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Britain's Foreign Secretary Jack Straw: London's position undermines
the "regime-change" option in Washington |
Iran:
Is Britain Putting U.S. Hawks on the Spot?
Having brought the Iran nuclear issue to
the UN Security Council, the U.S. is
struggling to find a consensus that would escalate pressure on Tehran,
as China and Russia balk at ultimatums and seek to have the matter
returned to the jurisdiction of the IAEA as quickly as possible. For
those in the Bush administration seeking regime-change in Tehran,
the diplomatic deadlock may simply underscore the case for tougher
action. But while the U.S. has been able to count on strong support
from London, Paris and Berlin in seeking a tough enforcement of
non-proliferation rules via the Security Council, none of those
countries can be counted on to back a regime-change initiative. Indeed,
a careful reading of
British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw's recent keynote address on Iran
at the International Institute for Strategic Studies makes clear that
Britain favors engagement, and ultimately normalization of relations
both with the Iranian people and with their government to deescalate
tension and provide a climate for coexistence and the expansion of
liberty in Iran. That position contrasts sharply with the regime-change
agenda being promoted by Washington hawks.
Now, the British may be seeking to ensure that the
crisis over Iran's nuclear program does not become a platform for
regime change: The Times reports that the foreign office has proposed
to resolve the deadlock at the Security Council via a proposal that, on
the one hand, offers a guarantee of stronger UN action by adopting a
Chapter VII Security Council resolution, which could pave the way for
sanctions or even military action if Iran fails to comply with demands
that it desist from enriching uranium -- but, and here lies the rub,
that resolution would be adopted only late in the summer, and before
that the British envisage a new round of negotiations with Tehran in
which the Iranians would be offered new incentives for cooperation. So
far, the U.S. has rejected the idea of further incentives for Tehran,
which would probably include things that could be construed as security
guarantees. The British position appears to be a skillful attempt to
split the difference by offering the U.S. the prospect of an
enforceable Security Council ultimatum, but only after the U.S. signs
on to offering more incentives to Tehran -- if London was simply trying
to set the stage for tougher action on the basis of the the current
deadlock, there's little reason to expect the Chinese and Russians
would sign on. As in the case of the
six-party process on North Korea, absent the U.S. being prepared to
offer the Tehran regime some form of security guarantees and even
direct talks, Washington may yet find itself unable to secure a
diplomatic
consensus for further pressure. (The Times, March 22, 2006)
Jessica Matthews warns that the
U.S. goals of regime-change and non-proliferation are incompatible in
the current diplomatic reality, and the Bush administration faces a
choice between the two. Opting for regime change, she says, will
almost certainly result in Iran going nuclear. (Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace,
March 24, 2006)
Tony Karon notes that
Russia and China not only have different priorities to the U.S.
regarding Iran; Washington's positions on their own national security
concerns may make them less accommodating of the U.S. agenda.
(TIME, March 20, 2006)
Kaveh L Afrasiabi argues that
the Iran crisis highlights the strains facing the Non Proliferation
Treaty itself. "Any false first steps at the Security Council can
have disastrous results down the road, which explains why some
permanent members are disinclined to appease the Iran-bashing US envoy,
John Bolton, who has declared: 'I'm not in the carrot business',"
writes Afrasiabi. "Maybe Bolton is in the wrong business, since the UN
business is the business of crisis prevention and not escalation."
