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Iran's uranium-conversion plant at Isfahan |
Iran
Nuke Standoff Escalates
The Iran nuclear dossier heads to the
United Nations Security Council, next week, after Russia failed to
broker an eleventh-hour deal to reconcile the positions of the U.S. and
its European allies on the one hand, and Tehran on the other. The
Russians had hoped that by permitting Iran to conduct, under strict
supervision, small-scale uranium enrichment on its own soil, Tehran
would agree to suspension of industrial-scale enrichment and accept
that the fuel for its nuclear reactors would be enriched in Russia. But
the U.S. and the EU3 (Britain, France and Germany) flatly rejected any
arrangement that allowed ongoing enrichment activities in Iran, on the
ground that it would help Iran perfect the know-how to create bomb
fuel, and also create a legal pretext for the procurement of technology
that could help a clandestine bomb program. Between the West's refusal
to countenance any enrichment of uranium inside Iran (in light of
evidence suggesting that Iran may be running a clandestine bomb
program) and Iran's insistence that enrichment is its sovereign right
under the NPT, there was simply too wide a gulf for compromise.
But having brought the issue before the Council -- in the form
of an IAEA
report assessing Iran's nuclear activities, which concluded that
the UN nuclear watchdog was unable to certify that all of Iran's
nuclear activities are transparent and for purely peaceful purposes --
the next steps for the U.S. and its allies are not clear. China and
Russia remain resolutely opposed to sanctions, and Iran will almost
certainly look to rally Arab support by pointing to the U.S. refusal to
discuss Israel's nuclear capability and by painting the nuclear issue
as the onset of another "regime change" adventure by the Bush
administration. (The fact that Vice
President Cheney this week threatened "meaningful consequences" for
Iran's stand while the Israeli and American flags were depicted
side by side in the backdrop -- he was speaking to the America Israel
Political Action Committee -- may have played into Iran's propaganda
strategy.) Reports suggest that the U.S. plans to sway Security Council
members by showing them
dossier of information drawn from a stolen Iranian laptop that makes a
circumstantial case that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons although
that strategy may also backfire, given the experience of Council
members in the three years that have passed since then-Secretary of
State Colin Powell delivered his indictment of Iraq.
The U.S. is demanding urgent action, claiming Iran has 85
tonnes of uranium gas stockpiled for enrichment, which once enriched
would create enough material for ten bombs. (Of course, argument leaves
out the fact that, according to
the New York Times reporting on the assessment of scientists and
proliferation experts, Iran may still be ten years away from the
capability of turning that gas into weapons-grade material. But,
mindful of the uphill battle it faces, the Bush administration appears
to accept that it will have to move slowly at the Council, and an
immediate push for sanctions is not realistic. And the Russians and
Chinese will, no doubt, in the coming weeks,
intensify their own efforts to find a compromise solution. (The
Guardian, March 8 2006)
The West may have found things a little easier if Iran's
president was still Mohammed Khatami. In an
interview with Al Jazeera, the failed reformist blames the nuclear
standoff on Western "double standards." But while he insists on Iran's
right to pursue a nuclear energy program, he advocates negotiation and
compromise, insisting that it is in Tehran's best interests to win the
confidence of the international community on the nuclear issue. (Al
Jazeera, March 7, 2006)
Ehsan Ahrari explains why the
Russians see the escalating rhetoric over Iran as an echo of the
pre-Iraq invasion period. (Asia Times, March 9, 2006)
Zeev Schiff of Haaretz, a reporter with impeccable sources
in Israel's defense establishment, claims
that Western intelligence agencies, and Russia's, believe Iran has an
extensive covert bomb program that is making steady progress.
Although this program has been concealed from IAEA scrutiny, the IAEA
did come across such tell-tale evidence as specifications for
fabricating enriched uranium hemispheres, whose only purpose is bomb
production. (Haaretz, March 7,
2006)
The Center for Defense Information has posted
extracts from the IAEA report on Iran which is to be discussed by the
Security Council. (CDI, March 6,
2006)
The International Crisis Group sees two possible diplomatic
solutions to prevent a breakdown
from which Iran would quite likely emerge nuclear-armed. The first is
that Iran would agree to refrain entirely from enriching uranium on its
own soil, but for that to happen, warns the ICG, the U.S. would have to
offer a far greater political incentive than is currently on the table.
