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U.S. Ambassador John Bolton at the UN Security Council |
Iran:
Regime Change or Normalization?
Now that the U.S. and its European allies
have succeeded in getting Iran referred to the UN Security Council for
discussion of its nuclear program, they face a classic dilemma: The
incentives on offer to Tehran right now don't appear sufficient to
persuade it to accept IAEA demands to refrain from uranium enrichment;
but the Western powers appear unable to muster sufficient disincentives
to produce the same effect. Russia and China see the Security Council
referral as likely to harden positions on both sides and narrow the
space for finding a diplomatic solution, and as a result they want the
matter taken out of the Council's hands and referred back to the IAEA
with the backing of a Security Council expression of concern. But the
U.S. and the EU 3 want the Council to hold onto the dossier and set
Iran a short deadline for compliance, with the threat of further action
to follow. The problem is that further action is precisely what China
and Russia want to avoid, Beijing having made clear that it cannot
tolerate any option that puts additional pressure on world oil markets.
The diplomatic deadlock won't especially trouble those
in the Bush administration who favor a policy of regime-change in Iran
-- and according the Washington Post, they are now in the ascendant in
shaping Administration policy towards Tehran. Thus the
strangely mixed messages of recent weeks -- President Bush
insisting that he wants a diplomatic solution, but reminding
journalists that Iran is part of his "Axis of Evil"; Secretary of State
Rice calling Iran the "central banker of terror" while urging it to do
the right thing; Defense Secretary Rumsfeld accusing Iran of stirring
up trouble in Iraq at the same time as Washington
and Tehran move towards holding talks on their common interests in Iraq.
For the hawks, the diplomatic process was expected to fail, proving the
intractability of the problem and the need for regime-change. But there
is negligible support for a regime-change strategy in the international
community, and the extent to which there is suspicion that this motive
is driving the West's handling of the crisis, the diplomatic deadlock
is likely to continue.
Jon Wolfsthal suggests that even a diplomatic united front is
unlikely to dissuade Iran from pursuing nuclear weapons. The only thing
that might, he argues, is a political incentive, noting that "the
geo-strategic situation seems to be on Iran’s side" because of its
share of oil markets and because of the limits on U.S. military power
right now as a result of Iraq and other commitments. Iran, in the
absence of an effective stick, a suitable carrot is required: "While
not a democracy, Iran is still a highly political country and any
viable solution to the standoff must include some way for
decisionmakers in Iran to justify their decision publicly," says
Wolfsthal. "To be sure, it would be preferred if the United States
could find a solution that would both end Iran’s nuclear ambitions and
weaken the regime, but such a compromise is unlikely to emerge unless
the international landscape changes significantly.” Indeed, rather than
regime-change, normalization of relations with Tehran may offer a more
prospect of resolving the nuclear issue. (Center for Strategic and
International Studies, March 9, 2006)
AUDIOClick here
to hear Wolfsthal discuss options for dealing with Iran on NPR's Diane
Rehm Show, along with fellow guests Undersecretary of State Nicholas
Burns and Charles Pena of the Cato Institute.
John Chipman explains that
the diplomatic priority on Iran is preventing any uranium enrichment
from occuring there. Although Iran is 5-10 years away from being in
a position to build a bomb, allowing enrichment experiments will put
the technical knowhow within its hands in a matter of months, if it is
allowed to master the technique of enrichment by cascade of
centrifuges. He suggests graduated diplomatic responses proportionate
to Iran’s infractions of IAEA demands, eventually designed to make the
cost of matering enrichment techonology prohibitive to Tehran.
(Financial Times via IISS, March 15, 2006)
Britain's Foreign Secretary Jack Straw this week set out a
program for engagement with Iranian society at all levels, markedly
different from the regime-change agenda of the Bush administration
hawks. Straw ruled out military action against Iran, and stressed a
cautious buildup of diplomatic pressure on the nuclear issue at the
Security Council, always leaving the door open for negotiation and
retreat. He expressed support for the Arab position that Iran's nuclear
ambitions must be addressed as part of a drive for a nuclear-free
Middle East, and waxed nostalgic for the opening to the West
represented by the reformist government of of former President Mohammed
Khatami, stressing that political change was in the hands of Iranians
and could not be pushed from outside. As part of his call for Western
engagement with Iranian society at all levels, he urged a normalization
of relations with Tehran(Financial Times via IISS, March 13, 2006)
VIDEO: Click here
for Jack Straw's Q&A session, which draws out the significance of
some of his positions.
