Civic Education for Muslim Students in the Era of Democracy: Lessons Learned from Indonesia

Achmad Ubaedillah

In Indonesia, the world’s largest majority Muslim country, the role of Islam has been significant in the country’s political history. It has been noted how Muslim groups have struggled historically, both in formal and informal political arenas, to make Islam the foundation of the state, instead of the secular ideology of Pancasila promoted by secular nationalists like Soekarno and Mohammad Hatta, the first president and vice president of the country. Despite the long lasting competition between the two groups, at the time of independence, a political agreement was reached to enshrine Pancasila as the state ideology (Hefner 2000: 41-2).

Political tension between those secular and Muslim groups has been recently revived during the wave of democratization in Indonesia at the turn of the 21st century. Though Islam did not become the state ideology, its role and contribution to strengthen both democracy and the position of Pancasila as the state ideology for the sake of national unity has been critical. In this regard, the initial success of Indonesia as the most democratic Muslim country cannot be disassociated from the contribution of Muslims. The role of two largest Muslim organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, has been tremendously important in promoting and strengthening democratization (Hermawan & Masdar 2000). Their strong commitment to Pancasila has framed the discussion on
how to keep nurturing democracy for Indonesia’s plural society and maintain Pancasila as the state ideology.

The fall of President Soeharto in 1998 changed the fundamentals of Indonesian politics, ending more than three decades of military rule under the “New Order”. Democracy had emerged as the core agenda of the student movement, and became the main public agenda in reforming the old political system. The ruling government had been corrupt, ignoring the participation of the population and abusing democracy and human rights. In the reform era (era reformasi), fair and credible democratic elections were instituted.

Finally, because of its focus on indoctrination of Pancasila for students, civil servants, and military personnel, the New Order’s civic education program was dismantled. The program, a hallmark of Soeharto’s New Order regime, was designed to educate Indonesians in their rights and obligations as citizens based on the state ideology of Pancasila. The regime’s manipulation and hegemonic understanding of the state ideology of Pancasila were the reasons why the parliament removed the national regulation requiring teaching and dissemination of Pancasila through the New Order’s program. As a result, teaching Pancasila is no longer considered a mandatory program for the government to implement, though the necessity of a new civic education program for strengthening democracy and character building was recognized in the government regulations on the national education system passed in 2003.

Civic Education in Modern Indonesia

The history of civic education in Indonesia, in the broad sense of efforts to provide knowledge to citizens about their rights and responsibilities, begins prior to independence. As noted by Winataputra (2015:71), before gaining independence, Indonesia showed great concern for the education of its youth. In 1930, for example, Ki Hajar Dewantara, known as the father of national education, said that education is an effort to develop children’s character (budi pekerti), intelligence, and body. According to Ki Hajar, national education must be based on national culture, aim to enhance the status of the nation and its people, and encourage the development of mutual collaborations with other nations. After Indonesia proclaimed independence in 1945, however, the civic education program was used primarily as a political tool of the government.

The first formal civic education program was implemented by the government of Soekarno, the first President of Indonesia, after independence. Soekarno mandated the ministry of education to lead the program, with a slogan and a vision to shape “New Indonesian People”. For this program, Soepardo and his colleagues wrote a civics textbook that was published in 1962 (Soepardo et al. 1962). The program, as described in the book, was dedicated to strengthening Soekarno’s revolutionary mission of “three people’s commands” (tri komando rakyat), ideologically inspired by socialism. Soekarno’s revolutionary mission to form Indonesian socialists was described in the book. Initially the book included eight subjects: Indonesia’s revolutionary struggle against the Dutch and the Japanese invasion prior to proclaiming independence on
August 17, 1945, the state ideology of Pancasila, the constitution, Soekarno’s Guided Democracy, the Asia-Africa Conference, Indonesian citizenship, President Soekarno’s political manifesto, and Soekarno’s speech in commemoration of the 15th anniversary of independence on August 17, 1960.

