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Condi Rice and Jack Straw meet British school children last week |
Bush Iran Policy Hits
a Wall
The United Nations Security Council last
week finally adopted a
Presidential Statement on Iran, but one that fell far short of what
Washington had wanted. Resistance from China and Russia proved
intractable, and rather than threaten action or frame the issue as a
threat to global security, it simply urged Iran to comply with IAEA
demands within 30 days or else the Council would discuss the matter
further. Then, on Wednesday in Berlin, Secretary of State Condi Rice
talked of sanctions as a consequence, and again her Russian counterpart
rebuked her and insisted that Moscow was opposed to sanctions. More
importantly,
European diplomats at the talks revealed that their own strategy
involved escalating both the pressure and the incentives for Iran to
comply. Innocuous as that may sound, it's a direct challenge to a
U.S. administration that has pursued non-proliferation diplomacy at the
same time as maintaining a "regime-change" agenda in relation to
Tehran: The incentives of which the Europeans are talking include
security guarantees, i.e. guaranteeing the safety of the regime from
outside threats in order to remove a key argument that might tip it in
the direction of acquiring a nuclear deterrent. Security guarantees are
incompatible with pursuing regime-change from without, and Washington
will in the coming months be forced to choose between those goals --
the international consensus against Iran acquiring nukes would likely
be almost as firmly against a policy of regime-change. And Washington
does not control the diplomacy in relation to Iran; it outsourced that
role to the Europeans precisely because of its unresolved internal
debate on regime-change. (A similar dynamic in the six-party process
over North Korea has resulted in the U.S. having no choice but to begin
finding a way of offering Pyongyang some form of direct talks and
security guarantees, which most of the other parties to the process see
as reasonable demands.)
In an interview with the Council on Foreign Relations' Bernard
Gwertzman, former Bush National Security Council official Flynt
Leverett has authored its own problem by failing to adopt a serious
policy on Iran. “We got into this dilemma because we essentially don’t
have a strategy for dealing with the Iranian nuclear issue," he
explains. "By 'we' I mean the United States and the Bush
administration. The Bush administration has deliberately ruled out
direct negotiations with Iran either over the nuclear issue or over the
broad range of strategic issues that you would need to talk to Iran
about if you were going to get a real diplomatic settlement on the
nuclear issue.
"The administration has, literally for years, ruled out that
kind of strategic dialogue withIran. In the absence of that sort of
approach, that sort of channel, the administration is left with two
options, one of which is to try and get something done in the Security
Council. It has been foreseeable literally for months, if not for
longer, that Russia and China at a minimum were not going to be
prepared to support serious multilateral sanctions or other serious
multilateral punitive measures on Iran. This is not a surprise. As I
said, it’s been foreseeable literally for months, but the
administration, without a strategy, is going down this feckless road
anyway.
The other option that the administration would have is unilateral
military action. Right now the administration is not in a position to
undertake that. The international outcry would, I think, be enormous.
We would literally have no one on our side at this point supporting
that kind of action. The administration certainly has many other
challenges on its plate that it’s having to cope with right now. And
frankly I don’t think a unilateral military strike would solve the
problem any more than trying to deal with it through the Security
Council. Because of the administration’s deliberate decision to rule
out serious strategically grounded diplomacy with Iran on this issue,
these are the only two options they’ve got, and neither is going to
work."
(Council on Foreign Relations March 30, 2006)
Kaveh L. Afrasiabi argues that
resolving the crisis now requires substantial new initiatives from the
West that would allow Tehran to save face while backing down from its
intractable position on uranium enrichment. The two key elements of
such an initiative, he says, are security guarantees and a credible,
politically neutral mechanism for guaranteeing Iran a secure and steady
flow of reactor fuel from abroad. (Asia Times, April 1, 2006)
Charles Kupchan and Ray Tayekh argue that the U.S. attempt to
browbeat Iran into nuclear compliance is bound to fail, because it
misreads Iranian history and political attitudes. In Iran, the
nuclear issue is framed as a matter of national pride that spans all
political persuasions, and from the point of view of Iranian
patriotism, the U.S. and Britain have not exactly distinguished
themselves as agents of democracy and fairness over the past century.
