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New reports suggest the U.S. has planned a massive air campaign to take
down Iran's nuclear facilities, posisbly even using tactical nuclear
weapons |
Nuking
Iran?
Seymour Hersh reports that the Bush
administration, despite its public commitment to diplomacy, is
preparing a comprehensive series of air strikes -- that would include
using tactical nuclear weapons to penetrate hardened underground
facilities -- to eliminate Iran's nuclear facilities, as well as much
of its capacity to retaliate. He reports that the fevered thinking at
the top of the administration includes a belief on the part of
President Bush and Vice President Cheney that Iran's President Mahmoud
Ahmedinejad is a "new Hitler" who seeks to eliminate Israel, and that
"saving Iran" must be Bush's legacy because none of his successors will
have the courage to take the necessary steps. (It is difficult not to
ask why these scenarios are being tossed out there, since the White
House presumably knows that whereas Hitler actually ran Germany,
Ahmedinejad's power in Iran is limited by a structure that puts more
than one clerically appointed authority above him in the executive
branch -- Iran's security forces don't actually report to their
president, but answer instead to the Supreme Leader.)
But what Hersh is reporting involves a lot more than fevered
rhetoric. He suggests members of Congress have been briefed on the
strike plans, and that there have been resignations at the top tier of
the military to express protest against the plans to use nuclear
weapons. Military and intelligence personnel are alarmed at the
assumption that a massive air strike will humiliate the Iranian
leadership and force its collapse. European diplomats warn that the
result of such a course of action will be many years of chaos. (The New
Yorker, April 10, 2006)
The Washington Post's sources echo some of Hersh's claims
but they also
make clear that part of the rationale for putting the story out there
is to intimidate the Iranians into retreating from their defiant posture.
(Washington Post, April 9, 2006)
Britain's Sunday Times reports a similar finding, that the
claims made in Hersh's report about the Bush administration's intention
to bomb Iran unless it satisfied international demands on its nuclear
program squares with leaks to their own reporters. The very fact of
this apparently coordinated set of leaks implying that attack plans are
already laid suggests that the White House is seeking to convey this
message to the public. It remains to be seen whether the intention of
this media campaign is to simply to rattle Iran or to prepare the
American public for a military strike. (Sunday Times, April 9, 2006)
Joseph Cirincone explains how the current reality of
Iran's nuclear program is being systematically overstated in order to
make a case for war. And, he warns, any strike on Iran's nuclear
facilities is sure to strengthen, rather than weaken the grip on power
of the current regime. (Council on Foreign Relations, April 7, 2006)
U.S.-Iran
Talks Amid Rising Tensions
Even as Western media carries new
revelations about U.S. plans to attack Iran, Washington is nonetheless
still going ahead with plans to hold talks with Tehran over the
situation in Iraq. And many of the allies on which the U.S. relies in
the diplomatic struggle over Iran see those as the best hope for the
sort of wide-ranging U.S.-Iranian strategic dialogue for which Tehran
is pushing, and which the Europeans would prefer to see, but which
Washington is resolute in rejecting. Kaveh Afrasiabi offers a
thoughtful look at the challenges facing both sides as they enter talks
on Iraq: The U.S. has to resolve the question of whether its Iran
policy is, in fact, regime change, in which case there is nothing to be
gained from talks. The Iranians have to figure out a modus vivendi with
a U.S. presence in Iraq despite their insistence that the purpose of
the talks is simply to urge it to leave. "At this stage the most
important thing the two parties can do is set the ground rules for a
constructive dialogue, one that will be something more than a 'dialogue
of the deaf' where both sides talk past each other." He suggests a
series of ground rules, including the requirement that each side
understand the other side's interests, that each side clarify its own
interests (and in the case of Iran, he says, this requires a debate
about normoalizaiotn of relations with the US, just as it does on the
U.S. side), and an analytical approach to differences which aims to
distinguish between differences that preclude normalization and those
that can be accommodated on the basis of normal diplomatic relation.
And also the opening of a good-faith channel of open ended dialogue
designed to avoid the escalation of conflict. (Asia Times, April 7,
2006)
Abbas William Samii
parses the perspective within Iran's corridors of power on the issue of
talking to the U.S.. Just as the Bush administration has been
strongly divided over the question of engaging with Iran, so has the
issue of engaging with the U.S. become a focus of the intense factional
rivalry within the clerical regime. While the competing factions
remains united behind Iran's insistence on the right to enrich uranium,
the more pragmatic element in the conservative camp -- including
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameini, and former President Ali Akbar
Rafsanjani -- as well as reformers such as former President Mohammed
Khatami have criticized the current government of President Mahmoud
Ahmedinejad's for its reckless postures, which have weakened Iran's
diplomatic position. That may be why the negotiations are being handled
by Ali Larijani, who reports directly to Khameini. Still, talking to
the US about Iraq has been condemned by Ahmedinejad's faction. And the
demand by Iraqi politicians to be able to participate -- which would
have to wait for the formation of a new government -- may suit the
agenda of those in Iran trying to balance the positions of the
different factions. By agreeing to talks it can show the West a
responsible face; by seeing those talks postponed because of Iraqi
political infighting, it can dodge the fallout from the conservatives.
