Mas-Colell				Table of Contents
	No	Day	Date	Section	Title	Page
	1			ONE	INDIVIDUAL DECISION MAKING	3
	3			Ch 1	Preference and Choice	5
	4	W	7-Sep	1.A	Introduction	5
	5			1.B	Preference Relations	6
	6			1.C	Choice Rules	9
	7			1.D	The Relationship between Preference Relations and Choice Rules	11
	8			1	Exercises	15
	9			Ch 2	Consumer Choice	17
	10			2.A	Introduction	17
	11			2.B	Commodities	17
	12			2.C	The Consumption Set	18
	13			2.D	Competitive Budgets	20
	14			2.E	Demand Functions and Comparative Statics	23
	15			2.F	The Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference and the Law of Demand	28
	16			2	Exercises	36
	17			Ch 3	Classical Demand Theory	40
	18			3.A	Introduction	40
	19			3.B	Preference Relations: Basic Properties	41
	20			3.C	Preference and Utility	46
	21			3.D	The Utility Maximization Problem	50
	22			3.E	The Expenditure Minimization Problem	57
	23			3.F	Duality: A Mathematical Introduction	63
	24			3.G	Relationships between Demand, Indirect Utility, and Expenditure Functions	67
	25			3.H	Integrability	75
	26			3.I	Welfare Evaluation of Economic Changes	80
	27			3J	The Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference	91
	28			Apdx A	Continuity and Differentiability Properties of Walrasian Demand	92
	29			3	Exercises	96
	30			Ch 4	Aggregate Demand	105
	31			4.A	Introduction	105
	32			4.B	Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Wealth	106
	33			4.C	Aggregate Demand and the Weak Axiom	109
	34			4.D	Aggregate Demand and the Existence of a Representative Consumer	116
	35			Apdx A	Regularizing Effects of Aggregation	122
	36			4	Exercises	123
	37			Ch 5	Production	127
	38			5.A	Introduction	127
	39			5.B	Production Sets	128
	40			5.C	Profit Maximization and Cost Minimization	135
	41			5.D	The Geometry of Cost and Supply in the Single-Output Case	143
	42			5.E	Aggregation	147
	43			5.F	Efficient Production	149
	44			5.G	Remarks on the Objectives of the Firm	152
	45			Apdx A	The Linear Activity Model	154
	46			5	Exercises	160
	47			Ch 6	Choice Under Uncertainty	167
	48			6.A	Introduction	167
	49			6.B	Expected Utility Theory	168
	50			6.C	Money Lotteries and Risk Aversion	183
	51			6.D	Comparison of Payoff Distributions in Terms of Return and Risk	194
	52			6.E	State-dependent Utility	199
	53			6.F	Subjective Probability Theory	205
	54			6	Exercises	208
	55			TWO	GAME THEORY	217
	56			Ch 7	Basic Elements of Noncooperative Games	219
	57			7.A	Introduction	219
	58			7.B	What Is a Game?	219
	59			7.C	The Extensive Form Representation of a Game	221
	60			7.D	Strategies and the Normal Form Representation of a Game	228
	61			7.E	Randomized Choices	231
	62			7	Exercises	233
	63			Ch 8	Simultaneous-Move Games	235
	64			8.A	Introduction	235
	65			8.B	Dominant and Dominated Strategies	236
	66			8.C	Rationalizable Strategies	242
	67			8.D	Nash Equilibrium	246
	68			8.E	Games of Incomplete Information: Bayesian Nash Equilibrium	253
	69			8.F	The Possibility of Mistakes: Trembling-Hand Perfection	258
	70			Apdx A	Existence of Nash Equilibrium	260
	71			8	Exercises	262
	72			Ch 9	Dynamic Games	267
	73			9.A	Introduction	267
	74			9.B	Sequential Rationality, Backward Induction, and Subgame Perfection	268
	75			9.C	Beliefs and Sequential Rationality	282
	76			9.D	Reasonable Beliefs and Forward Induction	292
	77			Apdx A	Finite and Infinite Horizon Bilateral Bargaining	296
	78			Apdx B	Extensive Form Trembling-Hand Perfect Nash Equilibrium	299
	79			9	Exercises	301