The only hope of changing Iran's course, they argue, would be to
profoundly change the manner in which Tehran is being addressed,
offering a full, open-ended dialogue aimed at normalizing relations.
(International Herald Tribune, March 29, 2006)
Pepe Escobar finds that on the
nuclear issue,
Tehran's liberal middle class and intelligentsia are firmly behind a
government they detest. (Asia Times, April 1, 2006)
Despite Foreign Secretary Jack Straw repeatedly ruling out
military action against Iran, The Telegraph reports that British
military planners have begun discussing possible involvement in a
U.S.-led air strike, believing that it is an inevitability if
diplomacy fails -- if not this year, then next year. "There will be no
invasion of Iran but the nuclear sites will be destroyed," the paper
writes. "This is not something that will happen imminently, maybe this
year, maybe next year. Jack Straw is making exactly the same noises
that the Government did in March 2003 when it spoke about the
likelihood of a war in Iraq." The report then goes on to offer a
detailed account of how such a strike would be staged -- so detailed,
in fact, that the reader would be forgiven for thinking the "leak" in
this instance may have been calculated to intimidate Tehran.
(The Telegraph, April 2, 2006)
Joseph Cirincione notes that
the rhetorical strategy of the Bush administration on Iran mirrors that
of prewar Iraq, raising his concern that many in the administration
may have already decided to attack Iran. The situation calls for
rational, informed discussion, he insists. "We cannot let the political
or ideological agenda of a small group determine a national security
decision that could create havoc in a critical area of the globe. Not
again." (Foreign Policy, March 27,
2006)
Background Material on Iran
The Center for Defense Information has posted
extracts from the IAEA report on Iran which is to be discussed by the
Security Council. (CDI, March 6,
2006)
The International Crisis Group sees two possible diplomatic
solutions to prevent a breakdown
from which Iran would quite likely emerge nuclear-armed. The first is
that Iran would agree to refrain entirely from enriching uranium on its
own soil, but for that to happen, warns the ICG, the U.S. would have to
offer a far greater political incentive than is currently on the table.
If the U.S. is unlikely in the near term to offer full recognition and
rehabilitation of the regime in Tehran, the only other plausible
outcome is for the West to back down on the principle of Iranian
enrichment but in exchange for Iran agreeing to delay its onset by a
number of years and submit to a far more intrusive inspection regime.
As imperfect as this solution would be to all sides, the alternative is
worse, the ICG argues. (International Crisis Group, February 28, 2006)
George Perkovich warns
that proposals allowing limited enrichment in Iran simply defer a
confrontation and make it more difficult to rein in what will then
be a fait accompli in Iran. (Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, March 7,
2006)
In an interview with TIME's Scott MacLeod, Iran's
top nuclear negotiator suggests his regime remains open to a deal, even
direct talks with the U.S.. But they would not be willing to be
"harangued" by President Bush, and they insist that their right to
uranium enrichment be recognized. (TIME, March 1, 2006)
As in the case of North Korea,
China's position may prove to be the critical influence on how the Iran
standoff plays out. Dingli Shen suggests Beijing is caught in the
dilemma of balancing its emerging status as a global diplomatic power,
maintaing stqability and the nuclear status quo, and protecting Iran's
sovereign right to civilian nuclear program and China's bilateral
energy relationship with Tehran. Beijing's view is that Iran must
account for its nuclear past under NPT commitment before it can demand
full cycle rights under the treaty. Of course if it withdrew from the
treaty, it could legally puruse both energy and weapons. Beijing's own
concerns militate against support for a strategy of confrontation by
either side. (Washington Quarterly, Spring 2006)
2006)
Stephen Sestanovich assesses the
Russian posture on Iran, parsing its likely course against the
backdrop of the current geopolitical posture of President Putin.
(Council on Foreign Relations, March 3, 2006)
The Oxford Research Group assesses the
effectiveness of military options against Iran, and concludes they
are unlikely to restrain Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons but will
promote chaos and instability.