(Daily Star, April 7, 2006)
The Financial Times reports that Iran
has made new approaches to Washington to initiate a comprehensive
dialogue to resolve the nuclear standoff and other points of contention.
The initiative has the blessing of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khameini,
but so far it is being rebuffed by the U.S. European allies are,
however, raising the pressure on Washington to talk directly to Tehran.
Germany's foreign minister made a public statement this week saying
Germany and Britain wanted the US to talk to Iran, and Chancellor
Angela Merkel is believed to have raised the idea in talks with
President Bush.
(Financial Times, April 7)
Ray Tayekh argues that if the U.S. is serious
about finding a diplomatic solution the crisis it will agree to direct
talks with Tehran. Only the U.S. is in a position to provide the
sort of security guarantees the Iranians may require to step back from
the nuclear brink. (Council on Foreign Relations, April 7, 2006)
Interviewed by Al-Ahram, IAEA chief Dr. Mohammed ElBaradei
offers some thoughtful observations on the issue of
nuclear double standards in response to a question on whether Iran
and North Korea would have been better off simply working outside of
the NPT, as India, Pakistan and Israel did. "Until we see serious
movement towards nuclear disarmament by the nuclear weapon states and a
security system that does not rely on nuclear deterrence, there will
continue to be a sense of double standards," he notes. "As I have said
before, a world of nuclear 'haves and have- nots' is not sustainable.
Eventually, some countries -- particularly those in areas of conflict
-- will start to ask whether they are better off leaving the NPT. This
would be a terrible development, because a world with more
nuclear-weapon states is a much more dangerous world. What we need is
to move away from nuclear weapons and not to increase the number of
those who have them. This could be the beginning of the end of our
world."
(Al Ahram, 6-12 April, 2006)
Tony Karon suggests that the
diplomatic deadlock on Iran is beginning to resemble the Six-Party
process on North Korea, in which the other parties to the talks
agree with the U.S. that North Korea should abandon nuclear weapons,
but at the same time insist that the U.S. take "regime-change" off its
agenda, offer Pyongyang security guarantees and enter direct talks.
(Time.com, April 6, 2006)
Background Material on Iran
The Center for Defense Information has posted
extracts from the IAEA report on Iran which is to be discussed by the
Security Council. (CDI, March 6,
2006)
Iran's UN ambassador Javad Sarif, in a New York Times op ed,
sets out sets
out Tehran's negotiating position on the nuclear issue. Iran has no
intention of building nuclear weapons, he insists, and is willing to
negotiate on the basis providing new guarantees to win Western
confidence in this assertion, including expanded inspections and the
creation of an international consortium to supply Iran's reactor fuel.
(New York Times, April 7,
2006)
Christopher de Bellaigue offers a comprehensive
analysis of the Iranian regime's nuclear intentions and its strategy
for handling the standoff with the U.S.
(New York Review of Books, April 27,
2006)
The International Crisis Group sees two possible diplomatic
solutions to prevent a breakdown
from which Iran would quite likely emerge nuclear-armed. The first is
that Iran would agree to refrain entirely from enriching uranium on its
own soil, but for that to happen, warns the ICG, the U.S. would have to
offer a far greater political incentive than is currently on the table.
If the U.S. is unlikely in the near term to offer full recognition and
rehabilitation of the regime in Tehran, the only other plausible
outcome is for the West to back down on the principle of Iranian
enrichment but in exchange for Iran agreeing to delay its onset by a
number of years and submit to a far more intrusive inspection regime.
As imperfect as this solution would be to all sides, the alternative is
worse, the ICG argues. (International Crisis Group, February 28, 2006)
George Perkovich warns
that proposals allowing limited enrichment in Iran simply defer a
confrontation and make it more difficult to rein in what will then
be a fait accompli in Iran. (Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, March 7,
2006)
In an interview with TIME's Scott MacLeod, Iran's
top nuclear negotiator suggests his regime remains open to a deal, even
direct talks with the U.S.. But they would not be willing to be
"harangued" by President Bush, and they insist that their right to
uranium enrichment be recognized. (TIME, March 1, 2006)
As in the case of North Korea,
China's position may prove to be the critical influence on how the Iran
standoff plays out. Dingli Shen suggests Beijing is caught in the
dilemma of balancing its emerging status as a global diplomatic power,
maintaing stqability and the nuclear status quo, and protecting Iran's
sovereign right to civilian nuclear program and China's bilateral
energy relationship with Tehran. Beijing's view is that Iran must
account for its nuclear past under NPT commitment before it can demand
full cycle rights under the treaty. Of course if it withdrew from the
treaty, it could legally puruse both energy and weapons. Beijing's own
concerns militate against support for a strategy of confrontation by
either side. (Washington Quarterly, Spring 2006)
2006)
Stephen Sestanovich assesses the
Russian posture on Iran, parsing its likely course against the
backdrop of the current geopolitical posture of President Putin.
