The Core Journal
Volume I
SPRING 1992
The Core Journal:

Mental Reconstructions of Core Curriculum

Spring 1992

"Look what they did to my brain, Ma!" – Professor Devlin

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Foreword

Four semesters, or two years ago, our esteemed Core professors compiled for us a curriculum of the works that we believed to be representative of the finest works in the history of mankind. Faced with a similar but smaller task, we, the editors, have brought together a collection of scholarly works that we believe reflects our studies.

As there are great books that couldn’t be included in the Curriculum, there are also a number of papers, just as worthy, which could not be included because of space and monetary constraints. We regret their absence, and wish we could have included more.

Although this journal may appear to resemble a course packet or a Capstone paper rather than a scholarly publication, we believe that our readers will look beyond the form and into ideas.

Special thanks to all professors for encouraging their students to submit their essays. And extra special thanks to Dean Jorgensen and Professors Glick, Johnson, Kahlberg, Lindholm, and Motzkin for their invaluable ideas and comments. Jennifer Martin also assisted in reading over submissions. We also thank Janine and the Core Office staff for housing Angie and serving as her mailbox and copy center in the past month. Also extra special thanks to Jerry the wonderboy...for just being you.

--The Core Journal Editors,
1992
In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was Core and the Core was with Dean Jorgensen. And all things were studied through it, and without it was not anything studied that was studied. And the Core became flesh and dwell among us.

And this is the editorial staff who is bearing witness to these things, and who have chosen these essays, and we believe that this testimony is true. But there were also many other essays written and submitted; were every one of them to be published we suppose that it would have exceeded our budget. And verily, we regret their exclusion.

Special thanks to all professors for encouraging their students to submit their essays. And extra special thanks to Dean Jorgensen and Professors Glick, Johnson, Kalberg, Lindholm, and Motzkin for their invaluable comments and input. We also thank Jannine and the Core Office staff for housing Angie and serving as her mailbox and copy center in the past month. Jennifer Martin also assisted in reading over submissions.

—The Editors
Contents

SUBCONSCIOUS SEARCH FOR SELF  1
Tara Hayes

THE GENTLE AND GOOD MAN  5
Aremin Hacobin

TAOISM'S RESPONSE TO DEATH  9
Lydia Moland

WESTERN ANALYSIS OF A HINDU WHOLE  13
John Madura

THE TRAGEDY OF DIDO  17
Shawn Loner

A LIBERATING DEATH  23
Adelaide D. Juguilon

IN VERSIONS OF TRUTH  31
Angie J. Lee

A RENDEZVOUS: MACHIAVELLI, CALIBAN, AND SANCHO PANZA  39
Anne M. Rzasa

THE TIME BE OUT  47
Angie J. Lee

"A PREGNANT BANK" AND THE VEGETATIVE SOUL  59
Jonathan Crow

KING OF PAIN  65
Kathi Chaplar
IRRATIONAL HOPE AND DORMANT FEAR:  
THE FATES OF FAUST AND DON GIOVANNI  71  
Doug Pfeiffer

THE OVERTURE: AN INTRODUCTION  81  
Kathi Chaplar

A TIMELY UTTERNACE: THE FEAR IN  
WORDSWORTH'S HOPE  87  
Doug Pfeiffer

On DURKHEIM: THE ELEMENT FORMS OF  
THE RELIGIOUS LIFE  95  
Adrian Rowland Gould

MODERN PROPHETS  99  
Annie Heringer

FREUD'S KNOT  105  
Joan Grace Ritchey

Bibliography  111
Biography: the Goffmanian Backstage  113
SUBCONSCIOUS SEARCH FOR SELF

The Epic of Gilgamesh utilizes the hero to exemplify the confused individual, the emotionally seeking person and the arrogantly, aggressive bohemian. Although the hero Gilgamesh is two-thirds god and one-half man, he lacks the knowledge to be happy with himself and the consequences of his life. Gilgamesh points out the inadequacies of the hero's knowledge while documenting his journey toward that knowledge. Unaware of his faults and by way of fault-aided blunder, Gilgamesh achieves the knowledge that enables him to overcome his faults and to find acceptance.

Gilgamesh opens with a description of the hero's characteristics. He is "bold, eminent, knowing and wise." Completely caught up in himself, Gilgamesh never realizes that the knowledge he possesses is only surface knowledge and that he is insulated by a loneliness that doesn't allow him to see what is missing from his life.

Gilgamesh has a set pattern to his life. He rules his people, negotiates with the gods and finds pleasure in himself and his whims. These whims often lead Gilgamesh to exert his kingly right of bedding the young virgins before their marriages. Gilgamesh is accustomed to getting his way. This fault is what brings Gilgamesh to the first step in his journey away from his faults.

The hero encounters someone who does not agree with his whim. Enkidu, the one recently created by the gods to counterbalance Gilgamesh, is angered by Gilgamesh's exertion of his kingly right.
Gilgamesh is angered that Enkidu dares to question him and by the encouragement Enkidu arouses in the people. Gilgamesh takes the offensive and the two grapple. When at last they stand exhausted against each other, they see one another through different eyes and realize that within the other is what they have been lacking. The arrogance in Gilgamesh brought about the confrontation that led to the discovery of companionship he had never known. This companionship revives a dormant sense of understanding and emotion.

Strengthened by this new feeling of completeness, Gilgamesh feels even more capable of controlling everything around him than before. His arrogance and boldness demand that he strike out in another way to prove himself. Gilgamesh persuades Enkidu into trekking off to the Cedar Forest to destroy Humbaba, the guardian of the trees.

Enroute both are plagued by doubts and in each instance the one convinces the other that it will all be settled. The absence of knowledge is again pinpointed as Gilgamesh disregards his dreams even when they are reinforced by Enkidu's visions. He continues to follow his powerful faults.

Humbaba is killed but with consequences. Enkidu decides to cut down the tallest tree, bringing wrath upon himself. Gilgamesh returns to Uruk with Humbaba's head and an intensified sense of self. Neither friend is happy nor do they understand why they feel incredibly powerful and yet restless. They are without the knowledge self serenity and being unhappy with themselves, they are unable to gain comfort from others.

Gilgamesh takes on his new feeling of power, confident in
his right to arrogance, and exultant in his belief that he ranks with the gods. When Ishtar, the goddess of love and war, comes before Gilgamesh with the suggestion of marriage, he puts down her advances with a sharp tongue and a cruel wit. Gilgamesh's selective sight sees only the power he radiates with his rejection, turning a blind eye to repercussions. Here it may again be noticed that even with Enkidu's friendship, Gilgamesh continues to think primarily of himself.

The repercussions come quickly. The Bull of Heaven, also known as famine and drought, deals the initial blow. Hundreds of Gilgamesh's people die while Gilgamesh remains unaffected and inactive. Enkidu shoulders Gilgamesh's responsibilities, killing the Bull of Heaven. Incensed Ishtar places a curse on Gilgamesh: "Woe unto Gilgamesh who slandered me and killed the bull of Heaven." Again Enkidu assumes what is intended for Gilgamesh and reacts by throwing the thigh of the Bull in Ishtar's face.

At this point Gilgamesh throws a celebration. He fails to think on what they have done, allowing himself to be ensumed by the headiness of power. Meanwhile Ishtar garnerers support for Enkidu's immediate death. Even as Enkidu lies dying, Gilgamesh tries to convince himself that it will pass. Time is brief before he begins to understand and he follows the whirlpool responses of rejection, denial, guilt and deep grief. With Enkidu now gone, Gilgamesh is forced to confront realization. The realization of what he had and did not fully appreciate before it was gone is but a secondary point. The reality that shakes Gilgamesh is the sudden confrontation with his own mortality.
The mighty Gilgamesh is afraid of death. Deluding himself into believing that he seeks only to bring Enkidu back, he departs with the intent of finding the secret of immortality. Even though he is still thinking of himself, it is at this point that Gilgamesh takes his second step along the journey to knowledge of happiness, acceptance, and self.

The arrogantly puissant tyrant Gilgamesh has finally been tempered by raw fear. Humbled, now the embodiment of nothing more than a confused individual and emotionally seeking person, he sets out to find what his mind has labeled immortality but what his heart knows is knowledge. Gilgamesh manages to escape the scorpion-beings, to find light beyond his journey into darkness, to resist the enchantment of Siduri, and to enter into the presence of Utmapishtim: the only one with the understanding of immortality.

Gilgamesh fails. He is unable to allude sleep with this test proving his inability to be a god, to resist the temptation of a clear spring, and to hang onto the one tangible object he received from his journey's efforts -- the plant of replenishment. It is this segment of the epic depicting Gilgamesh's persistence that establishes his heroism.

Gilgamesh returns to Uruk. At that moment Gilgamesh asks Urshanbi the ferryman to look up at the walls of Uruk and examine, he at last possesses knowledge. No longer pretending to be a god and accepting his place among mortal men, Gilgamesh returns home a rightful king, at peace with himself.
The Gentle and Good Man

The gentleman who ever parts company with Goodness does not fulfill that name. Never for a moment does a gentleman quit the way of Goodness (103).

The true gentleman is always a good man. The Analects of Confucius repeatedly link the gentleman to the good. However, confusion arises when one is perceived as a gentleman but is merely putting forth a facade meant to bring one the contentment which normally accompanies a true gentleman. The difference between these gentleman is that the false one lacks goodness. Confucius realizes that the false gentleman receives none of the contentment associated with the true gentleman. But what intrinsic value does the true gentleman possess which enables him to obtain goodness and, as a result, happiness?

This question can be answered only after Confucius' definition of the gentleman is obtained. A gentleman "wherever he sees Right, ranges himself beside it" (104). In other words, the gentleman is able to recognize the "Right," or the Good, and he willingly aligns himself with it. In order to be able to recognize the Good, one must know where to find it. The uncivilized, uneducated man will look to others in order to obtain the Good. The gentleman, though, will first look within himself to find the path towards the Good. Confucius states that "if one looks for faults it is only as a means of recognizing Goodness" (103). Thus, the gentleman searches himself to discover his faults. It is the correction of these faults which leads to Goodness.