(Oxford Research Group, February, 2006)
Ray Tayekh explains the factional disputes at the
heart of the Tehran regime, suggesting that the path of
confrontation is preferred by a new generation of conservatives
hardened during the Iran-Iraq war, and that the current atmosphere of
crisis strengthens their hand domestically.
(The National Interest, Spring, 2006)
Henry Sokolski suggests that the current debate over how to
stop Iran going nuclear is fruitless. Instead, he offers a
long-term strategy for managing Western rivalry with a nuclear-armed
Iran. (Transatlantic Institute, March 16, 2006)
Previously on Iran:
--
03.22.06: Has Britain Put U.S. on the Spot?
--
03.15.06: Regime Change or Normalization?
--
03.01.06: Nuclear Standoff Escalates
--
02.21.06: Dangers of a Military Option
--
02.28.06: Tehran Raises
the Stakes
Iraq:
The Magnitude of Failure
With spring in the air, Secretaries Rice
and Straw took a trip to Baghdad to urge the
Iraqis to get on with forming the government for which they voted last
winter. Among those with whom they met was Prime Minister Ibrahim
Jaafari, with Secretary Rice reportedly appearing "stiff" before the
encounter -- hardly surprising, really, given the fact that Washington
has told the Shiite alliance that it will not accept Jaafari's
nomination for a new term as Prime Minister. That message now appears
to have been echoed, even,
by members of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq,
which is the biggest party in the alliance. That suggests that
Jaafari's vow to fight to the end may be fruitless if the Shiite
alliance splits, although such an outcome will very likely provoke a
strong reaction against the U.S. from Jaafari's key ally, Moqtada Sadr,
whose militiamen may make their displeasure felt on the streets.
Nonetheless, even if the U.S. manages to work the opposition to Jaafari
from diverse rivals into a successful blocking maneuver, the prospects
for a strong central government in Iraq right now look bleak. The U.S.
may manage to block the ascension of those politicians it most detests
in Iraq, but it remains unable to put its own allies such as Iyad
Allawi into power, or to influence political events in Iraq towards a
satisfactory outcome.
As Shibley Telhami notes, what is most palpable in Iraq is the
failure of the world's only superpower to impose its will despite an
unprecedented investment in its attempt to do so. "Consider the
stunning magnitude of the failure," Telhami writes. "Iraq has been the
top priority for the world's only superpower for the past three years,
and a central one for many regional and international powers. The
United States, intent on keeping Iraq together, has spent more
resources in that country than any state ever has spent on another in
the history of the world.
"All of Iraq's neighbors, for their own reasons, sought to
avoid a divided Iraq. All of the major factions in Iraq have an
interest in preventing civil war - the Shiites, preferring to have the
majority voice in a unified Iraq; the Sunnis, fearing being left with a
resource-poor region; and the Kurds, who didn't want to risk Turkish
intervention.
"Arab states feared the breakup of Iraq, and Arab public
opinion identified division as the biggest concern. All major
international organizations, from the United Nations to the Arab
League, sought the preservation of a unified Iraq.
"Yet the prospect of civil war and a divided Iraq are now
greater than they had been at any time."
(Brookings Institution, March 27, 2006)
Patrick Cockburn offers a vivid account of the multiple
fissures plaguing Iraqi politics and propelling it towards civil war.
While Sunni parties oppose Jaafari because they see him as complicit
with rampaging Shiite militias that threaten their physical survival in
mixed cities, the Kurds -- whose opposition has proved decisive, since
they originally governed in coalition with Jaafari -- see him as a
threat to their quasi-separatist ambitions in the north, particularly
their aim of folding Kirkuk into what would then be an oil-rich Kurdish
entity. But, of course, some of the Shiites opposed to Jaafari are also
those with the most notorious sectarian militias, while the Sunnis
actually share Jaafari's position on Kirkuk. Whatever the outcome of
the specific political dispute, the same basic fissures look likely to
keep the country in a downward spiral. (London Review of Books, April
6, 2006)
The New York Times reports that thousands
of Iraqi civilians have fled mixed neighborhoods to take refuge in
areas dominated by their own sect or group, often under militia
protection. It is at this neighborhood level, rather than on the
political stage, that the civil war is taking shape. (New York Times,
April 2, 2006)
In a similar vein, Megan K. Stack reports that
Sunni civilians with no previous connection with the insurgency have
begun stockpiling weapons and preparing neighbhorhood militias to
repel attacks by Shiite militias on their neighborhoods and mosques.