(Asia Times, March 25, 2006)
Offering an Arab perspective on the Iran showdown, Galal
Nassar argues that the objective
restraints and consequences will prevent the U.S. and Israel from
taking direct military action against Iran. Instead, he suggests,
the U.S. will pursue a strategy of proxy war via a Shiite-Sunni clash
in Iraq that evolves into a civil war, drawing in Iran and draining its
resources. (Al Ahram, 23-29 March, 2006)
Marc Perelman explains why the enthusiasm of the
Republican-controlled U.S. Congress for sanctions against Iran has the
Bush administration worried: Legislation currently before the House
would slap sanctions on any countries and companies investing in Iran's
petroleum industry -- a move that would target China and probably
preclude it from cooperating with the U.S. on Iran and a range of other
crisis issues. (Forward, March 26,
2006)
Dilip Hiro notes that
a major problem facing the West over Iran's nuclear program is that its
defiant stand carries widespread popular support at home. (The
Telegraph, March 23, 2006)
Background Material on Iran
The Center for Defense Information has posted
extracts from the IAEA report on Iran which is to be discussed by the
Security Council. (CDI, March 6,
2006)
The International Crisis Group sees two possible diplomatic
solutions to prevent a breakdown
from which Iran would quite likely emerge nuclear-armed. The first is
that Iran would agree to refrain entirely from enriching uranium on its
own soil, but for that to happen, warns the ICG, the U.S. would have to
offer a far greater political incentive than is currently on the table.
If the U.S. is unlikely in the near term to offer full recognition and
rehabilitation of the regime in Tehran, the only other plausible
outcome is for the West to back down on the principle of Iranian
enrichment but in exchange for Iran agreeing to delay its onset by a
number of years and submit to a far more intrusive inspection regime.
As imperfect as this solution would be to all sides, the alternative is
worse, the ICG argues. (International Crisis Group, February 28, 2006)
George Perkovich warns
that proposals allowing limited enrichment in Iran simply defer a
confrontation and make it more difficult to rein in what will then
be a fait accompli in Iran. (Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, March 7,
2006)
In an interview with TIME's Scott MacLeod, Iran's
top nuclear negotiator suggests his regime remains open to a deal, even
direct talks with the U.S.. But they would not be willing to be
"harangued" by President Bush, and they insist that their right to
uranium enrichment be recognized. (TIME, March 1, 2006)
As in the case of North Korea,
China's position may prove to be the critical influence on how the Iran
standoff plays out. Dingli Shen suggests Beijing is caught in the
dilemma of balancing its emerging status as a global diplomatic power,
maintaing stqability and the nuclear status quo, and protecting Iran's
sovereign right to civilian nuclear program and China's bilateral
energy relationship with Tehran. Beijing's view is that Iran must
account for its nuclear past under NPT commitment before it can demand
full cycle rights under the treaty. Of course if it withdrew from the
treaty, it could legally puruse both energy and weapons. Beijing's own
concerns militate against support for a strategy of confrontation by
either side. (Washington Quarterly, Spring 2006)
2006)
Stephen Sestanovich assesses the
Russian posture on Iran, parsing its likely course against the
backdrop of the current geopolitical posture of President Putin.
(Council on Foreign Relations, March 3, 2006)
Previously on Iran:
--
03.08.06: Regime Change or Normalization?
--
03.01.06: Nuclear Standoff Escalates
--
02.21.06: Dangers of a Military Option
--
02.28.06: Tehran Raises
the Stakes
Iraq:
A Generational American War?
President Bush has finally admitted what had
become obvious from his actions on the ground in Iraq over the past
three years: The U.S. military won't be leaving Iraq for the
foreseeable future. Sure, troop levels will be reduced and forces
brought home, and the pattern of deployment of those left behind will
change substantially as Iraqi forces are cultivated to take on basic
policing functions. The objective may well be to reduce the profile of
U.S. forces, keeping them confined to base as much as possible, as U.S.
air power and rapid response units back up Iraqi forces that encounter
heavy resistance. And the U.S. may need tens of thousands fewer troops
to carry out such a mission. But there's no question of a complete
withdrawal for the simple reason that no Iraqi military capable of
defending the country's sovereignty has yet been created, or is even in
the process of being created. That may be the context for President
Bush's answer last week when asked whether there will come a time when
there are no U.S. forces in Iraq: That will be decided by future
presidents and future governments of Iraq."
