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Iran's nuclear research facility at Natanz, where IAEA seals were
broken this week in order to resume research into uranium enrichment,
triggering a diplomatic crisis |
Iran
Provokes a Crisis
By scrapping the voluntary suspension of
nuclear fuel-cycle activities that had been a cornerstone of its
negotiations with the European Union, Iran this week threw down the
gauntlet to the West over its nuclear program. The move marks the
culmination of a steadily more aggressive approach Tehran has adopted
towards the negotiations since the election of President Mahmoud
Ahmedinajad last summer. Tehran is insisting on exercising its right
under the Non-Proliferation Treaty to enrich uranium to create fuel for
civilian nuclear reactors, but the EU and the U.S. suspect that Iran
plans to use a civilian nuclear energy program to develop the essential
infrastructure for building a bomb -- a suspicion underscored by Iran's
concealment of certain enrichment activities, as well as by recent
reports that Iran
is pursuing the development of long range missiles capable of
delivering nuclear payloads -- and they insist that
Tehran accept a more limited version of its NPT rights, in which its
nuclear reactor fuel is supplied by Russia and that it refrains from
developing its own enrichment capability (which can be used to make
both reactor fuel and weapons-grade material). Tehran has insisted on
exercising all its NPT rights, and the decision to resume research work
on enrichment at the Natanz facility marks a rejection of the EU
framework.
By opting for confrontation, President Ahmedinajad may be, in
part, pursuing his domestic political agenda which is based on
rekindling a confrontation with the West in order to put his own power
center, the security forces, in the dominant position in Tehran's power
struggles. But the insistence on developing all aspects of the fuel
cycle has been a consensus position among the contending factions, and
it may also be that Iran is hoping to capitalize on what it perceives
as a favorable geopolitical climate. Some of the factors working in its
favor may be the growing extent to which the U.S. will need Iranian
cooperation to secure its goals in Iraq; the unlikelihood of military
confrontation being considered a viable response by the U.S. and even
more so by its European allies; and the fact that China's growing
dependence on Iranian oil and natural gas exports make sanctions an
intolerable outcome for Security Council veto-wielding Beijing. But the
belligerent tone adopted by Ahmedinajad, and Iran's summary rejection
of the negotiating framework, now challenges the Europeans to respond.
They're likely to push for
Security Council action despite the limited enthusiasm of China
and Russia, perhaps hoping to walk the Iranians back to some form of
compromise. (BBC, January 10, 2006)
Simon Tisdall warns that the issue is complicated by
Ahmedinajad's domestic agenda, because
punitive action may play into the hardline president's hands . Not
only is he confident that the reluctance of China to back
sanctions and the limited appetite of the Europeans for confrontation
will resolve the issue in Tehran's favor, Tisdall writes that
Ahmedinajad "has
deliberately sought confrontation with the west (and particularly
Israel) to strengthen his position and advance his 'revivalist
revolutionary' policies at home and in the region. While any UN
sanctions may have limited economic impact, a high-profile political
showdown may serve his purposes."
(The Guardian, January 10, 2006)
Before Ahmedinajad's shock election victory, Western leaders
had hoped that the pragmatic conservative Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani
would become president, and that he would seek a compromise on the
nuclear issue in order to pursue the priority of reintegrating Iran
into the world economy. Rafsanjani remains close to the Supreme Leader,
Ayatollah Ali Khameini, who in the wake of the election actually
elevated him in the power structure to counteract the more radical
Ahmedinajad, who has, in turn been
goading Israel and the West partly to sabotage the efforts of pragmatic
conservatives to repair relations with the West. Against that
background,
Rafsanjani's comments on the current escalation bear close
scrutiny. While he echoed the party line denouncing Western double
standards and demanding Iran's rights, he notably added that “to settle
the nuclear issue both parties are required to show wisdom and if they
take an unwise move, they have done injustice to the region and the
world and they cannot resolve the problem through sanctions and so on."
His emphasis on "both sides" showing wisdom suggests that the path of
confrontation may not have the backing of the Supreme Leader.
