UNIVERSALITY IS UBIQUITOUS

Martin Davis

Professor Emeritus Courant Institute, NYU

Visiting Scholar UC Berkeley



Turing machine operation:

- Replace symbol ("print")
- Move left or right one square, or don't move
- Change state



A "quintuple" representing one step in a Turing machine computation: Q5:7 \rightarrow W

Turing machine operation:

- Replace symbol ("print")
- Move left or right one square, or don't move
- Change state



A "quintuple" representing one step in a Turing machine computation: Q5:7 \rightarrow W



Turing machine operation:

- Replace symbol ("print")
- Move left or right one square, or don't move
- Change state



Q \Downarrow 9 3 4 3 4 E \Downarrow 3 () F \downarrow 1

Alan Turing's universal machine:

Code of \mathcal{M} Input to \mathcal{M}

It provides a model of a memory shared between program and data.

From Turing's 1947 Lecture to the London Mathematics Society

I considered a type of machine which had a central mechanism, and an infinite memory which was contained on an infinite tape... It was essential ... that the memory ... be infinite. Machines such as the ACE may be regarded as practical versions of ... this type of machine. There is at least a very close analogy. Digital computing machines all have ... some very extensive form of memory. The memory ... needs to be large ...

Let us now return to the analogy of the theoretical computing machines ... It can

be shown that a single special machine of that type can be made to do the work of all. It could in fact be made to work as a model of any other machine. The special machine may be called the universal machine; it works in the following quite simple manner ... we punch a description of [the machine we wish to imitate] on the tape of the universal machine ... digital computing machines ... are ... practical versions of the universal machine ... appropriate instructions for [any particular problem] are stored in the memory ...

What enables universality in a computational setup?

What enables universality in a computational setup? Could it be a rich supply of basic operations? What enables universality in a computational setup?

Could it be a rich supply of basic operations?

Hardly! It takes very little in basic operations to achieve universality!

- What enables universality in a computational setup?
- Could it be a rich supply of basic operations?
- Hardly! It takes very little in basic operations to achieve universality!
- It's Infinite memory!!

Howard Aiken (1956):

"If it should turn out that the basic logics of a machine designed for the numerical solution of differential equations coincide with the logics of a machine intended to make bills for a department store, I would regard this as the most amazing coincidence I have ever encountered."

From von Neumann (et al) 1946

It is easy to see by formal-logical methods that there exist codes that are in abstracto adequate to control and cause the execution of any sequence of operations ... The really decisive considerations from the present point of view, in selecting a code, are of a more practical nature: simplicity of the equipment demanded by the code, and the clarity of its application to the actually important problems together with the speed of its handling those problems. It would take us much too far afield to discuss these questions at all generally or from first principles.

Before Turing the ... supposition was that ... the

three categories, machine, program, and data, were entirely separate entities. The machine was a physical object ... hardware. The program was the plan for doing a computation ... [T]he data was the numerical input. Turing's universal machine showed that the distinctness of these three categories is an illusion. A Turing machine is initially envisioned as a machine ..., hardware. But its code ... functions as a program, detailing the instructions to the universal machine ... Finally, the universal machine in its stepby-step actions sees the ... machine code as just more *data* to be worked on. This fluidity ... is fundamental to contemporary computer practice. A program ... is data to the ... compiler.

- From The Universal Computer



THE DAWN OF SOFTWARE ENGINEERING From TURING to DIJKSTRA

ADVANCE FADING COPY NOT FOR SALE

EDGAR G. DAYLIGHT

TONY HOARE BARBARA LISKOV NIKLAUS WIRTH PETER NAUR

INCLUDES INTERVIEWS WITH 4 TURING AWARD WINNERS:

Turing's ACE and von Neumann's EDVAC

Von Neumann's primary interest in numerical calculation was reflected in the logical organization of the EDVAC and its successors (H-bomb calculations).

- ACE to be used for many tasks for which heavy arithmetic was inappropriate (chess)
- ACE was organized in a more minimal way with arithmetic operations to be carried out by software rather than hardware.
- The ACE design provided special mechanism for incorporating previously programmed operations in a longer program.

Turing on a proposal to modify the ACE in a von Neumann direction:

[It] is ... very contrary to the line of development here, and much more in the American tradition of solving one's difficulties by means of much equipment rather than by thought. ... Furthermore certain operations which we regard as more fundamental than addition and multiplication have been omitted.

Claims for Universality of Pre-1946 Devices

- The Analytic Engine (Robin Gandy)
- The Colossus (Benjamin Wells)
- The Einiac (Arthur & Alice Burks)
- Konrad Zuse's Z3 (Raúl Rojas)
- Howard Aiken's Mark I (Edgar Daylight)

THE AI HYPOTHESIS

- 1. The human mind is a function of the brain.
- 2. The brain is a computer.

THE AI HYPOTHESIS

- 1. The human mind is a function of the brain.
- 2. The brain is a computer.

If you believe this, the AI project is reasonable.

THE AI HYPOTHESIS

- 1. The human mind is a function of the brain.
- 2. The brain is a computer.
- If you believe this, the AI project is reasonable.
- If you reject the **possibility** of human level AI, you should reject 1 or 2.

- 1. The human mind is a function of the brain.
- 2. The brain is a computer.

Roger Penrose believes 1 but not 2. He argues that 2 implies that our mathematical capabilities would be limited by Gődel incompleteness, whereas we can **see** that the Gődel undecidable statement is true.

- 1. The human mind is a function of the brain.
- 2. The brain is a computer.

John Searle wrote:

"Here is what is going on inside Deep Blue. The computer has a bunch of meaningless symbols that the programmers use to represent the positions of the pieces on the board. It has a bunch of equally meaningless symbols that the programmers use to represent options for possible moves. The computer does not know that the symbols represent chess pieces and chess moves, because it does not know anything."

More from Searle:

Imagine that a man who does not know how to play chess is locked inside a room, and there he is given a set of, to him, meaningless symbols. Unknown to him, these represent positions on a chessboard. He looks up in a book what he is supposed to do, and he passes back more meaningless symbols. We can suppose that if the rule book, i.e., the program, is skillfully written, he will win chess games. People outside the room will say, ``This man understands chess, and in fact he is a good chess player because he wins." They will be totally mistaken. The man understands nothing of chess, he is just a computer. And the point of the parable is this: if the man does not understand chess on the basis of running the chess-playing program, neither does any other computer solely on that basis.

Stephen Wolfram has argued for the significance of the existence of tiny abstract structures that already exhibit universality. In particular he has suggested that universality is important in biological evolution. I think that he may well be correct about this. It has been found that considerable portions of what used to be called "junk DNA" are conserved by Darwinian evolution over immense stretches of time. I conjecture that DNA participates in the execution of algorithms that act on germ plasm and thus speed up, evolution.