

Decentralization and Accountability in Infrastructure Delivery in Developing Countries

Pranab Bardhan

University of California, Berkeley

Dilip Mookherjee

Boston University

November 2003

CORRESPONDING AUTHOR: Dilip Mookherjee, Department of Economics, Boston University, 270 Bay State Road, Boston, MA 02215. Tel. 617-353-4392; Fax: 617-353-4143; email: dilipm@bu.edu.

This paper extends the analysis in Part 2 of our earlier working paper titled ‘Expenditure Decentralization and Delivery of Public Services in Developing Countries’. For financial support we are grateful to the MacArthur Foundation. Mookherjee’s research was additionally funded by National Science Foundation Grant No SBS-9709254. For helpful comments we are grateful to participants at the 1998 meeting of the MacArthur Research Network on Inequality and Economic Performance, and conferences at UC Irvine in February 2001 and at Yale in March 2001. We also thank Christopher Bliss and two referees for useful suggestions.

Decentralization and Accountability in Infrastructure Delivery in Developing Countries

Abstract

We examine implications of delegating delivery of an infrastructure service to an elected local government rather than bureaucrats appointed by a central government. The latter is uninformed about local need and unable to monitor service allocations. Bureaucrats charge bribes for services as monopoly providers, resulting in underprovision of services, especially for the poor. Local governments are directly responsive to their citizens needs but may be subject to capture by elites. Effects of decentralization on service volumes, efficiency and equity are analyzed under different financing arrangements for local governments.

Keywords: bureaucracy, corruption, decentralization, local governments, infrastructure, targeting;

JEL Classification Nos.: D72, D73, H 41, H42, H77, I38, O17

1 Introduction

The theme of 2004 World Development Report is summarized by its opening paragraph:

Too often, services fail poor people — in access, in quantity, in quality. But the fact that there are strong examples where services do work means governments and citizens can do better. How? By putting poor people at the center of service provision: by enabling them to monitor and discipline service providers, by amplifying their voice in policymaking, and by strengthening the incentives for providers to serve the poor.

Problems of accountability associated with traditional modes of delivery involving centralized bureaucracies include cost padding, service diversion, limited responsiveness to local needs, limited access and high prices charged especially to the poor.¹ Many developing countries have thus begun to experiment with initiatives to increase accountability of service providers by providing greater control rights to citizen groups. These include decentralization of service delivery to local governments, community participation, direct transfers to households and contracting out delivery to private providers and NGOs. The programs include a wide range of infrastructure services (water, sanitation, electricity, telecommunications, roads) and social services (education, health and welfare programs). Countries where such trends have gathered momentum in the past two decades span different continents: Latin America (e.g., Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica), Africa (Ghana, Uganda, South Africa) and Asia (Bangladesh, Indonesia, India, Pakistan).²

¹Analysis, examples and empirical evidence concerning such ‘leakages’ and ‘targeting failures’ are provided by Banerjee (1997), Bardhan (1996a, 1996b), Besley (1989), Besley and Kanbur (1993), Bird (1995), Dreze and Saran (1995), Grosh (1991, 1995), Lipton and Ravallion (1995), van de Walle and Nead (1995), and the 1990, 1994, 1997 and 2004 World Development Reports.

²For further details, see the World Development Reports of 1994 and 2004, Estache (1995) and Litvack et al (1998).

These trends towards decentralization are difficult to interpret within the confines of the traditional literature on fiscal federalism³, owing to its lack of attention to problems of accountability in service delivery. The main concern of that literature has been to compare uniform provision of services to different communities (and funded by national taxes) under centralization, with nonuniform provision decided by local governments and funded by local taxes. The main drawback of centralization is believed to be its failure to adjust services to heterogenous local needs. This is traded off against its advantage in internalizing interregional externalities and realizing economies of scale. As noted by many recent authors (Bardhan (2002), Besley and Coate (2003), Bolton and Roland (1997), Laffont and Pouyet (2000), Lockwood (1998), Seabright (1996) and Tommasi and Weinschelbaum (1999)), the assumption of uniform provision under centralization is neither empirically realistic, nor well founded theoretically. It begs the question of what prevents centralized delivery systems from adjusting service levels to information received from local communities regarding their needs. In practice various aspects of the delivery system in a centralized system are delegated to a bureaucracy, who could be relied upon to gather information about local conditions and adjust services accordingly. If the bureaucrats were perfectly accountable, centralization would be able to achieve the best of both worlds (non-uniform provision, internalization of externalities and scale economies).

Other aspects of the experience of developing countries also do not sit comfortably with the traditional paradigm. The nature of decentralization to local governments and communities often takes the form of delegation of service delivery systems, without an accompanying devolution of financing authority. This is particularly so in many African and Asian countries, as stressed by Dillinger (1995). Many of the programs involve relatively few interjurisdictional spillovers, e.g., local

³These are summarized in Cremer, Estache and Seabright (1995), Oates (1972), Musgrave and Musgrave (1984, Chapter 24) and Inman and Rubinfeld (1996, 1997)).

water and sanitation projects. Economies of scale if significant tend to matter only with respect to production rather than distribution. Accordingly production can continue to be centralized in a public or private utility company, from whom local governments procure the service and decide how to allocate it within their respective communities. Under these conditions, decentralization of service delivery to local governments do not involve any of the welfare losses stressed by the traditional literature. With a well functioning local democracy, residents well informed about local conditions and able to monitor service deliveries can exert requisite pressure on elected local government officials in order to ensure their accountability. In that case decentralization should be able to achieve first-best allocations. However the practical concerns frequently expressed with decentralization are that local democracy may not function appropriately, thus limiting accountability of local government officials or community leaders (e.g., see Bardhan (1996), Crook and Manor (1998), Lieten (1996), Mathew and Nayak (1996), Prud'homme (1995), Tanzi (1996) or Manor (1999)). With limited political contestability of local elections, leaders may be susceptible to capture by special interest groups, slacken effort to improve public services, or be incompetent, without facing any risk of losing their positions. In that case efficiency and equity in service delivery may worsen under decentralization.

A theoretical analysis of decentralization of service delivery which is faithful to the main concerns faced by reformers in developing countries clearly needs to place problems of accountability at its forefront. In this paper we focus on the case of delivery of an infrastructural service such as water or electricity, which is entrusted either to a centralized bureaucracy or to elected local government officials.⁴ We abstract from problems of interjurisdictional spillovers, and model accountability

⁴The case of welfare services is somewhat different and is addressed in a separate paper (Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000b)). In that context the service can be resold among customers, and there are divergences between ability of the poor to pay for the service and the social valuation of services delivered to them. In this paper we abstract from these issues, resulting in a very different set of policy options and results. For instance it is not feasible to charge user

problems in either centralized or decentralized regimes as arising from agency problems intrinsic to either regime.

In either system we assume that service delivery has to be delegated by the central government, either to a bureaucracy or to local governments.⁵ In the case of the bureaucratic system the source of the accountability problem is that the actions of bureaucrats cannot be monitored by the central government that appoints them. This owes to high costs of communication between local areas and the central government, and difficulty faced by the central government in carrying out audits of actual service delivery patterns in local areas.⁶ The bureaucrats are thus able to extract bribes from customers in their role as monopoly providers of an essential service. The centralized system ends up differentiating services to different categories of customers based on their willingness to pay bribes, resulting in nonuniform delivery patterns. However, the bureaucrats are unable to engage in perfect bribe discrimination, so the centralized system gives rise to monopoly distortions, resulting in loss of efficiency and equity. These distortions are further magnified if bribes percolate upward through multiple hierarchical layers in the bureaucracy.⁷

fees for an anti-poverty program, whereas it is feasible in the context of an infrastructural or farm input service.

⁵From the standpoint of traditional fiscal federalism this may be viewed not as a choice between centralization and decentralization, but between two modes of federalism: bureaucratic and political. This is partly a semantic issue; we have no major quibble with such a characterization. However we believe that the policy trends in many developing countries described at the beginning of this paper do correspond to such a choice. And the two alternatives represent varying degrees of decentralization of monitoring and evaluation of the agents delegated responsibility over service delivery.

⁶See Wade (1996) for case studies of irrigation delivery systems in India and Korea, where the role of such problems of monitoring performance on accountability of service delivery agents is highlighted.

⁷Wade (1985) provides a vivid description of this phenomenon in the context of the irrigation bureaucracy in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh.

Decentralization shifts control rights over service distribution to a local government subject to electoral pressure from residents. The outcome of this is represented by policies that maximize a weighted sum of welfares of different classes of citizens. There are two classes of local users: large and small, where large users value the service more. Large users constitute a local elite commanding a higher political welfare weight, representing their superior capacity to form a special interest group (in the manner represented in capture models of Baron (1994), Grossman and Helpman (1996) and Bardhan and Mookherjee (1999, 2000a)). We impose no particular restriction on the extent of such capture, and treat it as an exogenous parameter summarizing the effect of socio-economic inequality and political tradition within each community.