State power typically involves a monopoly of force within a
defined territory, but in Iraq force appears to be divided with the
lion's share in the hands of the U.S. military (which also happens to
command the new Iraqi forces) and the remainder being shared out among
the men under arms loyal to rival ethnic and sectarian political
centers. Even as the elected leadership continues to struggle to form a
new government, the U.S. has moved to begin negotiating over the
distribution of power in Iraq not only among the political parties, but
also with two ostensibly hostile power centers -- the nationalist
leadership of the Sunni insurgency (even U.S. ambassador Zalmay
Khalilzad has taken to calling them "the resistance") and the
government of Iran, which remains a patron to the largest party of the
Shiite religious coalition that dominates the legislature, as well as
to its associated militia. While both Washington and Tehran insist they
are simply going to read the other the riot act, clearly the fact of
those talks suggests a mutual recognition of each other's interests in
achieving stability in Iraq. And perhaps, also, a move towards seeking
a regional compact to create stability, or at least contain the fallout
of a civil war. Either way, the U.S. and Iran are likely to be
neighbors in a very volatile region for years to come, making the
establishment of channels of communication a matter of urgency. And, of
course, the talks with both the neo-Baathists and the Iranians confirms
the extent to which the Iraq invasion has reinforced, rather than
undermined, the regional status quo that Washington had found so
problematic.(Knight Ridder, March 21, 2006)
It may be in Iraq for the foreseeable, but the U.S. military
is coming under fire from a range of Iraqis for its conduct in a number
of incidents in which Iraqi civilians have been killed. Shiite
politicians are up in arms over a
confrontation at a mosque in Baghdad after they claim to have been
fired on by militiamen loyal to Moqtada Sadr. And the Times reports
that a number of eyewitness accounts suggest that a number of
civilians were killed by Marines on a rampage at Abu Sifa, which
appears to echo accounts of enraged U.S. troops killing civilians at
Haditha after one of their number was killed by a roadside bomb.
(BBC, March 26, 2006 and the Sunday Times, March 25, 2006)
Marina Ottaway suggests that
the state has essentially collapsed in Iraq, making it difficult to
envision a new political order achieving stability or legitimacy. "At
this point in Iraq, you do not have a central government -- so you
don't have a legitimate authority running the country," she tells Der
Spiegel. "You don't have a government with the power to establish or
maintain order. What you have is a nominal government that can only
stay in power because the Americans are there. The government is
supposed to have derived legitimacy from the constitution and the
elections. But I think the government we end up with, won't have much
legitimacy either." (Der Spiegel, March 23, 2006)
Syrian analyst Sami Moubayed contends that the
victors after three years of the U.S. in Iraq are Iran, the Shiite
Islamists and the authoritarian Arab regimes whose death knell the
invasion was meant to sound. He suggests that the only way
stability may be achieved in Iraq would be to mimic those regimes by
finding a new Iraqi strongman. (Asia Times, March 23, 2006)
Amir Taheri signals
Sunni Arab hostility in the region to the U.S. talking to Iran about
Iraq . They see such talks as a disastrously shortsighted option
that will expand Iran’s influence at the expense of US (and Arab)
interests
(Asharq al-Awsat, March 24, 2006)
Iason Athanasiadis suggests that Turkey's
primary strategic concern in Iraq, now, is no longer a Kurdish
breakaway, but the transformation of Southern Iraq into an Iranian
sphere of influence, substantially expanding Tehran's power and
upsetting the region’s strategic balance. As a result, they are less
concerned with simply cultivating ethnic allies than with cultivating
ties with Iraqi Shiites.
(Daily Star, March 24, 2006)
Nicholas Blanford notes a rise in
regional tension as a result of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, which
has challenged prevailing geopolitical and sectarian balances.
(Christian Science Monitor, March 21, 2006)
Judith Yaphe parses the
consequences for U.S. regional interests of Iraq breaking apart in a
civil war. These include the destabilization of weaker regimes
dependent on U.S. military presence for their own security, a depletion
of confidence among U.S. ally in Washington's commitment to
safeguarding their interests, an expansion of Iranian influence and an
enhanced ability for al-Qaeda to intimidate weaker regional regimes.
(Bitterlemons, March 23, 2006)
Charles Recknagel says that
the key challenge facing a new government in Iraq is disbanding militias,
which by their very existence undermine the authority of a central
state. (International Security Watch, March 23, 2006)
Background on Iraq:
The Project on Defense Alternatives compiles an exhaustive
bibliography of online reports and studies on the Iraq insurgency.
