Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Gregory Pavlov
Author-X-Name-First: Gregory
Author-X-Name-Last:  Pavlov
Author-Email: gpavlov@bu.edu
Author-Workplace-Name: Boston University, Department of Economics



Title: Maximal Loss from Collusion in the IPV Symmetric
Auctions

Abstract:We derive a bound on the seller’s relative revenue loss from an unanticipated bidders’
collusion in the optimal auctions. Under the standard hazard rate assumption the
relative loss is at most 1
3 when there are just two bidders. The measure of the loss is
increasing with the number of bidders, but at a rather slow rate.

Length:09 pages
Creation-Date: 2006-07
Revision-Date: 
Publication-Status:
File-URL: http://people.bu.edu/gpavlov/collusionloss.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf
File-Function: 
Number: WP2006-037
Classification-JEL:D44; L41
Keywords:Collusion, Auctions
Handle: RePEc:bos:wpaper:WP2006-037