	80			THREE	MARKET EQUILIBRIUM AND MARKET FAILURE	307
	81			Ch 10	Competitive Markets	311
	82			10.A	Introduction	311
	83			10.B	Pareto Optimality and Competitive Equilibria	312
	84			10.C	Partial Equilibrium Competitive Analysis	316
	85			10.D	The Fundamental Welfare Theorems in a Partial Equilibrium Context	325
	86			10.E	Welfare Analysis in the Partial Equilibrium Model	328
	87			10.F	Free-Entry and Long-Run Competitive Equilibria	334
	88			10.G	Concluding Remarks on Partial Equilibrium Analysis	341
	89			10	Exercises	344
	90			Ch 11	Externalities and Public Goods	350
	91			11.A	Introduction	350
	92			11.B	A Simple Bilateral Externality	351
	93			11.C	Public Goods	359
	94			11.D	Multilateral Externalities	364
	95			11.E	Private Information and Second-Best Solutions	368
	96			Apdx A	Nonconvexities and the Theory of Externalities	374
	97			11	Exercises	378
	98			Ch 12	Market Power	383
	99			12.A	Introduction	383
	100			12.B	Monopoly Pricing	384
	101			12.C	Static Models of Oligopoly	387
	102			12.D	Repeated Interaction	400
	103			12.E	Entry	405
	104			12.F	The Competitive Limit	411
	105			12.G	Strategic Precommitments to Affect Future Competition	414
	106			Apdx A	Infinitely Repeated Games and the Folk Theorem	417
	107			Apdx B	Strategic Entry Deterrence and Accommodation	423
	108			12	Exercises	428
	110			Ch 13	Adverse Selection, Signaling, and Screening	436
	111			13.A	Introduction	436
	112			13.B	Informational Asymmetries and Adverse Selection	437
	113			13.C	Signaling	450
	114			13.D	Screening	460
	115			Apdx A	Reasonable-Beliefs Refinements in Signaling Games	467
	116			13	Exercises	473
	117			Ch 14	The Principal-Agent Problem	477
	118			14.A	Introduction	477
	119			14.B	Hidden Actions (Moral Hazard)	478
	120			14.C	Hidden Information (and Monopolistic Screening)	488
	121			14.D	Hidden Actions and Hidden Information: Hybrid Models	501
	122			Apdx A	Multiple Effort Levels in the Hidden Action Model	502
	123			Apdx B	A Formal Solution of the Principal-Agent Problem with Hidden Information	504
	124			14	Exercises	507
	125			FOUR	GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM	511
	126			Ch 15	General Equilibrium Theory: Some Examples	515
	127			15.A	Introduction	515
	128			15.B	Pure Exchange: The Edgeworth Box	515
	129			15.C	The One-Consumer, One-Producer Economy	525
	130			15.D	The 2 x 2 Production Model	529
	131			15.E	General Versus Partial Equilibrium Theory	538
	132			15	Exercises	540
	133			Ch 16	Equilibrium and Its Basic Welfare Properties	545
	135			16.A	Introduction	545
	136			16.B	The Basic Model and Definitions	546
	137			16.C	The First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics	549
	138			16.D	The Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics	551
	139			16.E	Pareto Optimality and Social Welfare Optima	558
	140			16.F	First-Order Conditions for Pareto Optimality	561
	141			16.G	Some Applications	566
	142			Apdx A	Technical Properties of the Set of Feasible Allocations	573
	143			16	Exercises	575
	144			Ch 17	The Positive Theory of Equilibrium	578
	145			17.A	Introduction	578
	146			17.B	Equilibrium: Definitions and Basic Equations	579
	147			17.C	Existence of Walrasian Equilibrium	584
	148			17.D	Local Uniqueness and the Index Theorem	589
	149			17.E	Anything Goes:The Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu Theorem	598
	150			17.F	Uniqueness of Equilibria	606
	151			17.G	Comparative Statics Analysis	616