(Council on Foreign Relations, March 3, 2006)
The Oxford Research Group assesses the
effectiveness of military options against Iran, and concludes they
are unlikely to restrain Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons but will
promote chaos and instability.
(Oxford Research Group, February, 2006)
Ray Tayekh explains the factional disputes at the
heart of the Tehran regime, suggesting that the path of
confrontation is preferred by a new generation of conservatives
hardened during the Iran-Iraq war, and that the current atmosphere of
crisis strengthens their hand domestically.
(The National Interest, Spring, 2006)
Henry Sokolski suggests that the current debate over how to
stop Iran going nuclear is fruitless. Instead, he offers a
long-term strategy for managing Western rivalry with a nuclear-armed
Iran. (Transatlantic Institute, March 16, 2006)
Previously on Iran:
--
03.29.06: Bush Iran Strategy Hits a Wall
--
03.22.06: Has Britain Put U.S. on the Spot?
--
03.15.06: Regime Change or Normalization?
--
03.01.06: Nuclear Standoff Escalates
--
02.21.06: Dangers of a Military Option
--
02.28.06: Tehran Raises
the Stakes
Hamas
Power Forces All Sides to Alter Their Positions
Hamas's power became a reality last week as
the new Palestinian government assumed the reins
of power amid mounting political turbulence. Its first cabinet
meeting had to be conducted by videoconference, because Israeli
restrictions prevent members traveling between the West Bank and Gaza
-- and the extent of Israeli control was made clear by the arrest of
the Minister for Jerusalem Affairs when he tried to enter the West
Bank. At the same time, the
EU suspended financial aid to the Palestinian Authority, joining
the U.S. and Israel in a financial blockade that has left government
coffers empty -- and the new administration unable to pay the salaries
on which one third of the population survives. That, together with
Israel's stranglehold on Gaza border crossings has restricted food
supplies in Gaza, and threatened a humanitarian crisis. But an even
more pressing problem for Hamas is the armed challenge of rival
factions, particularly Fatah, whose militants have been firing rockets
into Israel and even launching suicide attacks in the West Bank,
provoking Israeli artillery and air strikes. Fatah, whose structures
have been shattered by its electoral defeat and over which President
Abbas exercises negligible authority, is
using attacks on Israel and displays of weaponry on the streets as a
means of undermining the authority of Hamas, underlining the
urgency of the new Hamas-led government enforcing law and order. (That,
in itself remains a source of friction as Abbas
is refusing to cede control of the security forces to the
government.)
The International Institute for Strategic Studies sees the
ascent of Hamas as signaling a new, democratic phase of Palestinian
politics. "Despite endorsing the 1993 Oslo Accords and committing to
mutual recognition and co-existence with Israel," the IISS concludes,
"Fatah failed to change from guerilla movement to civilian party and
neglected to use its executive power or majority in the Palestinian
Legislative Council (PLC) to address poor governance, insecurity and
economic decline. Hamas, which Israel and the West associate most with
suicide bombings and implacable opposition to Oslo, in contrast has a
reputation among Palestinians for effective social welfare programmes
and honesty. And its astute election campaign suggested that Hamas is
more comfortable than Fateh in the conduct of civilian party politics."
Thus the fundamental flaw of the U.S.-Israeli effort to
reverse the Palestinian elections, which the IISS warns is encouraging
Fath "to make it impossible for Hamas to govern." But Fatah is no
longer a credible opposition party. "Fatah is incapable of the one
thing that could alter its prospects: reinventing itself as something
akin to a social democratic party and learning to act in effective but
peaceful opposition. The lure of retaking government and the power of
patronage through quicker, coercive means is too strong. Yet there is
no assurance that Fateh would be able to achieve much greater internal
discipline or present a more united front if new elections are held. It
does not help Fateh that its main strength - a political platform based
on pursuing the peace process with Israel and on attaining Palestinian
statehood within borders approximating the pre-1967 'Green Line', a
capital in East Jerusalem, and a reasonable deal on refugees - has been
substantially eroded by the collapse of the peace process and by the
Israeli refusal to acknowledge the Fateh-dominated PA or Abbas as a
genuine or capable partner. Hamas has further reduced Fateh's
comparative advantage by accepting much the same platform, even while
renewing its commitment to the eventual destruction of Israel after a
'truce' that could last decades. The main difference is that Hamas
promises to govern better, at least until allowed to prove otherwise."