(IRNA, January 10, 2006)
Dariush Zahedi and Ali Ezzatyar provide further
evidence of a split between the Supreme Leader and the President.
Khameini, they argue, has become increasingly alarmed at the
confrontation provoked by Ahmedinajad, fearing it will have
catastrophic consequences for the economy and the prospects for the
Islamic regime's survival. But given the broad national consensus in
Iran behind its nuclear demands, the key to making the split between
pragmatic and militant wings of the conservative regime work to resolve
the crisis, the Western powers -- they argue -- will have to offer a
mechanism that will allow the Iranians to back down while saving face.
(LA Times, January 8, 2006)
Zahedi writing with Omid Memarian warns that Ahmedinajad
has misread the international balance of forces, but that this in
itself produces a great danger because one of his key assumptions
is that the U.S. will be restrained by Iran's ability to wreak havoc in
Iraq, Afghanistan and Lebanon.
(LA Times, January 8, 2006)
David Hirst argues that the
Iran crisis is a symptom of a wider regional crisis initiated by the
Iraq invasion.
(Guardian, January 11, 2006)
Offering an Indian perspective on the stand-off, Beryl Anand
of New Delhi's Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies argues
that the vicious cycle at the heart of the crisis is the reason Iran
may be seeking nuclear weapons in the first place as a deterrent,
rather than a means of projecting power. Which is why, Anand reasons,
the greater the external pressure on Tehran, the more desirable nuclear
weapons become. (ICPS, January 3, 2006)
Tehran University political scientist Sadegh Zibakalam
argues that Iran
may eventually accept the Russian-fuel deal, but only if it is
accompanied by other concessions to its security and economic needs.
(Daily Star, January 9, 2006)
Ray Tayekh argues that
the U.S. is ill-served by outsourcing Iran diplomacy to Europe, and
should instead initiate a new negotiating framework in which Washington
is a participant -- and also hold bilateral talks with Tehran combining
incentives with penalties to change Iran's behavior. (Council on
Foreign Relations, December 29, 2006)
Abbas William Samii of the U.S. Navy War College
explores in fascinating detail the individuals and networks of the
Iranian regime that could be targeted by diplomatic and intelligence
initiatives to resolve the nuclear crisis. (Navy War College
Review, Winter 2006)
Jack Boureston and Charles D. Ferguson argue that the best
way to keep tabs on Iran's nuclear program is to remain engaged, and
even
offer the Iranians technical assistance. (Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, November-December 2005)
Russia looks set to play an increasingly central role in the
Iran nuclear crisis, and Andrei P Tsygankov explains why even if it
echoes political criticism of Tehran, Moscow's
positions will be guided by its growing economic ties with Iran .
(Asia Times, January 9, 2006)
Doing What
Sharon Would Do
The first order of business for Israel's
acting prime minister Ehud Olmert has been the issue of Palestinians
voting in East Jerusalem. Although Israel had previously indicated it
would prevent them casting ballots because of participation by Hamas in
the election, Olmert now looks set to allow balloting to go ahead. The
move is vintage Sharon, and not simply because it accommodates the Bush
administration's request: Many leaders of Fatah, the Palestinian ruling
party, had prevailed on President Mahmoud Abbas to use the Israeli
position as a pretext to cancel elections in which Hamas looks set to
match, or even eclipse Fatah's share of seats in the legislature. But
while preventing voting in Jerusalem risks casting Israel as the reason
for the election's postponement, allowing it to go ahead may even suit
Israel's agenda. Sharon had certainly maintained even during the year
that Abbas has been in power that "there is no Palestinian partner" for
talks and that Israel therefore had to make unilateral decisions. An
election in which Hamas emerges as a significant factor in the
Palestinian Authority will certainly do nothing to diminish that claim.
(Haaretz January 10, 2006)
Mona Eltahawy makes the case that the reason Sharon was so
widely hated in the Arab world was not his harsh record in dealing with
them; it was the fact that they
recognized in Sharon the qualities of the quintessential Arab
nationalist leader.