The local government procures the service from a public utility and distributes it among users. This is in contrast to the bureaucratic mechanism where the same bureaucracy is in charge of managing both the utility producing the service, and its distribution across and within communities. Both activities are financed directly by the central government. Under decentralization we study three different financing mechanisms for local governments, differing in the degree of autonomy over revenue raising. The first involves complete fiscal autonomy: local governments can impose and collect local taxes. The second restricts local governments to fund the service entirely from user fees instead of taxes. In the third alternative local governments cannot raise any local revenues, so service delivery is entirely financed by fiscal grants from the central government. In the latter context, the grants are endogenously determined by a mechanism designed by the central government, based on reports from local governments concerning local need or cost shocks. The objectives of central government officials are derived from the electoral compulsions they operate under (e.g., welfare weights they assign different classes of citizens), and the financing opportunities available to them for collecting taxes.

In this context we examine the impact of decentralization on delivery patterns (price and quantity of services delivered to different user groups, responsiveness to local need or cost shocks) and resulting welfare implications (e.g., on aggregate social surplus, and on relative welfares of rich and poor citizens). It is worth reiterating that our analysis does not assume anything about the relative corruptibility of bureaucrats and local governments, and takes this to be an exogenous parameter (in addition to other parameters such as demographic composition of different communities, the financing pattern, and cost and need patterns).

Our principal results are summarized as follows. First, in the case of local governments financed entirely by local taxes, there is an expansion of service levels to all categories of users relative to centralization. This owes to the elimination of monopoly distortions result from bribe-seeking by central bureaucrats. However, since local governments are prone to capture by local elites, they tend to overprovide and undercharge the service to them. Poor users bear a disproportionate share of local service costs. The extent of this regressive cross-subsidy depends on the extent of capture of the local government. The welfare impact of decentralization in this case therefore depends on the extent of such capture: decentralization generates higher (resp. lower) welfare (in terms of either total surplus or equity) if and only if the extent of capture is low (resp. high).

We next consider the case of local governments that are restricted to fund the service from user fees rather than taxes. The voluntariness inherent in user fee financing restricts the capacity of local governments to extract resources from the poor. This reduces the extent of the regressive cross-subsidy and service overprovision to the rich. In terms of both efficiency and equity, the outcome thus dominates the case of tax financing. Compared with centralization, the outcome still involves higher service volumes for both categories of users. Moreover, *the outcome is Pareto superior (from the citizen point of view), irrespective of the extent of local capture*. However all the welfare gains

accrue to the rich, as the poor are left just as well off as under centralization. Under centralization all their surplus was extracted by corrupt bureaucrats; under decentralization it is extracted by local governments for the benefit of the local rich. The main impact of the decentralization is to transfer surplus from the bureaucrats to rich citizens, with an accompanying easing of monopoly distortions (which causes service levels to expand). This obtains irrespective of the precise degree of political capture.

We finally consider case of services funded by fiscal grants. The determination of these grants raises a host of additional considerations concerning intergovernmental fiscal relations. Local governments are always motivated to overstate local need to the central government. Given the inability of the central government to directly observe these shocks, incentive compatibility constraints in centre-local relations cause grants to be unresponsive to local need shocks. As a consequence local governments operate under financial constraints, causing service levels to be lower compared with either tax or user fee financing. This is the main disadvantage of grant financing relative to tax financing or user fees. At the same time the financial constraint on local governments implies that services provided to local elites comes (on the margin) at the expense of alternative services, instead of being funded by higher levies on the poor. This limits the incentive of local governments to over-provide the service to the elites. Grant financing thus results in a superior intracommunity targeting pattern, relative to local tax finance or user fee mechanisms. In terms of overall welfare impact this has to be traded off against the lower flexibility of service levels to local need shocks. The resulting welfare comparison with other modes of financing or with centralization ultimately depends on various parameters.

In summary, the effects of decentralization on service volumes and welfare depend on the precise financing mechanism that accompanies decentralization. The expansion of service levels is greater,

the larger the extent of financing autonomy granted to local governments. This is consistent with the empirical findings of Estache and Sinha (1995) who study 20 countries over the period 1970-92. They found a significant positive effect of expenditure decentralization on per capita infrastructure deliveries, and that the expansion is weaker when local governments rely more on central funds rather than their own revenues. Our model suggests, however, that it would be a mistake to infer from this that greater devolution of financing authority to local governments is desirable from a welfare standpoint. The desirability of devolution of financing authority depends on the extent of capture of local governments. When capture is severe, decentralization runs the risk of worsening the lot of the poor. In particular, it is a mistake to identify service volume expansion as an index of welfare impact, since service volumes expand more when there is greater capture.

It is equally misleading to use bribes as a measure of corruption or welfare. The bribes associated with the centralized bureaucracy disappear under decentralization. But they are replaced by regressive cross-subsidies hidden in government finances, especially when the underpayment of taxes by the rich takes the form of tax evasion. From this perspective, cross-country studies of bribes and degree of expenditure decentralization (such as Fisman and Gatti (1999)) provide little indication of the true welfare impact.⁸ They indicate the impact on a purely economic measure of corruption, while ignoring political forms of corruption that may be equally important.

As mentioned previously, the issue of corruption and lack of accountability has largely been ignored by previous literature on fiscal decentralization, with the sole exceptions of Seabright (1996) and Tommasi and Weinschelbaum (1999). They focus on lack of accountability as the principal drawback of centralization, which has to be traded off against interjurisdictional coordination problems inherent in decentralization. In contrast, our theory based on the view that centralized systems may

⁸In a study covering 57 countries over the period 1980-95, Fisman and Gatti document a significant negative correlation between the subnational share of total government spending and various bribe-related measures of corruption.

be more or less accountable than local governments, depending on the nature of political institutions. The basis for this view has been argued by Bardhan and Mookherjee (1999, 2000a). Concern has frequently been expressed in many developing countries regarding the possible danger of worsened intracommunity allocations under decentralization owing to capture of local governments. At the same time our model focuses less on problems of interjurisdictional coordination.⁹

Our result concerning the value of constraining financing options of local governments carries some resemblance to the arguments of Brennan and Buchanan (1980) concerning the need to impose constitutional constraints on Leviathan-like governments. Yet there are many significant differences between our respective approaches and results. First, Brennan and Buchanan adopt the Leviathan assumption universally, wherein all governments are depicted as seeking to maximize surplus of revenues over public good supply for their own benefit. In contrast we derive objectives of decision makers from underlying information and control structures in either system. In our model Leviathan is an apt characterization of bureaucrats in the centralized regime, but not of local governments in the decentralized system. The difference arises from the role of political competition in the latter. The main argument in favor of decentralization is precisely that it limits the Leviathan tendency of centralized bureaucrats.¹⁰ The problem with local governments is not their Leviathanism but

⁹For instance there are no capacity constraints on service delivery across different communities. We also abstract from the possibility that local governments may possess less administrative or technical competence relative to central bureaucrats. Our model does however accommodate economies of scale in service provision across communities, which motivates production to be concentrated in a single utility from which local governments procure the service. It also allows for fiscal externalities across jurisdictions, i.e., the tendency for local communities to free-ride off revenues raised by the central government in the grant-financed system.

¹⁰In contrast, the arguments made by Brennan and Buchanan in favor of fiscal decentralization stem from the Tiebout-like competitive pressures operating on local governments when citizens can move costlessly from one jurisdiction to another (a phenomenon we abstract from on the grounds of limited relevance, especially in developing countries). Moreover, Brennan and Buchanan assert the tradeoffs between such gains in government accountability

favouritism with regard to one category of citizens. Moreover, our result concerning the superiority of decentralization under appropriate restrictions on financing authority of local governments, does not find a parallel in their work. Brennan and Buchanan lay greater emphasis instead on the need to constrain financing options of governments at the central level rather than at the local level, owing to greater competitive discipline on the Leviathanite tendencies allowed by citizen mobility across jurisdictions.

Section 2 introduces the model, Section 3 describes the centralized regime, and Section 4 the various decentralization regimes. Section 5 concludes.

2 The Model

The service is a private benefit such as irrigation or electricity, whose production is subject to a large fixed cost F , in addition to variable costs. Production is concentrated in a single large utility in both centralization and decentralization regimes. There are a number of different communities, denoted $i = 1, \dots, n$. The variable cost of generating supply Y_i to community i is $\theta_i Y_i$, so θ_i is the (constant) marginal cost of delivery to community i . The realization of θ_i is random, represented by a positive density function g_i over the interval $[\underline{\theta}_i, \bar{\theta}_i]$.