Even if a political deadlock forced new election, there's
little doubt that Hamas would trounce Fatah even more heavily now than
it did in January. Which makes the positions of Israel, the U.S. and
Europe untenable, although the same is true for Hamas. "The
international community faces a delicate task, therefore," the IISS
argues. "It is right to set conditions for political dialogue and
material assistance in order to compel Hamas to make clear choices and
then take full responsibility for them. But the Palestinian political
system, economy and governing structures have become too fragile to
withstand the impact of a coercive strategy aimed at bringing down the
Hamas government and restoring Fateh rule. Civil strife and
uncontrollable violence could then result, leaving the international
community with a humanitarian crisis on its hands."
(International Institute for Strategic Studies, April 7, 2006)
Hamas appears keenly aware of the need to alter its image in
the minds of the international community and even of the Israeli
public: Not only is it moving steadily towards advocating a two-state
solution and de facto recognition of Israel (see below);
Hamas activists have told the Observer that the organization plans to
end the use of suicide bombing as a tactic. "The suicide bombings
happened in an exceptional period and they have now stopped," a Hamas
legislator told the paper. "They came to an end as a change of belief."
Suicide bombings are the face of Hamas to much of the international
community, and analysts see them as having cost the Palestinians the
moral high ground in the battle for international public opinion. If,
indeed, Hamas has dispensed with the practice in principle, it would
signal a remarkable shift under way as a result of its entry into
political institutions. (The Observer, April 9, 2006)
The new Palestinian foreign minister, Mahmoud Zahar,
appeared to advance a version of a two-state solution in an interview
with the Times of London last week. (The Times, April 7, 2006)
The Jerusalem Post reports that
Hamas is preparing to present its own version of a two-state solution
that would allow it to recognize Israel. Although the shift has
come about as a result of international pressure on the organization --
the Arab regimes who have promised to support the new government
financially have nonetheless insisted that it pursue a negotiated
settlement on the basis of the 1967 borders, for example. But if Hamas
takes this step, it forces Israel and the West to reassess their own
hands-off approach, which may not be what the Israeli government had in
mind. (Jerusalem Post, April 7, 2006)
Ze'ev Schiff reports that finds that Hamas has, in
fact, made a new offer to Israel -- not simply the "long term truce
in exchange for withdrawal to 1967 borders" that its leaders have
floated for some time now, but a "calm for calm" deal proposed through
Egyptian intermediaries that would involve the following: "Hamas would
pledge not to carry out any violent actions against Israel and would
even prevent other Palestinian organizations from doing so," writes
Schiff. "Israel, for its part, would pledge by means of a third party
not to take action against the organizations operating in the
territories. Hamas is even prepared to declare a unilateral hudna
(cease-fire), should Israel not want to appear to be maintaining
contact with a body that calls for its destruction. According to this
offer, Israel is supposed to respond with positive measures of its
own." But, says Schiff, Israel's security chiefs see the offer as a
trap, designed to give Hamas a breather from the international and
domestic pressure it faces. And the Jewish State is therefore unlikely
to accept such offers from Hamas until it is ready to accept the full
set of conditions demanded by the Quartet.
(Haaretz, April 7, 2006)
Helena Cobban, in a thoughtful appraisal, reveals
the strategic logic of Hamas's shift in position on Israel: Rather
than embrace existing agreements or the "roadmap", Hamas is moving
towards what might be described as an "international law" position,
i.e. demanding that the Israelis withdraw to 1967 lines etc. in keeping
with relevant UN resolutions. These international law principles are
cited as the basis of the existing agreements, including the "roadmap,"
but they don't tie Hamas to agreements concluded by its predecessors in
quite the same way. (Dar al-Hayat, April 7)
Given the untenability of the current deadlock over how
Israel and the West relate to a Hamas-led government, all sides will be
forced to alter their positions. Hamas appears to be seizing the
strategic initiative by redefining its goals in order to answer the
questions over its intentions posed by the international community, and
turn the tables on Israel. Ze'ev Schiff warns that
Hamas has a strategy for dealing with Israel, but Israel has no
strategy for dealing with Hamas. Even if Hamas fails, it's not
clear that Israel wants to revert to a peace process with the old Fatah
leadership that it helped to fail, whose leader Mahmoud Abbas is
essentially a lame duck. Some Israelis favor responding to Hamas on the
basis of deeds rather than declarations, and Hamas itself prefers that
option because it gives it time to realign itself tactically in the
wake of its unexpected win. Others see that as dangerous, and favor
"regime-change," although that would not be likely to restore Abbas to
power, but instead bring on anarchy in the territories in which power
would revert entirely to armed formations. The problem for Israel is
that the waiting game in a policy vacuum works to Hamas's advantage,
because the humanitarian consequences of the sanctions being adopted by
Israel and Western governments are untenable.