Israel's security is front and center of the Bush
Administration's case for restraining Iran from building nuclear
weapons. But the Israelis clearly have assessed the issue through the
prism of their own interests. Former
IDF Chief of Staff General Moshe Yaalon briefed the Hudson Institute on
the mechanics of a military strike against Iranian nuclear facilities. .
But he also offered advice on how to push back against Iran's
geopolitical ambitions -- by rewarding Israel's own: "The international
community could undermine Iran’s perception of victory by supporting
political benefits for Israel and exacting prices for continued
Palestinian cooperation with Iran," he said. "The international
community could, for example, recognize Israeli positions on a number
of issues relevant to future Israeli-Palestinian negotiations,
including the right of return, refugees, Jerusalem, the Jordan valley,
settlement blocks, and the 'safe passage' between the West Bank and
Gaza." Making the Palestinians pay the price for Iran's nuclear
program, in other words. (Washington Institute for Near East Affairs,
March 7, 2006)
Tony Karon suggests that U.S.-Iran
talks on Iraq could improve the hostile atmosphere clouding the nuclear
issue. "The premise of direct talks is each side's recognition that
the other has a legitimate (or, least, unavoidable) interest and role
in shaping events in Iraq — and that the interests of both sides can be
better served by coordinating their interventions. And in light of the
mounting sectarian political tension, each side has good reason to
establish channels of communication for crisis management." If they
manage to agree to cooperate in Iraq, they will have achieved a
historic breakthrough and also opened a pattern of communication that
involves neither side appearing to back down in the face of the other's
hard line. (TIME, March 17, 2006)
Trita Parsi reports on the complex interaction
between Iran and Israel over the past decade, noting that Khatami
had actually offered talks with Israel over achieving a modus vivendi
based on Iran adopting a "Malaysian profile" -- not recognizing Israel
and occasionally criticizing it, but refraining from acting or
supporting any action against the Jewish State. Although the tides of
politics on both sides have shifted against such back-channel
engagement, Parsi reports that Iran's foreign policy chief, Ali
Larijani, is believed to still favor that approach even as President
Ahmedinajad calls for Israel's destruction. (Forward, March 16,
2006)
The Christian Science Monitor invited four experts to share
their views on the Iran nuclear standoff, and the
consensus was that subtler and more imaginative diplomacy is required,
because the path of confrontation is unlikely to prevent Iran going
nuclear. (Christian Science Monitor, March 13,
2006)
Background Material on Iran
The Center for Defense Information has posted
extracts from the IAEA report on Iran which is to be discussed by the
Security Council. (CDI, March 6,
2006)
The International Crisis Group sees two possible diplomatic
solutions to prevent a breakdown
from which Iran would quite likely emerge nuclear-armed. The first is
that Iran would agree to refrain entirely from enriching uranium on its
own soil, but for that to happen, warns the ICG, the U.S. would have to
offer a far greater political incentive than is currently on the table.
If the U.S. is unlikely in the near term to offer full recognition and
rehabilitation of the regime in Tehran, the only other plausible
outcome is for the West to back down on the principle of Iranian
enrichment but in exchange for Iran agreeing to delay its onset by a
number of years and submit to a far more intrusive inspection regime.
As imperfect as this solution would be to all sides, the alternative is
worse, the ICG argues. (International Crisis Group, February 28, 2006)
George Perkovich warns
that proposals allowing limited enrichment in Iran simply defer a
confrontation and make it more difficult to rein in what will then
be a fait accompli in Iran. (Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, March 7,
2006)
In an interview with TIME's Scott MacLeod, Iran's
top nuclear negotiator suggests his regime remains open to a deal, even
direct talks with the U.S.. But they would not be willing to be
"harangued" by President Bush, and they insist that their right to
uranium enrichment be recognized. (TIME, March 1, 2006)
As in the case of North Korea,
China's position may prove to be the critical influence on how the Iran
standoff plays out. Dingli Shen suggests Beijing is caught in the
dilemma of balancing its emerging status as a global diplomatic power,
maintaing stqability and the nuclear status quo, and protecting Iran's
sovereign right to civilian nuclear program and China's bilateral
energy relationship with Tehran. Beijing's view is that Iran must
account for its nuclear past under NPT commitment before it can demand
full cycle rights under the treaty. Of course if it withdrew from the
treaty, it could legally puruse both energy and weapons. Beijing's own
concerns militate against support for a strategy of confrontation by
either side. (Washington Quarterly, Spring 2006)
2006)
Stephen Sestanovich assesses the
Russian posture on Iran, parsing its likely course against the
backdrop of the current geopolitical posture of President Putin.
