral policy in the territories," writes Benn. "The rulers of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, who groaned under American pressure for democratization, can relax: The 'Bush doctrine' for changing Arab regimes disintegrated with Hamas' election victory. Even Syrian President Bashar Assad, who was almost kicked out of his seat, was saved at the last moment. His secular and despotic regime, with all its shortcomings, suddenly looks preferable to Islamic democracy in Damascus" (Haaretz, April 27, 2006)
  • China's Interests Return Africa to the Strategic Spotlight
    The fact that the U.S. military command for Europe spends 70 percent of its time focused on issues in Africa should come as no surprise given the shifts in global trends that have seen Africa make an unlikely return to the geopolitical spotlight. In the wake of the Cold War in which each side backed its proxy forces in a classic "great game," the global focus shifted elsewhere and Africa was largely ignored as the continent was ravaged by AID, famine and the epic bloodbaths of Liberia-Sierra Leone and Rwanda-Congo, even as democracy took hold in some 40 percent of the continent's states and its healthier economies displayed impressive growth figures. But the twin crises of terrorism and energy security have compelled the U.S. to devote considerably more focus to African problems. West Africa has long been identified as a major source of oil imports for the U.S., but some of its Muslim nations have also been identified by al-Qaeda as theaters of operations. The big geopolitical shift, however, has been the emergence of Chinese influence. Although China is driven by its need to procure the extensive supplies of raw materials available in Africa, including oil and natural gas, it is approaching the continent in a manner quite different from Washington, offering African leaders a 'strategic partnership'. And in scale of economic investment, China may have the edge, too, with its emphasis on primary industries: Chinese imports from Africa, mostly raw materials, increased 81 percent in the past year. Chinese involvement in Africa also has clear political consequences, for example in the sluggishness with which the UN has responded to the crisis in Darfur, in part because of China's trade relations with the government of Sudan. (Wall Street Journal via Yale Global, April 28, 2006)


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    Different Paths: Brazil's Lula and Venezuela's Chavez

    Left vs. Left in Latin America
    It has long been self-evident that the Left has turned back the tide in Latin America since the triumph of U.S. geopolitical and economic perspectives at the end of the 1980s. A decade of neo-liberal economics has done little to lift much of the region out of poverty, and has only deepened the divide between rich and poor. And Latin American nations have seen countries such as Argentina prove that the sky does not fall in when even deeply troubled nations buck the IMF.

    "Starting with Hugo Chávez's victory in Venezuela eight years ago and poised to culminate in the possible election of Andrés Manuel López Obrador in Mexico's July 2 presidential contest, a wave of leaders, parties, and movements generically labeled "leftist" have swept into power in one Latin American country after another," writes Jorge G. Castañeda. "After Chávez, it was Lula and the Workers' Party in Brazil, then Néstor Kirchner in Argentina and Tabaré Vázquez in Uruguay, and then, earlier this year, Evo Morales in Bolivia. If the long shot Ollanta Humala wins the April presidential election in Peru and López Obrador wins in Mexico, it will seem as if a veritable left-wing tsunami has hit the region. Colombia and Central America are the only exceptions, but even in Nicaragua, the possibility of a win by Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega cannot be dismissed."

    Indeed, as the furor over the announcement by Bolivia's new populist leader Evo Morales that the country's hydrocarbons would be nationalized demonstrates, today the major political contest in Latin America is no longer between Left and Right, but between two contending outlooks on the Left. "One is modern, open-minded, reformist, and internationalist, and it springs, paradoxically, from the hard-core left of the past," he writes. "The other, born of the great tradition of Latin American populism, is nationalist, strident, and close-minded. The first is well aware of its past mistakes (as well as those of its erstwhile role models in Cuba and the Soviet Union) and has changed accordingly. The second, unfortunately, has not."

    He offers a thoughtful history of the Left in Latin America, establishing the factors that have driven the emergence of what he terms the "right Left" (as opposed to the "wrong Left" personified by Chavez). Much more European and Centrist in outlook, it remains the region's best hope for democratic development. Castañeda warns against a knee-jerk Cold War type response to the provocations of Chavez, suggesting that the more aggressive the response from Washington, the more damaging the outcome will be to both U.S. and Latin American interests. The more centrist Left of Mexico, Chile, Argentina and Brazil ultimately have the policies that negate the Venezuelan leader's posturing, but if he becomes the object of a renewed push into the region by the politically discredited administration in Washington, Chavez will emerge the winner. (Foreign Affairs, May-June 2006)