At this point, the gentleman "takes trouble to discover what is right" (105), implying that he searches for the Good either through the daily experiences of living, or by seeking out one who is already a gentleman and a good man. This learning process marks another quality of the gentleman. By correcting his faults in the quest for Goodness, "he must not be afraid of admitting the fact and amending his ways" (85). The gentleman is a humble man who "grieves at his own incapacities." (188), yet "is never distressed at the failure of others to recognize his merits" (197). Therefore, the gentleman is more concerned with bettering himself, by attaining goodness, rather than receiving accolades and praise.

True, the gentleman seeks goodness, but what does Confucius imply
by the word "good?" This answer will provide the key to the intrinsic value of being a gentleman. What is it which causes the gentleman to devote his life to its pursuit, for "one who really cares for Goodness would never let any other consideration come first" (103)? After all, throughout The Analects of Confucius goodness is lauded as a desirable goal. The Master champions it repeatedly with phrases such as "He that is really Good can never be unhappy" (144), and "The Good Man rests content with Goodness" (102). Confucius freely praises the benefits of goodness, but he is less generous with the actual tenets of goodness. The definition of the good is contained in Confucius' writings, but is difficult to find. Confucius is less open with the path to the "Right" because he realizes that "Goodness cannot be obtained till what is difficult has been duly done. He who has done this may be called Good" (120).

With the fact that personal Good must be discovered through "difficult" means in mind, Confucius offers some guidelines leading to the creation of the Good Man. Confucius' image of the Good Man becomes comprehensible as he states that the Good Man is "he upon whom neither love of mastery, vanity, resentment, nor covetousness have any hold. Such a one has done what is difficult" (180). Thus, Confucius perceives the Good Man as one independent of the vices stated above. He is not obsessed with becoming the best; he is not in love with his appearance; he harbors no ill toward others; and he shies away from unnecessary secrecy. If the Good Man encounters success, he will accept it and be proud. However, the Good Man's success are purely incidental, and is not sought after in any way.

With Confucius' meanings uncovered, one can now examine why a gentleman would never "quit the way of Goodness." Merely to examine modern society offers insight into the contentment of the gentleman. Today's world is one of betterment, but specifically, a system endorsing self-elevation. Nowadays, Good is individually defined, as it suits one's state of happiness. In Confucius' time, society was also based on the concept of self-elevation, with one important differentiation. Confucius' self-elevation involved the elevation of one's level of Good. The Good sought in this era was one which was beneficial to the individual and to society. Therefore, by bettering oneself, the gentleman better those around him. This is illustrated by Confucius' remark that "the gentleman by his culture collects friends about him, and through these friends promotes Goodness" (170).
What does this have to do with desire to be a true gentleman who pursues the Good? By comparing the average product of modern society to Confucius' gentleman, one can observe the differences in mind-state. The average person today is involved in some sort of competitive atmosphere, whether it be at work, at school, or at home. This atmosphere causes stress due to the uncertainty of success. For example, one school day may bring great joy upon the return of a brilliant test, but the next day this joy could quickly dissolve into disgust when a paper is handed back. The drive to succeed is a powerful force, driving most people of today to compete against others as a means of measuring success. This type of behavior does not typify a gentleman, for "gentleman never compete" (95). Moreover, a gentleman does not feel a need to compete because he is a Good Man, and this man does not possess the "love of mastery" associated with competition. The gentleman "is calm and at ease" (131), because his discovery of Goodness has stripped him of the desires which can result in unhappiness.

Thus, the gentleman is at peace with himself as long as he is Good. Confucius then writes that "it is possible to be a true gentleman and yet lack Goodness. But there has never yet existed a Good man who was not a gentleman" (181). This quotation seems to state that one can be a true gentleman without Goodness, but a Good man is always a gentleman. What may at first appear to be a contradiction on Confucius' part, is actually only a method of discovering who is truly a gentleman and who is but masquerading as one for social purposes.

Confucius still believes that Good is synonymous with the true gentleman. However, he also is aware that, with some effort, one can appear to be a gentleman. Confucius, in Book Ten, outlines the very specific acts, mannerisms and attitudes a gentleman must display. Examples include: "On entering the Palace Gate he seems to shrink into himself, as though there were not room" (146); "When carrying the tablet of jade, he seems to double up, as though borne down by its weight" (147); and "He must not sit on a mat that is not straight" (149). What Confucius has done by providing these gentlemanly outlines is to allow one to follow the behavior of a gentleman without having discovered Goodness. Thus, "it is possible to be a true gentleman and yet lack Goodness" only implies that it is possible to imitate the behavior of a true gentleman, without having found Goodness. Thus, one could appear to be a true gentleman, without espousing the actual virtues associated with Goodness. Confucius states that "there has never yet existed a Good Man who was not a
gentleman" with the knowledge that one must first be a gentleman to want to be Good.

With Confucius' illumination of the path to Goodness available to everyone, why is there no sudden movement to resuscitate the true gentleman? After all, Confucius' depiction of the gentleman is one of the utmost contentment, for "he that is really Good is never unhappy" (188). That description seems to satisfy the aims of most people, concerned with ensuring happiness in their life. Unfortunately, for all that rings true in The Analects of Confucius, its guidelines cannot be directly followed by today's populace. What then is Confucius "Good" for? His words still contain amazing depths of truth, which can be applied in a modern lifestyle provided that his words are viewed with a modern slant. If one eliminated the "love of mastery, vanity and resentment" from their lives, much of the stress caused by society would be alleviated. And obviously the rules concerning a gentleman's behavior must be adapted to conform to a modern model. Yet even if all of this was written with a contemporary viewpoint, I doubt people would hasten to follow its principles. We need only to look towards Confucius for the reason. He writes, "If we really wanted Goodness, we should find that it was at our very side" (129). The problem must be that no one really wants Goodness.
Taoism's Response to Death

If it is true that humankind looks to religion for answers and solutions, it is imperative that every religion deal with the subject of death. Death is a reality which every person thinks about and which most people fear, perhaps because we realize that it is ultimately the one thing we cannot control. People follow religion often to give themselves assurance of hope in death for a better life afterward.

Taoism deals with the subject of death as well, but in a way entirely different than many religions. Instead of preaching preparation for death, Taoism teaches acceptance of it. Much of this has to do with the fact that Taoism does not view life as a culminating process with an end result, or even an end. Life is not a beginning and an ending, but rather an infinite cycle. Lao Tzu says in book forty that "Life on its way returns into a mist, Its quickness is its quietness again: existence of this world of things and men Renew their never needing to exist" (Bynner 70). Here Lao Tzu illustrates a paradox between existence and non-existence which governs Taoism—a paradox which in itself indicates that death and ending are immaterial to a Taoist. For if existence is a part of nonexistence, death must be part of life.

Death is discussed throughout the Tao Te Ching. Consistent with the Taoist philosophy, it is to be accepted and not dwelt upon. It is even treated as irrelevant, since human life is so small and insignificant in the continuum of life. In book seventy-five, Lao Tzu comments on this limited value of life: "Why do the people think so little of death? Because the rulers demand too much of life... Having little to live on, one knows better than to value life too much." (Feng 75). Unlike many Western philosophies which argue that the harder one works, the more life is worth, the Taoist sees that life, if it requires too much effort, should not be struggled with. Book seventy-four states that "Death is no threat to people who are not afraid to die" (Bynner 102). Life, then, is not something of ultimate value to be fought for. Book seventy-four also points out that death is in nature's hands, and therefore not something to be struggled against: "Nature is executioner. When man usurps the place ... an
apprentice hacking with the master's axe may slice his own hand" (Bynner 102).

When viewed as a whole and not as an ascending or descending spiral, life becomes more acceptable. As a result, death is acceptable because it does not interrupt a lifelong goal; rather the Way is the daily, constant goal. Death cannot interrupt the Way. In book twenty-one, Lao Tzu says: "The surest test if a man be sane Is if he accepts life whole, as it is, Without needing by measure to touch to understand The measureless untouchable source..." (Bynner 49). Death, too, becomes more acceptable by viewing it wholistically in the context of a connected universe.

After Lao Tzu attempts to explain that the thought of death should not affect our lives, he realizes that we are human, and that we must deal with its inevitability. Still, he argues that if a man has found the way of life, death should mean nothing to him. He describes a person so accepting of death that he does not really die in book fifty: "But there is one out of ten, they say, so sure of life That tiger and wild bull keep clear of his inland path... No weapon (could tell) where to enter him. And why? Because he has no death to die" (Bynner 77). Again, in book fifty-five, he explains why a man who has found the Way is protected from the fear of death: "Though his voice should cry out at full pitch all day, it would not rasp but would stay tender. Through the perfect balancing Of a man at endless ease with everything Because of the true life that he has led" (Bynner 84). Contentment and acceptance, then, are the results of following the way. Lao Tzu goes on to warn against rejecting the way: "It is said, 'there's a way where there's a will;' But let life ripen and then fall. Will is not the way at all: Deny the way of life and you are dead" (Bynner 84). It seems that from what Lao Tzu has previously said about death and life, he is talking about more than just a physical death; he is talking about an every-day death of being burdened and separated from the Way.

Death can also be overcome by flexibility and experience. Book seventy-six compares the softness of birth to the hard bitterness of death and then says: "Therefore the stiff and unbending is the disciple of death. The gentle and yielding is the disciple of life... The
hard and strong will fall. The soft and weak will overcome" (Feng 76). Lao Tzu believes that the way to defeat death is to be flexible and not fear the ending of this life.

Finally, the distinction between dying and perishing is made in book thirty-three. Lao Tzu says: "He who knows he has enough is rich. Perseverance is a sign of will power. He who stays where he is endures. To die but not to perish is to be eternally present" (Feng 33). In Bynner's translation, the second phrase is written "Ambition wanders blind," indicating that ambition leads you only to failed goals which can cause you to ultimately fail, or perish. To stay where you can endure leaves a sense of satisfaction. Death will not be the ending of a quest, but the continuing of existence which, as in Book seven, is really "unborn, so ever living" (Feng 7).