(Project on Defense Alternatives,
March 2006)
So
what was Saddam thinking in the run-up to the war? Kevin Woods,
James Lacey, and Williamson Murray share the findings of their
book-length intelligence study for the U.S. military. (Foreign Affairs,
May-June, 2006)
Previously on Iraq:
--
What's Left of Iraq?
-- Civil
War and the Region
-- Is
Sadr the
Key to Avoiding Civil War?
-- Mounting
Anger at Coalition Forces in Iraq
Israel
Hopes to Negotiate Borders With U.S.
As Israel goes to the polls on Tuesday,
its electorate looks set to produce yet another inconclusive mandate,
giving Ariel Sharon's Kadima Party (now headed by Ehud Olmert) a
plurality of votes but not enough to enable it to govern without
entering a coalition with right-wing parties. But even if he did
achieve a mandate to pursue his peace plans, Olmert -- like Sharon
before him -- appears to have little interest in discussing them with
the Palestinians, regardless of who their leaders are. Instead, Olmert
plans to continue Sharon's Gaza legacy by ordering further unilateral
pullouts from parts of the West Bank, in order to cement "final"
borders that leave Israel in control of far more Palestinian land than
the Palestinians would ever agree to. (The fact of Hamas being in
charge on the Palestinian side, if anything, helps the Israeli leader
make the case in the West that Israel "has no Palestinian partner.")
But Olmert did indicate on Sunday that he plans to enter into
negotiations on the "final" borders he plans to create -- not with the
Palestinians, but with the Bush administration. Having stood back from
enforcing any international requirements of Israel, the U.S. may soon
find itself invited to define the Jewish State's boundaries on terms
that no Arab constituency is likely to accept. Conventional wisdom has
long held that the U.S. standing in the Arab world depends first and
foremost on its ability to deliver a fair peace between Israel and the
Palestinians; if, instead, it finds itself enabling a unilateral
solution imposed on the Palestinians at their expense, the ability of
the U.S. to operate as a mediator in that conflict, much less to
influence events elsewhere in the region, will be further diminished.
(Al Jazeera, March 23, 2003)
Amira Hass sets the Israeli election in context by examining the
implications of Israel's choice for the residents of Gaza. The
Israeli government still makes the decisions that determine the minute
details of every Gaza Palestinian's life, she writes, and as punishment
for electing Hamas, Israel is essentially strangling the Gaza economy.
Food supplies are running low, she notes, but the policy of putting 1.5
million Palestinians under siege is untenable, and will provoke a
regional reaction against Israel. (Haaretz, March 23, 2006)
Uzi Benziman, however, notes that the fate of the
Palestinians -- and other national security concerns -- are marginal
concerns in this election. Perhaps as an indication of the extent
to which the current deadlock with the Palestinians has become a
permanent reality, Israeli voters are more concerned with domestic
policy issues. (Haaretz, March 23, 2006)
Chris McGreal reports on the
deteriorating humanitarian situation in Gaza. (The Guardian, March
22, 2006)
Graham Usher suggests that the biggest threat
to Olmert is not Labor or Likud, but voter apathy creating a low turnout.
Unlike previous elections, he says, this one is not being fought over
big ideas or fundamental choices. (Al Ahram, March 22-29, 2006)
He failed to convince Palestinian voters, now Mahmoud Abbas
hopes to convince Israel and the U.S. that he's able to conclude a
final peace agreement with Israel after covert negotiations. The
Israelis weren't interested in final-status talks with Abbas before
Hamas was elected to power; having committed themselves to a unilateral
redrawing of borders, it's hard to imagine the Israelis would see any
point in talking to him now. (Haaretz, March 22, 2006)
More interesting are the conflicting signals coming from
Hamas. On the one hand, its interior minister designate maintains that
a Hamas government won't act against Palestinians who commit acts of
violence against Israel. On the other hand,
Hamas prime minister designate Ismail Haniya tells the Palestinian
legislature that his government seeks a Palestinian state on the basis
of the 1967 borders, and wants talks with the international Quartet
over resolving the conlict. (Yediot Ahronot, March 27, 2006)
Matthew Leavitt argues that Hamas is unlikely to
moderate its positions in power . (Council on Foreign Relations,
March 20, 2006)
Previously on Israel and Palestine:
--Jericho
Raid Humiliates Abbas
--Hamas
and Israel: An Unspoken Peace?