However, the political turbulence of the 1960s indicates that the implementation of Soekarno’s civics program did not achieve its intended results. His policy on Guided Democracy, which effectively promoted him to the status of an authoritarian leader, was in contradiction of the principle of universal democracy. Opposition toward Soekarno's highly centralized leadership climaxed in political crisis in 1965, culminating with the failed leftist coup followed by the fall of Soekarno and the rise of Soeharto in the aftermath (Hefner 2000). A campaign for the return to a true understanding of Pancasila was a central issue during the Soeharto era, undertaken as a corrective for what was seen as the manipulated implementation of Pancasila under Soekarno. The New Order's interpretation of Pancasila, though less influenced by foreign ideologies (as Soekarno had been strongly influenced by socialism), failed to realize the idea of a Pancasila economy based on the principle of cooperation as articulated by one of Indonesia’s founding fathers, Mohammad Hatta.

The New Order’s vision for returning to the true principles of Pancasila was articulated through national development programs (Pembangunan Nasional). One of the policies implemented with an eye toward national development was Soeharto’s political policy in 1980s requiring Pancasila as the sole basis for all political and social organizations in the country. This policy had both supporters and critics. Supporters of the Pembangunan Nasional as carried out by the government were labeled as the Pancasila loyalists (Pancasilais), while those who disagreed with the policies were considered anti-Pancasila. The opposition groups included Muslims and nationalists, Soekarno loyalists. According to both groups, during the Soeharto era the state ideology of Pancasila was predominantly articulated and interpreted based on the president’s political and economic interests. The government considered Islam and other ideologies as the source of political conflicts. Therefore, according to Soeharto, Pancasila as the political basis for all political parties and civil organizations would eliminate conflicts. Such a political simplification endorsed by the new order government was responded to by individuals and political and mass organizations (Ismail 1999).

As the state ideology, Pancasila is a concept that has historically been manipulated by Indonesian regimes for their political interests. The first of two regimes, the Old Order (orde lama) under Soekarno and the New Order (orde baru) under Soeharto, had both manipulated Pancasila as a political tool. For example, Soekarno, introduced the principle of Guided Democracy (Demokrasi Terpimpin) in the 1950s in order to prolong his political power. During his presidency, Soeharto implemented Pancasila Democracy (Demokrasi Pancasila) with a similar political agenda of perpetuating his regime under the banner of the national ideology. In terms of their personal political privilege and their leveraging of Pancasila toward personal political ends, the two presidents were quite similar. Soekarno’s idea of democracy was related to his position as an Indonesian national revolutionary leader who had a special veto to reject other opinions when
disagreement occurred. Soeharto’s model of democracy was a highly centralized one in which his decision was of primary importance, overshadowing others’ opinions. As illustrated by Robinson (1998:250), the lack of tolerance for dissent was justified under the New Order regime by an assertion of the “family principle” (kekeluargaan) as a fundamental notion within Indonesian style “democracy”. In other words, both models of Pancasila were deliberately used by the two authoritarian regimes as a platform for their political legitimacy to maintain political power.

Though Pancasila is considered as an open ideology of Indonesia, in its implementation, however, it has been highly influenced by the military. The Indonesian military forces (ABRI) played an important role in providing support for both presidents’ political power, and ideological interest in Pancasila was a determining factor in its manipulation (Sundhaussen 1998). Consequently, the performance of Indonesian democracy under these two presidents was against central democratic principles, such as freedom of expression and fair elections, which were manipulated by the ruling governments. In contrast to the claim of Pancasila as an open ideology, the New Order government, in fact had narrowed its interpretation of Pancasila and eliminated the expression of any diverging interpretations of Pancasila from non-state actors.

In terms of educational policy, the Soeharto era civic education program was carried out under various names with Pancasila as the main subject matter through both formal and informal educational programs for civil servants and the broader population. In this program, indoctrination was the main method used to endorse and disseminate the regime’s singular interpretation of Pancasila. Nevertheless, the Pancasila civic education program under Soeharto was far from successful. The slogan of Pancasila as the legitimacy of his national development programs appeared hypocritical considering the overwhelming corruption, cronyism and nepotism within his centralistic bureaucracy. Soeharto’s corrupt government had exploited and worsened existing social tensions, another reflection of the failure of the national civic education program.

