

HAN YE

270 Bay State Road,
Boston , MA 02215
Cell: +1-857- 207-8696
Email: yehan@bu.edu
Website: <https://sites.google.com/a/bu.edu/hanye/>

EDUCATION

Ph.D., Economics, Boston University, Boston , *May 2018* (Expected)
Dissertation Title: Older Workers' Labor Supply
Dissertation Committee: Johannes F. Schmieder, Kevin Lang and M. Daniele Paserman

M.A., Economics, Boston University, Boston , *May 2012*
B.A., Economics, University of International Business and Economics, Beijing, *July 2007*

FIELDS OF INTERESTS

Labor Economics, Public Economics, Applied Microeconomics

WORKING PAPERS

“The Effect of Pension Subsidies on Retirement Decisions of Older Women: Evidence from a Regression Kink Design” ([Job Market Paper](#))
“The Labor Supply Effects of Unemployment Insurance for Older Workers”, *Joint with Matthew Gudgeon, Johannes F. Schmieder and Simon Trenkle*
“Global Health Donors Viewed as Regulators of Monopolistic Service Providers: Lessons from Regulatory Literature” ([CGD working paper 424](#), *February 2016*)

WORK IN PROGRESS

“Information Salience: Evidence from German Pension Notifications”
“The Effect of Advance Notification: Evidence from WARN Act” , *October 2014*

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

Dissertation Fellowship, Center for Retirement Research at Boston College, 2017- 2018
Summer Research Grant, Department of Economics, Boston University, *2014*

PRESENTATIONS

Conference of European Association of Labour Economists (EALE) , St. Gallen, CH, *2017*
Retirement Research Consortium Meeting (Poster session), Washington, DC, *2017*
Public Economics Department, German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin) , *2017*
Conference of Society of Labor Economists (SOLE) , Raleigh, NC, *2017*
Microeconomics dissertation workshop, Department of Economics, Boston University, *2014 - 2017*
Labor Reading Group , Department of Economics, Boston University, *2013-2017*
Workshop on Innovative Grantmaking Designs, Center for Global Development, UC Berkeley, *2015*

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

Independent Consultant, Working Group on Value for Money in Global Health, Center for Global Development, *November 2014-May 2015*

Research Assistant, Department of Economics, Boston University, *Spring, Summer 2011*

REFEREE EXPERIENCE

Industrial and Labor Relations Review

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Department of Economics, Boston University

Teaching Assistant and Laboratory Instructor, Intermediate Microeconomics (Master level), *Fall 2015, Fall 2016, Spring 2016*

Teaching Assistant, Economics of Labor Markets (Master level), Boston University, *Spring 2017*

Teaching Assistant, Labor Economics (Undergraduate), *Fall 2014, Spring 2015, Spring 2017*

Teaching Assistant, Poverty and Discrimination (Undergraduate), *Fall 2014, Spring 2015*

Teaching Assistant, Environmental Economics (Undergraduate), *Fall 2014, Spring 2015*

SOFTWARE SKILLS

STATA, MATLAB, SAS, LaTeX and Mathematica

LANGUAGE

Mandarin (Native), English (Fluent), German (Beginner)

REFERENCES

Johannes F. Schmieder

Associate Professor
Department of Economics
Boston University
Phone: +1-617-299-9841
Email: johannes@bu.edu

Kevin Lang

Professor
Department of Economics
Boston University
Phone: +1-617-353-5694
Email: lang@bu.edu

M. Daniele Paserman

Professor
Department of Economics
Boston University
Phone: +1-617-353-5695
Email: paserman@bu.edu

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The Effect of Pension Subsidies on Retirement Decisions of Older Women : Evidence from a Regression Kink Design ([Job Market Paper](#))

This paper provides a clear and transparent setting to study the effect of additional pension benefit on retirement timing . Using administrative pension insurance records from Germany, this paper studies the impact of a pension subsidy program for low pay workers, implemented in 1992, on retirement decisions of the recipients. The kinked schedule of this subsidy policy allows us to identify the causal effect using Regression Kink Design. On average, the subsidy increases pension benefit by around 16% and this creates an average implicit tax of around 8%. The estimation suggests that a 100 euro increase of pension benefit from this subsidy induces workers to retire earlier by about 10 months and the hazard rate to claim pension at age 60 increases by 17%. The effects on age of exiting employment have the same magnitude but noisy.

The Labor Supply Effects of Unemployment Insurance for Older Workers

Joint with Matthew Gudgeon, Johannes F. Schmieder and Simon Trenkle

Extending Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefits can affect labor supply along two margins: it can lengthen the unemployment duration of an individual who is entering UI and it can alter the inflows into UI . We study the total labor supply effects of UI for older workers using German Social Security data and policy variation over 3 decades. We present evidence of sharp bunchings in UI inflows at various age discontinuities created by UI eligibility for workers in their 50s, who may use UI as a pathway into early retirement. Using a combination of regression discontinuity designs and bunching techniques, we quantify the magnitude of these responses exploiting a variety of thresholds, kinks and notches induced by the UI and retirement institutions. Employing those moments, we estimate the total effect of UI extension for older workers using a dynamic life-cycle structure model. Preliminary results suggest that a 6 month UI extension for men increases non-employment durations by 1.46 months, almost doubled the effects for younger workers.

The Effect of Advance Notification: Evidence from WARN Act

Mandatory advance notice of the impending job loss in the event of plant closings and mass layoffs is one the government interventions to provide displaced workers separation protections. This paper evaluates the impact of advance notice on the employment prospects of the displaced workers using propensity-score matching method. The sample is obtained from the displaced worker supplement to the Current Population Surveys in the 1998 to 2008 decade. The estimation suggests workers received written notice two months before the layoffs are 5% less likely to become unemployment insurance (UI) claimants. However, advance notice has no significant effect on the UI exhaustion rate.