Community i has N_i users, who belong to either of two groups, large (l) and small (s), who differ in their valuation of the service. A fraction β_i of citizens in the community are small users; the rest are large users. Large users belong to a wealthy elite, and value the service more owing to complementarities with other assets (land or factories) they own. The utility function of a member and associated costs of lack of scale economies and existence of interjurisdictional externalities. In our context the principal tradeoff is with the tendency for local governments to be captured by special interest groups.

of group $k = l, s$ in community i is $\gamma_k \eta_i v(y_k) - t_k$, where γ_k is a group-specific valuation parameter satisfying $\gamma_l > \gamma_s > 0$, η_i is a community-specific need shock, y_k is the level of service delivered, and t_k is the net financial burden imposed on the user. The utility function v is homothetic: $v(y) = \frac{1}{\alpha+1} y^{\alpha+1}$ where $\alpha < 0$ and different from -1 . Local need η_i is distributed independently across regions; within region i it has a positive density function h_i on an interval $[0, \eta_u]$ which satisfies a standard monotone hazard rate condition that $\frac{1-H_i}{h_i}$ is nonincreasing, where H_i denotes the corresponding distribution function.¹¹

The central government knows only the demographic profile of the different communities, i.e., the populations N_i and its composition among the two groups β_i . It does not observe the realization of local need or cost shocks; nor can it monitor local service delivery patterns. Owing to this lack of information, it delegates control over allocation of this service between and within communities either to bureaucrats they appoint directly (the centralized regime), or to local governments (the decentralized regime).

The fixed cost F of the utility producing the service is financed by the central government out of central taxes in both regimes; accordingly we can ignore the costs of such finance when comparing the two regimes, and focus on how variable costs are financed.¹² In the centralized system variable costs are financed by a combination of user fees and subsidies financed out of central taxes. The user fees are exogenously set at a level that is insufficient to cover operating costs, necessitating

¹¹The assumption of independence of need or cost shocks across communities is a purely simplifying assumption. It only complicates the expressions for the way that intercommunity allocations react to these need and cost shocks, without altering any qualitative results.

¹²The analysis extends straightforwardly to the case where decentralization is accompanied by privatization of the utility, which is regulated effectively so that local governments procure the service at its true marginal cost from the utility.

a subsidy from the central government to the utility.¹³ Since central government officials cannot monitor service deliveries, the budgetary support C provided by the government to the utility must be a lumpsum amount, large enough to cover its operating costs in all circumstances. Since the user fees play no role in the analysis we can set them equal to zero, without any loss of generality.¹⁴ In the decentralized system by contrast, operating costs are funded either by local governments out of local taxes, user fees or fiscal grants.

Central taxes involve a deadweight cost of $\lambda > 0$. Taking these deadweight costs into account, the second-best service allocation is given by solution to

$$\gamma_k \eta_i v'(y_{ki}^f) - (1 + \lambda)\theta_i = 0. \quad (1)$$

The corresponding *first-best allocation* corresponds to the case where the deadweight costs of finance λ equals zero. The distributional burden of central taxes plays no role in the analysis except in the case where decentralization is funded by fiscal grants.

3 Centralized Bureaucracy

Under centralization, authority over service delivery is delegated to bureaucrats appointed by the central government. The bureaucracy consists of two layers. The top layer is in charge of the central utility and allocates services across communities, i.e., decides Y_i . The bottom layer consists of a bureaucrat in each community i , who allocates Y_i across users within the community. Top layer

¹³See Ahluwalia (1998) for a description of chronic financial problems of state electricity boards in India, resulting primarily from low levels of user fees.

¹⁴If l_i is a constant per-unit user fee imposed on services delivered to community i , then total user fees collected $\sum_i l_i Y_i$ will supplement central government revenues, thus reducing the net operating subsidy to the utility to $C - \sum_i l_i Y_i$.

bureaucrats observe the realization of cost θ_i for each community i , but not the local need η_i . The lower level bureaucrat assigned to the community observes the realization of η_i . Despite the fact that users are legally entitled to receive the service for free (or against payment of the mandated user fees), the local bureaucrat will be able to charge supplementary bribes as a precondition for service delivery. We first explain how bribes are set at the local level, and subsequently how they percolate upward to higher tiers of the bureaucracy.

Consider a local bureaucrat who controls the allocation of a given aggregate service Y_i in region i among its residents. Suppose that the realization of local need and delivery cost shocks is (η_i, θ_i) . The bureaucrat cannot engage in perfect price discrimination owing to his inability to identify the precise type of any given customer. Attempts to charge higher bribes to the large users that value the service more can be circumvented by these users by masquerading as a collection of small users (e.g., by splitting their lands and assets among different family members). Given absence of resale across users, the bureaucrat's problem is to select an optimal schedule of nonlinear bribes $b(y)$, which both categories of users are subject to. Given this schedule, each user type k will decide how much service y_k to procure by maximizing $\gamma_k \eta_i v(y_k) - b(y_k)$.

Using standard methods of solving such nonlinear pricing problems (see, e.g., Laffont and Tirole (1993)), this can be simplified as follows. Bribe and service levels for the two classes (denoted by b_k and y_k respectively) will be set to maximize (per capita) bribe income $\beta_i b_s + (1 - \beta_i) b_l$, subject to voluntary participation constraint for each class k : $\gamma_k \eta_i v(y_k) - b_k \geq 0$, the incentive constraint that large users do not seek to masquerade as small users¹⁵: $\gamma_l \eta_i v(y_l) - b_l \geq \gamma_l \eta_i v(y_s) - b_s$, and the

¹⁵It is well known that the solution will automatically satisfy the reverse incentive constraint as well, so small users will not try to masquerade as large users either. Moreover, the solution will automatically have the property that no large user will seek to masquerade as m (> 1) small users, since the large users will be charged a discounted bribe rate relative to small users.

allocation constraint $\beta_i y_s + (1 - \beta_i) y_l \leq \frac{Y_i}{N_i}$. Standard arguments can be employed to show that the participation constraint binds for small users, and so does the incentive constraint for large users, implying that

$$b_s = \gamma_s \eta_i v(y_s), b_l = \gamma_l \eta_i v(y_l) - (\gamma_l - \gamma_s) \eta_i v(y_s). \quad (2)$$

This generates the following reduced form expression for bribe income as a function of service delivery levels:

$$\beta_i D_s \eta_i v(y_s) + (1 - \beta_i) D_l \eta_i v(y_l) \quad (3)$$

where $D_s \equiv \gamma_s - \frac{1 - \beta_i}{\beta_i} (\gamma_l - \gamma_s)$ and $D_l \equiv \gamma_l$ represent the ‘virtual’ valuation parameters for the two classes respectively. Maximizing bribe income (3) less variable delivery cost yields (7). Moreover, the local bureaucrat ends up with a total bribe income from this community of

$$N_i B_i \eta_i \frac{Y_i^{-\frac{1}{\alpha}}}{\alpha + 1} \quad (4)$$

where $B_i \equiv [\beta_i D_s^{-\frac{1}{\alpha}} + (1 - \beta_i) D_l^{-\frac{1}{\alpha}}]^{-\alpha} < 1$.

In the case where the central government sets user fees for financing the service, the optimal allocation is the same as long as the user fee is less than the optimal bribe. In that case the local bureaucrat charges a bribe over and above the user fee, and the absence of income effects implies that the same solution obtains (with b_s, b_l now representing the total amount paid by each type of user, the sum of the user fee and the bribe). The bribe income of the bureaucrat is correspondingly reduced by the user fees they have to remit to upper levels of the government. At the margin the bribe income of the bureaucrat is unaffected, and therefore also their incentives.

Turn now to the allocation of service levels across communities by higher level bureaucrats. These bureaucrats will seek to extract bribe kickbacks from lower level bureaucrats in exchange for allocating service levels to their respective communities. However their lack of knowledge of local need η_i implies that they do not know how much bribe income (4) can be earned by a lower level

bureaucrat from a given service level Y_i . Hence they design a nonlinear kickback schedule $Q_i(Y_i)$ specifying the kickback they demand from a lower level bureaucrat in exchange for a given service allocation Y_i .