There are at least three factors that contributed to the failure of Pancasila education. First, the orientation of Pancasila education was designed to support the regime and its maintenance of power. In accordance, military power within the New Order narrowed the open ideology of Pancasila to a single interpretation. Indeed, during the New Order regime, Pancasila was wielded as a political mechanism used by the regime to exclude its political rivals. At the same time, the formal teaching of Pancasila was deliberately programmed to impose the regime’s subjective political agendas while eliminating dissenting opinions within the society, referred to as a “politics of the floating mass”.

Secondly, the Pancasila education material did not teach the concept of democracy and its reliance upon the importance of freedom of expression, in which everyone is guaranteed the right to express his or her mind without fear. In contrast to the universal principle of freedom of expression, in the Pancasila Democracy of the New Order, citizens were required to support and respect the majority opinion without expressing opposition. Similarly, in the political arena, in cases of political disagreement, political opposition was positioned by the regime as an opponent of Indonesian political culture.
and the state ideology. Thus, this particular kind of democracy was protected by the regime in order to hinder political opposition. Due to the running of his development programs, president Soeharto looked to the military as his critical political support for ensuring stability. As a result, President Soeharto faced no significant opposition from the military, or from either political parties or civil society components.

Last, the methods used to teach Pancasila civic education during the New Order contributed to its failure. The subject was taught through indoctrination, in which instructors who had been trained and certified by the government to teach the material played dominant roles in the classroom. Teachers delivered monotonous lectures, and students participated mostly by performing rote memorization. If opinions deviated from the material, for example, instructors would generally reject those different notions of Pancasila and impose the regime’s version of Pancasila as the only correct interpretation that should be followed by students. In doing so, teachers were disseminating the state ideology of Pancasila as formally mandated by the state.

In political terms, Soeharto’s monolithic ideological interpretation of Pancasila had opposition from nationalists (Soekarno loyalists) and Muslim activists. Both groups were very critical towards his policies, which were in contradiction with the spirit and principles of Pancasila. Furthermore, political opposition was voiced by Muslim figures who argued that Soeharto’s policy regarding Pancasila was anti-Islam. It was in the 1980s when Islamic groups emerged as hard-line groups against Soeharto’s regime. As a result, the tension between the state and the position of Muslim groups marked political discourses in the 1980s (Ubaedillah 2015).

In the 1990s, the political antagonism between Islam and the New Order state lessened and relations eventually became more cooperative. The foundation of the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia or ICMI) was led by B.J. Habibie as his ministry guided Soeharto’s political change towards Muslim politics (Effendy 2003). The founding of the ICMI was partially Soeharto’s attempt to politically accommodate Islam at a time when he was facing less support from the military and increasing challenge from prodemocracy movements (Hefner 2000: 128). Although many concluded the relation between Islam and the state was in a “honeymoon” period, the reform movement (gerakan reformasi) after Soeharto was initially led by Amien Rais, the chairman of the modernist Islamic organization of Muhammadiyah and prominent ICMI leader.

The Post Soeharto Era: A New Era of Teaching Democracy

The Asian financial crisis of 1998 had a significant impact on Southeast Asian countries, including Indonesia. As economic turbulence hit Indonesia, mass protests against President Soeharto forced him to step down. Furthermore, such a political crisis had pushed the country to be more democratic and transparent as well. In the case of Indonesia, the fall of the authoritarian New Order regime was noted as an extraordinary historical event in contemporary Indonesian history. The role of university students was critical in protesting the regime and leading to its end. Students, whose apolitical
orientation had been enforced during the regime, reemerged at the end of 20th century to call for President Soeharto to step down.

Democratic activism had become increasingly prevalent before the fall of Soeharto. After more than three decades of authoritarian rule, many argued that the moment had come for the nation to stand behind the true principles of democracy, unlike the Guided Democracy and Pancasila Democracy of the previous regimes. Furthermore, the democracy movement asked the parliament to nullify the national regulation on the dissemination of Pancasila and dissolve the institution responsible for producing the pedagogical materials. Indeed, the political manipulation of Pancasila during the New Order resulted in an aversion, especially among youth, toward Pancasila.