If the U.S. is unlikely in the near term to offer full recognition and
rehabilitation of the regime in Tehran, the only other plausible
outcome is for the West to back down on the principle of Iranian
enrichment but in exchange for Iran agreeing to delay its onset by a
number of years and submit to a far more intrusive inspection regime.
As imperfect as this solution would be to all sides, the alternative is
worse, the ICG argues. (International Crisis Group, February 28, 2006)
In an interview with TIME's Scott MacLeod, Iran's
top nuclear negotiator suggests his regime remains open to a deal, even
direct talks with the U.S.. But they would not be willing to be
"harangued" by President Bush, and they insist that their right to
uranium enrichment be recognized. (TIME, March 1, 2006)
George Perkovich warns
that proposals allowing limited enrichment in Iran simply defer a
confrontation and make it more difficult to rein in what will then
be a fait accompli in Iran. (Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, March 7,
2006)
David Isenberg suggests
that the same neoconservative ideologues who manipulated intelligence
to stir America to go to war in Iraq are now are overstating a “threat”
from Iran -- with remarkable success. The reality is that for
technical reasons alone, Iran remains a number of years away from the
capacity to assemble a bomb. (Center for Defense Information, March 1,
2003)
Visiting British MPs found that the
Bush administration is divided on familiar lines over how to
respond to Iran, with Secretary of State Rice more cautious than UN
ambassador Bolton and Vice President Cheney. (The Times, March 6,
2006)
As in the case of North Korea,
China's position may prove to be the critical influence on how the Iran
standoff plays out. Dingli Shen suggests Beijing is caught in the
dilemma of balancing its emerging status as a global diplomatic power,
maintaing stqability and the nuclear status quo, and protecting Iran's
sovereign right to civilian nuclear program and China's bilateral
energy relationship with Tehran. Beijing's view is that Iran must
account for its nuclear past under NPT commitment before it can demand
full cycle rights under the treaty. Of course if it withdrew from the
treaty, it could legally puruse both energy and weapons. Beijing's own
concerns militate against support for a strategy of confrontation by
either side. (Washington Quarterly, Spring 2006)
2006)
Reuven Pedhatsur argues that the U.S.-India
nuclear agreement was a gift to Iran. It will be cited as Exhibit A
in Tehran's efforts to rally support for its own positions in the Arab
and Muslim world on the basis of the double standard so clearly adopted
by the Bush administration on nuclear matters. (Haaretz, March 7, 2006)
Previously on Iran:
--
Dangers of a Military Option
--
Tehran Raises
the Stakes
Iraq: Civil War
and the Region
There is nothing inevitable about civil war
in Iraq, and yet the intensifying sectarian bloodshed is leading even
the U.S. ambassador to Baghdad to warn that such an outcome is quite
plausible. The democratic political process, far from creating a
unifying political consensus, has in fact intensified the centrifugal
tendencies as voters express their anxieties over the increasingly
uncertain future by casting their vote on the basis of tribe or sect.
Although recent headlines have been dominated by Sunni-Shiite tension,
stoked by gunmen on both sides who randomly target innocents of the
other side in retaliation for the last outrage perpetrated against
their own, the sectarian split among Iraqi Arabs is only one of the
factors paralyzing the political process.
The move by President Jalal Talabani to force the Shiite bloc
in parliament to withdraw the nomination as prime minister of incumbent
Ibrahim al-Jaafari carries the support of the Sunni bloc as well as the
smaller secularlist alliance. But while the Sunnis are angry at Jaafari
over his perceived failure to restrain murderous sectarianism within
Shiite ranks, Talabani's opposition may be based more on his
Kurdish-nationalist affinities-- Jaafari opposes the Kurds' attempts to
make the northern oil town of Kirkuk a part of their Kurdistan
mini-state, and angered Talabani by holding talks on Iraq with the
Kurds old enemy, Turkey. But the Sunnis actually agree with Jaafari on
Kirkuk. And then, of course, there are the sharp divisions within the
Shiite camp: Jaafari won the nomination by only one vote from the rival
candidate Adel Abdul Mahdi of the Supreme Council for the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq -- and then only because he was backed by SCIRI's
arch rival, the radical cleric Moqtada Sadr. These internecine dynamics
have produced a stalemate in the process of selecting a new government,
but they have not yet brought Iraq to a state of full-blown civil war.
