Dept. Colloquium- Briana Toole

Basu (2019a; 2019b), Moss (2018), and others working at the intersection of ethics and epistemology, argue that in some cases the epistemic status of a belief may depend on its moral features. This is the moral encroachment thesis. As a prime illustration of such a case, Basu introduces the notion of the ‘rational racist’. The rational racist, Basu argues, is guilty of no epistemic failing - his racist beliefs are formed in accordance with the evidence. And yet, he ought not believe as he does because his belief violates certain moral constraints on belief. So Basu argues. I argue that we need not appeal to the moral encroachment thesis to explain the wrong of racist beliefs. Instead, such beliefs can be shown to be in violation of certain evidential constraints on belief. Using the case of Basu’s ‘rational racist’, I will motivate the intuition that there is an, as of yet unarticulated, epistemic constraint on belief that racist beliefs (and others in this family) violate. A rational epistemic agent has a duty not just to form beliefs in accordance with his or her evidence, but to form a belief that is in accordance with the best interpretation of the evidence. Or, so I will argue. I thus offer an explanation of the wrong of racist beliefs that is consistent with epistemological orthodoxy.