Democratization supported by the student movement not only toppled Soeharto from his presidency, but also extended public participation in politics. In addition to the steep increase in the number of political parties, public participation exploded through the mushrooming of civil society organizations. The first general election of 1999 was followed by greater openness and public participation.

In contrast with the New Order era, in contemporary Indonesia people can express their critiques without any fear of retribution from state apparatus or infringement on citizen rights. Some oppressive regulations from the New Order have been replaced with more democratic ones. For example, the new regulation on public demonstrations protects protesters as long as they remain peaceful. In addition, the increasing number of media outlets through newspaper and television is a convincing sign of Indonesia’s democratization.

Unfortunately, after the fall of the New Order, the reform movement has not sufficiently paid attention to the necessary efforts to educate people on how to become responsible citizens in a democratic country. In fact, after the demise of authoritarian power, initiatives to prepare youth to engage as informed democratic citizens has been a necessary requirement for nurturing a democratic culture in the context of political reforms. When a democratic society is not something that can be taken for granted, efforts and programs for educating young generations in democratic values should be prioritized (Azra 2005). Compared to countries such as the United Kingdom, Australia, the USA, and European countries, which have made long lasting efforts of democratic education through their national curriculum (Print 2002), the role of formal educational institutions in transferring the culture of democracy is very significant for students in developing countries like Indonesia, coupled with building citizens’ awareness of the positive impacts of democracy for protecting their shared common needs.

Based on these arguments, teaching Indonesian students to be democratic citizens needs to be approached with a new orientation, materials, and methods. Therefore, a new civics education program centered on democracy was designed to substitute the old model of civic education that had been implemented by the government in the past. Inspired by Print’s approach to civic education, students are taught knowledge, skills, and values of democracy in order to be accustomed with and participate in democracy.
in their everyday lives (Print 1999). Here, learning based on experience appropriately parallels Dewey’s conception of the relationship between the process of education and daily lives of students. According to Dewey, learning should be conducted through experience in which each individual can be actively involved in the process of defining and solving their daily problems (Craton 1992). Also, in this model of democratic teaching, students are challenged to change their perspectives and consciousness to become part of a global democratic society.

Theoretically, many experts have come to a similar conclusion that civic education should be aimed at the process of preparing good citizens through learning principles of democratic citizenship and participation in civil society (Lynch 1992; Print 1999; Tibbitts 2001). In addition to those basic notions, answering the needs for ideal citizens in the 21st century is also important. Cogan (2000:14) defines the term “citizenship” as a set of characteristics of the citizen of the 21st century, as will be discussed later on.

Print (1999) argues that the main focus of civic education should include: 1) rights and responsibilities of citizens; 2) government and institutions; 3) history and constitution; 4) national identity; 5) legal system and rule of law; 6) human, political, economic and social rights; 7) democratic principles and processes; 8) active citizen participation in civic issues; 9) international perspectives and; 10) values of democratic citizenship. In the case of Indonesia, these components will be essential in allowing citizens to address the current multidimensional political and social crises facing the country.

In terms of current ethnic conflicts and the threat of disintegration, for instance, the new model of civic education could contribute in an educational effort to engender a democratic culture and respect for Indonesian diversity. Students of the program could be encouraged to be engaged deliberately in resolving their social problems through conflict resolution to address ethnic, religious, and social conflicts.

The main goal of any civic education program is to make participants responsible for solving their social problems and capable of resolving the problem by themselves in a democratic way. To this end, the civic education program developed by IAIN Jakarta (now UIN Jakarta), a state-run institution of Islamic higher education, focuses on community building that emphasizes the Indonesian tradition of community togetherness.

The new civic education program can be differentiated from previous versions in its orientation, material, learning methods, and evaluation. First, while the state’s orientation was strongly directive in past programs, the new program is designed to encourage students to become active, well informed, and critical citizens.