Given the weakness of the regime in Baghdad now and the likelihood that
much of what now passes for a national army may in fact be committed on
ethnic or sectarian lines in the event of civil war, a full-blown
conflict for the acquisition and control of territory would require
participation and backing from regional players. Some Iraqi analysts
today see Iraq as a battleground between the U.S. and Iran. As the
confrontation between Washington and Tehran intensifies, the prospects
for avoiding civil war in Iraq may decline.
(Al Ahram 2-8 March, 2006)
Juan Cole explains the
little-recognized centrality of Kirkuk in the dynamics of civil
conflict in Iraq. "Jaafari is not being attacked because he is weak, or
indecisive, or because he could not keep order in the country," Cole
writes of the Talabani challenge. "He is being attacked for the
opposite reasons-- that he has decisively decided to fight the Kurds on
their planned annexation of Kirkuk. The Kurds are powerful, so Jaafari
reached out to Ankara for an ally. He was pressed by the Turks to make
Kirkuk a city with a 'special status' as a way of denying it to the
Kurds, and he may have acquiesced. This is the reason that Talabani
went ballistic over the prime minister's visit to Turkey." (Informed
Comment, March 6, 2006)
Brian Conley and Isham Rashid report on the
cooperation between the Sunni Muslim Scholars Association and Moqtada
Sadr's movement in taking steps to tamp down communal tension.
These groups are united on the basis of a common Iraqi nationalism, in
opposition both the presence of Coalition forces, but also to Kurdish
attempts to take Kirkuk and create a de facto independent entity.
Indeed, some partisans of the Sadr-MSA alliance see the talk of civil
war as being fostered by Kurdish leaders precisely to create a climate
for a secession. (Asia Times, March 10, 2006)
Borzou Daragahi and Megan K. Stack report that Iraq
analysts see the "Lebanonization" of Iraq as irreversible -- in
both the political process and the construction of security forces
based on coopting rather than dissolving ethnic and sectarian militias,
power in the post-Saddam Iraq looks set to be apportioned on the basis
of an ethnic and sectarian balance of forces for the foreseeable
future. Stack also notes that
Shiites and Sunnis have switched roles in relation to the U.S. with
the Shiites who initially welcomed the U.S. invasion now turning
against the presence of Coalition troops while the Sunnis who were
largely hostile to their presence are now looking to Coalition forces
for protection. (Los Angeles Times, February
26 and March 6, 2006)
One of the paradoxes of the emerging alliance between
Moqtada Sadr and the Muslim Scholars Association is the fact that much
of the anti-Sunni violence in the wake of the Samarra bombing was
conducted by rank and file members of Sadr's Mehdi Army. Amira Howeidy
reports that leaders
of the MSA believe that Sadr's forces have been infiltrated by the Badr
Brigade of SCIRI. They don't blame Sadr, but see it as a case of
him losing control over his forces. (Al Ahram, March 2-6, 2006)
Previously on Iraq: Is Sadr the
Key to Avoiding Civil War?
Mounting
Anger at Coalition Forces in Iraq
Hamas
and Israel: An Unspoken Peace?
The difference between Ariel Sharon and
his Labor Party predecessors was not simply over the parameters and
territorial boundaries of a peace settlement with the Palestinians;
Sharon always insisted that no final peace settlement was possible for
the foreseeable future, and instead Israel should pursue interim
arrangements and some form of long-term truce. Similarly, the
difference between Fatah and Hamas is not simply over the terms of a
peace agreement, but whether one was possible: While the Fatah
leadership has been holding on in vain for a completion of the Oslo
process since the demise of Ehud Barak, while Israel has made clear
that it intends to pursue a unilateral course to which the identity of
the Palestinian government is, in the final instance, irrelevant. Now,
the Palestinians have dispensed with Fatah and elected a government
whose views on the issue of a peace deal are rather symmetrical with
those of Sharon: a long-term truce (or "hudna" in their case) allowing
the two sides to coexist without resolving all the issues that divide
them.