The optimal kickback schedule can be solved as follows. Applying the Revelation Principle, the problem can be posed as follows. The local bureaucrat makes a report η_i of the local need parameter defining the bribe potential in community i . Following such a report, the required kickback and allocated service level is $Q_i(\eta_i), Y_i(\eta_i)$. The central bureaucrats select these mechanisms, one for each local bureaucrat, to maximize their own surplus, which equals the expected value of sum of budgetary slack $C - F - \sum_i \theta_i Y_i$ and bribe kickbacks $\sum_i Q_i$. Hence they design the mechanism to maximize the difference between aggregate kickback and operating costs

$$\mathcal{E}_{\eta_i} \sum_i [Q_i(\eta_i) - \theta_i Y_i(\eta_i)]. \quad (5)$$

At the same time the local bureaucrat is motivated to maximize the difference between local bribe income and the kickback that needs to be paid to their bosses. Hence the maximization (5) is subject to breakeven and truthful reporting constraints for each local bureaucrat:

$$N_i B_i \eta_i v(Y_i(\eta_i)) - Q_i(\eta_i) \geq 0$$

$$\eta_i \in \arg \max_{\tilde{\eta}_i} [N_i B_i \eta_i v(Y_i(\tilde{\eta}_i)) - Q_i(\tilde{\eta}_i)]$$

Again standard techniques of solving these principal-agent problems (e.g., based on Baron-Myerson (1982)) can be employed to show that the equilibrium intercommunity service allocation $Y_i(\eta_i, \theta_i)$ maximizes

$$\sum_i [N_i B_i J_i(\eta_i) v(Y_i) - \theta_i Y_i]. \quad (6)$$

where $J_i(\eta_i)$ denotes $\eta_i - \frac{1 - H_i(\eta_i)}{h_i(\eta_i)}$.

We thus obtain the following outcome under centralization.

Proposition 1 *The centralized system results in the following allocation (for any given state (θ_i, η_i) , $i = 1, 2, \dots$*

(i) *In any given state $\{(\theta_i, \eta_i)\}_{i=1, \dots, m}$, the community service allocation $Y_i(\eta_i, \theta_i)$ maximizes (6), resulting in underprovision relative to the first-best.*

(ii) *Intracommunity allocation (given the per capita service level Y_i) for community i is given by*

$$\begin{aligned} y_s^* &= Y_i \frac{D_s^{-\frac{1}{\alpha}}}{\beta_i D_s^{-\frac{1}{\alpha}} + (1 - \beta_i) D_l^{-\frac{1}{\alpha}}} \\ y_l^* &= Y_i \frac{D_l^{-\frac{1}{\alpha}}}{\beta_i D_s^{-\frac{1}{\alpha}} + (1 - \beta_i) D_l^{-\frac{1}{\alpha}}} \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

and results in further underprovision to small users. Small users obtain a net utility of 0, while large users obtain a positive surplus, with the bribes given by (2).

Competition for rents across different layers of the bureaucracy causes the intercommunity allocation to be skewed in favor of communities with high need. Lower level bureaucrats are tempted to understate the bribe potential for their community in order to limit the kickback they have to pay their superiors. This temptation is counteracted by underproviding the service to a community when a low η_i is reported. This distortion compounds the distortion resulting from inability of local bureaucrats to price discriminate perfectly. The end result is (i) underprovision of service levels to each community (relative to the first-best allocation that corresponds to a zero deadweight cost of taxes)¹⁶, and (ii) the intracommunity distortion whereby service delivery is underprovided to non-elites.¹⁷ It should also be noted that the statement about surplus obtained by different categories

¹⁶With a positive deadweight cost, whether there is under or over-provision depends on how large λ is.

¹⁷If central user fees are imposed at a constant rate of l_i for community i , then it is easy to check that the term for costs in (6) will be modified to $(l_i + \theta_i)Y_i$, which will further compound the underprovision of the service under centralization.

of users in Proposition 1 does not incorporate the cost of the taxes they have paid to the central government; if these are additionally incorporated then their utilities are even lower by extent that depends on the distributional incidence of central taxes.

4 Decentralization

Now suppose authority over service delivery is devolved to local governments. They procure the service from the central utility, and allocate it across local users. In order to focus on considerations related to local capture (rather than the possibility of limited technical or administrative competence of local government officials that might raise costs under decentralization), we assume that they know the delivery cost θ_i and procure Y_i at this cost from the central utility.¹⁸

The local government may be captured by local elites owing to a variety of distortions in the functioning of local democracy. We represent the objective of the local government in community i by

$$W_i^l = \beta_i U_{si} + \delta_i^l (1 - \beta_i) U_{li} \quad (8)$$

where $\delta_i^l > 1$ represents the premium placed on the welfare of elites relative to non-elites. The switch from centralization to decentralization shifts control rights away from bribe extractors to those who respond to the interests of local users, owing to electoral pressures. However, they respond with a bias in favor of local elites. This bias reflects inequality within the community with regard to their wealth, literacy, social status, connections, political awareness, control over media or force. Nevertheless some degree of responsiveness of local governments to the interests of small users arises from the fact that these users often form a sizeable vote block in local elections. A

¹⁸In the absence of this assumption, decentralization will be subject to an additional disadvantage relative to centralization.

local government that rides roughshod over their interests may be ejected from office by disgruntled voters. Accordingly, the degree of capture may depend on β_i , the demographic weight of small users within the community. We impose no particular structure on the capture coefficient δ_i^l , as it summarizes a multitude of political determinants of local capture that we take to be exogenous.

One particular model of electoral competition that generates an objective function exactly of the form (8) is the Baron (1994) or Grossman-Helpman (1996) theory of special interest groups that contribute to campaign finance of two parties or candidates engaging in Downsian competition for local office. This version is elaborated further in Bardhan and Mookherjee (1999, 2000a). In that version it turns out that the extent of capture δ_i^l is an increasing function of β_i , owing to the lower level of political awareness among small users, which increases the value of campaign funds in winning elections (thus increasing the influence of elites arising from their campaign contributions). Moreover, δ_i^l tends to 0 as β_i tends to 0 and to a finite limit as β_i tends to 1. While these assumptions are inessential to our results, the figures illustrating the service deliveries under different regimes will be drawn corresponding to such a case.

4.1 Local-Tax-Financed Decentralization

In this version expenditure decentralization is accompanied by devolution of local revenue raising authority to local governments, which are fiscally autonomous and self-sufficient. Local governments have the ability and constitutional authority to finance their expenditure needs from local taxes, at the same deadweight cost λ as the central government.

Decentralization has the advantage of exploiting the information and control possessed at the local level concerning service deliveries. On the other hand it is subject to political favouritism by elected officials towards local elites. This takes the form of preferential service deliveries and

undertaxation of the large users. The undertaxation may be achieved by selectively allowing large users to evade their tax obligations, or by designing a regressive system of local taxes (e.g., based on indirect taxes rather than property taxes). A local government will set service levels and local taxes y_k, t_k for the two classes $k = p, l$ to maximize

$$\beta_i[\gamma_s \eta_i v(y_s) - t_s] + \delta_i^l(1 - \beta_i)[\gamma_l \eta_i v(y_l) - t_l] \quad (9)$$

subject to the budget constraint $\beta_i t_s + (1 - \beta_i)t_l = (1 + \lambda)\theta_i[\beta_i y_s + (1 - \beta_i)y_l]$, and nonnegativity constraints on t_l, t_s .¹⁹ Voluntary participation constraints do not need to be imposed, as local governments have the ability to impose coercive taxes, and citizens are assumed unable to move across districts owing to high mobility costs. The resulting outcome is described below, and the resulting welfare compared with centralization.²⁰

Proposition 2 *Consider any state η_i such that*

$$1 + \lambda = \frac{\eta_i}{J(\eta_i)}. \quad (10)$$

Then local-tax-financed decentralization generates the following outcomes:

(i) *tax burdens $t_l = 0$, $t_s = (1 + \lambda)\theta_i[y_s + \frac{1 - \beta_i}{\beta_i}y_l]$, and service deliveries satisfying*

$$\eta_i \gamma_s v'(y_s^d) = (1 + \lambda)\theta_i; \eta_i \gamma_l v'(y_l^d) = \frac{(1 + \lambda)\theta_i}{\delta_i^l} \quad (11)$$

¹⁹The nonnegativity constraints prevent elites from using the local fiscal mechanism to directly capture the wealth of non-elites. Such forms of redistribution would typically be illegal. Hence reverse redistribution must be carried out indirectly in the form of distorted patterns of service delivery and selective tax evasion by elites, rather than direct transfers. If some degree of direct transfers is admitted, the outcome would be less equitable than represented below, but would not affect service levels. Consequently this version of decentralization would perform worse relative to the other two financing variants, further reinforcing our results concerning their relative ranking.

²⁰We use a utilitarian welfare criterion. However, the same results would apply with any other individualistic inequality-averse social welfare function, since the ranking of different regimes on efficiency and equity dimensions turn out to coincide.

i.e., second-best supply to small users and overprovision to large users, implying that service levels are larger than under centralization for both groups;

(ii) higher welfare than centralization as δ_i^l approaches 1;

(iii) lower welfare than centralization if δ_i^l is sufficiently large.