(Council on Foreign Relations, March 3, 2006)
Previously on Iran:
--
Nuclear Standoff Escalates
--
Dangers of a Military Option
--
Tehran Raises
the Stakes
What is
Left of Iraq?
Much of the media is marking the third
anniversary of the U.S. invasion of Iraq with questions about whether
the war was worth it; reflections on the many failures the U.S. has
confronted and the perils facing efforts to establish a new government
of national unity. President Bush, mindful of the level of U.S. public
support for the war effort being at an all-time low, is back on the
campaign trail, painting a picture of progress despite setbacks, guided
by the objective of transferring security control to Iraqi forces. And
the U.S. military appears to be playing ball, mounting an expansive
counterinsurgency policing operation, touted as the largest airborne
assault since the invasion, in which hundreds of Iraqi commandoes were
landed around three villages north of Samarra -- but it quickly became
clear, in the absence of any significant engagements there, that the
whole exercise may have been designed primarily to send a message back
home that U.S. forces are enabling Iraqis to to take the fight to the
enemy.
Although Iraq is supposedly once again a sovereign entity
running its own affairs, Michael Schwartz questions the extent of its
sovereignty. Iraq currently has no government because electoral rules
bequeathed by the U.S. and the largely ethnic- and sectarian basis on
which Iraqis have voted in two elections has thus far precluded the
creation of one. Even more importantly, it has no national army capable
of defending the country's borders -- the Iraqi forces built by the
U.S. have no air capability, very little armor or heavy weaponry, and
are largely capable of operating only to the extent that they are
integrated with U.S. forces, under whose command they continue to fall.
And the current plans for developing these forces envisages such a
dependence on the presence of U.S. forces for the foreseeable future.
And in instances where paramilitary police forces are, in fact,
answerable to Iraqi authorities, these forces are often simply
uniformed versions of ethnic and sectarian militias, whose loyalties
are not to the new state but to old political factions.
The central government in Iraq is so weak that without the
presence of foreign troops, real power would devolve quickly into armed
ethnic and sectarian fiefdoms. Central government writ hardly applies
in the Kurdish north, where the crypto-separatist regional government
is already negotiating its own oil exploration deals with foreign
companies, nor in large parts of the south where Shiite militias hold
sway. In this sense, the breakup of Iraq has already begun. In the
Sunni heartland in central Iraq, Schwartz
notes that the dominant political force is the nationalist insurgency
and the political parties broadly aligned with it. The only
question is whether a governing entity will be established capable of
pulling it back together. And the indicators, thus far, are not good.
The U.S. has put itself at the fulcrum of three sets of
negotiations, all of which are central the prospects of stabilizing
Iraq: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad is holding the ring among the rival
parliamentary factions, pressing them to achieve consensus over a unity
government, but he is also overseeing talks with what he calls "the
resistance" (an extraordinary linguistic turnaround for a
representative of an Administration that had denounced all anti-U.S.
violence in Iraq as the work of remnants of a discredited dictatorship
and foreign terrorists) and now looks set to hold talks on the
situation in Iraq with representatives of Iran. This is a wise and
prudent policy, of course, if the situation is to be stabilized. But it
also tell how little sovereign power the government being created as a
result of the December elections will have. Three years after the U.S.
invasion, Iraq remains very much a U.S. protectorate, and right now
still looks more like a failed state than a beacon to the region of the
promise of democracy. (TomDispatch.com)
Warren P. Strobel and Hanna Allam note that
by every measure of possible U.S. objectives in invading Iraq
from promoting democracy to fighting terrorism, promoting stability and
intimidating hostile regimes to improving the flow of oil, the region
is now worse off than it was before the invasion. (Knight-Ridder, March
18, 2006)
Brian Bennett and Al Jallam report on
a major U.S.-led counterinsurgency offensive that coincided with the
anniversary, but captured more headlines than insurgents. Indeed,
cynics suggested that the whole operation was driven by the concern to
demonstrate to a domestic audience in the U.S. that Iraqi forces were
taking the fight to the enemy. (TIME, March 17, 2006)
The New York Times reports on a
surprising turn in a conflict usually covered strictly along ethnic
lines -- the Kurdish population of Halabja has turned violently against
the nationalist leadership that represents them in Baghdad. So
deep was their anger over the allocation of resources that they trashed
and burned a shrine to the victims of Saddam Hussein's notorious gas
attack on the town. (New York Times, March 17, 2006)
Stephen Biddle argues in Foreign Affairs that
the U.S. is fighting the wrong war in Iraq -- its tactics are
those designed to combat a Maoist "people's war," as in Vietnam, where
Iraq is now a low intensity civil war. U.S. tactics therefore should be
based on balancing the interests of the combatants, creating incentives
for good behavior and sanctions for acting badly. (Foreign Affairs,
March-April, 2006)
AUDIO:
Click here to listen to Hilterman and Biddle discussing America’s
options and the likely outcome in Iraq on Christopher Lydon’s NPR
program Open Source.