Rami Khouri argues that this new symmetry in the thinking on
the Israeli and Palestinian sides marks an end to Oslo, but actually
introduces the prospect of moving towards long-term coexistence. Both
sides have tired of war, he argues, and are now beginning to find ways
to get on with rebuilding their societies. The road ahead is replete
with peril, as ever, but the combination of Hamas and Sharon's heirs
may nonetheless be more than capable of achieving a modus vivendi that
avoids violent conflict. (Daily Star, March 7, 2006)
And
who elected you to lead the Palestinians? That seemed to be the
response of the leadership of Hamas to the unsolicited advice of Al
Qaeda's Ayman Zawahiri, who delivered a video sermon berating the
Palestinian group to avoid recognizing Israel and to continue its armed
struggle. Zawahiri has been shrill in his denunciation of Islamist
groups, such as Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, for participating in
democratic elections. And it's not hard to see why: The decision by
groupings such as the Brotherhood and Hamas to enter the democratic
process opens a new channel of expression for Islamist grievances; one
that essentially marginalizes Al-Qaeda, which by its ideology and
transnational character can never enter politics in the way that
national Islamist bodies can. (BBC, March 5, 2006)
Fatah
is struggling to find its footing as an opposition party after
the new legislature was seated. Hamas predictably simply reversed a
series of votes taken in the lame duck legislature controlled by Fatah
which had already been soundly defeated in the election, but sought to
change a series of laws to give President Mahmoud Abbas effective veto
power over the legislature. Fatah reacted by calling the move a "coup"
attempt and storming out of the legislature, although it appears to
have been Fatah that was trying to remake the law to its advantage in
the new political circumstances. The skirmish suggests a unity
government may not be imminent. (Haaretz, March 6, 2006)
Rashid Khalidi explains to Bernard Gwertzman that Fatah lost
the election not simply because of corruption, but because its
negotiations with Israel failed to improve Palestinian lives. It
has no way back to power in the short term, he argues, and should
instead focus on entirely remaking itself. "I think it is urgent to
have the entire old guard drummed out of Fatah," says Khalidi. "I
assume they will keep Abbas as a figurehead, but if Fatah has not fully
renewed, it's worthless, it's good for nothing, it will have no impact
on Palestinian politics in the near future, nor will it deserve to."
(Council on Foreign Relations, March 6, 2006)
Graham Usher notes that while Israel was
caught off guard by the Hamas victory, it won't affect Israeli policy
toward the Palestinians which is based on a unilateral redrawing of
boundaries to Israel's preference, with no need of a "partner" on the
Palestinian side. (Al Ahram, March 2-8, 2006)
Acting Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has
made clear that he intends to unilaterally redraw the boundaries in the
West Bank, and settle areas currently deemed off limits even by the U.S..
(Haaretz, March 9, 2006)
Previously on the Hamas victory:
--Rice
Fails to Secure Hamas Blockade
-- Is
the
U.S. Trying to Reverse the Palestinian Election?
U.S.
and India Rewrite the Nuclear Rules
The historic deal announced in New Delhi
Thursday, under which India will be allowed access to U.S. nuclear
technology and fuel in exchange for subjecting the non-military part of
its nuclear program -- 14 of its 22 facilities -- to international
inspection has been greeted by some, including International Atomic
Energy Agency head Mohammed ElBaradei, as a visionary breakthrough that
will strengthen non-proliferation efforts on the basis of contemporary
realities. Others, including a number of legislators on Capitol Hill,
decry it as a tragic end-run around the NPT that sends the worst
possible message to Iran, North Korea and other potential nuclear
aspirants: That the best way to win acceptance as a nuclear nation is
to simply go ahead and build and test weapons, show an intent to manage
them responsibly and then wait for the international community to make
its peace with the new reality.
Iran lost no time in pointing to the hypocrisy of agreeing
to
supply fuel and technology to a state that stayed out of the NPT and
used its nuclear energy program to build nuclear weapons, while denying
the rights of an NPT signatory that has undertaken to refrain from
building weapons (itself). Asked by U.S. journalists how he
rationalized the decision in light of questions over the likes of Iran,
President Bush said simply it was a question of "leadership." Advocates
of the deal are certainly correct that India's nukes are an intractable
reality, and that having them belatedly join the NPT on their own terms
is better than nothing. To be sure, the NPT itself is under existential
strain in a world where its basic premise -- not only that those
without nuclear weapons would refrain from pursuing them, but also that
those who have them would negotiate them away -- is widely ignored. But
the India deal also makes it increasingly difficult to make the case
that restraining Iran is a matter of enforcing universally accepted
rules rather than singling out a regime in conflict with the West.