(Los Angeles Times, April 1, 2006)
Michael O'Hanlon argues that repeatedly ruling out military
action against Iran, The Telegraph reports that the U.S.
strategy of pushing Iraqi forces to the forefront of efforts to avoid a
civil war is dangerously misguided. The make-up of those forces is
such that they will not stand above and outside ethnic and sectarian
conflict, and the country will break apart unless U.S. forces are
deployed as an active deterrent to civil strife.(Washington Post, March
22, 2006)
The shifting pattern of U.S. deployments seems evident in
figures cited by the Washington Post that show
U.S. troop casualties at their lowest in two years even as the overall
level of violence in Iraq is near an all-time high." (Washington
Post, April 1, 2006)
Abbas Khadim reports that Iraq's Shiites see
in U.S. political interventions an attempt to deprive them of the
victory they won at the polls, and he predicts a sharp
deterioration in relations between the U.S. and the Shiite community.
(Al Ahram, March 29-April 4, 2005)
Kidnapped journalist Jill
Carroll sets the record straight in a statement following her
release, in which she explains that a video made shortly before her
release and an interview conducted in the offices of a Sunni political
party shortly after don't reflect her views -- she remains deeply angry
at the men who held her for two months. (Christian Science Monitory,
April 1, 2006)
Previously on Iraq:
--
A Generational American War?
--
What's Left of Iraq?
-- Civil
War and the Region
-- Is
Sadr the
Key to Avoiding Civil War?
-- Mounting
Anger at Coalition Forces in Iraq
Hamas
Inherits a Policing Dilemma
The Middle East is never short on ironies,
but nobody in Hamas or outside of it could have expected to see the
movement having to grapple with the same headache the movement itself
once caused for Yasser Arafat. Despite the diplomatic pressure and
massive financial crisis facing the new Palestinian Authority
government from abroad, the major challenge right now is domestic
security -- restoring order, restraining militants from mounting terror
attacks that will bring ruinous Israeli retaliation, and getting
militias off the streets of Gaza and the West Bank. And in what might
seem like a role reversal, it's not only the militant factions that are
defying the stability initiatives of Hamas, but also Fatah. Last week,
the Fatah-linked al-Aksa Martyr's Brigade killed three Israelis in a
suicide attack on a northern West Bank settlement, while Samir
Masharawi, a senior fatah official in Gaza, bluntly rejected the demand
of Prime Minister Ismail Haniya's to stop the brandishing of weapons in
public. So Hamas must now craft a strategy of persuasion and coercion
to enforce calm and security, while Fatah -- the preferred party of the
Bush administration -- looks to restore its street credibility through
violence. And as Amos Harel writes, the idea that Hamas would somehow
be able to enforce discipline and calm on the streets of Gaza by virtue
of its own internal discipline now looks fanciful. (Haaretz, April 2,
2006)
Ibrahim Nafie offers a thoughtful
commentary on the dilemmas thrown up by the Arab League position on
Hamas. He commends their decision to respect the democratic choice
of the Palestinian electorate, and to continue economic assistance –
but slams their failure to implement that policy, noting that only the
Saudis have delivered the economic assistance they offered. He also
notes that the Khartoum summit reaffirmed the Beirut declaration (that
Israel be recognized within its 1967 borders as the basis of a peace
agreement) and rejected unilateral Israeli moves to determine final
borders. “The rejection is based on a clear understanding that such
unilateral moves will not bring peace: rather, they are designed to
consolidate Israeli control over the Palestinians, via its control of
roads, ports and crossings and, by extension, the income on which
Palestinians depend to survive,” writes Nafie. “But the Arab position
also acknowledges the necessity of there being a party ready to
negotiate with Israel. That, finally, depends on the position adopted
by Hamas.” (Al Ahram, March 29-April 4, 2006)
In a scathing op ed, Hamas prime minister Ismail Haniya asks
why the West has no hesitation in making demands of Hamas, but won't
ask a thing of Israeli leaders even when their positions contravene
international law and peace processes advocated by the West. He
warns that Ehud Olmert's plans for unilateral redrawing of boundaries
on the basis of Israel's own terms will lead to conflict and
confrontation. "Our land will still be occupied and our people enslaved
and oppressed by the occupying power," Haniya writes. "So we will
remain committed to our struggle to get back our lands and our freedom.