Second, whereas the New Order’s civics program called Kewiraan stressed national resilience with an inward-looking perspective of nationalism, the new civic education offers principles of democracy, human rights and civil society in the global arena as the bulk of the curriculum. Third, in contrast to the method of indoctrination commonly used in the old civic education program with its very limited active learning (Wahab 2007), the
instructors of the new program are enriched and urged to practice democracy through an active learning method. With these new methods, the relationship between teachers and students appears as one of partners who study together during the classes, finding, discussing, and solving problems. Last, also different from past modes of evaluation grading of civic education in the new program is evaluated through a combined quantitative and qualitative evaluation made by instructors. Combinations of the two evaluations are used in order to assess comparative results of students’ knowledge, affect, and performance or attitude during their classes. In addition to this combination, to gain a more comprehensive result of students’ engagement in the classroom, instructors are obliged to have portfolio evaluations or field research activities of their students.

Though the program was run by a state institution of Islamic higher education, it was not a state-led initiative, and all faculty members engaged in the program were chosen through an open selection process and came from various educational backgrounds. In this way, it differed from the old civic education program with instructors trained and exclusively certified by the government agency charged with teaching and disseminating the values of Pancasila across the country.

Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic Institute’s Civic Education Project

Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic Institute (IAIN, now a State Islamic University or UIN Jakarta) is the largest institution of Islamic higher education in Indonesia. It is known for its moderate stance, and for housing prominent Indonesian Muslim thinkers such as Harun Nasution, Nurcholish Madjid, Azyumardi Azra, Komaruddin Hidayat, Bahtiar Effendy and so on. In particular, Professor Azyumardi Azra has been highly involved in the development of IAIN’s civic education programs in the post Soeharto era. As rector of IAIN at the time, Azra was the initiator of the program, which recognized the importance of teaching democracy for the Muslim community, especially Muslim youth. According to him, the democratization process in Indonesia must be carried out fully, without turning back. To support this move toward democracy, democratic values should be programmatically disseminated through formal and informal education programs. Although IAIN’s pilot civic education program has been sponsored by American aid awarded through the Asia Foundation in Jakarta, Azra affirms that its material and methods of teaching must be designed and based on the Indonesian context and dedicated to an inclusive teaching of Islam.

The pilot civic education program was developed with the goal to enrich Muslim students’ understanding of democracy to support the future of democracy in Indonesia, as a new democratic Muslim country. Azra suggests that IAIN, as a renowned center of moderate Islam, is responsible for contributing to the improvement of democracy in the country. Therefore, he emphasizes, dissemination of democratic teachings and a building up of democratic culture during the classes is needed, and will encourage students to be informed and active citizens. His point of view that democracy and Islam are compatible in Indonesia undoubtedly has shaped the implementation of IAIN’s civic education program, which was the first program developed toward the goal of teaching
democracy in the reform era. According to Azra (2000:v), during the transition to democracy at least three interlinked reform agendas must be carried out: constitutional reform through the ideology and the foundation of national politics and its system; institutional reform by development and enhancement of political institutions; and last but not least, the development of more democratic political culture, in which the role of civic education is critical.

The program was launched in the middle of the year 2000 and implemented as a collaboration between IAIN’s research center and The Asian Foundation (TAF) in Jakarta. After a rough draft of the module was prepared by IAIN’s civic education team, experts discussed and scrutinized the agenda, working to enrich the materials relevant for teaching democracy according to a perspective and method in line with the spirit of reform era. Experts of different backgrounds contributed to the project, including Mochtar Buchori (education), Azyumardi Azra (history of Islam, the rector), Udin Winataputra (civic education), Rita Maran (democracy), Abuddin Nata (Islamic education) and Dede Rosyada (Chair of IAIN’s research center and current rector of UIN). These knowledgeable experts were invited to participate in the seminar, aimed at enriching the first draft for the program and its teaching guide.