Assumption (10) enables us to control for the aggregate service level to the community, and focus on differences in intracommunity allocations between centralization and decentralization. Inspecting the objective function (9) of the local government, it is evident that small users will bear the entire financial burden of the service, as local elites use their political clout to evade all tax obligations. Incorporating this financing pattern, the objective of the local governments can be expressed as a function only of the service deliveries:

$$\eta_i \gamma_s v'(y_s^d) = (1 + \lambda) \theta_i; \eta_i \gamma_l v'(y_l^d) = \frac{(1 + \lambda) \theta_i}{\delta_i^l} \quad (12)$$

from which result (i) follows. Decentralization is thus characterized by a regressive pattern of cross-subsidization: non-elites pay for their service as well as of the elites. Moreover, elites tend to be overprovided the service (relative to second-best cost). The greater the capture of local government the more extreme these misallocations, with lower efficiency and equity. On the other hand, with sufficiently low capture the local government maximizes welfare, so the allocation approaches the second-best. Hence the welfare comparison with centralization depends upon the extent of local capture.²¹

²¹The results of Proposition 2 survive even when we include the costs of central taxes paid by users in the centralized system. Parts (ii) and (iii) are limiting results that continue to apply. They are also unaffected if provision in the centralized system is partially funded by user fees, since the service allocations and welfare calculations for different users in the centralized system remain unchanged in that case.

Nevertheless, irrespective of the degree of capture, note that that our model predicts that decentralization expands the volume of infrastructural service delivered (assuming (10) holds). This is consistent with the empirical finding of Estache and Sinha (1995) in a cross-country context that expenditure decentralization results in increased supply of infrastructure services when accompanied by revenue decentralization. The principal reason for this in our model is the removal of monopoly (bribe) distortions inherent in the centralized system. Figure 1 depicts the service allocation patterns under the two systems across regions of varying demographic composition (corresponding to an increasing capture function $\delta_i^l(\beta_i)$ of the form predicted by the Grossman-Helpman model).

4.2 User Fee Financing

In practice, local governments in many developing countries lack elastic revenue bases, especially with respect to middle and low income citizens. They may also lack the constitutional authority or administrative capacity to levy and collect local taxes. Local services correspondingly tend to be financed by fiscal grants from the center, whence local governments are no longer self-sufficient, creating a host of problems (such as asymmetric information about local need, ‘soft’ budget constraints, and dependence of service levels on the vagaries of public finances of the central government) that will be studied in the next section. An intermediate solution involves local governments financing services by levying user charges, an approach commanding increasing attention in developing countries for infrastructure services. The virtues frequently commended for this approach are that they enhance fiscal autonomy of local governments, thus minimizing the problems described above. Less attention has been devoted to the implications for intracommunity allocations, to which we now turn.

The key feature of user fee financing (in contrast to local taxes) is their noncoercive character: fees

are paid on the basis of voluntary purchase decisions by users. This has two important consequences. First, the government does not need a specialized administration to collect local taxes, limiting deadweight costs. Indeed, we shall assume that these are zero for collection of user fees: this is inessential to the arguments below, which will continue to apply as long as they do not exceed the deadweight costs of central tax revenues.²²

Second, every citizen has the option of foregoing the service if the fee is excessive, limiting the surplus that local governments can extract from them. Large users can of course still use their political power to evade paying fees for the services they consume. But the voluntary participation constraint for small users restricts the extent of feasible cross-subsidization. Formally, the optimization problem faced by the local government in the tax financed regime is subject to the participation constraint:

$$\eta_i \gamma_k v(y_k) - t_k \geq 0, k = s, l. \quad (13)$$

Proposition 3 *(i) Service and fees set by local governments under user-fee-financed decentralization are as follows:*

$$y_s = y_s^f, t_s = \gamma_s \eta_s v(y_s^f), y_l = \max\{y_l^f, \hat{y}_l\}, t_l = \theta_l (y_l^f - \hat{y}_l) \quad (14)$$

where \hat{y}_l denotes $\frac{\beta_l (\gamma_s \eta_s v(y_s^f) - \theta_l y_s^f)}{(1 - \beta_l) \theta_l}$. Compared with centralization, service deliveries are larger for both groups. Compared with local-tax-financed decentralization, service deliveries are higher for small users, while the comparison is ambiguous for large users.

(ii) User-fee-financed decentralization (weakly) Pareto dominates centralization: small users are

²²Note that the efficiency costs of user fees in terms of inducing over or under-use of the service are already incorporated in the analysis below, so the deadweight costs in the user fee mechanism involve only collection costs. These are likely to be much lower than administration and collection of direct taxes, which requires valuation of local properties and monitoring taxable activities of local citizens.

equally well off while large users are better off. It welfare-dominates local-tax-financed decentralization, i.e., with respect to both efficiency and equity.

The reasoning is straightforward. Consider the problem of maximizing the local government objective function (9) subject to (13) and the budget constraint $\beta_i t_s + (1 - \beta_i) t_l = (1 + \lambda) \theta_i [\beta_i y_s + (1 - \beta_i) y_l]$. The fee t_s for small users will be set at a level which reduces their surplus to zero, while providing them the first-best service level. The financial surplus generated thereby will be used to fund provision of the service to the large users. It pays for a service level \hat{y}_l for large users. This will be the service actually delivered to large users, if it exceeds the first-best level y_l^f . Otherwise the latter will pay the supplemental amount necessary to raise their service to the first-best level.

To prove (ii), consider first the welfare comparison with centralization. It will be simpler to ignore the cost of taxes paid by users in the centralized system; once they are incorporated the welfare of users in that system will become even lower, further reinforcing our conclusion. Small users are exactly as well off, since in either system they receive zero surplus. And large users are better off: this is obvious when $\hat{y}_l \geq y_l^f$, since they receive a larger service and pay nothing. In the other case they receive the first-best service level, the same as in centralization, and they pay less.²³

Next consider the comparison with decentralization financed by local taxes. Here it helps to focus on the case where collection of user fees involves the same deadweight cost λ as local taxes. Small users will get the same (second-best) service level under both systems of financing, since they involve the same burden and allocation of cost. We claim that service provision to large users will either be the same or higher under tax financing. It will obviously be the same in the case where

²³They pay less than the cost of their service in the decentralized system, being subsidized partly by the small users. Whereas under centralization bureaucrats earn positive rents from both categories of users, implying that large users pay more than the marginal cost of their service.

the participation constraint for small users does not bind in the tax financing solution. On the other hand if the participation constraint binds, small users must be paying more under tax financing (since they receive the same service level under both systems), which funds a larger service to large users, as claimed above. Since the latter receive second-best supply or greater under user-fee financing, the service must be over-provided to large users under tax-financing. Therefore tax-financing is both less efficient and less equitable. To complete the argument, note that if the collection of user fees involves lower deadweight costs compared to local taxes, the relative performance of the user-fee mechanism improves even further.

A user-fee system administered by a local government subject to local capture thus continues to overprovide the service to the large users at the expense of the small users. But the extent is lower compared with the case of local tax finance. Service levels under the scheme are illustrated in Figure 2. Supply to small users expands uniformly from second-best to first-best because of the reduction in deadweight costs of collection. The same is true for large users in regions with negligible (β_i close to 0) small users: supply levels expand from the second-best to the first-best level. In such regions there is an expansion of service deliveries to both groups, compared with the case of tax-financing. For regions with higher fraction of small users, there can be over-provision to large users, but to a lesser extent under user-fee financing. Hence aggregate service level to communities can shrink as a result of the restriction on the revenue raising capacity of local governments. From a welfare standpoint, however, this is a blessing — it reflects a mitigation of the damaging efficiency and equity effects of local capture.

This explains the welfare ranking of user-fee-financed decentralization relative to local tax finance or centralization. The generality of this result is striking: it holds irrespective of the degree of local capture, the composition of the district, or the realization of local need and cost shocks. Of

course there are a number of qualifications: it rests on some of the maintained assumptions of the model, such as absence of need to incorporate inter-regional spillovers or redistribution, and adequate capacity of local governments to ensure cost-effective procurement. The argument also utilized the assumption of only two classes of users; we have not checked whether it survives when there are more than two classes. Despite these qualifications, the result illustrates a number of advantages of user fees: lower collection costs, and limited scope for discretionary cross-subsidization by captured local governments to favor local elites. User fees selected by local governments with purchase decisions subsequently decentralized to individual users permit flexibility of service provision with respect to local cost and need. It is not, however, an optimal mechanism, since it permits some degree of cross-subsidization and overprovision to large users. This motivates interest in alternative financing mechanisms that restrict discretion of local governments in other ways.

4.3 Central Grant Financing

We now consider the third financing mode for local governments: grants from the central government. Suppose that local governments have no revenue raising capabilities at all, and receive block grants from the center to fund infrastructural service allocations. Note that the local government would always prefer a larger grant to a smaller one. This will give rise to an incentive problem between central and local governments: the latter would always like to overstate local need and cost in order to be eligible for a larger grant. Lacking information about local conditions, and being unable to monitor service deliveries actually implemented by local governments, the center will be unable to verify the claims made by local governments. Consequently grants will end up being insensitive to local conditions.