    Orla Guerin live from Jerusalem

    BBC Reviews Its Mideast Coverage
    Like any other news organization covering the Middle East, the BBC is consistently under pressure from partisans of both the Israelis and the Palestinians over its coverage. In response, the board of governors of the publicly-funded British broadcaster conducted an extensive internal review of its coverage, and reached some remarkable conclusions -- conclusions likely to irritate the pro-Israel lobby, although they will be welcomed teachers of journalism everywhere whose greatest fear is the loss of context in reporting a dramatic story, whether in the Middle East or elsewhere. While it commended the BBC's excellent record under very trying circumstances, it faulted the network's coverage for failing to take adequate account of the disparity in power between the two sides, and the historical context that frames that disparity. Israelis and Palestinians clash not as equals across some national boundary, but as an occupying and occupied people. The BBC's governors warn that too often, the network is tempted to rely on the dramatic, available imagery to the exclusion of background and context that explains the events. And they accuse it of being too reactive and not doing enough to proactively set out the story that has shaped and driven the conflict. For partisans of the Web as the primary vehicle in the future of journalism, the report also has some reassuring news: the way to address the problem and provide the necessary background and context often missing from a dramatic news story, the governors conclude, is to make the additional material available in linked packages on its web site. And that's a prescription for doing in-depth journalism today that makes sense no matter what your point of view. (BBC Board of Governors, April 2006)



    Ahmedinajad: Scary, perhaps, but he's not in charge

    Iran's President Rattles Sabers, But He Doesn't Call the Shots
    Memo to the editors of America: Mahmoud Ahmedinajad does not, repeat NOT, rule Iran. Executive power in the Islamic Republic, and particularly control over foreign policy and security issues, is ultimately in the hands of unelected clerics -- and Ahmedinajad is not one of them. While the U.S. news media seemed well apprised of this fact during the presidency of the reformist Mohammed Khatami, for some reason it has been forgotten now that Iran is ruled by a conservative populist who loves making wild threats, particularly where Israel is concerned. That may be grist to the mill for those seeking to make the case that Iran represents a global menace -- and the Iranians have themselves to blame for not speaking with one voice -- but Ahmedinajad's rants do not represent Iran's positions. So, when the U.S. media reports that Iran has called off talks with the U.S. over Iraq because Ahmedinajad has said they're no longer necessary, it behooves editors to dig a little deeper, for the simple reason that Ahmedinajad does not make foreign policy.

    Executive authority over all matters of foreign policy and national security remains in the hands of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khameini, who, incidentally, backed the candidacy of former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani against Ahmedinajad's. The Supreme Leader, of course, tends to consult on these matters and follow the consensus on the National Security Council, a body of about a dozen figures, including representatives of the Expediency Council, chaired by Rafsanjani, and the heads of the security forces, as well as President Ahmedinajad. But his voice is simply one of many, and he has to lobby for his positions -- which is one reason he spends so much time making demagogic speeches designed to rally popular support for his uncompromising positions.

    The National Security Council is chaired by Ali Larijani, who also ran for president against Ahmedinajad. And Larijani, who is in charge of Iran's negotiations over the nuclear issue, as well as the proposed talks with Washington over Iraq, reports not to the president, but to the Supreme Leader. And the message projected by Larijani is quite different from that of Ahmedinajad. For example, the U.S. press reported Ahmedinajad's threat that Iran might withdraw from the Non Proliferation Treaty, but Larijani explains why this is not necessary. Still, Iran's ambiguous communication with the world works to the advantage of hard-liners in the West, while Iranian pragmatists are increasingly worried about the damage being wrought by Ahmedinajad's reckless rhetoric. Iran's nuclear policy is increasingly the focus of an escalating power struggle within the Tehran regime, but that in itself should alert Western journalists and editors to the fact that as juicy as his quotes may be, Ahmedinajad's bluster can hardly be construed as Iran's policy. (Time, April 20, 2006)



    Long time, no see

    What if They Gave a Global Jihad and Nobody Came?
    The most striking thing about Osama bin Laden's latest taped missive is how quickly the two entities he was claiming to "protect" against a Western "crusade" -- the Hamas-led Palestinian government and the government of Sudan -- distanced themselves from his attentions. Rather than play eternal victims in somebody else's ideology, the Palestinians and their elected leaders are taking their national fate into their own hands, and addressing their own, extensive domestic and international crises. And even a leadership committed to an Islamist world view and which has been ready in the past to use suicide-terror as a means of advancing its cause instantly recognizes that Bin Laden offers them nothing. Indeed, this is hardly the first such public spat: Hamas publicly slapped down Bin Laden's deputy, Ayman Zawahiri, last month after the Qaeda leader released a statement warning Hamas against compromise. And the Washington Post reports that Zawahiri has also tangled repeatedly with the leadership of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, further evidence of a split between al Qaeda's self-styled "Comintern" of global jihad and the nationally-based Islamist movements that are entering the political mainstream in the Arab world.



