Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Fernanda Brollo
Author-X-Name-First: Fernanda
Author-X-Name-Last: Brollo
Author-Email: fernanda.brollo@phd.unibocconi.it
Author-Workplace-Name: Bocconi University
Title:  Who Is Punishing Corrupt Politicians - Voters or the Central Government? Evidence from the Brazilian Anti-Corruption Program
Abstract: This paper presents evidence that central government has a very important role in improving the quality of oce-holders when political clientelism is present. Exploiting the exogenous variation of the release of the audit reports and the Brazilian institutional scheme, there is evidence that the central government reduces the amount of infrastructure transfers to municipalities with unveiled corrupt mayors after the release of the audit reports. Furthermore, the eects of the dissemination of corruption information on the probability of incumbent's re-election seem to gradually disappear with time. Then, when the corruption
information is gone, voters punish corrupt politicians as a consequence of the reduction on transfers.
Length: 34
Creation-Date: 2008-11
Revision-Date: 
Publication-Status: 
File-URL: http://www.bu.edu/econ/ied/dp/papers/whoispunishing_reviewed.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf
File-Function: 
Number: dp-168
Classification-JEL: 
Keywords: 
Handle: RePEc:bos:iedwpr:dp-168