The insensitivity of central grants to local conditions implies that first-best or second-best al-

locations cannot be implemented, even if all other conditions were ideal (e.g., if local governments were not subject to elite capture). Nevertheless, some flexibility is possible if the grants are not tied to specific categories of services: local governments can then allocate a given budget across different services in response to shifts in relative local needs or costs. Even tied grants admit considerable *de facto* fungibility, allowing them to be spent on alternative services via creative accounting practices. In particular they can be diverted to alternative programs that happen to be favored by local elites.

To represent such flexibility in its simplest form, we assume that governments allocate their fiscal resources between the infrastructure service in question, and lump sum subsidies to either class of users (representing the pecuniary equivalent of alternative services delivered). Since there is scope for discretion with respect to whom the alternative services are delivered, we assume that the local government can discriminate perfectly across the users in their allocation.²⁴²⁵

Given a fixed (per capita) block grant G , the local government in region i will select an allocation of the given infrastructure service y_s, y_l and subsidy equivalents S_s, S_l for alternative services for the

²⁴The results below will not be qualitatively altered with alternative specifications, e.g., if the alternative services are allocated uniformly across both classes, or if marginal utility of users are diminishing with respect to the level of their supply.

²⁵In the tax financing case we assumed that local taxes collected would be spent entirely on the infrastructural service in question. It may appear therefore that we are arbitrarily altering the set of feasible policies between the two financing regimes. However, the results are not driven by this difference. In the tax financing case the scale of aggregate budget for local governments is not given, unlike the case of grant financing. Under the assumption of constant marginal cost of tax finance, delivery of different services can be separated from one another under tax financing, since the cost of any given service in that regime is the marginal cost of the related tax finance. Whereas under grant financing the local government allocates a fixed grant budget across different services, whence the cost of any given service is the opportunity cost in terms of alternative services foregone. It is this difference which is fundamental, and accounts for the differences in allocation patterns across the two regimes.

two classes of users to maximize

$$\beta_i[\gamma_s \eta_i v(y_s) + S_s] + \delta_i^l(1 - \beta_i)[\gamma_l \eta_i v(y_l) + S_l] \quad (15)$$

subject to the budget constraint

$$\beta_i[\theta_i y_s + S_s] + (1 - \beta_i)[\theta_i y_l + S_l] \leq G \quad (16)$$

and the nonnegativity constraints $S_s \geq 0, S_l \geq 0$ that arise from the lack of local revenue raising capacity. Given local capture it is immediately evident that small users will receive no alternative services at all: $S_s = 0$. Hence grant income not spent on the infrastructural service will be diverted to the procurement of alternative services that selectively benefit local elites.

Since the budget constraint (16) must bind, it follows that $S_l = G - \theta_i[\beta_i y_s + (1 - \beta_i)y_l]$: spending more resources on the assigned service means less is available for diversion to the alternative service. *In contrast to the two previous financing modes, therefore, the cost of service delivery at the margin is effectively borne by large rather than small users.* This implies a different pattern of service allocation from the two previous regimes. The problem of the local government reduces to maximization of

$$\eta_i[\beta_i \gamma_s v(y_s) + \delta_i^l(1 - \beta_i)\gamma_l v(y_l)] + \delta_i^l\{G - \theta_i[\beta_i y_s + (1 - \beta_i)y_l]\} \quad (17)$$

subject to the constraint that $G \geq \theta_i[\beta_i y_s + (1 - \beta_i)y_l]$. If the grant G is large enough, this constraint will not bite, and the service allocations will satisfy the first order condition

$$\gamma_s \eta_i v'(y_s) = \delta_i^l \theta_i; \quad \gamma_l \eta_i v'(y_l) = \theta_i \quad (18)$$

Large users then get delivered the first-best level, while there is under-provision to small users. This is closer to the pattern under centralization, rather than the other financing modes of decentralization.

The implications of a given block grant G on community allocation is described next.

Proposition 4 *The allocation resulting from a block grant G in community i is the following:*

(i) Service delivery for a group k user is $y_k = f_k \cdot Y_i^l$, where Y_i^l is the per capita service level in the community (described further below), and f_k is the share of group k , determined as follows:

$$f_s = \frac{\gamma_s^{-\frac{1}{\alpha}}}{\beta_i \gamma_s^{-\frac{1}{\alpha}} + (1-\beta_i) \delta_i^l \gamma_l^{-\frac{1}{\alpha}}}, \text{ and } \beta_i f_s + (1-\beta_i) f_l = 1.$$

(ii) There exists a threshold need level η_i^* that depends on G, θ_i, δ_i^l ²⁶ such that when local need θ_i is less than η_i^* , the local government is not financially constrained, with the per-capita service level for the community Y_i^l equal to the desired level $Y_i^f(\eta_i, \theta_i)$, characterized by

$$L_i \eta_i v'(Y_i^f) = \delta_i^l \theta_i \quad (19)$$

where L_i denotes $\frac{\beta_i \gamma_s^{1-\frac{1}{\alpha}} + (1-\beta_i) \delta_i^l \gamma_l^{1-\frac{1}{\alpha}}}{\beta_i \gamma_s^{-\frac{1}{\alpha}} + (1-\beta_i) \delta_i^l \gamma_l^{-\frac{1}{\alpha}}}$. In this case spending on the service is less than the grant G , with the surplus diverted to elite consumption ($S_l > 0$). When need exceeds η_i^* , the local government is financially constrained, spending it entirely on the service, so $Y_i^l = \frac{G}{\theta_i} < Y_i^f$, and there is no diversion.

The per capita service delivery pattern is

$$Y_i^L(\eta_i, \theta_i, G) = \min[Y_i^f(\eta_i, \theta_i), \frac{G}{\theta_i}]. \quad (20)$$

This restriction in the flexibility of service levels to local conditions in high need states is a distinctive feature of grant-financed decentralization. It is an outcome of the informational constraints facing central governments while designing fiscal grants, and the incentive of each local government to free-ride off a common revenue pool at the expense of other communities. The severity of these fiscal constraints depends on how large the grant is. We therefore turn to the question of how these grants are determined.

This depends on the political objectives of the central government, and the way that they fund the grants. The central government may also be subject to capture by elites, to an extent that may

²⁶This is given by $\eta_i^*(G, \theta_i, \delta_i^l) = \frac{\delta_i^l \theta_i}{L_i v'(\frac{G}{\theta_i})}$.

bear no obvious relation to the extent of local capture (as argued in Bardhan and Mookherjee (1999, 2000a)). So letting δ^c denote the degree of capture at the central level, the objective of the central government is

$$\Sigma_i N_i [\beta_i U_{si} + \delta^c (1 - \beta_i) U_{li}] \quad (21)$$

As for financing patterns, it is well known that for a variety of reasons, both including political will and administrative ease, most developing countries rely primarily on indirect (sales, excise and customs duties) rather than direct taxes.²⁷ Owing to their regressive nature, we shall assume that small users bear a burden that is proportionately greater or the same as the burden borne by large users. Let $1 - \psi \in (0, 1)$ denote the asymmetry in tax burden, i.e., if $\psi = 0$ the burden falls exclusively on small users, whereas it is shared evenly if $\psi = 1$. Then the objective of the central government as a function of the grant allocation G_1, G_2, \dots to different communities reduces to

$$\begin{aligned} V^c(G_1, G_2, \dots) \equiv & \Sigma_i N_i \mathcal{E}_{\eta_i, \theta_i} [\beta_i \gamma_s \eta_i v(f_s Y_i^L) + \delta^c \{(1 - \beta_i) \gamma_l \eta_i v(f_l Y_i^L) + G_i - \theta_i Y_i^L\} \\ & - \{1 + \psi(\delta^c - 1)(1 - \beta_i)\}(1 + \lambda)G_i], \end{aligned}$$

This can be expressed as the sum of separate objective functions for different regions:

$$V^c(G_1, G_2, \dots) \equiv \Sigma_i N_i V_i^c(G_i) \quad (22)$$

where the objective function corresponding to community i is a function of the grant to that community alone:

$$\begin{aligned} V_i^c(G_i) \equiv & \mathcal{E}_{\eta_i, \theta_i} [\beta_i \gamma_s \eta_i v(f_s Y_i^L) + \delta^c \{(1 - \beta_i) \gamma_l \eta_i v(f_l Y_i^L) \\ & + G_i - \theta_i Y_i^L\} - \{1 + \psi(\delta^c - 1)(1 - \beta_i)\}(1 + \lambda)G_i] \end{aligned} \quad (23)$$

The community grant G_i will be selected to maximize (23). In making this decision, the central

²⁷See, e.g., the evidence cited in Ahmed and Stern (1984), Newbery and Stern (1987) and Das-Gupta and Mookherjee (1998).

government incorporates its expectations of how local governments will allocate any given grant level within their respective communities.