Throughout Taoism, then, there is a paradox between redefining the connotations of death and dealing with death as we see it. If one is a true Taoist and virtuous, one will never truly die. It is clear that there are two kinds of death: the physical death which we need not fear if we are living in the Tao, and the every-day death of living contrary to the Tao. Between the two, it seems that Lao Tzu would cite the second as worse, since it so clearly violates nature, and natural death is itself a part of nature. Lao Tzu teaches that submission to this natural force will bring us back to the natural state from which we came, which will ultimately bring us to an acceptance of life, and with it, death. In book twenty-five, he illustrates the hierarchy that this acceptance must follow: "Man follows the earth. Earth follows heaven. Heaven follows the Tao. Tao follows what is natural" (Feng 25). If we choose to follow this, Lao Tzu believes that we will find peace, even in death.
Western Analysis of a Hindu Whole

The Bhagavad Gita is one of the world's most profound philosophical texts. Its symbolic battlefield provides us with keen insight into the deepest meanings of Hinduism and The Gita itself. The core of The Gita's message is found in the dilemma of Arjuna on the battlefield of Kurukshetra. Yet this "dejection" of Arjuna's is not only his to bear. Rather, Arjuna and the battlefield represent ourselves and the inner struggles that all humans bear concerning the question of precise action. The complexity in understanding the central theme of The Gita is resolved through the intricate arguments that Arjuna's charioteer Krishna uses to get him to act. Through Lord Krishna, we understand two questions concerning the larger message of the Bhagavad Gita: what is meant by precise action, and what are the means by which one invokes precise action.

Precise action in the Bhagavad Gita is put in quite empirical terms by Krishna. Precise action is that which fulfills one's "sacred duty". It is the appropriate conduct of an individual with respect to one's own caste. It is based on the idea that "if each unit or group in the manifold and complex universe performs its own function correctly, the whole (the individual, the society, and the cosmos) will be harmonious and ordered" (Barbara Stoler Miller: Duty). Action is the fundamental energy of the universe. Action can both disrupt and maintain the universe. Action that maintains the universe is dharma or precise action. Krishna states, "These worlds would collapse if I did not perform action; so wise men should act with detachment to preserve the world" (III 24-25). Thus, any action which ultimately fulfills one's dharma is the correct way to act.

The dilemma then comes to be, how does one decide how to act in such a way that it fulfills one's dharma? This is the crux of Krishna's argument. This question is resolved in his various arguments that take the three forms or disciplines that are paths of dharma. The three possibilities become karamayoga, jnanayoga, and bhaktiyoga.

The first point concerning these three disciplines is that there is a loose hierarchy of interpretation. In reality, none of these disciplines are independent paths. In the end, the goal is for the reader understand
the implicit fusion of the three disciplines, but, as stated, there exists a certain order of execution. The highest discipline of the hierarchy is jnanayoga. Naturally, it is also the most difficult to obtain. Jnanayoga has two basic components, logical knowledge of the world and mystic knowledge of the Brahman. Yet, very few humans reach the understanding of Krishna and dharma through this discipline. "But how can I communicate with the gods, who am a pencil-maker on earth, and not be insane?" (Henry David Thoreau, A week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers p.146). Nevertheless, Krishna does offer it as a possible path in his arguments, "One man among thousands strives for success, and of the few who are successful, a rare one knows my reality" (VII 3). Its difficulty in attainment though, adds to prestige and honor in Krishna. "of these, the disciplined man of knowledge is set apart by his singular devotion; I am dear to the man of knowledge and he is dear to me" (VII 17). Most importantly, the benefit of jnanayoga is that it is one way by which an individual can realize his dharma. "At the end of many births, the man of knowledge finds refuge in me; he is the great spirit who sees 'Krishna is all that is'" (VII 19). Thus, however difficult jnanayoga is, it still remains the quintessential discipline by which to understand one's "sacred duty". The honor bestowed on knowledge is best understood through a quote by Henry David Thoreau, "The best of the Hindoo Scripture [is praised] for it's pure intellectuality" (A week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers p.142).

The most basic and fundamental of the disciplines is that of bhaktiyoga. The discipline of devotion. This yoga is the most widely followed and easiest to fulfill. The idea behind bhaktiyoga is that the human is too weak to discipline themselves so they then rely on the power of Krishna through dedication of action. The act for the sake of Krishna, in turn they rely on him rather than themselves for discipline. Krishna proclaims in his argument, "Keep me in your mind and devotion, sacrifice to me, discipline yourself toward me and you will reach me" (IX 34)! Krishna considers devotion very profitable and the frankly the simplest mode by which to satisfy one's dharma. "How easy it is then for holy priests and devoted sages- in this transient world of sorrow, devote yourself to me" (IX 33)! Krishna focuses his argument to that of devotion and stresses its importance. "Content always, disciplined, self-controlled, firm in
his resolve, his mind and understanding dedicated to me, devoted to me, he is dear to me" (XII 14). Thus, "sacred duty" can be fulfilled with Krishna as the mediator and object of devotion. It seems that bhakti becomes a stepping stone to dharma that is obviously nonexistent in jnanayoga.

Krishna's final argument takes the form of karmayoga, the discipline of action. This becomes part of the resolution of the complexities of action that Arjuna desires. The discipline of karma is basically one step above that bhakti. There definitely exists in karmayoga a more distinct responsibility on the part of the individual rather than an intermediary guide. This is the renunciation of the fruits of action. This basically is the symbol of one's devotion to Krishna. "Relinquishing the fruit of action, the disciplined man attains perfect peace; the undisciplined man is in bondage, attached to the fruit of his desire" (V 12). Krishna again emphasizes the importance of this point with regards to the highest goals of dharma, "You will be freed from the bonds of action, from the fruit of fortune and misfortune; armed with the discipline of renunciation, you self liberated, you will join me" (IX 28). This "renunciation of the fruits of action", is the crux of this discipline. This is the most relevant to Arjuna's situation and therefore our own. The epitome of Krishna's argument can be found in the third teaching, "Always perform with detachment any action you must do; performing action with detachment, one achieves supreme good" (III 19).

The larger meaning of the Bhagavad Gita is very difficult to understand and therefore it becomes even harder to explain. Yet it is best understood through the various yogas that were previously discussed. In retrospect, it appears that the Bhagavad Gita is a book concerning spiritual life. It seems that the interest of the Gita's philosophy and its yoga is to highlight the fusion of man's inner soul with the outer reality of action. In one sentence the Gita is the secret of dharma. The Gita concentrates on two components: the modes of reaching dharma, and the results of its achievement. The modes are three disciplines that have been thoroughly discussed and defined already. But the core meaning of "sacred duty" has not been highlighted. This becomes the crux of the Bhagavad Gita.

The idea of dharma involves two intertwined actions. The first being that the individual understand his own mortality, caste, and reincarnation.
This entails the realization that a man is not the doer of action, but rather the larger monism acts through him. This is a realization that follows any of the three disciplines. "Our bodies are known to end, but the embodied self is enduring, indestructible, and immeasurable; therefore, Arjuna, fight the battle!" (II 18). The means by which one invokes this monism is to balance action and inaction. Inaction of the body and the mind, complimented with the action of the soul. "When he gives up desires in the mind, is content with the self within himself, then he is said to be a man whose insight is sure, Arjuna" (II 55). Therefore, this understanding that follows discipline, leads to one final step, the realization of the inner deity that permits release from dharma.

Moksa, or release, is the freedom from the world where it is felt that "sabbam dukkham" is our lot. But, the Bhagavad Gita has really nothing to detail about this mystical release for it is obviously beyond words. The Gita is rather the handbook for the discovering how to reach your own personal dharma and what that wonderful state details. The understanding of the path to get to one's "sacred duty" is essentially the most difficult to idea to comprehend yet it is the fundamental building block by which Hinduism constructs dharma and subsequently moksa. This is why the detail of Krishna's arguments through the three yogas was mandatory to understand the whole of the Gita, the base of dharma, and the monism of moksa. The disciplines of devotion, knowledge and action are the foundation by which we build the core meaning of the Bhagavad Gita.
The Tragedy of Dido

Within the pages of the ancient literary work, The Aeneid, stands a most tragic and pitiful character, the fated queen Dido. Dido is a heroine of strong will who takes in the weather beaten hero, Aeneas, giving him a year of ease and a year of her undying love. However, in the end of Book IV of The Aeneid, she takes her own life on the sword of Aeneas. One might ask the question why a strong willful and very persevering young queen would end her life over Aeneas' departure? The object of this paper is to find out the many reasons behind Dido's suicide by analyzing the poetic words of Virgil and to perhaps understand the allegoric meaning to the killing. Dido was not a weak women, something had to have driven her to commit this most unjust and heinous act.

Dido is a woman who has loved and violently lost; she knows the pain of desire and love. However, it is her passion that causes her to commit suicide. Her heart becomes totally consumed by the fever of love for Aeneas. "And Dido, fated queen, drew out the night with talk of various matters, while she drank long draughts of love" (The Aeneid, p.30). The cup from which Dido drinks her love is not one of regular passion but one that is all consuming and maddening. "The queen, for her part, all that evening ached with a longing that her heart's blood fed, a wound or inward fire eating her away" (95). She is all consumed by her passion for Aeneas so much that she becomes deluded into the belief that she will marry Aeneas. "High Heaven became witness to the marriage, ... That day was the first cause of death, and first of sorrow. Dido had no further qualms as to impressions given and set abroad; she thought no longer of a secret love but called it marriage. Thus, under that name she hid her fault" (101). With this mind set she had no choice but to kill herself when her darling Aeneas sailed away from her on his voyage to found Rome. She was Aeneas' wife in her own passion-clouded mind and was completely devastated by his departure. The main reason Dido kills herself is because she is consumed by passion for Aeneas and then madness at his leaving her. However, her passion is
a result of divine intervention from Aeneas' mother, Venus. "I propose is to ensnare the queen by guile beforehand, pin her down in passion, so she cannot be changed by any power but will be kept on my side by profound love of Aeneas" (28). In this Venus has devised a plot to sway Dido's affections toward Aeneas in order to keep him safe from the wrath of the angry goddess Juno who is out to stop him and his destined mission. By using her son Amor, Venus causes Dido's heart to become full of an uncontrollable passion which she can not resist. "When she embraces you and kisses you, you'll breathe invisible fire into her and dupe her with your sorcery" (28). Dido is an unwilling participant in this whole affair. There is no evidence that Dido would have been hostile to Aeneas yet Venus feels the need to cause Dido to fall hard for him. She has no choice in the matter, either to harm Aeneas or to love him. She is a pawn in a chess match between the goddess Juno and Venus. Juno even remarks that it is the fault of the heavens that Dido will kill herself. "If by collusion of two gods one mortal woman is brought low" (99).