Peaceful means will do if the world is willing to engage in a
constructive and fair process in which we and the Israelis are treated
as equals. We are sick and tired of the west's racist approach to the
conflict, in which the Palestinians are regarded as inferior. Though we
are the victims, we offer our hands in peace, but only a peace that is
based on justice." (Haaretz, April 2, 2006)
Whatever Hamas's leaders in parliament are saying, Marie
Colvin finds the
movement's violent wing still very much alive. She visits a
training camp where new recruits are being trained among the ruins of
the vacated Israeli settlement of Morag in Gaza. (The Sunday Times,
April 2, 2006)
Graham Usher suggests that economic and social
issues, rather than the "separation" plan, determined the outcome of
Israel's election. (Al Ahram, March 29-April 4, 2006)
Robert Satloff makes the case that Hamas will not moderate
in power, and that
U.S. interests are best served by setting out to "abort" Hamas's rule.
(Washington Institute for Near East Studies, March 27, 2006)
Previously on Israel and Palestine:
--Israel
Hopes to Negotiate its Borders with U.S.
--Jericho
Raid Humiliates Abbas
--Hamas
and Israel: An Unspoken Peace?
--Rice
Fails to Secure Hamas Blockade
-- Is
the
U.S. Trying to Reverse the Palestinian Election?
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Hamas's cabinet is sworn in
Should the West Engage With Radical Islamists?
Mark Perry and Alastair Crooke are former Western intelligence
officials who have, along with a number of their colleagues, been holding
talks with officials from Hamas, Hezbollah and Egypt's Muslim
Brotherhood. These officials, who worked at the highest levels of
British and U.S. intelligence, have recognized that the political
momentum in the Arab world is with the Islamists, but in the course of
their discussions they have recognized a profoundly important
distinction between the interests and agendas of nationally-based
groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah and the transnational jihadists of
al-Qaeda. (Indeed, the same distinction was clearly on view recently
when
Hamas firmly rejected Al Qaeda's demand that it fight on and reject
compromise -- the premise of the brusque rebuff by Prime Minister
Ismail Haniya was that the Palestinians don't need Al-Qaeda's advice.
Crooke and Perry believe that the West is making a tragic mistake if it
continues to conflate these two groups, rather than recognizing the
considerable basis for dialogue and even common interests (particularly
in democracy) with some of the nationally-based Islamist groups. They
sought to brief the U.S. government on their discussions but were
rebuffed, on the grounds that such a briefing would be seen to be
legitimizing talks with terrorists. They write:
"The question of legitimacy is important because for
democracies, legitimacy is not conferred, but earned at the ballot box.
Hamas and Hezbollah would welcome a dialogue with the West not because
it would confer 'legitimacy' - they already have that - but because
such a dialogue would acknowledge the differences between Islamist
movements that represent actual constituencies from those (such as
al-Qaeda and its allied movements) that represent no one....