--Rice
Fails to Secure Hamas Blockade
-- Is
the
U.S. Trying to Reverse the Palestinian Election?
Long
March for Belarus Opposition
Although the Belarus opposition has
attracted the support of most of Europe and the U.S. for its efforts to
challenge the electoral farce that returned Alexander Yukashenko to
power after 12 years of increasingly authoritarian rule, they're not in
a position to mount an equivalent of Ukraine's Orange Revolution. That
much was acknowledged in an interview Monday by opposition leader
Alexander Milinkevich, after police violently cracked down on
demonstrators on Saturday and arrested fellow opposition candidate
Alexander Kozulin. The regime still commands substantial popular
support, and it enjoys backing from Moscow, which
sees the wave of democracy movements in former Soviet territories as
part of a Western strategy to encroach on Moscow's traditional sphere
of influence. For the opposition, says Milinkevich, the only option
is a political strategy of siege, working to build popular support and
strip the regime of its legitimacy, while Western sanctions take
effect. But the regime will be looking to make opposition leaders pay
by pursuing them through the legal system.
(AP via Houston Chronicle, March 27, 2003)
Although the opposition will be forced to retreat
temporarily, David Marples believes the Lukashenko
has won a pyrrhic victory. The repression following the poll, he
suggests, has opened up cracks in the regime that will see it gradually
collapse. (International Security Network, March 24, 2006)
Ironically, perhaps, just as Moscow was backing one ally's
efforts to steal an election in Belarus, in the former
Soviet territory of Ukraine it was the most democratic election in the
country's history that put the pro-Russia candidate at the top of the
pile. Disillusioned by the failure of the President Viktor
Yuschenko to deliver on the promise of the Orange Revolution, voters
gave about a third of the ballot to Moscow's man, Viktor Yunukovych,
and a further 20 percent to arch nationalist former Prime Minister
Yulia Timoshenko. Timoshenko and Yuschenko may yet join forces to keep
out Moscow's man, but the election clearly stunned the reformist
president and may hobble his agenda. The result also underscored the
complexity of political life in the former Soviet territories, where
Moscow's clients often enjoy substantial political support. (Washington
Post, March 27, 2006)
Celeste Wallander explains the
stakes in the Ukraine election, both from the perspective of the
Kremlin and the various Ukrainian parties. She warns that the plurality
won by the party of Yanukovich may function to block Ukraine's movement
towards integration with Europe. (CSIS, March 27, 2006)
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Abdul Rahman states his faith, posing a problem for both
Karzai and Bush
Kabul Christian Convert Puts Afghanistan's Karzai
in a Bind
Under pressure from his patron, the U.S. government, Afghanistan's
President Hamid Karzai intervened personally to secure the release of
Abdul Rahman, a 41-year-old convert to Christianity who faced a
potential death sentence under Sharia law for apostasy. And,
predictably,
thousands took to the streets to protest and demand that he be put to
death. The case highlights not only a
contradiction in Afghanistan's constitution between its endorsement
of international human rights conventions guaranteeing freedom of
worship, and its codifying of Sharia law, but also a political tension
that exposes the limits of Karzai's own authority -- and a domestic
problem for his U.S. backers.