Another reason why Dido kills herself is because she is abandoned physically and emotionally by Aeneas. When the gods call him and he obeys, Dido is amazed and confused. "The excellent Dido had no notion, no warning that such love could be cut short" (106). She begs and pleads with Aeneas but he refuses to even recognize the time they spent together. "As to the event, a few words... I never held the torches of a bridegroom, never entered upon the pact of marriage" (107). His denial drives her into madness; he would not even admit that he loved her as a mate. Dido must have felt used and wronged by Aeneas. She comes to realize that her passion has clouded her sight so much that she came to love such a wretched man.

"Dido, poor soul, your evil doing has come home to you. Then was the right time, when you offered him a royal scepter. See the good faith and honor of one they say bears with him everywhere the hearthgods of his country! One who bore his father, spent with age, upon his shoulders!" (117-118). Dido's suicide can be seen as her last display of strength and her revenge against the injustices of Aeneas.

Dido was once married to a right and noble king named Sycaeus. This man was then murdered by Dido's brother. Upon the ashes of her dead husband she made a vow of chastity. Aeneas was the first and only man for whom she questioned her chaste life. "Had I not set my face against remarriage
after my first love died and failed me, left me barren and bereaved—sick to death at the mere thought of torch and bridal bed—I could perhaps give way in this one case to frailty" (96). Aeneas' departure and refusal to acknowledge their love, however, drove Dido to become mad with guilt and shame that she had been so unvirtuous with so "wicked" a man. "It was not given me to lead my life without new passion, innocently, the way wild creatures live, and not to touch these depths. The vow I took to the ashes of Sychaeus was not kept" (116). To Dido killing herself may have been the only way to cleanse her spirit for the evil she had committed to the memory of her dead husband.

Dido's love for Aeneas became so all consuming that she began to fail at her royal duties and obligations. "Towers, half-built, rose no farther; men no longer trained in arms or toiled to make harbors and battlements impregnable. Projects were broken off, laid over, and the menacing huge walls with cranes unmoving stood against the sky" (98). She neglected her office and her people. This woman had once led a people across the sea to found a new nation, yet she had become enthralled to Aeneas so much that she began to lose respect. "Because of you, Libyans and nomad kings detest me, my own Tyrians are hostile; because of you, I lost my integrity and that admired name by which alone I made my way once toward the stars" (107). Dido had become nothing in the eyes of her people. She no longer had the sway over them that it took to command. She had gone from a mighty leader to an enslaved whore. Dido had lost everything that she had struggled so hard for. Even if she could live without Aeneas she had nothing to go back to and nothing to live for. She was a defeated woman.

The final reason which all these others have led to is her madness. She became mad from passion, guilt, defeat, and resentment. Her madness was horrible in the extreme and, one might say, not at all earthly. "Now she saw before her a thing one shudders to recall; on altars fuming with incense where she placed her gifts, the holy water blackened, the spilt wine turned into blood and mire. ... From this she now thought voices could be heard and words could be made out, her husband's words" (112). Madness gripped her heart with such strength that she was completely out of control. Her mind was sick with a fever brought on by the whole situation and she had no control of her actions. "So broken in mind by suffering, Dido caught her fatal madness and resolved to die" (113). Suicide was the only solution
her confused mind could see and without reason she took her own life.

Now that we know the reasons why Dido killed herself we can try to draw out Virgil's allegoric intent on having her suicide in The Aeneid. The era in which Virgil wrote was a time of great upheaval in which two great leaders, Octavian, later to become Caesar Augustus, and Mark Antony, vied for complete domination of Roman power. Dido fits in to the situation by being a literary portrayal of the Egyptian queen Cleopatra. Cleopatra was a warrior queen who allied herself with Antony in war and in love. She was from the East and was therefore considered evil by Virgil in his ideal Roman mold. Cleopatra displayed none of the stoical Roman virtues that Virgil wished to exemplify in his epic. Therefore, he used Dido to represent Cleopatra. They were both powerful queens who fell in love with a "Roman" hero. They both let their passions overrule their lives and they both destroyed themselves for it. Cleopatra allowed herself to be bitten by an asp while Dido fell on a sword. One can theorize that the whole reason Dido had to die in the story was because her real life counterpart had committed suicide rather than face the hostile world. This idea fits in with Virgil's allegoric retelling of the civil wars and Cleopatra's fate because Dido's suicide does not seem in nature with her character. As well Virgil might have planned Dido's death as a harsh lesson in the value of stoicism.

Lastly Virgil reveals one last hint to explain Dido's suicide. Before the time of Virgil, the city of Carthage had been Rome's worst enemy. Dido in her madness curses the two cities so that they will never know peace between them. "Then, O my Tyrrians, besiege with hate his progeny and all his race to come: make this your offering to my dust. No love, no pact must be between our peoples; No, but rise up from my bones, avenging spirit!" (118). This could be seen as an explanation of why the two cities have always been enemies. Of course it is not the real reason but it is interesting for the reader to be able to tie their real history with this mythic history. Virgil, using his extreme literary skill, is able to tie fact and legend together with a simple curse from a dying queen.

The character of Dido is truly tragic. She is destroyed by her own hand but the fault lies with both gods and men. Her womanly passion is inflamed through divine intervention, she is humiliated by her love for Aeneas and his failure to acknowledge it, she is guilt-ridden by her
impropriety, and finally she is driven mad. Dido is not truly responsible for her own death. She is simply a pawn of the gods and a toy to Aeneas. Virgil invents her character on a pattern of someone else so in that respect her character is not her own and her death is not her fault. Therefore, one can safely say that Dido's death is not a clear cut suicide but an ingenious plot of murder most foul.
A Liberating Death

In Montaigne's "That to Philosophize is to Learn to Die", Montaigne states that

It is uncertain where death awaits us; let us await it everywhere. Premeditation of death is premeditation of freedom. He who has learned how to die has unlearned how to be a slave. Knowing how to die frees from all subjugation and constraint. There is nothing evil in life for the man who has thoroughly grasped the fact that to be deprived of life is not an evil. Aemilius Paulus replied to the messenger sent by that miserable king of Macedon, his prisoner, to beg him not to lead him in his triumph: "Let him make that request himself."

In truth, in all things, unless nature lends a hand, it is hard for art and industry to get very far. I am by nature not melancholy, but dreamy. Since my earliest days, there is nothing with which I have occupied my mind more than with images of death. Even in the most licentious season of my life...amid ladies and games, someone would think me involved in digesting some jealousy by myself, or the uncertainty of some hope, while I was thinking about I don't remember whom, who had been overtaken a few days before by a hot fever and by death, on leaving a similar feast, his head full of idleness, love, and a good time, like myself; and thinking that the same chance was hanging from my ear...

I did not wrinkle my forehead anymore over that thought than any other. It is impossible that we should fail to feel the sting of such notions at first. But by handling them and going over them, in the long run we tame them beyond question. Otherwise for my part I should be in continual fright and frenzy; for never did a man so distrust his life, never did a man set less faith in his duration. Neither does health, which thus far I have enjoyed in great vigor and with little interruption, lengthen my hope of life, nor do illnesses shorten it. Every minute I seem to be slipping away from myself.

And I constantly sing myself this refrain: Whatever can be done another day can be done today. Truly risks and dangers bring us little or no nearer our end; and if we think how many million accidents hang above our heads, not to mention this one that seems to threaten us most, we shall conclude that lusty or feverish, on sea or in our houses, in battle or at rest, death is equally near us. "No man is fatter than another, no man more certain of the morrow." --Seneca. To finish what I have to do before I die, even if it were one hour's work, any leisure seems short to me.

"It is uncertain where death awaits us; let us await it everywhere."

Montaigne theorizes that no one can know the exact moment of when their death will arrive and so it is best to be prepared for it at every moment.

By this, Montaigne suggests a slew of moral conscience issues that one would
amend had they been given the chance before their lifetime was up, as well as accomplishments and justices. Montaigne implies that, should the moment of death occur suddenly, one would be ready, in the sense that they would have no regret for their actions and their lives would be properly fulfilled before death. Montaigne also suggests that, it is best to live each day to its fulfillment as if awaiting death everywhere and constantly so that our lives will always be rich and free of loose ends.

By stating that premeditation of death is premeditation of freedom," Montaigne assesses the belief that if one contemplates their own death and makes preparation as to lift their moral consciences and fulfill their lives to its utmost potential, and if they premeditate and carry out things on a regular, habitual basis, then so too does this produce a premeditation of freedom; And y freedom Montaigne means the condition of the soul, for to consider one's own death is to consider the departure of soul from the body. But more so than the division of spirit and body as freedom is the release of conscience from the physical barrier of imperfection and vice. Montaigne implies that, if the body is the doer of sin while the soul is consentor, and sin can only be carried about or imagined by the body. Hence, death of the body is the dissipation of the immoral factor which taints the soul's record. No longer imprisoned by the banal anatomy, the soul is free to go back to its creator, no longer adding to the weight of sin already marking it. Montaigne also does not specify what sort of death he sees as the equivalent to freedom, and aside from the physical and spiritual realms, Montaigne implies that death could also mean the death of ignorance, which is better understood as the gain of knowledge. And so premeditation of knowledge is also liberating, for if one seeks and considers knowledge daily, they free themselves from the snares of the unknown, the superstitious, which generate fear and insecurity. And so Montaigne's implication evolves into the idea that "the quest for knowledge alleviates fear and insecurity."