(Asharq al-Awsat, January 9, 2006)
Aluf Benn warns that the chaos in
Palestinian areas will prevent Ehud Olmert from evacuating parts of the
West Bank as a Phase 2 of last year's Gaza withdrawal.
Rejectionists led by Likud's Bibi Netanyahu will win the day as long as
Israelis see a vacuum across the security wall. The only alternative,
Benn argues, is for Israel to demand that the international community
directly administer former the former occupied territories, in the way
that it does in parts of former Yugoslavia. (Haaretz, January 10, 2006)
Danny Rubinstein reports that the authors of
much of the violence that has recently seized the West Bank and Gaza
are leaders of Fatah, fueling suspicion on the Palestinian street
that the chaos is part of a strategy by the party's entrenched powers
to avoid an election that could unseat them. (Haaretz, January 10, 2006)
Amos Harel notes that the Israeli
security establishment believes an al-Qaeda claim that it ordered a
recent rocket attack from Lebanon, and sees the emergence of a
direct Qaeda threat to the Jewish State as a product of the Iraq
insurgency creating a training ground for new weapons and fighters.
(Haaretz, January 9, 2006)
Shiites
Threaten U.S. Iraq Strategy
The U.S. endgame in Iraq is premised on the
democratic political process ultimately accommodating sufficient
sectors of the Sunni population to neutralize the insurgency, or co-opt
its largest constituency. But the fundamental problem facing
Washington's point man, U.S. ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, is that the
Shiite coalition that looks to have won last month's election is flatly
rejecting the sorts of concessions to the Sunnis being proposed by the
U.S. The leader of the largest Shiite party, Abdul-Aziz Hakim of the
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq has warned
that no substantial changes will be permitted to the Iraqi constitution,
even though it was the promise of such changes -- particularly in
respect of federalism -- that was an important part of the deal offered
to draw Sunni parties in to participate in the election. Hakim has also
begun accusing Sunni political leaders who contested the election of
being fronts for "terrorism," adopting a hostile posture and dismissing
the suggestion of drawing these elements into a unity government. Thus
the dilemma facing the U.S. that the concessions necessary to draw in
the Sunnis are unacceptable to the Shiites. And given
Washington's quickly waning ability to influence events
in Iraq in light of the clear limits on its military and financial
commitment there, the Shiite ruling party is more likely to have the
decisive say. (Asia Times, January 9, 2006)
Previously Noted: Endgame
in Iraq
A
Qaeda Detainee Pakistan Won't be Touting
Usually (typically before General Musharraf
is due to meet top U.S. officials) Pakistan broadcasts news of new Al
Qaeda detainees, and inflates their importance. But, as Syed Saleem
Shahzad reports, they seem to be doing the opposite in the case of
Ghulam Mustafa, the 38-year-old head of Qaeda operations in Pakistan.
Captured late last year, Shahzad suggests Mustafa is likely to
"disappear down a dark hole" because although he is a mine of
information on Qaeda operations in Pakistan, not all of it is
information the Pakistani security establishment would be comfortable
sharing with the U.S. His story, says Shahzad, reveals the complex
relationship between the jihadi community and the security forces,
which makes Pakistan an inconsistent ally in the U.S. "war on terror."
(Asia Times, January 9, 2006)
Bin Laden biographer Peter Bergen shares
rare insights into the Qaeda leader's personal psychology derived
from eight years of research among those who have been close to him.
(The Sunday Times, January 3, 2006)
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Long-term
damage: An Iraq war amputee
Cost of Iraq Could Top $2 Trillion
Properly calculating the cost to
the U.S. of the Iraq war requires tabulating not only the weekly budget
expenditure on maintaining the U.S. force in Iraq, but also the
long-term costs such as those of providing health care to wounded
Americans, rebuilding an over-stretched military and other unforeseen
expenditures. Using this broader approach, economist Joseph Stiglitz
has calculated that the total long-term cost of the Iraq war to the
U.S. could top $2 trillion. Stiglitz presented his findings on a panel
hosted by Economists for Peace and
Security at the American Economic Association/Allied Social
Sciences Association annual conference in Boston. "Predicting overall
costs when no one knows how long the war will last, or how many US
troops will remain deployed and for how long, is an imprecise
exercise," writes the Boston Globe on Stiglitz's findings. "But the
range of some future expenses can be assessed, such as the likely
medical bills and disability payments for the soldiers who have been
wounded in the conflict. Twenty percent of them, for example, have
serious brain or spinal injuries that will require life-long care. The
cost of death benefits to military families and bonuses being paid to
soldiers to reenlist and to sign up new recruits can also be tallied.