The analysis of optimal community grants is somewhat complicated, and so we omit some of the technical steps (which are available in the working paper version of this paper Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000c)). The overall implications are summarized below.

Proposition 5 *With decentralization financed entirely by central grants:*

(a) *Region i will be financially constrained with positive probability if*

$$(1 + \lambda) > \left[\frac{1}{\delta^c} + \psi(1 - \beta_i) \left(1 - \frac{1}{\delta^c}\right) \right]^{-1} \quad (24)$$

In this case, region i will be financially constrained if and only if local need shock η_i exceeds the threshold η_i^ .*

(b) *In low need states where region i is not financially constrained, large users are provided first-best service levels (besides the benefits of diverted funds), while small users are underprovided relative to the first-best to an extent depending on local capture. In financially constrained states, service levels are the same as at the threshold state η_i^* , and no funds are diverted.*

(c) *Service delivery levels for either group are smaller in all states compared with user-fee-financed decentralization.*

(d) *If the deadweight cost of taxes λ is sufficiently large, grant-financed decentralization is less efficient compared with either centralization, or decentralization financed by central taxes or by user fees. If λ is sufficiently small, local and central capture $(\delta_i^l - 1)$, $\psi(\delta^c - 1)$ sufficiently close to zero, then grant-financed decentralization approaches the first-best.*

Note the importance of financing constraints faced by the central government, represented by λ . Even with perfectly accountable governments, financing constraints at the central level will lead to service underprovision with grant financing, unlike decentralization based on user fees. As λ rises, service levels will progressively shrink as central grants dry up. For λ sufficiently large, service levels will decline precipitously, causing performance to drop below centralization as well. At the other extreme, if collection at the center is efficient and λ is close to zero, and governments are sufficiently accountable at both levels, the outcome of grant-financed decentralization will approach the first-best.

In particular, note that grant-financing may be dominated by user-fee financing under appropriate conditions (e.g., λ sufficiently large), while under others grant financing may be more or almost as efficient than user fees. To gain further insight into the relevant trade-offs, we compare the resulting patterns of service deliveries with centralization and user-fee-financed decentralization. These are depicted in Figures (3) through (6). Figure 3 compares deliveries with those under centralization for regions where $\beta_i < \beta_1^*$, where the threshold β_1^* is defined by the condition $\delta_i^l = [1 - \frac{1-\beta_1^*}{\beta_i^*}(\frac{\gamma_l}{\gamma_s} - 1)]^{-1}$, i.e., service underprovision to small users is the same as in centralization. In low β_i regions, grant financing expands supplies to small users in low need states where the local government is not financially constrained, while supplies to large users is unaffected. But in high-need states where local financing constraints bind, service levels may shrink for both groups as a result of transition to grant financed decentralization. The overall effect on service levels and efficiency thus depends on the severity of the local financing constraints, as explained above. One apparent benefit of decentralization in these regions is that it improves equity in service levels (in low need states). This may however not be mirrored in a genuine improvement in equity since small users may ultimately bear a greater financial burden under decentralization (e.g., if they bear a disproportionate share of the burden of central taxes).

On the other hand in regions where the fraction of small users β_i is larger (depicted in Figure 4), service allocations to small users shrink under decentralization even when local governments are financially constrained, resulting in a less equitable outcome. In this case, service levels shrink for both classes of users (except large users in low need states, who receive the same service). Here grant-financed decentralization hurts growth, efficiency as well as equity. Indeed, it may be Pareto-inferior to centralization: large users may be worse off even if they bear a negligible fraction of the burden of central taxes, as a consequence of shrinking central grants that dry up service deliveries. This is a case where transition to decentralization will cause both categories of users to regret the absence of the corruption which ‘lubricated’ the centralized system in the past!

We turn finally to the comparison with user-fee financed decentralization, which we have shown above dominated local-tax-financing. Note that user-fee financing generates efficient provision of the service if and only if β_i is small enough, whence the burden of financing over-provision on small users tends to be excessive. For instance in the case where α , the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption, lies between 0 and -1 , the relevant threshold β_2^* is defined by the condition $\frac{\beta_2^*}{1-\beta_2^*} [\frac{1}{1+\alpha} - 1] = (\frac{\gamma_s}{\gamma_l})^{\frac{1}{\alpha}}$. For β^i smaller than this threshold, both categories of users are served at the first-best level under user-financing, and small users bear the entire fiscal burden. For β^i higher, large users are overprovided, while small users continue to be efficiently funded. See Figures 5 and 6 for these two cases respectively. It therefore follows that in all cases, grant financing shrinks service levels to both categories of users relative to user-fee financing, with the exception of large users in low β_i regions when their local governments are not financially constrained. Hence *the effect of not devolving revenue raising powers to local governments in step with their expenditure responsibilities causes an unambiguous reduction in the level of services in all regions, irrespective of patterns of political accountability*. This is again consistent with the empirical results of Estache and Sinha (1995). The reduction in service levels may however be efficiency enhancing, as they constrain the

tendency for large users to be overprovided under user-fee financing. Since such overprovision is paid for by the small users, it may improve local equity as well. The problem with grant-financing on the other hand is the tendency for small users to be under-served if local governments are susceptible to capture, or both categories to get under-served in high-need states when financing constraints bind. The severity of the latter problems depend respectively on the extent of local capture, and on the costs of raising central taxes. If they are not very acute, grant-financing may conceivably end up dominating user-fee financing.

5 Concluding Comments

This paper has studied the tradeoffs between allocation distortions resulting from monopoly power of unregulated and corrupt bureaucrats in a centralized delivery system, and the tendency for local governments to be captured by local elites under decentralization. The key point is that the effects of decentralizing service delivery will depend on the method chosen for financing local governments. Existing empirical results suggest that expenditure decentralization not accompanied by revenue decentralization limit the expansionary effect of decentralization on service levels. Our model provides an explanation for this pattern, and at the same time urges caution in inferring that greater revenue decentralization would be welfare enhancing. Local capture tends to be manifested in service overprovision to local elites, at the expense of elites, which is both inefficient and inequitable. Accordingly restraints on the revenue-raising capability of local governments can limit the extent of such resource misallocations.

User fee financing mechanisms are particularly notable in this connection: the voluntariness of such mechanisms in contrast to the coercive character of local taxes limit the extent of regressive

redistributions that elites can employ in their favor. In our model user fees ensure that decentralization generates higher efficiency and equity compared to centralization, irrespective of the extent of local capture. Compared with the more traditional form of financing, i.e., intergovernmental fiscal grants, user fees have the added advantage of enhancing fiscal autonomy of local governments. This enables service allocations to be sensitive to random fluctuations in local costs and needs, particularly when such flexibility is most useful (i.e., when local need is high). They also ensure higher service deliveries compared with grant financing, owing to the avoidance of asymmetric information, inter-community free-riding and bargaining distortions inherent in a system of intergovernmental fiscal grants. Of course user fee mechanisms have a number of shortcomings which our model abstracted from: for instance when redistribution across communities is an important objective, or if a significant proportion of intended beneficiaries do not have the means to pay for the service.

Apart from the normative results, our model also provides a number of detailed predictions concerning the impact of decentralization on service allocations and their financing, which are empirically testable. We hope that future empirical analyses of fiscal decentralization in developing countries will be carried out to test these predictions.

Our model abstracted from problems of interregional spillovers of decisions made by local governments, and possible lack of expertise at local levels. Both of these may be important in practice, and need to be evaluated independently in assessing the effects of decentralization. Spillovers might naturally arise in the areas of roads, telecommunications, schools and public health. Even in the context of water resources, spillovers will arise if there are aggregate capacity constraints that bind. In all these cases, decentralization will require coordination of decisions made independently by different local governments, involving either central interventions, establishment of resource sharing formulae, or market-like mechanisms. Lack of managerial and technical expertise at the local level

may prevent cost-effective provision of the service within regions. For instance, if local government officials are not informed about the realization of marginal costs of serving their community, managers of the central production enterprise may be able to earn rents by exploiting their specialized information, resulting in additional distortions under decentralization. Cost-effective procurement may also be vitiated if local government officials do not have much bargaining power when dealing with service providers, allowing the latter to earn monopoly rents. In the presence of either of these problems, the performance of decentralized regimes will deteriorate further.