(Haaretz, April 7, 2007)
If Hamas is looking to restrain other factions from attacking
Israel from within its domain, it will be on a collision course not
only with Fatah, but also with Al-Qaeda. Marie Colvin reports that
Qaeda cells are being created in Gaza, and that they will take
advantage of any move to moderation on the part of Hamas. (Sunday
Times, April 9,
2006)
Bir Zeit professor Ali Jarbawi warns that
the infighting between Hamas and Fatah leaves the playing field open to
Israel to unilaterally redefine its boundaries. It has thus far
prevented the Palestinians from fashioning a credible challenge to
Israel's unilateral agenda. Hamas's wait-and-see attitude on
negotiations with Israel will allow it to reject Israel's own plans,
but it won't enable the movement to stop them. "Palestinians will be
preoccupied by the domestic tensions, leaving Israel to decide the
Palestinians' destiny," he writes. "After that, Palestinians may well
decide to begin a new intifada. Unfortunately, Palestinians oscillate
between favoring negotiations at times and the intifada at others, and
offer no creative alternatives." His own version of a creative
alternative is for the Palestinians to dissolve the PA, which will
underscore the continuing occupied-status of the West Bank and Gaza and
prevent Israel from retreating behind borders of its own making.
Certainly counterintuitive. (Daily Star, April 6,
2006)
John Robertson suggests that
although the new Israeli government will likely be a center-left
coalition, Israeli resistance to any further West Bank withdrawal
will likely elicit support from pro-Israel quarters in the U.S. That,
together with the flimsy nature of this coalition, like its forebears,
suggests that despite his best intentions, Ehud Olmert may not be
capable of the "Forward" movement implied by the translation of his
party's Hebrew name, Kadima. (The War in Context, April 6,
2006)
Chris McGreal provides an insightful look at the
cultural policies of the new Hamas government. Belly dancing is
out, but cinema is okay, says the minister. ("We're not the Taliban.")
Curiously enough, Hamas appears to have had as much of a problem with
the Palestinian film "Paradise Now" as the Israelis and their
supporters in the U.S. had -- for Hamas, the problem may be that the
film questions the use of suicide bombings. (Guardian, April 6,
2006)
Donald McIntyre reports on
the
emergence of Combatants for Peace, a remarkable initiative that
brings together Israeli soldiers from elite forces and retired
militants from Palestinian armed formations to press for non-violent
conflict resolution. (The Independent, April 7,
2006)
Previously on Israel and Palestine:
--Hamas
Inherits a Policing Dilemma
--Israel
Hopes to Negotiate its Borders with U.S.
--Jericho
Raid Humiliates Abbas
--Hamas
and Israel: An Unspoken Peace?
--Rice
Fails to Secure Hamas Blockade
-- Is
the
U.S. Trying to Reverse the Palestinian Election?
Iraq:
The Magnitude of Failure
With spring in the air, Secretaries
Rice
and Straw took a trip to Baghdad to urge the
Iraqis to get on with forming the government for which they voted last
winter. Among those with whom they met was Prime Minister Ibrahim
Jaafari, with Secretary Rice reportedly appearing "stiff" before the
encounter -- hardly surprising, really, given the fact that Washington
has told the Shiite alliance that it will not accept Jaafari's
nomination for a new term as Prime Minister. That message now appears
to have been echoed, even,
by members of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq,
which is the biggest party in the alliance. That suggests that
Jaafari's vow to fight to the end may be fruitless if the Shiite
alliance splits, although such an outcome will very likely provoke a
strong reaction against the U.S. from Jaafari's key ally, Moqtada Sadr,
whose militiamen may make their displeasure felt on the streets.
Nonetheless, even if the U.S. manages to work the opposition to Jaafari
from diverse rivals into a successful blocking maneuver, the prospects
for a strong central government in Iraq right now look bleak. The U.S.
may manage to block the ascension of those politicians it most detests
in Iraq, but it remains unable to put its own allies such as Iyad
Allawi into power, or to influence political events in Iraq towards a
satisfactory outcome.
As Shibley Telhami notes, what is most palpable in Iraq is the
failure of the world's only superpower to impose its will despite an
unprecedented investment in its attempt to do so. "Consider the
stunning magnitude of the failure," Telhami writes. "Iraq has been the
top priority for the world's only superpower for the past three years,
and a central one for many regional and international powers. The
United States, intent on keeping Iraq together, has spent more
resources in that country than any state ever has spent on another in
the history of the world.