	152			17.H	Tatonnement Stability	620
	153			17.1	Large Economies and Nonconvexities	627
	154			Apdx A	Characterizing Equilibrium through Welfare Equations	630
	155			Apdx B	A General Approach to the Existence of Walrasian Equilibrium	632
	156			17	Exercises	641
	157			Ch 18	Some Foundations for Competitive Equilibria	652
	158			18.A	Introduction	652
	159			18.B	Core and Equilibria	652
	160			18.C	Noncooperative Foundations of Walrasian Equilibria	660
	161			18.D	The Limits to Redistribution	665
	162			18.E	Equilibrium and the Marginal Productivity Principle	670
	163			Apdx A	Cooperative Game Theory	673
	164			18	Exercises	684
	165			Ch 19	General Equilibrium Under Uncertainty	687
	166			19.A	Introduction	687
	167			19.B	A Market Economy with Contingent Commodities: Description	688
	168			19.C	Arrow-Debreu Equilibrium	691
	169			19.D	Sequential Trade	694
	170			19.E	Asset Markets	699
	171			19.F	Incomplete Markets	709
	172			19.G	Firm Behavior in General Equilibrium Models Under Uncertainty	713
	173			19.H	Imperfect Information	716
	174			19	Exercises	725
	175			Ch 20	Equilibrium and Time	732
	176			20.A	Introduction	732
	177			20.B	Intertemporal Utility	733
	178			20.C	Intertemporal Production and Efficiency	736
	179			20.D	Equilibrium: The One-Consumer Case	743
	180			20.E	Stationary Paths, Interest Rates, and Golden Rules	754
	181			20.F	Dynamics	759
	182			20.G	Equilibrium: Several Consumers	765
	183			20.H	Overlapping Generations	769
	184			20.1	Remarks on Nonequilibrium Dynamics: Tatonnement and Learning	778
	185			20	Exercises	782
	187			FIVE	WELFARE ECONOMICS AND INCENTIVES	787
	188			Ch 21	Social Choice Theory	789
	189			21.A	Introduction	789
	190			21.B	A Special Case: Social Preferences over Two Alternatives	790
	191			21.C	The General Case: Arrow's Impossibility Theorem	792
	192			21.D	Some Possibility Results: Restricted Domains	799
	193			21.E	Social Choice Functions	807
	194			21	Exercises	812
	195			Ch 22	Elements of Welfare Economics and Axiomatic Bargaining	817
	196			22.A	Introduction	817
	197			22.B	Utility Possibility Sets	818
	198			22.C	Social Welfare Functions and Social Optima	825
	199			22.D	Invariance Properties of Social Welfare Functions	831
	200			22.E	The Axiomatic Bargaining Approach	838
	201			22.F	Coalitional Bargaining: The Shapley Value	846
	202			22	Exercises	850
	203			Ch 23	Incentives and Mechanism Design	857
	204			23.A	Introduction	857
	205			23.B	The Mechanism Design Problem	858
	206			23.C	Dominant Strategy Implementation	869
	207			23.D	Bayesian Implementation	883
	208			23.E	Participation Constraints	891
	209			23.F	Optimal Bayesian Mechanisms	897
	210			Apdx A	Implementation and Multiple Equilibria	910
	211			Apdx B	Implementation in Environments with Complete Information	912
	212			23	Exercises	918
	213			MATH		926
	214			M.A	Matrix Notation for Derivatives	926
	215			M.B	Homogeneous Functions and Euler's Formula	928
	216			M.C	Concave and Quasiconcave Functions	930
	217			M.D	Matrices:Negative (Semi)Definiteness and Other Properties	935
	218			M.E	The Implicit Function Theorem	940
	219			M.F	Continuous Functions and Compact Sets	943
	220			M.G	Convex Sets and Separating Hyperplanes	946
	221			M.H	Correspondences	949
	222			M.I	Fixed Point Theorems	952
	223			M J	Unconstrained Maximization	954
	224			M.K	Constrained Maximization	956
	225			M.L	The Envelope Theorem	964
	226			M.M	Linear Programming	966
	227			M.N	Dynamic Programming	969
	228			Index		971