We considered three polar modes of financing most commonly employed in developing countries (see, e.g., (Dillinger (1995))). Mixed modes of financing may also be worth exploring in this context, e.g., where local governments rely on a mixture of local user charges and central grants, which might dominate either polar mode. We also restricted attention to unrestricted fiscal grants, which allowed some degree of flexibility in local service delivery, at the cost of allowing diversions of surplus resources to local elites in low-need states. Grants tied to expenditures on specific services restrict both flexibility in service delivery and scope for diversion of unspent funds to other less important social purposes. An intermediate form of grant finance involves matching grants tied to specific services, which combine advantages of providing some degree of flexibility in service delivery, while limiting scope for diversion. Clearly the welfare implications of a richer set of financing options than analysed in this paper deserve to be explored in future research. Finally, it may also be worthwhile to explore additional variants of decentralization such as privatization of the service delivery process (where private delivery companies are subject to a combination of central and local government regulation), or yardstick competition between different local governments.

References

Ahluwalia M. (1988). "Infrastructure Development in India's Reforms," in *Indian Economic Reforms and Development: Essays for Manmohan Singh*, Little I.M.D. (Ed.), Delhi, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, 87–121.

Ahmad E. and N. Stern (1984). "The Theory of Tax Reform and Indian Indirect Taxes", *Journal of Public Economics*, vol. 25(3), pp. 259-298.

Banerjee A. (1997). "A Theory of Misgovernance," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, vol 62, pp. 1289- 1332.

P. Bardhan, "Efficiency, Equity and Poverty Alleviation: Policy Issues in Less Developed Countries", *Economic Journal*, vol. 106, September 1996a.

——— "Decentralized Development", *Indian Economic Review*, vol.31, no.2, 1996b.

——— "Decentralization of Governance and Development," *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Fall 2002, 16(4), 185–206.

——— and Dilip Mookherjee, "Relative Capture of Local and Central Governments: An Essay in the Political Economy of Decentralization," Working Paper, Institute for Economic Development, Boston University, 1999.

———, "Capture and Governance at Local and National Levels," *American Economic Review*, May 2000a, 135–139.

———, "Decentralizing Anti-Poverty Program Delivery in Developing Countries," mimeo, Institute for Economic Development, Boston University, 2000b. Forthcoming, *Journal of Public Economics*.

—————, “Corruption and Decentralization of Infrastructure Delivery in Developing Countries,” Working Paper, Institute for Economic Development, Boston University, 2000c.

D. Baron and R. Myerson, “Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Cost,” *Econometrica*, 1982.

D. Baron, “Electoral Competition with Informed and Uninformed Voters,” *American Political Science Review*, 88, 1994, 33-47.

T. Besley, “Targeting Taxes and Transfers: Administrative Costs and Policy Design in Developing Economies,” Development Studies Working Paper 146, 1989, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School.

————— and R. Kanbur, “Principles of Targeting,” in Michael Lipton and Jacques ven der Gaag, eds., *Including the Poor*, Washington DC, World Bank, 1993.

————— and S.Coate, “Centralized Versus Decentralized Provision of Local Public Goods: A Political Economy Analysis,” *Journal of Public Economics*, 2003, 87(12), 2611-2637.

R. Bird, “Decentralizing Infrastructure: For Good or Ill?” in A. Estache (ed.), *Decentralizing Infrastructure: Advantages and Limitations*, World Bank Discussion Papers 290, Washington D.C., 1995.

P. Bolton and G. Roland, “The Breakup of Nations: A Political Economy Analysis,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 62, 1057-1090, 1997.

G. Brennan and J. Buchanan, *The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution*, 1980, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.

J. Cremer, A. Estache, and P. Seabright, ”The Decentralization of Public Services: Lessons from the Theory of the Firm”, in A. Estache (ed.), *Decentralizing Infrastructure: Advantages and Limitations*, World Bank Discussion Papers 290, Washington D.C., 1995.

Richard Crook and James Manor, *Democracy and Decentralisation in South Asia and West Africa*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

A. Das-Gupta and D. Mookherjee, *Incentive and Institutional Reforms in Tax Enforcement: An Analysis of Developing Country Experience*, New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1998.

B. Dillinger, "Decentralization, Politics and Public Service," in A. Estache (ed.), *Decentralizing Infrastructure: Advantages and Limitations*, World Bank Discussion Papers 290, Washington D.C., 1995.

J. Dreze and M. Saran, "Primary Education and Economic Development in China and India: Overview and Two Case Studies", in K. Basu et al (eds.), *Choice, Welfare, and Development: A Festschrift in Honor of Amartya K. Sen*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1995.

A. Estache (Editor), *Decentralizing Infrastructure: Advantages and Limitations*, World Bank Discussion Paper no. 290, 1995.

——— and S. Sinha, "Does Decentralization Increase Public Infrastructure Expenditure?" in A. Estache (ed.), *Decentralizing Infrastructure: Advantages and Limitations*, World Bank Discussion Papers 290, Washington D.C., 1995.

R. Fisman and R. Gatti, "Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence Across Countries," Working Paper, Development Research Group, World Bank, October 1999. Forthcoming, *Journal of Public Economics*.

M.E. Grosh, "The Household Survey as a Tool for Policy Change: Lessons from the Jamaican Survey of Living Conditions," LSMS Working Paper 80, the World Bank, 1991.

———, "Towards Quantifying the Tradeoff: Administrative Costs and Targeting Accuracy," in van de Walle and Nead (ed.), 1995.

G. Grossman and E. Helpman, "Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics," *Review of Economic Studies*, 63, 265-286, 1996.

R. P. Inman and D. L. Rubinfeld, "Designing Tax Policies in Federalist Economies: An Overview", *Journal of Public Economics*, vol.60, 1996.

—————, "Rethinking Federalism," *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 11(4), 1997, 43-64.

J.J. Laffont and J. Pouyet, "The Subsidiarity Bias in Regulation," mimeo, University of Toulouse, 2000.

J.J. Laffont and J. Tirole, *A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation*, 1993, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

G K Lieten, "Panchayats in Western Uttar Pradesh," *Economic and Political Weekly*, September 28 1996, 2700-2705.

M. Lipton and M. Ravallion, "Poverty and Policy," in *Handbook of Development Economics*, Volume III, edited by J. Behrman and T.N. Srinivasan, Chapter 41, Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1995.

J. Litvack, J. Ahmed and R. Bird, "Rethinking Decentralization at the World Bank," Discussion Paper, World Bank, 1998.

B. Lockwood, "Distributive Politics and the Benefits of Decentralization," 1998, CSGR Working Paper No. 10/98

J. Manor, *The Political Economy of Democratic Decentralization*. Washington DC: The World Bank, 1999.

George Mathew and Ramesh Nayak, "Panchayats at Work: What It Means for the Oppressed?" *Economic and Political Weekly*, July 6 1996, 1765-1771.

R. Musgrave and P. Musgrave, *Public Finance in Theory and Practice*, 4th Edition, New York, McGraw Hill, 1984.

D. Newbery and N. Stern, *The Theory of Taxation for Developing Countries*, 1987, World Bank: Oxford University Press.

W. E. Oates, *Fiscal Federalism*, Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich, New York, 1972.

P. Prud'homme, "The Dangers of Decentralization," *World Bank Research Observer*, 10, 1995, 201-20.

P. Seabright, "Accountability and Decentralization in Government: An Incomplete Contracts Model", *European Economic Review*, vol. 40, 1996.

Tanzi V., "Fiscal Federalism and Efficiency: A Review of Some Efficiency and Macroeconomic Aspects," in M. Bruno and B. Pleskovic (Edited), *Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 1996*. Washington DC: The World Bank.

M. Tommasi and F. Weinschelbaum, "A Principal-Agent Building Block for the Study of Decentralization and Integration," mimeo, Universidad de San Andres, 1999.

D. van de Walle and K. Nead (eds.), *Public Spending and the Poor: Theory and Evidence*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1995.

Robert Wade, "The Market for Public Office: Why the Indian State is not Better at Development," *World Development*, April 1985, 13(4), 467-97.

———, "How Infrastructure Agencies Motivate Staff: Canal Irrigation in India and the Republic of Korea," in *Infrastructure Strategies in East Asia*, Ashoka Mody (ed.), World Bank, 1997.

World Development Reports, various years, The World Bank, Oxford University Press.

TABLE OF SYMBOLS USED

Symbol	Explanation
Y_i	total service to community i
λ	deadweight cost of tax revenues
θ_i	marginal supply cost for community i
η_i	need parameter for community i
N_i	population size in community i
β_i	proportion of community i comprised of small users
$k = s, l$	user category (small, large)
γ_k	valuation parameter for user category k
y_k	service delivered to each user in category k
b_k	bribe paid by user of category k in centralized system
$v(y)$	normalized utility function for service level y
D_k	‘virtual’ valuation parameter for user in category k
B_i	bribe income coefficient for community i
Q_i	kickback from local bureaucrat in community i to higher level bureaucrats
J_i	‘virtual’ need parameter for community i
δ_i^l	capture coefficient for local government in community i
δ_c	capture coefficient for central government
G	block grant to a community
S_k	subsidy equivalent of diversion from block grant to category k
ψ	parameter representing asymmetry of central tax burden