And, being set free from misunderstanding nature and mankind, one learns how to be a controller of one's own destiny, and mastering the quest for knowledge, will not be ruled by fortune. Hence, "He who has learned how to die" (meaning he who has learned how to gain knowledge) "has unlearned how to be a slave," for "Knowing how to die frees us from all subjugation and constraint."
Montaigne also states that "there is nothing evil in life for the man who has thoroughly grasped the fact that to be deprived of life is not an evil." By this statement Montaigne means that if a man realizes that the worst thing that can happen to him is the physical termination of his life, and if he spends each day in preparation of his own death, and if a man can face death bravely and free of moral fear, then nothing which fortune sends his way -- no sorrows, physical pain, or anguish of any kind -- all of which falls short of the irreparable consequences of death, then his acceptance of death alleviates the evil of all those things which precede it. Hence, no evil awaits one who realizes that no harm will come from death. Secondly, Montaigne also challenges the fact that although the "life" concerns human life, and human life by virtue of Adam and Eve was meant to be lived in a state of ignorance, (for it was God's commandment that they not eat of the fruit of the tree of knowledge of what is good and what is bad), the gain of knowledge and refusal to be ignorant is not an evil as the Bible suggests.

"In truth, in all things, unless nature lends a hand, it is hard for art and industry to get very far."

Montaigne discusses man's ultimate dependence on fate itself for the constant progression of the art and industry of everything in life. By this he means that nature is the driving force which eventually has the hand in the outcome of projects. By art and industry, Montaigne also refers to the art of creativity, imagination, and the materialization of these ideas. Also, nature interferes with the progression of art and industry by allowing or disallowing natural ability and gift to those of the field. One who does not possess the ability to master the art will doubtless be of no use to the progression of mankind. So too is the sciences affected by nature, for it is the subject of discovery, and nature may or may not make it easy for scientists to uncover the mysteries it presents. And nature may or may not comply with the theories. And so nature as the external factor, and nature as the driving spirit which activates the the theories boosts the evolution of art and industry.

Montaigne also states that he is

by nature not melancholy, but dreamy.
Since my earliest days there is nothing
with which I have occupied my mind more
than with the images of death. (That to
Philosophize is to Learn to Die p. 60)

By this he means that his own personal interest in death has not to do with
a self-annihilating perspective but with his vast imagination and his
philosophical inquiry. Montaigne admits that even he has been preoccupied
with his fascination of his death, and judging by his tone, is not repentant
of this behavior. In fact, Montaigne makes it seem all the more natural,
and considering his previous statements, he is implying that he is quite
proud of the fact that he has always been prepared for death.

The progression of Montaigne's nature from what would likely be
melancholy to that of dreamy attitude in leading him to the consideration
of death allows for the progression of speculation and philosophy of death.
Hence, the chosen nature of Montaigne's approach boosts him in his
advancement of philosophical inquiry, allowing the delightful art and
scientific progression of philosophy to ensue.

It is impossible that we should fail to feel
the sting of such notions at first. But by
handling them and going over them, in the long
run we tame them beyond question.

Montaigne suggests that it is only natural that one should feel bitter
or disturbed by the first mention of death, as it is a natural human reaction.
And, perhaps upon first consideration the subject of death appears
intimidating, and it depresses one to think of one's own death. Furthermore,
Montaigne suggests that to overcome this perturbance one must consider it
often to familiarize oneself with it, and if one dares to philosophize over
it, eventually one needn't fear the onslaught of death and will come to
understand it. And, in understanding the nature of death, one eventually
conquers the ignorance of it. So too is it implied about knowledge, for
the power of knowledge renders the power of responsibility, and it is
therefore intimidating to inherit; for not only does knowledge dissipate
the fantasy and the superstitious, but with it, it risks the dissolution
of hopes and dreams. And, in accepting knowledge it is demanded by a higher
law that one behave with greater morality. So too, Montaigne implies that
one must wrestle with one's own knowledge and seek to find the truth in each mystery, so that eventually fear of knowledge is tamed by the gain of wisdom.

Otherwise for my part I should be in continual fright and frenzy; for never did a man so distrust his life, never did a man set less faith in his duration. (That to Philosophize is to Learn to Die p.61)

For Montaigne, not even health "which thus far I have enjoyed in great vigor and with little interruption" plays a determining factor in his regard for death. Montaigne ascribes to a fatalistic philosophy that regardless of good vigor or serious illness, he is not swayed to believe that his life is neither strengthened or weakened by the circumstance. And so because of his continual diversion from his physical status to his emotional stability, Montaigne looks beyond himself, realizing that everyday that one lives is another day closer to their death. So he rightfully claims that "every minute I seem to be slipping away from myself."

"And I constantly sing myself this refrain: Whatever can be done another day can be done today."

Montaigne here states that he habitually reminds himself of the wilyness of destiny, and that chances of a disaster or a fortunate event is just as likely to occur now as it may occur later. Hence, because we cannot predict the exact time or place, fate seems random. Therefore as he repeatedly suggests, it is better to be prepared for it today, or for whatever may come, addressing it in a positive note. That is why Montaigne sings the refrain rather than weeps over it, because in being prepared one's life is fulfilled at each sunset, and if each day is fulfilling, then one is much happier.

Truly risks and dangers bring us little or no nearer our end; and we think how many millions accidents remain hanging over our heads, not to mention this one that seems to threaten us most, we shall conclude that lusty or feverish, on sea or in our houses, in battle or in rest, death is equally near us. (That to Phil-
Montaigne's use of Seneca's quote ("No man is plainer than another, no man more certain of the morrow") just emphasizes the fact that his philosophy extends to all mankind, and that it is possible for death to suddenly strike him as well as any other. Death is not particular, and no man can be certain of the next moment in time. Montaigne reiterates by these words that a man must always be prepared for death because of the uncertainty of when it will strike. Also in the same sense however, no man is lesser than another when it comes to the concept of knowledge. Hence, no man can be certain as to one who will be gifted with insight, or the time when it shall occur, (which in effect decrees abortion on a philosophical/ utilitarian viewpoint). And so one must not treat a poor man worse than a wealthy man, or look to the poor as creatures of lesser intelligence capacity.

"To finish what I have to do before I die, even if it were one hour's work, any leisure seems short to me." Montaigne concludes briefly by this sentence that his entire purpose in life is therefore to finish all that he sets out to do before his death comes, and because each day is so full of tasks which must be completed before the sun sets, for man is unsure of when Death should arrive, there is little time to sit idly, for even leisure time is really a sort of carpe diem. Hence, true leisure spent in no serious contemplation or fulfilling activity is limited, and for Montaigne, decidedly so.
In Versions of Truth

"For all of that," replied the Bachelor, "some who have read your history say that they would have been glad if the authors had left out a few of the countless beatings which Don Quixote received in various encounters."

"That's where the truth of the story comes in," said Sancho.

"Yet they might in fairness have kept quiet about them," said Don Quixote, "for there is no reason to record those actions which do not change or affect the truth of the story, if they redound to the discredit of the hero. Aeneas was not as pious as Virgil paints him, I promise you, nor Ulysses as prudent as Homer describes him."

"That is true," replied Sampson; "but it is one thing to write as a poet, and another as a historian. The poet can relate and sing things, not as they were but as they should have been, without in any way affecting the truth of the matter."

"Well, if it's the truth this Moor's after," said Sancho, "and my master's beatings are all set down, then mine will be found amongst them. For they never took the measure of his worship's shoulders without taking it of my whole body. But that is not to be wondered at, for this same master of mine says the limbs have to take a share in the head's pain."

"You are a sly fellow, Sancho," answered Don Quixote. "I swear your memory does not fail you when you want to remember anything."

"Even if I'd a mind to forget the thrashings I got," said Sancho, "the marks wouldn't let me, for they're still fresh on my ribs."

-Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra, The Adventures of Don Quixote
Part II; chapter III
trans. J. M. Cohen

As Cervantes opens the second part of Don Quixote, the readers find the hero very aware of, and very interested in, how he is perceived and judged by others. In his concern, Don Quixote asks the bachelor, Sampson Carrasco, not only of how the hero is presented in his published
history, but also about the judgement on the book itself. Replies the Bachelor, "there are different opinions, as there are different tastes...some who have read your history say that they would have been glad if the authors had left out a few of the countless beatings which Don Quixote received in his various encounters." The Bachelor speaks of the work as a "history," which, by the narrator's understanding, is "bound to be exact, truthful, and absolutely unprejudiced" (Cohen 1:78; ch. 1). But if it may be said that "there are different opinions as there are different tastes," then the ensuing discussion might suggest that there are as many truths (or more precisely, versions of the truth) as there are opinions.

Some of the readers, for example, believe that the account could be improved by deleting "a few of the countless beatings which Don Quixote received" from record. Sancho protests, declaring that it is in those details that "the truth of the story comes in." The truth, for Sancho, is concrete and inclusive. His version of truth is very close to reality, to the world as it exists. "And the only things which exist," says Sancho, "are what we see" (2:501; ch. 5). Sancho's reality, then, is grounded in the empirical; and history (i.e. the truth of the story) can be written from his observations. Further, because he is the witness of Don Quixote's history, he has the authority to defend what he knows to be the truth. And so he protests that the omission of even a few incidents from the many would make the account less than history. For just as the truth of the story comes in the inclusion of the defeats, the truth as history necessarily leaves with their exclusion.
Don Quixote disagrees. The history, in his opinion, could be just as valid in the absence of those defeats. Don Quixote is more inclined to agree with the narrator, who notes that "there were some other details to be seen, but they were none of them of great importance, and have no concern with the faithful telling of this story" (1:77; ch. 9). Don Quixote, however, does more than state that the inclusion/exclusion of events does not affect the validity of his history; he asserts that the events themselves, that "those actions...do not change or affect the truth of the story." Truth, for Don Quixote, lies in the essence of the story; not necessarily in the events observed. More specifically, it lies in his perception of the essence he creates in his story.