"All of Iraq's neighbors, for their own reasons, sought to
avoid a divided Iraq. All of the major factions in Iraq have an
interest in preventing civil war - the Shiites, preferring to have the
majority voice in a unified Iraq; the Sunnis, fearing being left with a
resource-poor region; and the Kurds, who didn't want to risk Turkish
intervention.
"Arab states feared the breakup of Iraq, and Arab public
opinion identified division as the biggest concern. All major
international organizations, from the United Nations to the Arab
League, sought the preservation of a unified Iraq.
"Yet the prospect of civil war and a divided Iraq are now
greater than they had been at any time."
(Brookings Institution, March 27, 2006)
Patrick Cockburn offers a vivid account of the multiple
fissures plaguing Iraqi politics and propelling it towards civil war.
While Sunni parties oppose Jaafari because they see him as complicit
with rampaging Shiite militias that threaten their physical survival in
mixed cities, the Kurds -- whose opposition has proved decisive, since
they originally governed in coalition with Jaafari -- see him as a
threat to their quasi-separatist ambitions in the north, particularly
their aim of folding Kirkuk into what would then be an oil-rich Kurdish
entity. But, of course, some of the Shiites opposed to Jaafari are also
those with the most notorious sectarian militias, while the Sunnis
actually share Jaafari's position on Kirkuk. Whatever the outcome of
the specific political dispute, the same basic fissures look likely to
keep the country in a downward spiral. (London Review of Books, April
6, 2006)
The New York Times reports that thousands
of Iraqi civilians have fled mixed neighborhoods to take refuge in
areas dominated by their own sect or group, often under militia
protection. It is at this neighborhood level, rather than on the
political stage, that the civil war is taking shape. (New York Times,
April 2, 2006)
In a similar vein, Megan K. Stack reports that
Sunni civilians with no previous connection with the insurgency have
begun stockpiling weapons and preparing neighbhorhood militias to
repel attacks by Shiite militias on their neighborhoods and mosques.
(Los Angeles Times, April 1, 2006)
Michael O'Hanlon argues that repeatedly ruling out military
action against Iran, The Telegraph reports that the U.S.
strategy of pushing Iraqi forces to the forefront of efforts to avoid a
civil war is dangerously misguided. The make-up of those forces is
such that they will not stand above and outside ethnic and sectarian
conflict, and the country will break apart unless U.S. forces are
deployed as an active deterrent to civil strife.(Washington Post, March
22, 2006)
The shifting pattern of U.S. deployments seems evident in
figures cited by the Washington Post that show
U.S. troop casualties at their lowest in two years even as the overall
level of violence in Iraq is near an all-time high." (Washington
Post, April 1, 2006)
Abbas Khadim reports that Iraq's Shiites see
in U.S. political interventions an attempt to deprive them of the
victory they won at the polls, and he predicts a sharp
deterioration in relations between the U.S. and the Shiite community.
(Al Ahram, March 29-April 4, 2005)
Kidnapped journalist Jill
Carroll sets the record straight in a statement following her
release, in which she explains that a video made shortly before her
release and an interview conducted in the offices of a Sunni political
party shortly after don't reflect her views -- she remains deeply angry
at the men who held her for two months. (Christian Science Monitory,
April 1, 2006)
Previously on Iraq:
--
A Generational American War?
--
What's Left of Iraq?
-- Civil
War and the Region
-- Is
Sadr the
Key to Avoiding Civil War?
-- Mounting
Anger at Coalition Forces in Iraq
|
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Beirut Takes a Time Out From the 'Clash of
Cultures'
In the not too distant past, the observation that Beirut "has a lot of
secret stuff going on" would have referred to clandestine political and
military operations of radical factions, espionage duels, kidnappings
and the plotting of a bloody civil war. Today, it's the raison d'etre
offered by the publishers of Time Out Beirut, the local edition of the
London-based magazine franchise that showcase hedonistic delights of
all the world's great metropolises for a weekly readership. The idea
that Beirut will have its own edition, starting as a monthly, may be
the surest sign that the city has put the scars of civil war behind it,
and epitomizes a new optimism in the wake of the Syrian withdrawal. And
it also blows something of a raspberry in the direction of those who
insist that we're in the throes of a clash of cultures.
(Daily Star, April 7, 2006)

Hamas's cabinet is sworn in
Should the West Engage With Radical Islamists?