After the module had been completed, the team stepped forward to prepare faculty members for the implementation of the program, which was designed to be enriched with active learning methods to deliver democratic teaching for university students. Accordingly, andragogy was chosen as a suitable method in line with the democratic approaches employed during teaching and learning in the class. Andragogy refers to an adult learning method in which adult students are encouraged to fully participate in the learning process by allowing them to share their daily life experiences and to work together to consider an appropriate solution for their problem. The method seemed to fit well with the goal of UIN’s civic education program to prepare active, well informed and critical citizens. Fortunately, several faculty members at IAIN were familiar with active and adult learning methods. As part of IAIN’s project, education professors from McGill University of Canada were invited to empower the faculty member with new teaching skills. As part of the collaboration, the professors from McGill University were also enriched by academic discussion from Indonesian academics, such as Aldi Alfian Malarangeng (political science), Imam Prasodjo (sociology), Bahtiar Effendy (political science), Dawam Rahardjo (economy), Indria Samego (political science) Salim Said (political science), Udin Winataputra (civic education).

The program was designed with the ultimate goal of making students smart, responsible, active and good citizens, with required citizenship competencies such as a strong commitment to democracy and human rights. Students should also be able to engage in peaceful conflict resolution and contribute toward solving daily problems. To support the aims of the program, the module was developed with the following eight subjects: national identity, state and citizenship, constitution, civil and military government, the relation of state and religion, civil society, democracy, and human rights. Through the teaching of these interlinked modules and the application of the skills and techniques of the faculty members, the program was delivered in in
accordance with the common goal of global civic education programs and their four fundamental elements of civic knowledge, civic skills, civic dispositions, and civic participation.

The next step was to test the program in smaller scale through a pilot project. For the project, ten trained faculty members and 463 students from five different departments at IAIN engaged in one semester of teaching and learning the new civic education material. Each class consisted of approximately 35-40 students. Before the program began, each instructor was required to present his/her course outline and course design for every weekly teaching during the semester.

As active learning methods are employed during the program, the instructor is meant to lead the class to be active through the varied methods of brainstorming, discussion, small group activities, presentation, role-playing, or debates on current issues, requiring students to be engaged in collaborative learning. At the end of each class, which lasted for 100 minutes, students and teachers were asked to participate in a short evaluation of the day’s lesson. This evaluation involved students commenting on the teacher’s method of teaching, followed by an assessment of their understanding of the material and feeling during the class. Before closing, the instructors also had to fill out observation forms to evaluate their students’ involvement during the class. Each week the ten instructors made weekly reports to share their experiences, findings, and difficulties during their classes. In addition to a weekly report, during the semester students were evaluated by two exams: a mid-term and final exam. Both exams consisted of multiple choice and essays questions related to the chapters and material they studied. Finally, the results of the students’ final exams were combined with portfolios detailing their activities and their comments on the instructors, materials, and methods of their teaching.

At the end of semester, IAIN released a research center report (2001:24-27) which showed that compared to classes of controlled students or who did not take the course, the civic knowledge and civic attitude of those experimental students had increased. In addition to this change in attitude, the experimental classes with democratic methods and contextual teaching contributed to a dynamic class atmosphere in which students had higher motivation to study and discuss daily problems within society. The report also showed high enthusiasm among civic education instructors. They said that the program has made them more informed on issues related to politics, economy, government policies and citizens’ problems. Finally, they recommended that IAIN’s pilot project be implemented in all Islamic universities throughout the country.

Following the recommendation given in IAIN’s pilot project report, since 2001 the project has been widely implemented in all state Islamic universities across the country. Before the launch of the national program, more than 150 young faculty members were recruited from each university and college to participate in a two-week workshop. Under the new national program of civic education led by IAIN Jakarta, around 2000 students enrolled in Islamic higher education institutions participated. For this program, the rector of IAIN Jakarta founded the Indonesian Center for Civic Education (ICCE) at IAIN
Jakarta. During the 2001 academic year, the center was responsible for providing supplementary materials and a guidebook for teachers offering methods for teaching civic education, monitoring class progress, and seminars on civic education on the consolidation of Indonesia’s democracy.