    The Poor Man's Air Force
    Mike Davis provides a fascinating history of the car-bomb and its evolution as a weapon in contemporary conflict, from its roots among anarchists in New York through its uses by both sides in Israel-Palestine in the mid 1940s, through internecine Mafia wars in Sicily in the early 1960s via Algeria, to more contemporary incarnations in Beirut, Ireland and Sri Lanka. Davis explores the emergence of the technology that levels the playing field in destructive power between conventional armies and terror outfits. Summarizing their advantages, he notes the following:

    "First, vehicle bombs are stealth weapons of surprising power and destructive efficiency. Trucks, vans, or even SUVs can easily transport the equivalent of several conventional 1,000-pound bombs to the doorstep of a prime target. Moreover, their destructive power is still evolving, thanks to the constant tinkering of ingenious bomb-makers. We have yet to face the full horror of semi-trailer-sized explosions with a lethal blast range of 200 yards or of dirty bombs sheathed in enough nuclear waste to render mid-Manhattan radioactive for generations.

    "Second, they are extraordinarily cheap: 40 or 50 people can be massacred with a stolen car and maybe $400 of fertilizer and bootlegged electronics. Ramzi Yousef, the mastermind of the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center, bragged that his most expensive outlay was in long-distance phone calls. The explosive itself (one half ton of urea) cost $3,615 plus the $59 per day rental for a ten-foot-long Ryder van. In contrast, the cruise missiles that have become the classic American riposte to overseas terrorist attacks cost $1.1 million each.

    "Third, car bombings are operationally simple to organize. Although some still refuse to believe that Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols didn't have secret assistance from a government or dark entity, two men in the proverbial phone booth -- a security-guard and a farmer -- successfully planned and executed the horrendous Oklahoma City bombing with instructional books and information acquired from the gun-show circuit.

    "Fourth, like even the 'smartest' of aerial bombs, car bombs are inherently indiscriminate: "Collateral damage" is virtually inevitable. If the logic of an attack is to slaughter innocents and sow panic in the widest circle, to operate a "strategy of tension," or just demoralize a society, car bombs are ideal. But they are equally effective at destroying the moral credibility of a cause and alienating its mass base of support, as both the IRA and the ETA in Spain have independently discovered. The car bomb is an inherently fascist weapon.

    "Fifth, car bombs are highly anonymous and leave minimal forensic evidence. Buda quietly went home to Italy, leaving William Burns, J. Edgar Hoover, and the Bureau of Investigation (later, to be renamed the FBI) to make fools of themselves as they chased one false lead after another for a decade. Most of Buda's descendants have also escaped identification and arrest. Anonymity, in addition, greatly recommends car bombs to those who like to disguise their handiwork, including the CIA, the Israeli Mossad, the Syrian GSD, the Iranian Pasdaran, and the Pakistani ISI -- all of whom have caused unspeakable carnage with such devices.

    In his followup piece, he examines the politics of some of the groups using car bombs and how the weapon interacts with those. He also notes that car bombing and IEDs in Iraq have forced an occupation authority to retreat into the tiny quadrant of the capital known at "The Green Zone." (TomDispatch, April , 2006)



    Beirut Takes a Time Out From the 'Clash of Cultures'
    In the not too distant past, the observation that Beirut "has a lot of secret stuff going on" would have referred to clandestine political and military operations of radical factions, espionage duels, kidnappings and the plotting of a bloody civil war. Today, it's the raison d'etre offered by the publishers of Time Out Beirut, the local edition of the London-based magazine franchise that showcase hedonistic delights of all the world's great metropolises for a weekly readership. The idea that Beirut will have its own edition, starting as a monthly, may be the surest sign that the city has put the scars of civil war behind it, and epitomizes a new optimism in the wake of the Syrian withdrawal. And it also blows something of a raspberry in the direction of those who insist that we're in the throes of a clash of cultures. (Daily Star, April 7, 2006)