Those in the Iranian leadership who may be inclined to press ahead with
a nuclear weapons program may well be quietly joining in the
celebrations of the U.S.-India deal. (The Times, March 3, 2006)
George Perkovich
parses the terms of the India-U.S. nuclear deal and finds them wanting,
but also acknowledges the breakthrough they represent: “U.S. and
Indian leaders have, in their boldness, identified premises that must
be questioned and policies that should be rethought in both bilateral
relations and in the international non-proliferation regime.” Still, he
says, the deal was done with little public discussion, and there is
considerable room for improvement. (Carnegie Endowment, February 2006)
Randeep Ramesh suggests
the real motivation behind the nuclear deal is to rein in an
independent nuclear power that had managed to master the
technical complexities of the reprocessing cycle all the way to being
able to assemble a bomb. In response, the U.S. is trying to ensnare
India in a series of rules designed to benefit Washington.
(Guardian, March 3 2006)
The New York Times reports that members of both parties on
Capitol Hill are concerned
about the timing of the deal and the message sent to Iran and North
Korea, while some arms-control experts suggest India got everything
it could have asked for on its weapons program. (New York Times, March
3 2006)
Ron Hutcheson and Jonathan S. Landay report on congressional
skepticism over the India nuclear deal. They also note that
Pakistan has asked for a similar deal and been rebuffed because
it is "not in the same place as India." A true enough political,
economic and strategic assessment, but one that will fuel the fires of
those claiming that the non-proliferation regime is being rewritten on
the basis of political preferences. (Knight-Ridder, March 3 2006)
Claude Arpi suggests that the strategic
rationale for the U.S. giving India a generous nuclear deal is
Washington's belief that New Delhi will be an essential counterweight
to Beijing. (Rediff.com, March 1 2006)
Parties on the Left in India, including some in the ruling
coalition, were skeptical of the deal.
Amit Baruah argues in the Hindu that India’s strategic options are
expanding with its rising power, but that these options will be limited
if India allies too closely with the U.S. (The Hindu, March 1, 2003)
New Delhi's Insistute for Peace and Conflict Studies offers
a comprehensive
discussion of India's strategic nuclear doctrine of credible minimum
deterrence and its implications for the country's nuclear arsenal.
(ICPS, February 2006)
Does
Musharraf Need Bin Laden?
There's something almost surreal about the
fact that almost five years after 9/11, President Bush is heading for
Pakistan -- knowing that it's the country where Osama bin Laden is
based. The bizarre state of relations between the Bush administration
and Islamabad was further underscored in a press conference
shortly before his departure, where an Indian journalist asked why
the U.S. had never questioned A.Q. Khan, the Pakistani nuclear
scientist who had operated a veritable supermarket for rogue regimes
looking to acquire strategic weapons. Bush replied: "Well, we were the
nation that exposed the conspiracy to deal with — more than the
conspiracy, the activities, let me rephrase that — we were the nation
that exposed the activities of sharing technologies, sensitive
technologies, nuclear weapons-related technologies. And we, of course,
want to know as much about the A.Q. Khan network as possible. But had
it not been for US intelligence, coupled with British intelligence,
this network never would have been exposed. And the light of day helps
understand proliferation." Indeed, or put more succinctly, Pakistan has
refused U.S. requests to interview Khan.
Shortly before Bush's arrival, the Pakistani security forces
mounted a raid on a purported Qaeda cell operating in Waziristan, and
claimed to have killed dozens of fighters -- the announcement of such
successes shortly before Musharraf is due to meet top U.S. officials
has become a familiar pattern. But they do serve to remind that the
fact of Osama bin Laden lurking in the wilds of Waziristan gives
Musharraf a free pass with Washington on everything from his military
rule through A.Q. Khan. It's difficult not to wonder how difficult life
might get for Musharraf if Bin Laden were ever caught or killed. But
regardless of the fate of the Qaeda leader, the mounting tide of
protest against his regime by both Islamists and the traditional
secular opposition who claim he uses the 'Islamist Peril' to justify
suppressing democratic opposition, as well as a secessionist rebellion
in Baluchistan and ongoing hostility in Waziristan, suggests that the
Musharraf regime may be fast becoming untenable. (TIME, March 1, 2006)
Paula Newberg suggests Musharraf's
efforts to portray himself as the custodian of democracy in the face of
extremism are mocked by his actions against the democratic opposition.