Richard Haass makes the case that
invading Iraq has weakened the geopolitical position of the U.S.
It has absorbed so much of America's military capability that it has
not only restricted the availability of force that could be projected
elsewhere, but also the deterrent power and diplomatic leverage that
comes from the perception of U.S. power that has now been diminished.
Economically, it has sapped the U.S. fiscus and clouded the financial
outlook, and diplomatically it has alienated the U.S. from many
traditional allies and diminished U.S. leadership -- it has become far
easier and more commonplace for allies to simply say no to Washington.
(Foreign Affairs, March16, 2006)
Nir Rosen, whose reporting from inside Fallujah was some of
the best early coverage of Iraq’s insurgency, explains to Foreign
Policy magazine why
"leaving Iraq is the best option for the U.S., why Moktada al-Sadr is
the only man who can keep Iraq together, and why Iran and the United
States are natural allies." (Foreign Policy, March16, 2006)
Background on Iraq:
The Project on Defense Alternatives compiles an exhaustive
bibliography of online reports and studies on the Iraq insurgency.
(Project on Defense Alternatives,
March 2006)
So
what was Saddam thinking in the run-up to the war? Kevin Woods,
James Lacey, and Williamson Murray share the findings of their
book-length intelligence study for the U.S. military. (Foreign Affairs,
May-June, 2006)
Previously on Iraq:
-- Civil
War and the Region
-- Is
Sadr the
Key to Avoiding Civil War?
-- Mounting
Anger at Coalition Forces in Iraq
Jericho
Raid Humiliates Abbas
Israel's raid last week on a Palestinian
prison in Jericho to arrest a number of prisoners held there under the
watch of U.S.-British monitors may have played well with the Israeli
electorate, but it could prove to be the final nail in the political
coffin on President Mahmoud Abbas. Abbas inherited the deal imprisoning
the men from Yasser Arafat, but with one of them elected to the
Palestinian Legislature, it had become increasingly untenable. And
Hamas had indicated it would free the men since they had not been found
guilty of any crime in any court. That prompted Abbas to indicate he
might do the same, and then when U.S. and British monitors left, citing
concerns for their own safety, Israel pounced.
The resulting
humiliation of the Palestinian Authority -- as epitomized by images of
Palestinian policemen fleeing the prison in their underwear -- further
erodes Abbas's standing, and burnishes the image of Hamas as the
redeemer of Palestinian dignity.
U.S.-Israeli
schemes to undermine Hamas by restricting funds to the PA are
premised on the idea that if Hamas can be "helped" to fail, the
Palestinian electorate will restore Fatah to power at the earliest
opportunity. But the Jericho humiliation of Abbas in the eyes of
Palestinians was a potent reminder of why that may be wishful thinking.
(TIME, March 16, 2003)
The Palestine Media Center reports that the Fatah
leadership was so incensed by Jericho that they urged Abbas to resign
and dissolve the PA, turning over responsibility for the West Bank and
Gaza back to Israel. Hamas, of course, suggested that would be a
bad idea. (Palestine Media Center, March 17, 2006)
Graham Usher notes that Palestinians see
the Jericho raid as evidence of the bad faith of Britain and the U.S.
as mediators, suggesting it has diminished their potential to act
as mediators in the conflict. (Al Ahram, March 16-22, 2006)
Previously on the Hamas victory:
--Hamas
and Israel: An Unspoken Peace?
--Rice
Fails to Secure Hamas Blockade
-- Is
the
U.S. Trying to Reverse the Palestinian Election?
U.S.
and India Rewrite the Nuclear Rules
The historic deal announced in New Delhi
Thursday, under which India will be allowed access to U.S. nuclear
technology and fuel in exchange for subjecting the non-military part of
its nuclear program -- 14 of its 22 facilities -- to international
inspection has been greeted by some, including International Atomic
Energy Agency head Mohammed ElBaradei, as a visionary breakthrough that
will strengthen non-proliferation efforts on the basis of contemporary
realities. Others, including a number of legislators on Capitol Hill,
decry it as a tragic end-run around the NPT that sends the worst
possible message to Iran, North Korea and other potential nuclear
aspirants: That the best way to win acceptance as a nuclear nation is
to simply go ahead and build and test weapons, show an intent to manage
them responsibly and then wait for the international community to make
its peace with the new reality.