According to ICCE’s final report, many students, faculty members, and university leaders had a positive response to the program. As many as 95% of the respondents (students and faculty members) indicated that the program had positive impact on themselves, because of its orientation toward increasing student and faculty members’ knowledge and empowering them to practice democracy. Respondents also appreciated that space was given for different opinions, that there was room to develop critical ideas, and that they were provided with actual information on democracy, human rights, and civil society (ICCE 2001).

In contrast with the pilot program, the evaluation of the national program was undertaken by Muhammadiyah University of Yogyakarta. According to its qualitative findings, the program has been considered valuable because of its well-developed materials and strategies, and its distinctiveness in encouraging change among Muslim University students. The program also creates a progressive learning atmosphere among students that could potentially encourage them to become good citizens (Chamin 2001). The ICCE has continued to publish books on Civic Education for university students in support of the program. The Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) has supported the implementation of IAIN’s civic education program in private Islamic Universities and colleges (ICCE 2007). Since the program has been accepted as a compulsory course (Mata Kuliah Dasar Umum) in Indonesian Islamic Universities, the center has developed its national wide networks to promote democracy education through democratic methods.

In addition to the university level civic education program, the center also shares the program with Islamic secondary schools (madrasah). Seminars and workshops on teaching democracy have been undertaken in collaboration with local and international institutions with a similar concern for nurturing democracy and tolerance among students. Among the center’s civic education programs for students are “peer mediation” and “student government”, which were implemented in Jakarta from 2006 to 2008 under the cooperation among ICCE, TAF, and USAID. Peer mediation is a program that introduces students to the process of democratic politics in the parliament and the creation of public policy. Students from different secondary schools are invited to engage in a conflict mediation workshop and act as politicians. In addition, they engage in dialogues with religious leaders of different beliefs, aimed at building mutual understanding among students with different faith backgrounds (ICCE 2008).

**Civic Education in the Era of Religious Radicalism: Putting Pancasila in the Center**

Since its new beginning in 2000, civic education in Indonesia has been facing new challenges. A crisis of national identity, religious intolerance, conflicts, and corruption
are among those recent issues. As money politics and corruption are still high and religious radicalism has grown, the need for citizenship education remains critical for the nation. To face these ongoing threats to the inclusive ideology of Pancasila, the ICCE of UIN Jakarta has responded by including material about Pancasila and anti-corruption education in its current civics publications for students (Ubaedillah 2015).

Pancasila and democracy have been selected as the angle of civic education in Indonesia to respond to the obligation of the nation to ensure the future of democracy, with Pancasila as the common denominator for Indonesian citizens. Since democracy has become the main focus in the amendment of the constitution, the rise of political discontent and deliberate manipulation of the notion of democracy has been overwhelming. Indeed, such misconceptions of democracy have led to the idea that democracy clashes with the principles of Pancasila. The current practice of democracy, which is seen by many as too liberal, is said to be incompatible with the Indonesian culture of *musyawarah*, democracy through deliberation and consensus, as it is stated in the national ideology. In a similar vein, manipulation of democracy has been occurring among hard-line Muslim organizations. According to their interpretation, because democracy ensures freedom of expression, any efforts to promote a true implementation of Islamic law or replace Pancasila with Islamic ideology are constitutionally allowed and guaranteed. At the same time, proponents of a global Islamic caliphate (*khalifah Islamiyah*) have been penetrating campuses. Due to these major concerns, especially the influence of religious radicalism among students, teaching the history of Pancasila in civic education courses is necessary for students (Sarwono 2012:xxi).

The principles of democracy and Pancasila have been challenged by the propagation of radical Islam through hard-line Muslim groups like Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). According to HTI, since the decline of the Ottoman Empire in 1924, the ummah has faced a crisis of global leadership and failed to implement Islamic law (*syari’ah*). HTI promotes Islam as the solution and replacement for an un-Islamic-democratic system in Indonesia (HTI 2013). Based on these views, the HTI has been nationally recognized as the most radical Islamic hard-line group in the country, particularly among youth. Its campaign for the implementation of Islamic law has threatened the concept of the Indonesian nation state and its national ideology.