The Bush administration should press Musharraf to move back towards
freely elected government, she argues, because the crisis building in
Pakistan as wider sections of the society turn against Musharraf will
hurt U.S. interests. (Yale Global, March 1, 2006)
Simon Tisdall warns that Musharraf
is now politically weaker than at any point since he seized power in
1999, and that the Islamists have never been stronger. But, he
says, Bush is unlikely to heed advice to balance his ties with the
general by engaging in contacts with democratic opposition groups, and
pressing for greater democracy. (The Guardian, March 1, 2006)
Husain Haqqani explores
the history of the relationship between Pakistan’s military
establishment and the country’s radical Islamists, and finds the
latter playing an integral role in realizing the vision of the military
establishment that has ruled the country, brief democratic interludes
notwithstanding, since independence. (Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, February 2006)
Previously on Pakistan:
Myth of an 'Islamist Peril'
|

The Arab identity of P&O's new owners was seized on
by legislators looking to make political hay
Racism Over Ports?
Foreign Affairs managing editor Gideon Rose gets to
the heart of the matter when he charges that any sober assessment of
the issues in the furor over the acquisition of management contracts at
six U.S. ports by Dubai Ports World must lead to the conclusion that
the only problem being cited by the naysayers is simply that this is an
Arab-owned company. Notwithstanding the fact that it has an excellent
record of cooperation with the U.S. on security matters and is run by
American executives -- or the fact that security in U.S. ports is the
responsibility of Homeland Security regardless of who owns the
management companies -- politicians began alerting the media with
warnings about "a country involved in 9/11" taking over American ports.
(Dubai may not have been more involved in 9/11 than Germany, but nobody
was bothering with the details.)
Tom Friedman echoed the racism theme, warning that
to
reject a
company playing by the rules of the globalization game and
international counter-terrorism simply because it is Arab will
actually
weaken the U.S. ability to win moderate allies in the Muslim world,
and leave it even more vulnerable. The Nation notes that the real security
issue in U.S. ports is the rules and procedures adopted by the U.S.
government, and how much the U.S. taxpayer is willing to spend on
keeping America's harbors safe. But Bill Greider sees a dark irony in the
fact that the Bush administration is being stymied by a climate of fear
it helped stoke.
(Foreign Affairs, February 27, 2006)

Fatman and Little Boy launched a generation of
weapons designed to ensure U.S. strategic primacy
No Limit on U.S. Nukes
Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press
argue that the end of the Cold War has removed restraints on the U.S.
pursuit of nuclear primacy, because the MAD (mutually assured
destruction)
principle that served as the foundation for arms control no longer
serves as a brake on U.S. ambitions. The Bush administration is
pursuing a revitalized nuclear program as part of its strategy to
remain, in perpetuity, the single superpower and to prevent the
emergence of a peer competitor to replace the Soviet Union on the
strategic map. That requires substantially altering the rules of arms
control and non proliferation.
“During the Cold War, MAD rendered
the debate about the wisdom of nuclear primacy little more than a
theoretical exercise," they write. "Now that MAD and the awkward
equilibrium it maintained are about to be upset, the argument has
become deadly serious. Hawks will undoubtedly see the advent of U.S.
nuclear primacy as a positive development. For them, MAD was
regrettable because it left the United States vulnerable to nuclear
attack. With the passing of MAD, they argue, Washington will have what
strategists refer to as 'escalation dominance' -- the ability to win a
war at any level of violence -- and will thus be better positioned to
check the ambitions of dangerous states such as China, North Korea, and
Iran. Doves, on the other hand, are fearful of a world in which the
United States feels free to threaten -- and perhaps even use -- force
in pursuit of its foreign policy goals. In their view, nuclear weapons
can produce peace and stability only when all nuclear powers are
equally vulnerable. Owls worry that nuclear primacy will cause
destabilizing reactions on the part of other governments regardless of
the United States' intentions. They assume that Russia and China will
work furiously to reduce their vulnerability by building more missiles,
submarines, and bombers; putting more warheads on each weapon; keeping
their nuclear forces on higher peacetime levels of alert; and adopting
hair-trigger retaliatory policies. If Russia and China take these
steps, owls argue, the risk of accidental, unauthorized, or even
intentional nuclear war -- especially during moments of crisis -- may
climb to levels not seen for decades."