Iran lost no time in pointing to the hypocrisy of agreeing
to
supply fuel and technology to a state that stayed out of the NPT and
used its nuclear energy program to build nuclear weapons, while denying
the rights of an NPT signatory that has undertaken to refrain from
building weapons (itself). Asked by U.S. journalists how he
rationalized the decision in light of questions over the likes of Iran,
President Bush said simply it was a question of "leadership." Advocates
of the deal are certainly correct that India's nukes are an intractable
reality, and that having them belatedly join the NPT on their own terms
is better than nothing. To be sure, the NPT itself is under existential
strain in a world where its basic premise -- not only that those
without nuclear weapons would refrain from pursuing them, but also that
those who have them would negotiate them away -- is widely ignored. But
the India deal also makes it increasingly difficult to make the case
that restraining Iran is a matter of enforcing universally accepted
rules rather than singling out a regime in conflict with the West.
Those in the Iranian leadership who may be inclined to press ahead with
a nuclear weapons program may well be quietly joining in the
celebrations of the U.S.-India deal. (The Times, March 3, 2006)
George Perkovich
parses the terms of the India-U.S. nuclear deal and finds them wanting,
but also acknowledges the breakthrough they represent: “U.S. and
Indian leaders have, in their boldness, identified premises that must
be questioned and policies that should be rethought in both bilateral
relations and in the international non-proliferation regime.” Still, he
says, the deal was done with little public discussion, and there is
considerable room for improvement. (Carnegie Endowment, February 2006)
Randeep Ramesh suggests
the real motivation behind the nuclear deal is to rein in an
independent nuclear power that had managed to master the
technical complexities of the reprocessing cycle all the way to being
able to assemble a bomb. In response, the U.S. is trying to ensnare
India in a series of rules designed to benefit Washington.
(Guardian, March 3 2006)
The New York Times reports that members of both parties on
Capitol Hill are concerned
about the timing of the deal and the message sent to Iran and North
Korea, while some arms-control experts suggest India got everything
it could have asked for on its weapons program. (New York Times, March
3 2006)
Ron Hutcheson and Jonathan S. Landay report on congressional
skepticism over the India nuclear deal. They also note that
Pakistan has asked for a similar deal and been rebuffed because
it is "not in the same place as India." A true enough political,
economic and strategic assessment, but one that will fuel the fires of
those claiming that the non-proliferation regime is being rewritten on
the basis of political preferences. (Knight-Ridder, March 3 2006)
Claude Arpi suggests that the strategic
rationale for the U.S. giving India a generous nuclear deal is
Washington's belief that New Delhi will be an essential counterweight
to Beijing. (Rediff.com, March 1 2006)
Parties on the Left in India, including some in the ruling
coalition, were skeptical of the deal.
Amit Baruah argues in the Hindu that India’s strategic options are
expanding with its rising power, but that these options will be limited
if India allies too closely with the U.S. (The Hindu, March 1, 2003)
New Delhi's Insistute for Peace and Conflict Studies offers
a comprehensive
discussion of India's strategic nuclear doctrine of credible minimum
deterrence and its implications for the country's nuclear arsenal.
(ICPS, February 2006)
Does
Musharraf Need Bin Laden?
There's something almost surreal about the
fact that almost five years after 9/11, President Bush is heading for
Pakistan -- knowing that it's the country where Osama bin Laden is
based. The bizarre state of relations between the Bush administration
and Islamabad was further underscored in a press conference
shortly before his departure, where an Indian journalist asked why
the U.S. had never questioned A.Q. Khan, the Pakistani nuclear
scientist who had operated a veritable supermarket for rogue regimes
looking to acquire strategic weapons. Bush replied: "Well, we were the
nation that exposed the conspiracy to deal with — more than the
conspiracy, the activities, let me rephrase that — we were the nation
that exposed the activities of sharing technologies, sensitive
technologies, nuclear weapons-related technologies. And we, of course,
want to know as much about the A.Q. Khan network as possible. But had
it not been for US intelligence, coupled with British intelligence,
this network never would have been exposed. And the light of day helps
understand proliferation." Indeed, or put more succinctly, Pakistan has
refused U.S. requests to interview Khan.