"There is no question that two of the groups with whom
we spoke - Hamas and Hezbollah - have adopted violent tactics to
forward their political goals. They are not alone: Fatah (whose
candidates for election the US supported with US$2 million in campaign
funds) continues to use violence (and kidnap Westerners), so do the
Tamil Tigers, so did the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the African
National Congress. So too does the United States. America's insistence
that Hamas and Hezbollah 'renounce violence' and 'disarm' is dismissed
by these groups as not only an invitation to surrender but, in light of
the continuing and increasingly indefensible use of alarmingly
disproportionate US and British firepower in Iraq, the rankest
hypocrisy.
"The West's seeming abhorrence of violence is derived
from its deeply rooted belief that political change is possible without
it. But defending this proposition requires an extraordinary exercise
in historical amnesia....
"The leaders of major Islamist organizations view the
issue of violence in the same way Americans do - as a legitimate option
that is applied to establish deterrence and stability and to defend and
promote their interests. For Hamas and Hezbollah, 'armed resistance' is
a way of balancing the asymmetry of force available to Israel. Both
groups place their use of violence in a political context.
" 'Armed resistance is not simply a tool that we use to
respond to Israeli aggression,' a Hamas leader averred. 'It gives our
people confidence that they are being defended, that they have an
identity, that someone is trying to balance the scales.
"Hezbollah puts this idea in the same political context:
'It may be that some day we will have to sit down across from our
enemies and talk to them about a political settlement. That could
happen,' reflected Nawaf Mousawi, the chief of the Hezbollah's foreign
relations department. 'But no political agreement will be possible
until they respect us. I want them to know that when they're sitting
there across from us that if they decide to get up and walk away,
they'll have to pay a price.'
"The West's insistence that opening a political dialogue
be preceded by and conditioned on disarmament is simply unrealistic: it
suggests that we believe that 'our' violence is benevolent while
'theirs' is unreasoning and random - that a 19-year-old rifle-toting
American in Fallujah is somehow less dangerous than a 19-year-old
Shi'ite in southern Lebanon.
"In fact, political agreements have rarely been preceded
by disarmament. United Nations demands for the disarmament of the South
West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) in 1978 unraveled a
conflict-ending political agreement (a situation put right when the
rebels were allowed to keep their weapons), and Northern Ireland's
'Good Friday Agreement' allowed the IRA to keep its weapons until a
political process (leading to 'decommissioning') reflecting their
concerns was put in place.
"The West often views Islamic violence as random and
unreasoning, but Hamas and Hezbollah believe that violence can shift
practical political considerations to create a psychology in which
armed groups can use the tool of de-escalation as a way of forwarding a
political process. That is to say, absent a political agreement, Hamas
and Hezbollah will not voluntarily abandon what they view as their only
defense against the overwhelming weight of Israeli military power.
"Disarmament (or 'demilitarization') is possible: it
worked in Northern Ireland and South Africa. When coupled with
substantive political talks, the unification of armed elements into a
single security or military force - demilitarization - provides the
best hope for increased stability and security in Lebanon, the West
Bank and Gaza."
(Asia Times, March 30, 2006)

Abdul Rahman states his faith, posing a problem for both
Karzai and Bush
Kabul Christian Convert Puts Afghanistan's Karzai
in a Bind
Under pressure from his patron, the U.S. government, Afghanistan's
President Hamid Karzai intervened personally to secure the release of
Abdul Rahman, a 41-year-old convert to Christianity who faced a
potential death sentence under Sharia law for apostasy. And,
predictably,
thousands took to the streets to protest and demand that he be put to
death. The case highlights not only a
contradiction in Afghanistan's constitution between its endorsement
of international human rights conventions guaranteeing freedom of
worship, and its codifying of Sharia law, but also a political tension
that exposes the limits of Karzai's own authority -- and a domestic
problem for his U.S. backers.