(Foreign Affairs, April-May, 2006)

Turkish U.S.-bashing movie 'Valley of the Wolves: Iraq'
has drawn record crowds
Where the Bad Guys are American
It's not likely to be nominated
for a Best Foreign Language Film Oscar, but the runaway success of the
Turkish movie "Valley of the Wolves: Iraq" is a sign that local
filmmakers have figured out a way to make pots of money out of the
simultaneous loathing of American foreign policy and love of its action
movies: Cast Americans as the bad guys in Rambo-style shoot-em-ups.
On its website,
which offers explanations, images and a trailer, the film is explained
as a Rambo-style revenge fantasy in which a group of Turkish Special
Forces soldiers head into Iraq to avenge some of their comrades who've
fallen foul of U.S. forces and end up championing the stolen honor of
the Iraqi people. The movie's popularity resonates with attitudes in
the Turkish mainstream: The Prime Minister and his wife have seen the
movie and recommended it to others, the first lady calling it "a
beautiful film."
And given the popularity of
American action movies,
the fact that the genre is now being turned against U.S. foreign policy
represents a far more serious challenge than the droning video sermons
of Bin Laden and Zawahiri.
Nor does "Valley of the Wolves"
have the genre all to itself. Over in Cairo, record crowds are turning
out to see The
Night Baghdad Fell, a vicious satire in which Egypt is conquered by
an invading U.S. army. In the socially conservative Egyptian cultural
landscape, the film's depiction of the fantasy of one of its main
characters having sex with Secretary of State Condolleeza Rice, who is
portrayed as a belly dancer, is no doubt contributing to its salacious
appeal.
(Knight-Ridder, February 14, 2006 and Al-Jazeera, January 10, 2006)

The object of slander: Iran's national soccer team
The Next Cartoon War?
Even as people continue to die in
protests sparked by the Prophet Muhammad caricatures, a German
newspaper decided to open a second front by publishing a cartoon
depicting Iran's national soccer team -- due to compete in Germany in
the World Cup finals in June -- as suicide bombers. Iran immediately
announced formal protests, and demanded an apology. Keep a watching
brief on this one, which has the potential to merge the passions of the
current cartoon war with the nationalist soccer passion of the Iranians
in a volatile political cocktail. (The Guardian, February 15, 2006)

Kim Jong Il visits China
China and North Korea: Comrades Forever?
U.S. strategy for dealing with
the challenge of North Korea's nuclear weapons program is premised
largely on the willingness and ability of China to hold Pyongyang's
feet to the fire, using its status as North Korea's major trading
partner to deliver good behavior. But, warns the International Crisis
Group, China's position vis-a-vis North Korea is often misunderstood in
Washington.
"China's influence on North Korea
is more than it is willing to admit but far less than outsiders tend to
believe," the ICG writes. "Although it shares the international
community's denuclearisation goal, it has its own concept of how to
achieve it. It will not tolerate erratic and dangerous behaviour if it
poses a risk of conflict but neither will it endorse or implement
policies that it believes will create instability or threaten its
influence in both Pyongyang and Seoul."
China's priorities with regard to
North Korea are not the same as Washington's. They include maintaining
economic and social stability, preventing the U.S. from dominating a
united Korea, and using its role in mediating the standoff to enhance
its diplomatic prestige, while avoiding triggering a regional arms
race. Although its almost $2 billion in trade and investment is the
lifeblood of North Korea's economy, "there is virtually no circumstance
under which China would use it to force North Korea's compliance on the
nuclear issue." It fears that sanctions would do more harm than good,
and also set a precedent that could prove uncomfortable for Beijing on
other fronts. Its fear of a flood of refugees crossing the border also
gives it a greater stake in maintaining the status quo on the Korean
peninsula, or altering it very gradually through market reforms.
"Although it cannot deliver a
rapid end to Pyongyang's weapons program, China must still be an
integral component of any strategy with a chance of reducing the threat
of a nuclear North Korea," the ICG writes. "No other country has the
interest and political position in North Korea to facilitate and
mediate negotiations. It is also the key to preventing transfers of the
North's nuclear materials and other illicit goods, although its ability
to do this is limited by logistical and intelligence weaknesses, and
unwillingness to curb border trade. Over the long-term, Chinese
economic interaction with the North may be the best hope for sparking
deeper systemic reform and liberalisation there." (International Crisis
Group, January 31, 2006)
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