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EDUCATION

Ph.D., Economics, Boston University, Boston, MA, 2012-2018 (expected)
Dissertation Title: *Three Essays on Industrial Organization and Information Acquisition*
Main advisor: Ching-to Albert Ma
Dissertation Committee: Ching-to Albert Ma, Juan Ortner and Barton L. Lipman

M.S., Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK, 2011

B.S., Mathematics (*with distinction*), Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, 2010

B.S., Finance (*with honors and distinction*), Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, 2010

FIELDS OF INTEREST

Industrial Organization, Applied Microeconomic Theory, Health Economics, and Organizational Economics

WORKING PAPERS

"Referral and Inspection," September 2017 (Job Market Paper)
"Gatekeeping Mechanism and Information Acquisition," October 2017

WORK IN PROGRESS

"Selection, Quality, and Competition between Private and Public Firms," (with Ching-to Albert Ma)
"Information Acquisitions and Referrals between Experts"

PRESENTATIONS

North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society, St. Louis, MO, June 2017
Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society, Hong Kong, June 2017
Midwest Economic Theory Conference, Lexington, KY, May 2017
International Industrial Organization Conference (Discussant), Boston, MA, April 2017

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

Graduate Scholarship, Boston University, 2013-2017
Summer Research Grant, Boston University, 2015
Distinction in Microeconomics Qualifying Exam, Boston University, 2013
Phi Beta Kappa, Indiana University, 2010
Faculty Award Scholarship, Indiana University, 2005-2009

WORK EXPERIENCE

Research Assistant for Feng Zhu, Harvard University, 2017-Present
Department Research Assistant, Boston University, 2016-2017
Research Assistant for Keyu Jin, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2012
Internship, Source ETF, London, UK, 2011

Internship, DBS Bank, Hong Kong, 2007

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Teaching Fellow, Introductory Microeconomic Analysis, Boston University Fall 2015
Teaching Assistant, Intermediate Microeconomic Analysis, Boston University, Spring 2015, Fall 2014, and Fall 2013
Teaching Assistant, Introduction to Health Economics, Boston University, Spring 2014
Teaching Assistant, Economic Statistics, Boston University, Spring 2014
Teaching Assistant, Information Technology, Indiana University, Spring 2007

LANGUAGES: Fluent in English, Cantonese, and Mandarin

COMPUTER SKILLS: STATA, MATLAB, SAS, LaTeX

CITIZENSHIP/VISA STATUS: U.S. Permanent Resident and Hong Kong Permanent Resident

REFERENCES

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HENRY LIN

Referral and Inspection (Job Market Paper)

I study a referral market in which efficiency depends on the correct assignments of projects among experts and the assigned expert's production effort. Each of two experts, one with a higher productivity and a higher cost than the other, may refer projects with different potentials to each other at different prices. The referring expert is privately informed about projects' potentials, but the referred expert may inspect projects before accepting. Inspection benefits the referred expert. First, it allows the expert to find out projects' potentials before he makes acceptance decisions. Second, it allows the expert to tailor efforts for maximum efficiency. In equilibrium, an expert pools projects into subsets and refers each subset at a different price. The referred expert almost always inspects and always accepts, although he can infer the potentials from equilibrium prices. Each equilibrium referred subset must be small enough to incentivize the referral, but must also be large enough to incentivize the referred expert's inspection. The referred expert's seemingly inefficient inspection deters lemons, so the market does not unravel, and productions are always efficient. Inefficiency stems from the referred expert's inspection and insufficient referrals. The model sheds lights on referrals between professionals as well as subcontracting in the construction and manufacturing industries.

Gatekeeping Mechanism and Information Acquisition

A Principal would like to learn about projects' difficulties so that they can be efficiently assigned among two experts. The low-skill expert has cost comparative advantage in less difficult projects whereas the opposite is true for the high-skill expert. Difficult projects are always more costly for either expert. In a mechanism, an expert is chosen as a gatekeeper. After the gatekeeper accepts a contract, he may acquire information about projects and make reports to the Principal. The mechanism then assigns projects based on the reports. In an optimal mechanism, the Principal chooses the low-skill expert as the gatekeeper. At low information-acquisition cost, the Principal implements the first best. At high information-acquisition cost, the Principal incentivizes the low-skill expert gatekeeper to acquire information by assigning more projects to him if and only if the low-skill expert is less efficient in implementing an average project. I compare the optimal mechanism with first-price and second-price auctions. I also study a mechanism for an alternative environment in which the gatekeeper can acquire information before accepting a contract.

Selection, Quality, and Competition between Private and Public Firms (with Ching-to Albert Ma)

A public firm and a private firm compete in both quality and price to serve a continuum of consumers. In the first stage each firm decides on qualities; in the second, each firm decides on prices. Consumers' valuations of service quality are drawn from a general distribution. Firms' unit service cost is increasing and convex in quality, but also dependent on consumers' valuations. If the unit cost is increasing in valuation, the model exhibits adverse selection; conversely, it exhibits advantageous selection. The public firm aims to maximize social surplus, whereas the private firm aims to maximize profits. In the second stage, given any quality pair, the equilibrium price difference between firms equals the difference in service quality cost of the marginal consumer. Given qualities, the allocation of consumers across firms is efficient. Selection, however, leads to distortion in equilibrium qualities.