So can secondary costs such as the interest on the rising budget
deficit as a result of war spending." On the basis of those and other
expenses, Stiglitz suggests $2 trillion may be a conservative estimate.
(Boston Globe, January 8, 2006)

Improvised
Explosive Device, as described by Globalsecurity.org
Dealing with Iraq's IEDs
The insurgent weapon that has
claimed the most American lives in Iraq is also one of the simplest:
The Improvised Explosive Device or IED. Recognizing that these homemade
charges assembled from a variety of easily accessible munitions poses a
grave threat to U.S. forces not only in the current war in Iraq, but as
insurgents share knowledge across borders it will likely become the
norm in anti-American insurgencies elsewhere, the U.S. military has
called for the equivalent of a Manhattan Project to counter the danger.
But, says Center for Defense Information researcher Hannah Levine, that
may be the wrong approach. The IED threat is always evolving as
insurgents adapt their technology to U.S. responses, she notes. The
only effective counter must be similarly adaptive. The analogy, she
suggests, is combatting a mutating flu virus. If vaccine programs are
based on an earlier version of the virus, they are ineffective. (Center
for Defense Information, January 4, 2006)

East Timor: A peacemaking success story
Peace Breaking Out All Over?
You'd never know it to read the
headlines, argues David Mack, but "the reality is that, since the end
of the Cold War, armed conflict and nearly all other forms of political
violence have decreased. The world is far more peaceful than it was.
Why has this change attracted so little attention? In part because the
global media give far more coverage to wars that start than to those
that quietly end, but also because no international agency collects
global or regional data on any form of political violence." So Mack, of
the University of British Columbia, and a group of international
colleagues spent five years collating the Oxford University-backed Human
Security Report. Its conclusions show conflict in decline since the
end of the Cold War, and a level of success for diplomatic efforts to
avoid war quite remarkable in light of popular perceptions. (Washington
Post via Winston Salem Journal, January 2, 2006)

Artist's rendering of a hypothetical 'bullet hitting a
bullet' scenario
It Doesn't Work, But That's No Reason Not to Deploy
It: Missile Defense Update
The Pentagon's multibillion dollar
missile defense program is in full swing, with the tenth interceptor
missile having been deployed in California last month. Soon, the U.S.
will begin seeking a European host for parts of the system, currently
confined to California and Alaska. One small problem, writes Victoria
Sampson, is that so far, the system has failed to prove itself viable.
"The interceptors fielded in Alaska and California are part of a
weapons system that suffered two flight test failures within three
months. In December 2004 and February 2005, the interceptor rockets not
only failed to intercept their test targets -- they could not even
leave the launch pad. The United States has been launching rockets for
decades now; while missile defense requires an accuracy that has been
likened to 'hitting a bullet with a bullet,' rocket launches should be
well within our capabilities.
"Following these recent setbacks,
MDA officials took a hard look at their testing program and scaled
things down. On Dec. 13, 2005, a test of the interceptor rocket was
held, and finally it managed to get off the ground. No target was used;
nor will a live target be incorporated in the tests for some time.
"Yet somehow, the Pentagon argues
with a straight face that this system can provide a 'limited' defense
for the United States against missile attack. It is theoretically
possible that it may do so in the future, but missile defense, as it
stands today, tomorrow, and really, for the next few years, does
nothing more than divert funding and resources from programs that
actually do work. Still, it continues to grow." (Center for Defense
Information, January 4, 2006)
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