Mark Perry and Alastair Crooke are former Western intelligence
officials who have, along with a number of their colleagues, been holding
talks with officials from Hamas, Hezbollah and Egypt's Muslim
Brotherhood. These officials, who worked at the highest levels of
British and U.S. intelligence, have recognized that the political
momentum in the Arab world is with the Islamists, but in the course of
their discussions they have recognized a profoundly important
distinction between the interests and agendas of nationally-based
groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah and the transnational jihadists of
al-Qaeda. (Indeed, the same distinction was clearly on view recently
when
Hamas firmly rejected Al Qaeda's demand that it fight on and reject
compromise -- the premise of the brusque rebuff by Prime Minister
Ismail Haniya was that the Palestinians don't need Al-Qaeda's advice.
Crooke and Perry believe that the West is making a tragic mistake if it
continues to conflate these two groups, rather than recognizing the
considerable basis for dialogue and even common interests (particularly
in democracy) with some of the nationally-based Islamist groups. They
sought to brief the U.S. government on their discussions but were
rebuffed, on the grounds that such a briefing would be seen to be
legitimizing talks with terrorists. They write:
"The question of legitimacy is important because for
democracies, legitimacy is not conferred, but earned at the ballot box.
Hamas and Hezbollah would welcome a dialogue with the West not because
it would confer 'legitimacy' - they already have that - but because
such a dialogue would acknowledge the differences between Islamist
movements that represent actual constituencies from those (such as
al-Qaeda and its allied movements) that represent no one....
"There is no question that two of the groups with whom
we spoke - Hamas and Hezbollah - have adopted violent tactics to
forward their political goals. They are not alone: Fatah (whose
candidates for election the US supported with US$2 million in campaign
funds) continues to use violence (and kidnap Westerners), so do the
Tamil Tigers, so did the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the African
National Congress. So too does the United States. America's insistence
that Hamas and Hezbollah 'renounce violence' and 'disarm' is dismissed
by these groups as not only an invitation to surrender but, in light of
the continuing and increasingly indefensible use of alarmingly
disproportionate US and British firepower in Iraq, the rankest
hypocrisy.
"The West's seeming abhorrence of violence is derived
from its deeply rooted belief that political change is possible without
it. But defending this proposition requires an extraordinary exercise
in historical amnesia....
"The leaders of major Islamist organizations view the
issue of violence in the same way Americans do - as a legitimate option
that is applied to establish deterrence and stability and to defend and
promote their interests. For Hamas and Hezbollah, 'armed resistance' is
a way of balancing the asymmetry of force available to Israel. Both
groups place their use of violence in a political context.
" 'Armed resistance is not simply a tool that we use to
respond to Israeli aggression,' a Hamas leader averred. 'It gives our
people confidence that they are being defended, that they have an
identity, that someone is trying to balance the scales.
"Hezbollah puts this idea in the same political context:
'It may be that some day we will have to sit down across from our
enemies and talk to them about a political settlement. That could
happen,' reflected Nawaf Mousawi, the chief of the Hezbollah's foreign
relations department. 'But no political agreement will be possible
until they respect us. I want them to know that when they're sitting
there across from us that if they decide to get up and walk away,
they'll have to pay a price.'
"The West's insistence that opening a political dialogue
be preceded by and conditioned on disarmament is simply unrealistic: it
suggests that we believe that 'our' violence is benevolent while
'theirs' is unreasoning and random - that a 19-year-old rifle-toting
American in Fallujah is somehow less dangerous than a 19-year-old
Shi'ite in southern Lebanon.
"In fact, political agreements have rarely been preceded
by disarmament. United Nations demands for the disarmament of the South
West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) in 1978 unraveled a
conflict-ending political agreement (a situation put right when the
rebels were allowed to keep their weapons), and Northern Ireland's
'Good Friday Agreement' allowed the IRA to keep its weapons until a
political process (leading to 'decommissioning') reflecting their
concerns was put in place.
"The West often views Islamic violence as random and
unreasoning, but Hamas and Hezbollah believe that violence can shift
practical political considerations to create a psychology in which
armed groups can use the tool of de-escalation as a way of forwarding a
political process. That is to say, absent a political agreement, Hamas
and Hezbollah will not voluntarily abandon what they view as their only
defense against the overwhelming weight of Israeli military power.
"Disarmament (or 'demilitarization') is possible: it
worked in Northern Ireland and South Africa. When coupled with
substantive political talks, the unification of armed elements into a
single security or military force - demilitarization - provides the
best hope for increased stability and security in Lebanon, the West
Bank and Gaza."
(Asia Times, March 30, 2006)

Abdul Rahman states his faith, posing a problem for both
Karzai and Bush
Kabul Christian Convert Puts Afghanistan's Karzai
in a Bind
Under pressure from his patron, the U.S. government, Afghanistan's
President Hamid Karzai intervened personally to secure the release of
Abdul Rahman, a 41-year-old convert to Christianity who faced a
potential death sentence under Sharia law for apostasy. And,
predictably,
thousands took to the streets to protest and demand that he be put to
death. The case highlights not only a
contradiction in Afghanistan's constitution between its endorsement
of international human rights conventions guaranteeing freedom of
worship, and its codifying of Sharia law, but also a political tension
that exposes the limits of Karzai's own authority -- and a domestic
problem for his U.S. backers.