Another movement with a divergent understanding of Pancasila is the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (*Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia*, MMI). Opposing to the notion supported by Pancasila that Indonesia is neither a religious nor secular state, MMI argues that religion (Islam) should be the spirit of the state in accordance with the first principle of Pancasila, the oneness of God (*Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*), which is a theological teaching of Islam. Thus, according to MMI the government of Indonesia must implement Islamic law (*syari’ah*) (Awwas 2014).

Slightly different from MMI’s impression of Pancasila, the Islamic Defender’s Front (*Front Pembela Islam* / FPI) respects the position of Pancasila and the diversity of Indonesia, though it often acts outside the legal system. According the FPI, Pancasila
must be understood and interpreted according to an Islamic perspective (syari’ah islamiyah). To that extent that Pancasila is based on Islamic principles, the Muslim community might not have serious problems with the acceptance of Pancasila. Therefore, rather than denouncing Pancasila, FPI leaders have sought to make Indonesia increasingly influenced by syari’ah rather than replacing Pancasila with another ideology (Syihab 2013). To respond to criticisms toward Pancasila and reaffirm its relevance for Indonesia, it is useful to re-contextualize its five principles with current problems faced by the nation (Latif 2011). As an open ideology Pancasila is believed to be able to respond to changes brought by globalization, including the wave of democracy and any global Islamic ideas and movements. In other words, in its very literal meaning Pancasila is not in opposition to democracy or Islam (Ubaedillah 2015). Furthermore, to practice democracy in such a diverse country, placing Pancasila in the center of the civic education program is part of an effort to maintain constitutional respect for diversity of the nation. The country’s diverse reality is addressed in the nation’s motto: Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diversity).

Since the development of democracy in Indonesia, corruption has been rampant during regular elections. In response to this national problem, many have called the nation to re-consider the ideal democracy for Indonesia as stipulated in Pancasila’s fourth pillar of democracy. Different from liberal democracy which is based on individual rights, Indonesian democracy is based on the notion of making decisions through a group consensus (musyawarah). Historically, the musyawarah, which might have existed for centuries and been practiced by villagers across the archipelago, has been viewed by the founding fathers as the authentic practice of the Indonesian mode of democracy. In the modern era of the country, however, Soekarno and Hatta, firmly emphasized that Indonesian democracy is not only for the sake of political freedom, but also of economic freedom of the nation (Latif 2011).

Since democracy and political freedom have thus far failed to reduce economic gaps in the population, making Pancasila the core of the civic education program could serve to tame the individualism of liberal democracy, deemed unsuitable for the character and tradition of Indonesia’s collectivism. In this regard, the author, has argued for an emphasis on the need for the re-actualization of Pancasila for the sake of democracy, pluralism, tolerance, and last but not least, to encourage gender balance and anti-corruption education (Ubaedillah 2015). It has not been an easy task thus far, but after introducing IAIN’s program through workshops and seminars on civic education and teaching democracy for Muslim students, Islamic campus leaders have showed their positive response to the program. Their enthusiasm about the need for a civil Islam to promote democracy has been affirmed by the number of lecturers and students who have participated in our programmed workshops on civic education and who have used our publication for civic education in their universities.

In conclusion, the ideal of making Indonesia a democratic nation should be materialized through democratic educational efforts. The civic education program with an emphasis on teaching democracy is offering a new perspective on how Islam is viable for the
process of democratization. Through democratic and participative methods of teaching, the program transforms campuses into laboratories of democracy for the reactualization of Pancasila in the reform era. Almost two decades into the reform era, Indonesia is still experiencing tension between pro-democratic and anti-democratic groups, such as moderate Muslims and those with radical ties. To address anti-democratic groups, the flexibility of Pancasila as a shared common denominator seems to still be a viable framework to maintain the nation’s diversity and simultaneously promote its unity. For the time being, to strengthen Indonesia’s consolidated democracy, the role of civic education in disseminating the values and culture of democracy is of critical importance, in addition to the ongoing institutional and regulatory reforms.

References