    Hamas's cabinet is sworn in

    Should the West Engage With Radical Islamists?
    Mark Perry and Alastair Crooke are former Western intelligence officials who have, along with a number of their colleagues, been holding talks with officials from Hamas, Hezbollah and Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood. These officials, who worked at the highest levels of British and U.S. intelligence, have recognized that the political momentum in the Arab world is with the Islamists, but in the course of their discussions they have recognized a profoundly important distinction between the interests and agendas of nationally-based groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah and the transnational jihadists of al-Qaeda. (Indeed, the same distinction was clearly on view recently when Hamas firmly rejected Al Qaeda's demand that it fight on and reject compromise -- the premise of the brusque rebuff by Prime Minister Ismail Haniya was that the Palestinians don't need Al-Qaeda's advice. Crooke and Perry believe that the West is making a tragic mistake if it continues to conflate these two groups, rather than recognizing the considerable basis for dialogue and even common interests (particularly in democracy) with some of the nationally-based Islamist groups. They sought to brief the U.S. government on their discussions but were rebuffed, on the grounds that such a briefing would be seen to be legitimizing talks with terrorists. They write:

    "The question of legitimacy is important because for democracies, legitimacy is not conferred, but earned at the ballot box. Hamas and Hezbollah would welcome a dialogue with the West not because it would confer 'legitimacy' - they already have that - but because such a dialogue would acknowledge the differences between Islamist movements that represent actual constituencies from those (such as al-Qaeda and its allied movements) that represent no one....

    "There is no question that two of the groups with whom we spoke - Hamas and Hezbollah - have adopted violent tactics to forward their political goals. They are not alone: Fatah (whose candidates for election the US supported with US$2 million in campaign funds) continues to use violence (and kidnap Westerners), so do the Tamil Tigers, so did the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the African National Congress. So too does the United States. America's insistence that Hamas and Hezbollah 'renounce violence' and 'disarm' is dismissed by these groups as not only an invitation to surrender but, in light of the continuing and increasingly indefensible use of alarmingly disproportionate US and British firepower in Iraq, the rankest hypocrisy.

    "The West's seeming abhorrence of violence is derived from its deeply rooted belief that political change is possible without it. But defending this proposition requires an extraordinary exercise in historical amnesia....

    "The leaders of major Islamist organizations view the issue of violence in the same way Americans do - as a legitimate option that is applied to establish deterrence and stability and to defend and promote their interests. For Hamas and Hezbollah, 'armed resistance' is a way of balancing the asymmetry of force available to Israel. Both groups place their use of violence in a political context.

    " 'Armed resistance is not simply a tool that we use to respond to Israeli aggression,' a Hamas leader averred. 'It gives our people confidence that they are being defended, that they have an identity, that someone is trying to balance the scales.

    "Hezbollah puts this idea in the same political context: 'It may be that some day we will have to sit down across from our enemies and talk to them about a political settlement. That could happen,' reflected Nawaf Mousawi, the chief of the Hezbollah's foreign relations department. 'But no political agreement will be possible until they respect us. I want them to know that when they're sitting there across from us that if they decide to get up and walk away, they'll have to pay a price.'

    "The West's insistence that opening a political dialogue be preceded by and conditioned on disarmament is simply unrealistic: it suggests that we believe that 'our' violence is benevolent while 'theirs' is unreasoning and random - that a 19-year-old rifle-toting American in Fallujah is somehow less dangerous than a 19-year-old Shi'ite in southern Lebanon.

    "In fact, political agreements have rarely been preceded by disarmament. United Nations demands for the disarmament of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) in 1978 unraveled a conflict-ending political agreement (a situation put right when the rebels were allowed to keep their weapons), and Northern Ireland's 'Good Friday Agreement' allowed the IRA to keep its weapons until a political process (leading to 'decommissioning') reflecting their concerns was put in place.

    "The West often views Islamic violence as random and unreasoning, but Hamas and Hezbollah believe that violence can shift practical political considerations to create a psychology in which armed groups can use the tool of de-escalation as a way of forwarding a political process. That is to say, absent a political agreement, Hamas and Hezbollah will not voluntarily abandon what they view as their only defense against the overwhelming weight of Israeli military power.

    "Disarmament (or 'demilitarization') is possible: it worked in Northern Ireland and South Africa. When coupled with substantive political talks, the unification of armed elements into a single security or military force - demilitarization - provides the best hope for increased stability and security in Lebanon, the West Bank and Gaza."
    (Asia Times, March 30, 2006)


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