Shortly before Bush's arrival, the Pakistani security forces
mounted a raid on a purported Qaeda cell operating in Waziristan, and
claimed to have killed dozens of fighters -- the announcement of such
successes shortly before Musharraf is due to meet top U.S. officials
has become a familiar pattern. But they do serve to remind that the
fact of Osama bin Laden lurking in the wilds of Waziristan gives
Musharraf a free pass with Washington on everything from his military
rule through A.Q. Khan. It's difficult not to wonder how difficult life
might get for Musharraf if Bin Laden were ever caught or killed. But
regardless of the fate of the Qaeda leader, the mounting tide of
protest against his regime by both Islamists and the traditional
secular opposition who claim he uses the 'Islamist Peril' to justify
suppressing democratic opposition, as well as a secessionist rebellion
in Baluchistan and ongoing hostility in Waziristan, suggests that the
Musharraf regime may be fast becoming untenable. (TIME, March 1, 2006)
Paula Newberg suggests Musharraf's
efforts to portray himself as the custodian of democracy in the face of
extremism are mocked by his actions against the democratic opposition.
The Bush administration should press Musharraf to move back towards
freely elected government, she argues, because the crisis building in
Pakistan as wider sections of the society turn against Musharraf will
hurt U.S. interests. (Yale Global, March 1, 2006)
Simon Tisdall warns that Musharraf
is now politically weaker than at any point since he seized power in
1999, and that the Islamists have never been stronger. But, he
says, Bush is unlikely to heed advice to balance his ties with the
general by engaging in contacts with democratic opposition groups, and
pressing for greater democracy. (The Guardian, March 1, 2006)
Husain Haqqani explores
the history of the relationship between Pakistan’s military
establishment and the country’s radical Islamists, and finds the
latter playing an integral role in realizing the vision of the military
establishment that has ruled the country, brief democratic interludes
notwithstanding, since independence. (Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, February 2006)
Previously on Pakistan:
Myth of an 'Islamist Peril'
|
______________________________
New
From CWPNM:
Bibliography
of
analysis
and
criticism of international coverage in U.S. media
______________________________

A bloodied camera lies on a carpet at Baghdad's
Palestine Hotel after it was struck by U.S. fire
Green Zone Journalism
To mark the third anniversary of the Iraq war, Orville Schell went to
Baghdad to chronicle the state of media coverage of the conflict, and
the lives of the journalists tasked with getting the story in the face
of mounting obstacles. Extracts:
As Borzou Daragahi of the Los Angeles Times explained, "Squeezing off a
few rounds of automatic weapons fire here in Baghdad is the equivalent
of honking your horn in America." So unless an explosion is quite
close, people hardly break step. At most, if there is a particularly
loud report, a journalist might go up onto his bureau's rooftop to see
where the smoke is coming from.
There is undeniably a Blade Runner-like feel to this
city. The violence is so pervasive and unfathomable that you wonder
what people think they are dying for. Nevertheless, despite the fact
that the everyday violence is horrendous, it does not take too many
days before the deadly noises and the devastation everywhere seem to
become just part of the ordinary landscape. Soon, quite to your
surprise, you find yourself paying hardly more attention to the sounds
of gunshots than a New Yorker does to the car alarms that go off every
night... until, that is, someone you know, a neighbor, or just someone
you have heard about, gets blown up, shot on patrol, or kidnapped by
insurgents….
Visiting any of the news bureaus gives an immediate
sense of how embattled foreign journalists now are and how difficult it
has become for them to do their jobs. Everyone I spoke to complained
that the deteriorating security situation has increasingly made them
prisoners of their bureaus.
"We could go almost anywhere in Iraq in a regular car,
unprotected," wrote the Wall Street Journal correspondent Farnaz
Fassihi this February, in a wistful front-page story for her paper
about the situation she found when she first arrived in 2003. "I wore
Western clothes -- pants and T-shirts, skirts, sandals -- walked freely
around Baghdad chatting with shopkeepers and having lunch or dinner
with people I met." By the spring of 2004, she writes, "the insurgency
had been spreading and gaining strength faster than we had imagined
possible. For the first time, I hired armed guards and began traveling
in a fully armored car. Outings were measured and limited and road
trips were few and far between... As security deteriorated around the
country, the areas in which we could safely operate shrank."….
Foreign news bureaus are either in or near the few
operating hotels such as the Al Hamra, the Rashid, or the Palestine.
Like battleships that have been badly damaged but are still at sea,
these hotels have survived repeated bomb attacks and yet have managed
to stay open. A few hotels like the Rashid, where once there was a
mosaic depicting George Bush Sr. on the floor of the lobby, are
sheltered within the Green Zone. A few other bureaus have their own
houses, usually somewhat shabby villas that have the advantage of being
included inside some collective defense perimeter that makes the
resulting neighborhood feel like a walled medieval town….