Karzai's power remains limited, and entirely dependent
on a combination of U.S. and NATO forces, and the consent of various
warlords -- some of them radical Islamists -- who have been drawn into
government. For the Bush administration, the persecution by a
U.S.-backed regime of a Christian for having chosen the same faith as
the President of the United States is untenable: Washington was pressed
to demand Abdul Rahman's release by a clamor of protest from the
Evangelical activist base of the Republican Party. But for Karzai,
caving in to the U.S. on a matter of faith and identity is a risk
option. And the case has inflamed the passions of religious activists
on both sides, and the
Taliban is using it as a rallying point to build a coalition against
Karzai. Nor is it over, for Abdul Rahman's release was engineered
on the grounds of evidentiary technicalities and insinuations about his
sanity, rather than any question over the legitimacy of the law that
makes it possible to charge him for converting from Islam to another
faith. The fact that Abdul Rahman has reportedly applied for asylum in
a third country underscores the problem. The Bush administration likes
to point to Afghanistan as a
poster child for its promotion of democracy abroad; the Abdul Rahman
case will have alerted Americans at home to the limits of the freedom
that is being defended in Afghanistan.
(TIME, March 26, 2006)

President Bush addresses AIPAC
America's Israel Lobby
If social security has long been
the "third rail" of U.S. domestic politics, then its equivalent in the
sphere of foreign policy has been the U.S. alliance with Israe. John
Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago and Stephen Walt of Harvard's
Kennedy school tackle the taboo head on, in a provocative research
study that assesses the impact of the Israel lobby on decades of U.S.
policy in the Middle East. And it asserts that the Israel lobby's
influence on U.S. policy has been bad both for the U.S. and even for
Israel:
" The Lobby’s influence causes
trouble on several fronts. It increases the terrorist danger that all
states face – including America’s European allies. It has made it
impossible to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a situation that
gives extremists a powerful recruiting tool, increases the pool of
potential terrorists and sympathisers, and contributes to Islamic
radicalism in Europe and Asia.
"Equally worrying, the Lobby’s
campaign for regime change in Iran and Syria could lead the US to
attack those countries, with potentially disastrous effects. We don’t
need another Iraq. At a minimum, the Lobby’s hostility towards Syria
and Iran makes it almost impossible for Washington to enlist them in
the struggle against al-Qaida and the Iraqi insurgency, where their
help is badly needed.
"There is a moral dimension here
as well. Thanks to the Lobby, the United States has become the de facto
enabler of Israeli expansion in the Occupied Territories, making it
complicit in the crimes perpetrated against the Palestinians. This
situation undercuts Washington’s efforts to promote democracy abroad
and makes it look hypocritical when it presses other states to respect
human rights. US efforts to limit nuclear proliferation appear equally
hypocritical given its willingness to accept Israel’s nuclear arsenal,
which only encourages Iran and others to seek a similar capability.
"Besides, the Lobby’s campaign to
quash debate about Israel is unhealthy for democracy. Silencing
sceptics by organising blacklists and boycotts – or by suggesting that
critics are anti-semites – violates the principle of open debate on
which democracy depends. The inability of Congress to conduct a genuine
debate on these important issues paralyses the entire process of
democratic deliberation. Israel’s backers should be free to make their
case and to challenge those who disagree with them, but efforts to
stifle debate by intimidation must be roundly condemned.
"Finally, the Lobby’s influence
has been bad for Israel. Its ability to persuade Washington to support
an expansionist agenda has discouraged Israel from seizing
opportunities – including a peace treaty with Syria and a prompt and
full implementation of the Oslo Accords – that would have saved Israeli
lives and shrunk the ranks of Palestinian extremists. Denying the
Palestinians their legitimate political rights certainly has not made
Israel more secure, and the long campaign to kill or marginalise a
generation of Palestinian leaders has empowered extremist groups like
Hamas, and reduced the number of Palestinian leaders who would be
willing to accept a fair settlement and able to make it work. Israel
itself would probably be better off if the Lobby were less powerful and
US policy more even-handed...
"What is needed is a candid discussion of the Lobby’s influence and a
more open debate about US interests in this vital region. Israel’s
well-being is one of those interests, but its continued occupation of
the West Bank and its broader regional agenda are not. Open debate will
expose the limits of the strategic and moral case for one-sided US
support and could move the US to a position more consistent with its
own national interest, with the interests of the other states in the
region, and with Israel’s long-term interests as well. (London Review
of Books, March10, 2006)
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