Karzai's power remains limited, and entirely dependent
on a combination of U.S. and NATO forces, and the consent of various
warlords -- some of them radical Islamists -- who have been drawn into
government. For the Bush administration, the persecution by a
U.S.-backed regime of a Christian for having chosen the same faith as
the President of the United States is untenable: Washington was pressed
to demand Abdul Rahman's release by a clamor of protest from the
Evangelical activist base of the Republican Party. But for Karzai,
caving in to the U.S. on a matter of faith and identity is a risk
option. And the case has inflamed the passions of religious activists
on both sides, and the
Taliban is using it as a rallying point to build a coalition against
Karzai. Nor is it over, for Abdul Rahman's release was engineered
on the grounds of evidentiary technicalities and insinuations about his
sanity, rather than any question over the legitimacy of the law that
makes it possible to charge him for converting from Islam to another
faith. The fact that Abdul Rahman has reportedly applied for asylum in
a third country underscores the problem. The Bush administration likes
to point to Afghanistan as a
poster child for its promotion of democracy abroad; the Abdul Rahman
case will have alerted Americans at home to the limits of the freedom
that is being defended in Afghanistan.
(TIME, March 26, 2006)

President Bush addresses AIPAC
America's Israel Lobby
If social security has long been
the "third rail" of U.S. domestic politics, then its equivalent in the
sphere of foreign policy has been the U.S. alliance with Israe. John
Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago and Stephen Walt of Harvard's
Kennedy school tackle the taboo head on, in a provocative research
study that assesses the impact of the Israel lobby on decades of U.S.
policy in the Middle East. And it asserts that the Israel lobby's
influence on U.S. policy has been bad both for the U.S. and even for
Israel:
" The Lobby’s influence causes
trouble on several fronts. It increases the terrorist danger that all
states face – including America’s European allies. It has made it
impossible to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a situation that
gives extremists a powerful recruiting tool, increases the pool of
potential terrorists and sympathisers, and contributes to Islamic
radicalism in Europe and Asia.
"Equally worrying, the Lobby’s
campaign for regime change in Iran and Syria could lead the US to
attack those countries, with potentially disastrous effects. We don’t
need another Iraq. At a minimum, the Lobby’s hostility towards Syria
and Iran makes it almost impossible for Washington to enlist them in
the struggle against al-Qaida and the Iraqi insurgency, where their
help is badly needed.
"There is a moral dimension here
as well. Thanks to the Lobby, the United States has become the de facto
enabler of Israeli expansion in the Occupied Territories, making it
complicit in the crimes perpetrated against the Palestinians. This
situation undercuts Washington’s efforts to promote democracy abroad
and makes it look hypocritical when it presses other states to respect
human rights. US efforts to limit nuclear proliferation appear equally
hypocritical given its willingness to accept Israel’s nuclear arsenal,
which only encourages Iran and others to seek a similar capability.
"Besides, the Lobby’s campaign to
quash debate about Israel is unhealthy for democracy. Silencing
sceptics by organising blacklists and boycotts – or by suggesting that
critics are anti-semites – violates the principle of open debate on
which democracy depends. The inability of Congress to conduct a genuine
debate on these important issues paralyses the entire process of
democratic deliberation. Israel’s backers should be free to make their
case and to challenge those who disagree with them, but efforts to
stifle debate by intimidation must be roundly condemned.
"Finally, the Lobby’s influence
has been bad for Israel. Its ability to persuade Washington to support
an expansionist agenda has discouraged Israel from seizing
opportunities – including a peace treaty with Syria and a prompt and
full implementation of the Oslo Accords – that would have saved Israeli
lives and shrunk the ranks of Palestinian extremists. Denying the
Palestinians their legitimate political rights certainly has not made
Israel more secure, and the long campaign to kill or marginalise a
generation of Palestinian leaders has empowered extremist groups like
Hamas, and reduced the number of Palestinian leaders who would be
willing to accept a fair settlement and able to make it work. Israel
itself would probably be better off if the Lobby were less powerful and
US policy more even-handed...
"What is needed is a candid discussion of the Lobby’s influence and a
more open debate about US interests in this vital region. Israel’s
well-being is one of those interests, but its continued occupation of
the West Bank and its broader regional agenda are not. Open debate will
expose the limits of the strategic and moral case for one-sided US
support and could move the US to a position more consistent with its
own national interest, with the interests of the other states in the
region, and with Israel’s long-term interests as well. (London Review
of Books, March10, 2006)
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