I had arrived here in Baghdad naively expecting that as
an antidote to their isolation from Iraqi society, journalists might
have kept up something of a fraternity among themselves. What I
discovered was that even the most basic social interactions have become
difficult. It is true that some of the larger and better-appointed news
bureaus (with kitchens and cooks) have tried to organize informal
evening dinners with colleagues. But while guests were able to get to
an early dinner, there was the problem of getting back again to their
compounds or hotels by dark, when the odds of being attacked vastly
increase. The only alternative was to stay the night, which posed many
difficulties for everyone, especially Iraqi drivers and guards.
The result is that reporters find themselves living in a
strangely retro mode where their days end before sunset, and they are
pulled back to their bureaus for dinner like an American family of the
1950s. Not a few have sought solace in cooking….
Few reporters I talked to, whether Western or Iraqi,
have any direct contact with the insurgents or with the sectarian
militias: it is too difficult and dangerous, they say, to talk with
Iraqis who do the fighting and set off the explosives. And thus, the
various attacks, suicide bombings, and the pervasive anti-Western
sentiment, as well as the sectarian hatred that has erupted during the
occupation, continue to be largely unexplored and unexplained from the
viewpoint of the Iraqis, whether they are Sunni insurgents, members of
the Shia militias, or from the American-supplied Iraqi forces that are
attacking them.
(New York Review of Books via TomDispatch, March 13, 2006)

President Bush addresses AIPAC
America's Israel Lobby
If social security has long been
the "third rail" of U.S. domestic politics, then its equivalent in the
sphere of foreign policy has been the U.S. alliance with Israe. John
Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago and Stephen Walt of Harvard's
Kennedy school tackle the taboo head on, in a provocative research
study that assesses the impact of the Israel lobby on decades of U.S.
policy in the Middle East. And it asserts that the Israel lobby's
influence on U.S. policy has been bad both for the U.S. and even for
Israel:
" The Lobby’s influence causes
trouble on several fronts. It increases the terrorist danger that all
states face – including America’s European allies. It has made it
impossible to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a situation that
gives extremists a powerful recruiting tool, increases the pool of
potential terrorists and sympathisers, and contributes to Islamic
radicalism in Europe and Asia.
"Equally worrying, the Lobby’s
campaign for regime change in Iran and Syria could lead the US to
attack those countries, with potentially disastrous effects. We don’t
need another Iraq. At a minimum, the Lobby’s hostility towards Syria
and Iran makes it almost impossible for Washington to enlist them in
the struggle against al-Qaida and the Iraqi insurgency, where their
help is badly needed.
"There is a moral dimension here
as well. Thanks to the Lobby, the United States has become the de facto
enabler of Israeli expansion in the Occupied Territories, making it
complicit in the crimes perpetrated against the Palestinians. This
situation undercuts Washington’s efforts to promote democracy abroad
and makes it look hypocritical when it presses other states to respect
human rights. US efforts to limit nuclear proliferation appear equally
hypocritical given its willingness to accept Israel’s nuclear arsenal,
which only encourages Iran and others to seek a similar capability.
"Besides, the Lobby’s campaign to
quash debate about Israel is unhealthy for democracy. Silencing
sceptics by organising blacklists and boycotts – or by suggesting that
critics are anti-semites – violates the principle of open debate on
which democracy depends. The inability of Congress to conduct a genuine
debate on these important issues paralyses the entire process of
democratic deliberation. Israel’s backers should be free to make their
case and to challenge those who disagree with them, but efforts to
stifle debate by intimidation must be roundly condemned.
"Finally, the Lobby’s influence
has been bad for Israel. Its ability to persuade Washington to support
an expansionist agenda has discouraged Israel from seizing
opportunities – including a peace treaty with Syria and a prompt and
full implementation of the Oslo Accords – that would have saved Israeli
lives and shrunk the ranks of Palestinian extremists. Denying the
Palestinians their legitimate political rights certainly has not made
Israel more secure, and the long campaign to kill or marginalise a
generation of Palestinian leaders has empowered extremist groups like
Hamas, and reduced the number of Palestinian leaders who would be
willing to accept a fair settlement and able to make it work. Israel
itself would probably be better off if the Lobby were less powerful and
US policy more even-handed...
"What is needed is a candid discussion of the Lobby’s influence and a
more open debate about US interests in this vital region. Israel’s
well-being is one of those interests, but its continued occupation of
the West Bank and its broader regional agenda are not. Open debate will
expose the limits of the strategic and moral case for one-sided US
support and could move the US to a position more consistent with its
own national interest, with the interests of the other states in the
region, and with Israel’s long-term interests as well. (London Review
of Books, March10, 2006)
Racism Over Ports?
