Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Kevin Lang		
Author-X-Name-First:Kevin 
Author-X-Name-Last: Lang
Author-Email: lang@bu.edu	
Author-Workplace-Name: 	Institute for Economic Development, Boston University		
Author-Name: Michael Manove
Author-X-Name-First: Michael
Author-X-Name-Last: Manove
Author-Email: manove@bu.edu
Author-Workplace-Name: Institute for Economic Development, Boston University
Author-Name:William T. Dickens
Author-X-Name-First: William T.
Author-X-Name-Last: Dickens
Author-Email: wdickens@brookings.edu
Author-Workplace-Name:  The Brookings Institution
Title: Racial Discrimination in Labor Markets with Posted Wage Offers
Abstract: We analyze race discrimination in labor markets in which wage offers are posted. If employers
with job vacancies receive multiple applicants, they choose the most qualified but may choose arbitrarily
among equally qualified applicants. In the model, firms post wages, workers choose where
to apply, and firms decide which workers to hire. Labor-market frictions greatly amplify racial
disparities, so mild discriminatory tastes or small productivity differences can produce large wage
differentials between the races. Compared with the nondiscriminatory equilibrium, the discriminatory
equilibrium features lower net output, lower wages for both white and black workers and
greater profits for firms.
Length: 30 pages
Creation-Date: 2005-04
Revision-Date: 
Publication-Status: 
File-URL:http://www.bu.edu/econ/ied/dp/papers/dp145-Lang-Manove.pdf
File-Format: Application/pdf
File-Function: 
Number: dp-145
Classification-JEL:J70 
Keywords: 
Handle: RePEc:bos:iedwpr:dp-145