Karzai's power remains limited, and entirely dependent
on a combination of U.S. and NATO forces, and the consent of various
warlords -- some of them radical Islamists -- who have been drawn into
government. For the Bush administration, the persecution by a
U.S.-backed regime of a Christian for having chosen the same faith as
the President of the United States is untenable: Washington was pressed
to demand Abdul Rahman's release by a clamor of protest from the
Evangelical activist base of the Republican Party. But for Karzai,
caving in to the U.S. on a matter of faith and identity is a risk
option. And the case has inflamed the passions of religious activists
on both sides, and the
Taliban is using it as a rallying point to build a coalition against
Karzai. Nor is it over, for Abdul Rahman's release was engineered
on the grounds of evidentiary technicalities and insinuations about his
sanity, rather than any question over the legitimacy of the law that
makes it possible to charge him for converting from Islam to another
faith. The fact that Abdul Rahman has reportedly applied for asylum in
a third country underscores the problem. The Bush administration likes
to point to Afghanistan as a
poster child for its promotion of democracy abroad; the Abdul Rahman
case will have alerted Americans at home to the limits of the freedom
that is being defended in Afghanistan.
(TIME, March 26, 2006)

A bloodied camera lies on a carpet at Baghdad's
Palestine Hotel after it was struck by U.S. fire
Green Zone Journalism
To mark the third anniversary of the Iraq war, Orville Schell went to
Baghdad to chronicle the state of media coverage of the conflict, and
the lives of the journalists tasked with getting the story in the face
of mounting obstacles. Extracts:
As Borzou Daragahi of the Los Angeles Times explained, "Squeezing off a
few rounds of automatic weapons fire here in Baghdad is the equivalent
of honking your horn in America." So unless an explosion is quite
close, people hardly break step. At most, if there is a particularly
loud report, a journalist might go up onto his bureau's rooftop to see
where the smoke is coming from.
There is undeniably a Blade Runner-like feel to this
city. The violence is so pervasive and unfathomable that you wonder
what people think they are dying for. Nevertheless, despite the fact
that the everyday violence is horrendous, it does not take too many
days before the deadly noises and the devastation everywhere seem to
become just part of the ordinary landscape. Soon, quite to your
surprise, you find yourself paying hardly more attention to the sounds
of gunshots than a New Yorker does to the car alarms that go off every
night... until, that is, someone you know, a neighbor, or just someone
you have heard about, gets blown up, shot on patrol, or kidnapped by
insurgents….
Visiting any of the news bureaus gives an immediate
sense of how embattled foreign journalists now are and how difficult it
has become for them to do their jobs. Everyone I spoke to complained
that the deteriorating security situation has increasingly made them
prisoners of their bureaus.
"We could go almost anywhere in Iraq in a regular car,
unprotected," wrote the Wall Street Journal correspondent Farnaz
Fassihi this February, in a wistful front-page story for her paper
about the situation she found when she first arrived in 2003. "I wore
Western clothes -- pants and T-shirts, skirts, sandals -- walked freely
around Baghdad chatting with shopkeepers and having lunch or dinner
with people I met." By the spring of 2004, she writes, "the insurgency
had been spreading and gaining strength faster than we had imagined
possible. For the first time, I hired armed guards and began traveling
in a fully armored car. Outings were measured and limited and road
trips were few and far between... As security deteriorated around the
country, the areas in which we could safely operate shrank."….
Foreign news bureaus are either in or near the few
operating hotels such as the Al Hamra, the Rashid, or the Palestine.
Like battleships that have been badly damaged but are still at sea,
these hotels have survived repeated bomb attacks and yet have managed
to stay open. A few hotels like the Rashid, where once there was a
mosaic depicting George Bush Sr. on the floor of the lobby, are
sheltered within the Green Zone. A few other bureaus have their own
houses, usually somewhat shabby villas that have the advantage of being
included inside some collective defense perimeter that makes the
resulting neighborhood feel like a walled medieval town….
I had arrived here in Baghdad naively expecting that as
an antidote to their isolation from Iraqi society, journalists might
have kept up something of a fraternity among themselves. What I
discovered was that even the most basic social interactions have become
difficult. It is true that some of the larger and better-appointed news
bureaus (with kitchens and cooks) have tried to organize informal
evening dinners with colleagues. But while guests were able to get to
an early dinner, there was the problem of getting back again to their
compounds or hotels by dark, when the odds of being attacked vastly
increase. The only alternative was to stay the night, which posed many
difficulties for everyone, especially Iraqi drivers and guards.