Foreign Affairs managing editor Gideon Rose gets to
the heart of the matter when he charges that any sober assessment of
the issues in the furor over the acquisition of management contracts at
six U.S. ports by Dubai Ports World must lead to the conclusion that
the only problem being cited by the naysayers is simply that this is an
Arab-owned company. Notwithstanding the fact that it has an excellent
record of cooperation with the U.S. on security matters and is run by
American executives -- or the fact that security in U.S. ports is the
responsibility of Homeland Security regardless of who owns the
management companies -- politicians began alerting the media with
warnings about "a country involved in 9/11" taking over American ports.
(Dubai may not have been more involved in 9/11 than Germany, but nobody
was bothering with the details.)
Tom Friedman echoed the racism theme, warning that
to
reject a
company playing by the rules of the globalization game and
international counter-terrorism simply because it is Arab will
actually
weaken the U.S. ability to win moderate allies in the Muslim world,
and leave it even more vulnerable. The Nation notes that the real security
issue in U.S. ports is the rules and procedures adopted by the U.S.
government, and how much the U.S. taxpayer is willing to spend on
keeping America's harbors safe. But Bill Greider sees a dark irony in the
fact that the Bush administration is being stymied by a climate of fear
it helped stoke.
(Foreign Affairs, February 27, 2006)

Fatman and Little Boy launched a generation of
weapons designed to ensure U.S. strategic primacy
No Limit on U.S. Nukes
Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press
argue that the end of the Cold War has removed restraints on the U.S.
pursuit of nuclear primacy, because the MAD (mutually assured
destruction)
principle that served as the foundation for arms control no longer
serves as a brake on U.S. ambitions. The Bush administration is
pursuing a revitalized nuclear program as part of its strategy to
remain, in perpetuity, the single superpower and to prevent the
emergence of a peer competitor to replace the Soviet Union on the
strategic map. That requires substantially altering the rules of arms
control and non proliferation.
“During the Cold War, MAD rendered
the debate about the wisdom of nuclear primacy little more than a
theoretical exercise," they write. "Now that MAD and the awkward
equilibrium it maintained are about to be upset, the argument has
become deadly serious. Hawks will undoubtedly see the advent of U.S.
nuclear primacy as a positive development. For them, MAD was
regrettable because it left the United States vulnerable to nuclear
attack. With the passing of MAD, they argue, Washington will have what
strategists refer to as 'escalation dominance' -- the ability to win a
war at any level of violence -- and will thus be better positioned to
check the ambitions of dangerous states such as China, North Korea, and
Iran. Doves, on the other hand, are fearful of a world in which the
United States feels free to threaten -- and perhaps even use -- force
in pursuit of its foreign policy goals. In their view, nuclear weapons
can produce peace and stability only when all nuclear powers are
equally vulnerable. Owls worry that nuclear primacy will cause
destabilizing reactions on the part of other governments regardless of
the United States' intentions. They assume that Russia and China will
work furiously to reduce their vulnerability by building more missiles,
submarines, and bombers; putting more warheads on each weapon; keeping
their nuclear forces on higher peacetime levels of alert; and adopting
hair-trigger retaliatory policies. If Russia and China take these
steps, owls argue, the risk of accidental, unauthorized, or even
intentional nuclear war -- especially during moments of crisis -- may
climb to levels not seen for decades."
(Foreign Affairs, April-May, 2006)

Why the Islamists Are Winning
Rami Khouri sees much of the
discussion in the West about the rise of Islamist politics in the
Middle East as misguided, and shaped by Western cultural and political
assumptions transposed onto a very different context. After analyzing
the prevailing misconceptions, and periodizing the phases of the modern
Islamist phenomenon, he offers the following conclusion:
"This wave of victories is not due
to a longing for virgins in the afterlife or the consequence of poor
primary education. It is the consequence of a modern history combining
the cumulative pain of poor, often corrupt and brutal, governance, with
foreign military occupations and threats (mostly from Israel, the U.S.
and Britain recently). Most ordinary people consequently feel they have
been denied their cultural identity, political rights, national
sovereignty, personal freedoms and basic human dignity.
"Islamist groups in turn have
responded with an irresistible package that speaks to the citizenry
about religion, national identity, legitimate governance, and
resistance to foreign occupation and subjugation. That's why there is
nothing surprising about victorious Islamists. The best response to
their victories, whether you like or dislike the Islamists, is to
understand the political, national and personal issues that have
generated their victories, and to address the real grievances behind
them, rather than to wander off into intellectual swamps and
fantasylands."
(Daily Star, March 15, 2006)
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