Until this point, Don Quixote has held in his mind a fixed truth, based on texts, articulated and held together by careful semantics, and thrust onto the outside world by the sheer force of his will. As the creator of his mind's truth, he is the sole authority over it. The fierce confidence he holds in his dogma makes him intolerant to any challenge to it, including reality; if it is incongruous, it is ignored. Reality, however, refuses to be ignored, and the results are not unlike one of the beatings in question. But now, after a number of these misadventures and defeats, Don Quixote is not as forceful nor as complete in his intolerance. He no longer denies reality, or accounts his defeats to the opposing will of an enchanter. Don Quixote denies only the importance of reality to "the truth of the story," the effect of the empirical on the essence. Further, in establishing that there are "actions which do not change or affect the truth," he implies that there
are actions and events which do alter and affect the truth. Don Quixote no longer perceives truth as frozen and immutable.

However, Don Quixote states that the "truth of the story" would not have been affected by the absence of a few of the more humiliating tales of defeat. And as the victim of those beatings, he may well be expected to argue for their removal. But here, he speaks not so much as an embarrassed victim as he does a third-person observer, concerned with the reputation and regard for "the hero," for the literary figure. After all, Don Quixote, and truth as he knows it to be, have not been wholly defeated. "I know who I am," says Don Quixote, "and who I may be if I choose" (1:91; ch. 5). And Don Quixote chooses, from the start of the book, to be a knight errant, a hero from one of his much revered texts. His goal is to realize these stories into truths. He does in fact have some measure of success in this turning of art into life, as he sucks outsiders into his own perception of reality. But his real victory is now, when his life has been turned into art. After all, comments the narrator, it seems "impossible...that so good a knight should have lacked a sage to undertake the writing of his unparalleled acheivements, since there never was one of those knights errant who...ever lacked one" (1:75; ch. 9). The "truth of the story," the truth as Don Quixote had decided it to be from the first of the story, is that there is a story. He is, in reality, the literary hero he believed and willed himself to be.

For Don Quixote, then, it is enough that the story exists; need the authors include every detail, especially if they "redound to the discredit of the hero...?" After all, to discredit the essence of the
hero is to discredit the essence of the truth (i.e. Don Quixote's concept of the truth). In recognizing his identity as a literary hero, he argues that "Aeneas was not as pious as Virgil paints him, I promise you, nor Ulysses as prudent as Homer describes him." This is quite a different Don Quixote from the one introduced in the first chapter, who believed that "all the fanciful stuff he read was true," and spoke of fictional characters as if they were actors in history. This is hardly the same man who grounded his logic and justified his decisions by the authority invested in works of Feliciano de Silva. Neither Aeneas nor Ulysses, argues Don Quixote, was as true to his virtue (i.e. essence) in life as he appeared in art. And because Don Quixote finds his truth in essence, the authors "might in fairness" keep quiet about events that subtract from the purity of the the hero's virtue. Further, his comment hints that authorship no longer endows authority; readers can question and judge the author's credibility, to determine for themselves what is the truth of the story. Here, for example, it is Don Quixote who speaks with authority, backed by his own promise, on the virtues of Aeneas and Ulysses.

The Bachelor, with his credibility as a scholar, affirms Don Quixote's authority, but then introduces an important distinction. Virgil and Ulysses are poets, who have license to "relate and sing things, not as they were but as they should have been," and they will not have violated the truth of reality in doing so. But not only are the boundaries of truth being examined and tested in this passage, but the boundaries between art and life as well. The publication at hand, in any
case, is not poetry; the Bachelor has, from the first, referred to it as a "history." And a historian, he tacitly implies, must describe things as they are, and not as they should have been. The Bachelor seems to establish here that the poet's truth is a second kind of truth, separate and independent of the historian's truth. He appears to agree with Sancho that the "truth of the matter" (i.e. the historian's truth) is very close to, and inclusive of, reality. And Cide Hamete Aubergine, the Bachelor might argue, has been a dutiful historian in his loyalty to reality, leaving "nothing in his ink-horn...(telling) us everything and (dwelling) on every point, even to the capers Sancho cut on the blanket" (2:486; ch. 3).

Now the reader senses a discrepancy between the Bachelor's truth of the story and Sancho's truth of the story. Where the Bachelor is impressed that Cide includes "even...the capers Sancho cut," Sancho would say, "but of course, Cide includes the capers Sancho cut." (And there were no cuts on the blanket, Sancho would have the reader note, "but in the air." (Cohen 2:486; ch. 3)) If "telling the truth" is really what the historian is after, then he should automatically include details of Sancho's activities. Here, Sancho expands the realm of reality to be included in the truth of the story. One feels that if Sancho had been the one to record the adventures of Don Quixote, then the book would have been frighteningly longer. For not only should the master's beatings be included, but his squire's as well. After all, a full account of the faithful squire's role (like the measure of his "whole body"), no matter how small, is as relevant to the truth as the inclusion of one incident in the knight errant's adventure (i.e. the measure of a part). Further,
just as the head and limb experience the same pain, Sancho and Don Quixote experience the same adventures and participate in the same reality. And in sharing the same reality, Sancho affects Don Quixote's truth, just as Don Quixote affects Sancho's truth.

"But (this) is not to be wondered at," Sancho assures us, for it is what "this same master of mine says." Sancho quotes Don Quixote to cast authority on his argument of what should be included in "the truth of the story." And even though Don Quixote does not agree with Sancho's argument, he cannot argue against his own words, or deny that he has said them. He instead accuses his faithful squire of being "sly" and deceptive by remembering only what he "want(s) to remember," when he wants to remember it. But it is Don Quixote who would choose to have the memories of less glorifying events conveniently forgotten in the writing of his history. According to the narrator, however, history is the mother of truth (2:78; ch. 9), the record and the rememberance of reality. So if Sancho is guilty of deception by virtue of his 'selective memory,' then Don Quixote must be so much more guilty by fault of his 'selective history.'

For Sancho, though, reality and truth are not so easily manipulated. "Even if I'd a mind to forget the thrashings," Sancho argues, "the marks wouldn't let me, for they are still fresh on my ribs." The observable evidence prevents Sancho from straying from his truth. He notes that the bruises are "still fresh on his ribs," just as Don Quixote's words about the head and the limbs are still fresh in his ears. For recent realities, "what we see present and before our eyes appear, stay, and persist in our memories much better and much more vividly than
things past" (2:501; ch. 5). The reader might infer, then, that time itself strips credibility from history, and the truth becomes that much harder to find. But Sancho's bruises, since they are fresh and yet visible, seem to be the most believable and authoritative of the "truths" discussed in the passage. But Cervantes does not say that appearance is always the best determmer of truth; perhaps he only suggests that something that can be observed by all can be better tolerated. After all, even Don Quixote does not challenge Sancho's remarks here.

Cervantes, throughout the passage, brings up the problem of authority and credibility. The passage opens with a reference to the "authors," plural, of this history. This recalls the discrepancies between the alleged authors (discussed in part one), and reminds the readers that there is no sole authority on the truth in this book. The narrator is neither sure of his sources, the translator, nor even his own representation of the history. For every author, there is a different opinion; for every opinion, a different version of the truth. And each character, with his own perspective of truth, claims authority and legitimacy to his version. The readers can believe Sancho, because he was an eye witness. The bachelor's credibility lies in his education and "great intelligence" (2:486; ch. 2). And Don Quixote's truth comes not only from the authoritative texts he has read, but because he arbitrarily creates the truth in his mind. He is the artist of his own portrait, choosing reality as his medium. But it is this same artist who challenges the poets' accuracy in describing the epic heroes. Thus, Don Quixote transfers the authority from the artist and his ideal to the readers and their reality. And, of course, there are as many different
opinions as there are readers; and so many more truths as there are opinions. But from where do the readers derive their authority to judge what is truth and what is not? A return to the first sentence in the passage answers the question: for all of that, the readers may judge, simply because they have read.

"So is it true, then, that there is a history of me?" asks Don Quixote. Yes, it is true. And the reader knows it to be, because he holds it in his hand.
A Rendezvous: Machiavelli, Caliban, and Sancho Panza

SCENE I

The Scene: The Boston University Student Union, at lunchtime. The three main characters are waiting in line to enter The Banner Room (vegetarian dining) when a woman seated by the door asks them to participate in the upcoming Oxfam Fast. The three men had not met previously, but begin a conversation while waiting in line that continues in the dining hall.

Oxfam Volunteer: Have you signed up for the Fast yet?
[Machiavelli is clearly ignoring the question, so she touches his sleeve to make it clear that she is addressing him].
Machiavelli: No. This is the first I've heard of it. What does it entail?

Oxfam Volunteer: By signing this list, you will give up lunch and dinner for one day, donating the money instead to Oxfam America, an organization dedicated to eliminating hunger.
Machiavelli: How can I be sure that this is not another one of the University's scams to get more of my money?

Oxfam Volunteer: Each day 60,000 people die of hunger and related diseases. It's a serious issue -- and one that even BU would not use for its own benefit.

[Machiavelli appears to be unmoved.]

Machiavelli: I'll think about it over lunch and see you on my way
out. [In order to appease her for the present time, he draws forward a poorly groomed man from behind him and offers his meal card.]

**Machiavelli:** This man, however, is interested in sacrificing two meals for the benefit of the less fortunate.

[Caliban stumbles forward, irritated that his lustful admiration of a nearby table of women has been interrupted].

**Caliban:** What? I must eat my dinner! (Tempest I. ii. 330).

[Machiavelli leans to whisper into Caliban's ear]

**Machiavelli:** I'm sure you can find a way for her to return the favor. And you don't really have anything to lose. You could give her a false I.D. number and just make her think you actually care. Don't let her social consciousness fool you--she's still just a woman.

[Caliban grins (and drools a bit as well) and steps forward to sign the list. Meanwhile, another character steps forward.]

**Sancho Panza:** I've got quite a pair of oxen at home -- real docile creatures. Is this some sort of livestock league?

**Oxfam Volunteer:** No, actually quite the contrary. Did you know that such animals consume enough grain to deplete half of the grain supply that could easily feed the entire world's population? Raising livestock is a wasteful production...no matter how docile they are. I'm actually here to take food donations in the form of meals. Are you interested?

**Sancho Panza:** Ha! I've worked hard and paid dearly for my meal plan. Despite the personal satisfaction you say I'll have for starving myself for one day, I hold that "a post that won't find a man in food
isn't worth two beans" (Cervantes, 767).