The result is that reporters find themselves living in a
strangely retro mode where their days end before sunset, and they are
pulled back to their bureaus for dinner like an American family of the
1950s. Not a few have sought solace in cooking….
Few reporters I talked to, whether Western or Iraqi,
have any direct contact with the insurgents or with the sectarian
militias: it is too difficult and dangerous, they say, to talk with
Iraqis who do the fighting and set off the explosives. And thus, the
various attacks, suicide bombings, and the pervasive anti-Western
sentiment, as well as the sectarian hatred that has erupted during the
occupation, continue to be largely unexplored and unexplained from the
viewpoint of the Iraqis, whether they are Sunni insurgents, members of
the Shia militias, or from the American-supplied Iraqi forces that are
attacking them.
(New York Review of Books via TomDispatch, March 13, 2006)

President Bush addresses AIPAC
America's Israel Lobby
If social security has long been
the "third rail" of U.S. domestic politics, then its equivalent in the
sphere of foreign policy has been the U.S. alliance with Israe. John
Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago and Stephen Walt of Harvard's
Kennedy school tackle the taboo head on, in a provocative research
study that assesses the impact of the Israel lobby on decades of U.S.
policy in the Middle East. And it asserts that the Israel lobby's
influence on U.S. policy has been bad both for the U.S. and even for
Israel:
" The Lobby’s influence causes
trouble on several fronts. It increases the terrorist danger that all
states face – including America’s European allies. It has made it
impossible to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a situation that
gives extremists a powerful recruiting tool, increases the pool of
potential terrorists and sympathisers, and contributes to Islamic
radicalism in Europe and Asia.
"Equally worrying, the Lobby’s
campaign for regime change in Iran and Syria could lead the US to
attack those countries, with potentially disastrous effects. We don’t
need another Iraq. At a minimum, the Lobby’s hostility towards Syria
and Iran makes it almost impossible for Washington to enlist them in
the struggle against al-Qaida and the Iraqi insurgency, where their
help is badly needed.
"There is a moral dimension here
as well. Thanks to the Lobby, the United States has become the de facto
enabler of Israeli expansion in the Occupied Territories, making it
complicit in the crimes perpetrated against the Palestinians. This
situation undercuts Washington’s efforts to promote democracy abroad
and makes it look hypocritical when it presses other states to respect
human rights. US efforts to limit nuclear proliferation appear equally
hypocritical given its willingness to accept Israel’s nuclear arsenal,
which only encourages Iran and others to seek a similar capability.
"Besides, the Lobby’s campaign to
quash debate about Israel is unhealthy for democracy. Silencing
sceptics by organising blacklists and boycotts – or by suggesting that
critics are anti-semites – violates the principle of open debate on
which democracy depends. The inability of Congress to conduct a genuine
debate on these important issues paralyses the entire process of
democratic deliberation. Israel’s backers should be free to make their
case and to challenge those who disagree with them, but efforts to
stifle debate by intimidation must be roundly condemned.
"Finally, the Lobby’s influence
has been bad for Israel. Its ability to persuade Washington to support
an expansionist agenda has discouraged Israel from seizing
opportunities – including a peace treaty with Syria and a prompt and
full implementation of the Oslo Accords – that would have saved Israeli
lives and shrunk the ranks of Palestinian extremists. Denying the
Palestinians their legitimate political rights certainly has not made
Israel more secure, and the long campaign to kill or marginalise a
generation of Palestinian leaders has empowered extremist groups like
Hamas, and reduced the number of Palestinian leaders who would be
willing to accept a fair settlement and able to make it work. Israel
itself would probably be better off if the Lobby were less powerful and
US policy more even-handed...
"What is needed is a candid discussion of the Lobby’s influence and a
more open debate about US interests in this vital region. Israel’s
well-being is one of those interests, but its continued occupation of
the West Bank and its broader regional agenda are not. Open debate will
expose the limits of the strategic and moral case for one-sided US
support and could move the US to a position more consistent with its
own national interest, with the interests of the other states in the
region, and with Israel’s long-term interests as well. (London Review
of Books, March10, 2006)
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