Oxfam Volunteer: If you can't handle fasting for a whole day, perhaps you can just donate your meals and then use points to buy lunch at The Backstage.

Sancho Panza: I have no more points, but to please you I will sign my name...if you agree to buy me lunch that day.

Oxfam Volunteer: I'm sorry, but you're clearly not grasping the concept of the Fast. You aren't willing to make any sacrifices.

Sancho Panza: I'm not obliged to do anything (Cervantes, 495).

[He walks into the dining hall. Meanwhile, Machiavelli has entertained himself by observing the volunteer's conversation with Panza, and with Caliban's evident sexual desire for the Oxfam representative. He lingers to witness Caliban's pathetic attempt to pick up the woman.]

Oxfam Volunteer: Is there anything else I can do for you?

Caliban: Well, since you're asking.....[he leans in closer to the woman and whispers some suggestive remark into her ear.]

Oxfam Volunteer: I'll thank you to leave my presence...NOW!

Caliban: How does thy honor? Let me lick thy shoe. (Tempest, 86).

[The woman turns away, repulsed. Machiavelli is overcome with laughter at the scene he has caused.]

Machiavelli: Come, let's have our lunch. [He takes Caliban by the arm, and they enter the dining hall.]
SCENE II

_The Scene:_ The Banner Room. At this point, Caliban is unaware that it is a vegetarian dining hall.

_Caliban:_ What is this? Beans and rice? Lentil soup? Where is the roasted boar? Show me the stuffed turkey! I can feed myself better living alone in the wilderness! I need red meat to satisfy my appetite!

[Machiavelli and Caliban join Sancho Panza, who is already seated.]

_Machiavelli:_ You are adept at exercising the ability not to be humane and merciful. I am Niccolo Machiavelli, and pleased to make your acquaintance.

_Caliban:_ I am Caliban, and at your service...if you might share some of your victuals with me.

_Sancho Panza:_ Indeed, I am Sancho Panza by name, and delighted to know you.

[After introductions are made, Panza continues to admire the banners that hang from the ceiling. As one of the cafeteria staff passes his table, he inquires about the origin of the banners.]

_Sancho Panza:_ I beg your pardon, but I do not recognize these banners as representing any isle with which I am familiar. Do you know anything about them?

[The cafeteria worker speaks little English, so she just smiles and nods...then, much to Panza's irritation, she walks away.]

_Machiavelli:_ That poor woman at the Oxfam table certainly has my
pity. Humans become frustrated when they try to reach unattainable goals. She is going to end up disappointed when she realizes that the statistics haven't changed after all of her effort.

*Sanzo Panza:* Every land has its own customs (Cervantes, 522). Perhaps some people have brought extreme thinness to the United States as a fashion ideal.

*Machiavelli:* Perhaps. In any case, people who try to be good in all regards come to ruin. Such ideals neglect the need for class distinctions and one ultimate conqueror. That is why I don't feel any responsibility to the less fortunate. They need to be where they are as a point of reference for the rest of us.

*Sanzo Panza:* Then why didn't you just tell her that instead of saying that you'd think about it over lunch? Caliban is the only one of us three who actually joined the Fast, and you still seem to have managed the most honorable position.

*Machiavelli:* I'm not going to contribute to a bad image for myself. It's all right to be bad, as long as you can avoid the reputation. Perhaps I can sneak by her on my way out and avoid a confrontation altogether. If not, I'll make up some other half-truth. He who deceives will always find someone who will let himself be deceived"(Machiavelli, 70).

*Caliban:* You're a true devil, but you spend too much time weighing and reasoning your actions. Just learn to recognize where you hunger, and act to satisfy your appetite.

*Machiavelli:* Your scope is so limited. You have to learn one simple philosophy: The ends justify the means. It wouldn't have been so bad
to lose two meals if you could have had that woman's body, would it? You have to learn how to use such things to your advantage -- but be subtle about it.

Sancho Panza: I have no problems with serving others, but I'm realistic about such things as meals. I support those who choose to fight, but prefer a more passive stance.

[Panza catches sight of a piece of dark hair in his lasagna, and removes it excitedly.]

Sancho Panza: God bless me -- I was right when I noticed something suspicious about that cafeteria worker! She is certain to have been an enchanter of some sort, cleverly smiling for her knowledge of this magical, dangerous thread, woven in my dish that I might choke on it! It must be an omen...a warning that I ought not refrain from signing the Oxfam list before I leave today! How fortunate I am that my eyes discovered it before some worse fate claimed my very life! I should make haste and sign for my redemption with the fates.

Machiavelli: It is so far from how one lives to how one should live that he who lets go of what is done for what should be done learns his ruin rather than his preservation (Machiavelli, 61).

Sancho Panza: I could do nothing more foolish than to ignore this blessed warning which the fates have lent me.

[Panza abandons his meal and hurries out to find the Oxfam representative.]

Caliban: Ha, Ha, Ha! He's but a sot(Tempest III. ii. 97). Pass me his
plate. Surely he won't mind sacrificing one meal more.

[Machiavelli gives Panza's abandoned dish to Caliban]

**Caliban:** What! No meat here, either!

**Machiavelli:** Caliban, they do not serve meat at this dining hall. It is against some people's health and ethical codes.

**Caliban:** O Setebos (Tempest V. i. 261)...I shall be pinched to death (li. 277) by such strange practices! Some humans are so far beyond my understanding! But, I shall strive for grace and wisdom. Our meeting today has made me realize what a simpleton I have been. It had been a pleasure meeting you, Niccolo.

**Machiavelli:** And you, Caliban. Be prosperous (p. 111). Farewell.
The Time Be Out

Ariel: Is there more toil? Since thou dost give me pains,
Let me remember thee what thou hast promised,
Which is not yet preformed me.

Prospero: How now? Moody?

Ariel: What is't thou canst demand?

Prospero: My liberty.

Ariel: I prithee,
Remember I have done thee worthy service,
Told thee no lies, made thee no misgivings, served
Without or grudge or grumblings. Thou did promise
To bate me a full year.

Prospero: Dost thou forget
From what a torment I did free thee?

Ariel: No.

Prospero: Thou dost; and think'st it much to tread the ooze
Of the salt deep,
To run upon the sharp wind of the North,
To do me business in the veins o' th' earth
When it is baked with frost.

Ariel: I do not, sir.

Prospero: Thou liest, malignant thing! Hast thou forgot
The foul witch Sycorax, who with age and envy
Was grown into a hoop? Hast thou forgot her?

Ariel: No, sir.

Prospero: Thou hast. Where was she born? Speak! Tell me!

Ariel: Sir, in Argier.

Prospero: O, was she so? I must
Once in a month recount what thou hast been,
Which thou forget'st. This damned witch Sycorax,
For mischiefs manifold, and sorceries terrible
To enter human hearing, from Argier,
Thou know'st was banished. For one thing she did
They would not take her life. Is this not true?

Ariel: Ay, sir.

Prospero: This blue-eyed hag was hither brought with child
And here was left by the sailors. Thou my slave,
As thou report'st thyself, wast her servant.
And, for thou was a spirit too delicate
To act her earthy and abhorred commands,
Refusing her grand hests, she did confine thee,
By help of her more potent ministers,
And in her most unmitigable rage,
Into as cloven pine: within which thou rift
Imprisoned thou dist painfully remain
A dozen years; within which space she died
And left the there, where thou didst vent thou groans
As fast as millwheels strike. Then was this island
(Save for that son that she did litter here,
A freckled whelp, hagborn) not honored with
A human shape.

Ariel: Yes, Caliban her son.

Prospero: Dull thing, I say so! He, that Caliban
Whom I now keep in service. Thou best know'st
What torment I did find thee in; thy groans
Did make wolves howl and penetrate the breasts
Of ever-angry bears. It was a torment
To lay upon the damned, which Sycorax
Could not again undo. It was mine art,
When I arrived and heard thee, that made gape
The pine, and let thee out.

Ariel: I thank thee, master.

Prospero: If thou more murmur'st, I will rend an oak
And peg thee in his knotty entrails till
Thou hast howled away twelve winters.

Ariel: Pardon, master.

I will be correspondent to command
And do my spirit ing gently.

Prospero: Do so; and after two days

Ariel: I will discharge thee.

That's my noble master!

What shall I do? Say what? What shall I do?

- Shakespeare's The Tempest
  Act I, scene ii, In.242-300

In act I, scene ii of Shakespeare's The Tempest, the audience
learns that the tempest has been but an illusion, directed by Prospero
and performed by Ariel. But even as Prospero praises Ariel at the end
of his triumphant report, his mind is already moving ahead, measuring
out their next task. Ariel, on the other hand, seems rather startled
by this--"is there more toil?" (242). He apparently believed this
past performance to have been his last; a finale, perhaps, to end his
career of service. But the illusion of the tempest is to be the first
of several that the audience will witness, each created by the same
team; Ariel, the creative force, and Prospero, the mind behind the
motion.

Before they move onto their next performance, however, Ariel
graciously appeals to Prospero to "let (him) remember...what
(Prospero) hast promised, which is not yet performed" (243-244). But
Prospero snaps back with unexpected agitation. His sentences are
terse, delivered with force, and tinged with sarcasm: "How now?
Moody?... What is't thou canst demand?... Before time be out? No
more!... Dost thou forget from what a torment I did free thee?... Thou
dost... Thou liest, malignant thing!... Speak! Tell me!" (244-257).
Not only have his words lost their usual poetry, but his entire mood
and his attitude towards Ariel have been transformed in the space of
a few lines. Where before he had been full of delight and had
lathered praise on his "brave spirit" (I.i.206), he now pounds him
with accusing questions. Before, they had seemed more like partners
in their art, but now Prospero is absolutely, and unmistakably, the
master. This is the way Prospero is accustomed to treating Caliban,
the more savage and rebellious servant.

Though he questions Ariel for being "moody" (244), it is
ironically Prospero who seems to be unduly emotional here. Ariel,
after all, has asked permission to "remember." Again, Ariel seeks to
support his petition by asking of Prospero, "I prithee, remember I
have done thee worthy service" (246-247). Throughout the play, the
act of remembrance seems to be a metaphor for the act of learning.
Ariel is invoking a mental activity, then—not an emotional one. In
his own words, Prospero seems to be the one not "so firm, so constant
that this coil would not infect his reason" (I.i.207). And while
this particular "coil" has hardly the force of a tempest, Prospero is
intolerant of the slightest challenge to order. He will not hear of
changing the order of things "before the time be out." Nonetheless,
the force of Prospero's response is understandable; he is remembering
a "coil" of twelve years ago, when his generosity was abused and his
authority uprooted by his own brother. Having suffered the error
before, he will not again be mistaken for a soft ruler.

But neither will he be mistaken for a cruel ruler. While Ariel
is not overtly accusing, his reference to a false promise threatens to
present Prospero as unjust. So Prospero's reaction is further fed by
his need to defend the ideal image of himself as the "grave sir" and
"great master" (I.i.199). Though "moody," Prospero will present Ariel with a logical justification for his servitude by guiding him through their history. Now, it is Prospero who invokes the act of remembrance.

Prospero's appeal to Ariel's logic and sense of justice is probably more effective than his brute intimidation. After all, one can allegorically understand Ariel as the embodiment of, among other things, the nobler spiritual powers of mankind. The original inhabitant of the island, Ariel is the pure mind of man before the Fall. He is a soul in touch with the immaterial and eternal truths, and has "told thee no lies, made thee no misgivings." We might even call the spirit Ariel divine, just as we might consider the higher and purer aspects of the human soul to be divine. As Prospero's muse, he is associated with the creative energy and the imagination of man; he is the poet and the musician, the essential artist of the illusions.

If Ariel is the pure and spiritual mind, then Prospero is the enlightened and rational mind. He embodies that noble mental power of man; the power of reason. Ariel's emancipator, Prospero's intellect and reason are the redemptive powers for mankind. Where Ariel is the creative artist, Prospero is the strategic engineer; together, they can perform the incredible. But as Prospero firmly establishes his natural and just position as Ariel's master, Shakespeare seems to allegorically establish the natural and just position of the rational above the spiritual. The spirituality of man, until now, has been of "worthy" and willing service to his intellect, cooperating "without grudge or grumbling" (249).

This, however, is not, and has not been, a constant and permanent relationship. Ariel reminds Prospero of this, looking towards and imagining a future when he will be free. Prospero, in turn, reminds Ariel of the same by recalling a time when Ariel was not only indentured, but immobilized. When Ariel petitions Prospero to remember his promise, Prospero asks in near disbelief, "what is't that thou canst demand?" (245). The enlightened mind, after all, is a kind master, allowing the spiritual soul much license. Further, this
master has empowered his servant by sharing his enlightenment, enabling the spirit to rise above and control nature, "to tread the ooze of the salt deep, to run upon the sharp wind of the north, to do business in the veins o' th' earth" (252-255). What more could Ariel ask for? Or has he forgotten "from what a torment (Prospero) did free (him)?" (251).

The spirit, though his position is much improved, desires to return to his primal, natural state in ultimate and absolute liberty. Prospero, though he tacitly acknowledges this, does not view liberty to be something that Ariel "canst demand" (245). The spirit's liberty may not even be within Prospero's authority to grant, anymore than a soul's salvation can be ecclesiastically granted. Prospero understands Ariel's liberation to have an ordered place in time. So what time is it now? It is "past the mid season" (I.ii.238), the latter half of a period; the end of an era is in sight and a new age, the Age of Reason, is imminent. Civilization's triumph of reason and the restoration of its natural order will free mankind's spirituality. On a personal level, an individual's intellectual realization of his true, noble nature signals his spiritual maturity, an age for its salvation. For man and his civilization, then, the spiritual cannot be liberated until the end of the age of restoration not "before the time be out" (246).

Both Prospero and Ariel, however, seem to recognize that Ariel's freedom rests on more than the passage of time. Ariel argues that he has earned his liberty through his deeds; the spirit reminds the master that he has done his duty, has not misrepresented the truth, has not led reason astray, nor hindered its progress (247-250). Prospero, however, knows that freedom and salvation do not come by good deeds alone. But when they combine their powers, their deeds can restore the natural order, and Ariel can return to his true form. Likewise, the powers of the state and the church needed to come together to reestablish order, and thus allow mankind to realize its nobler virtues. Further, an individual soul's salvation comes when he embraces, with both mind and spirit, his uncorrupted virtues.
Before Ariel can know his salvation, however, he must know "from what a torment" it is that he is being saved. Ariel states that he has not forgotten the misery from which Prospero redeemed him. Prospero says that he must have; for if the spirit remembered, he would find neither his service to Prospero nor his labor with nature too harsh (257-259). The pure spirit replies for the second time that he does not forget. "Thou liest, malignant thing!" cries Prospero, denying Ariel's claim that he had "told thee no lies" (248). In calling the spirit a "malignant thing," he seems to slander and betray Ariel's divine nature. Or he is only realizing that a blind and deceived spirit has a potency for harm, so it becomes doubly important to make Ariel recite his history. Again, Ariel states that he has not forgotten, and Prospero denies the spirit for the third time.

Prospero wants more than to just remind Ariel of his past; he wants to hear Ariel remember it (259). Intellectual knowledge must be met by spiritual recognition. For Prospero, and for Shakespeare, to remember is to know; and to have knowledge is to have power. In order to completely overcome the chains of his past, Prospero must make Ariel remember his history of his torment completely, from its earliest point; the birth of Sycorax. This is not the first time Ariel and Prospero have gone through this ritual of remembrance; Prospero must "once a month recount what thou (Ariel) hast been, which thou forget'st" (262-263). Prospero periodically takes Ariel through the entire ritual to remind him of one essential thing: that not only have the conditions of the spirit been changed by enlightened knowledge, but the spirit himself has been profoundly transformed from "what (he) hast been." For the human soul, as for Ariel, a profound retransformation must take place for salvation to occur.

Self-knowledge, both of past and present, is the empowering key for Ariel to regain his natural state; remembering who he was under Sycorax becomes necessary for his liberation. Understanding Sycorax, then, becomes imperative for the reader to understand Ariel's liberalization. If we understand Prospero as man's reason and intellect, and Ariel as man's spirit and soul, then how can we
understand Sycorax? Prospero describes her as a "foul witch...who with age and envy was grown into a hoop" (258). Sycorax, then, might represent an ancient part of mankind—one so maliciously devouring that it consumes even itself. Further, Sycorax comes to the island from Algiers, banished from her birthplace. She is not native to the isle; her powers are not natural to man's mind. Seventeenth century audiences might have associated Algiers with pagan lands, lands untouched by Christianity. Further, Prospero directly refers to her as a "damned witch" (263), and Caliban calls "the charms of Sycorax—toads, beetles, bats." Sycorax and her black magic, then, might represent the irrational spirit, the superstition that dominated the minds of men in earlier ages. This black magic and witchcraft, banished from the higher realms of the supernatural, exercise their supernatural powers with "earthy and abhorred" commands (273).

Prospero reminds Ariel, now his "slave," that he had been Sycorax's "servant" (270-271). Here, Prospero underlines a distinction between a slave and a servant. A slave is not free to question his position. In slavery, the spirit it absolutely subject, and reason is unimpeachably supreme. In contrast, his servitude to Sycorax implies a willingness, or at least resignation, to his position. Prospero presents Ariel's acknowledgement of his servitude to the witch as a confessional, reminding him that the history is "as thou report'st thyself" (271). His resulting misery, then, would be the a result of his own inaction early on; the spirits failure to refuse witchcraft as its master. Similarly, Christianity, rather than overcoming the superstition of the pagans, permitted (and even fostered) its own strain of Christian superstition during the medieval age.

Sycorax's magic is black magic, ground in superstition; it is unenlightened and born from ignorance. She does not have the knowledge, and thus the power, to make this "spirit too delicate to act her earthy deeds and abhorred commands" (273). The witch has no real power over the spirit, and finds him "refusing her grand hests" (274). In her passionate rage and frustration, Sycorax imprisons
Ariel "into a cloven pine" (277). Under Prospero, Ariel has power over the powerful winds and deep seas of nature (253-254); under Sycorax he is imprisoned by one of the simplest things of nature; inanimate vegetation. And the tree in which he is immobilized is a "cloven pine," a twisted aberration of nature. Here, the spirit is trapped for "a dozen years" (277); the same amount of time that Prospero and Miranda have lived on the island before the tempest. Just as there are twelve months in a year, the twelve months might represent a natural cycle; the cycle of a generation. Then for one generation of the island, Ariel's spirit is tortuously imprisoned by the witchcraft of Sycorax—just as for one generation of mankind, the human spirits was grievously immobilized by the ignorance of superstition.

Even though the spirit, impeded by form, is immobilized, he does not lose the power of his voice. His groans were "as fast as millwheels strike" (280), their insistence and repetition reflecting something made by man, something unnatural. But Shakespeare also invokes animal imagery here, as Prospero describes how Ariel's "groans did make wolves howl and penetrate the breasts of ever-angry bears" (287-289). The unnatural misery of man’s spirit, brought on by man himself, debases humanity with the anguish of a wounded animal. Prospero implies that even Sycorax was moved to free Ariel, but she lacked the knowledge and power and "could not again undo" (291) her own work; "grown into a hoop" (259), her ignorance perpetuated their misery. Before the twelve year cycle was out, Sycorax died, leaving Ariel imprisoned, and her base, savage son to roam the island. Similarly, even when superstition had largely died out from civilization, man’s spirit remained frozen in ignorance, leaving only the baser qualities of man free.

This is the state that Prospero finds the inhabitants of the island in, and "it was (his) art...that made gape the pine, and let (Ariel) out" (292-293). Prospero's art is reason, and it is reason that frees man's soul from ignorance. This same power controls the baseness of man, and "keep(s) in service" the lower virtues (286).
Neither Prospero nor Caliban seem to be willing participants in their relationship. Yet, even though Prospero would like to be free of the "dull thing" Caliban, he knows that he can not let this beast-man run free if he is to fully control his island. Further, he cannot yet give liberty to Ariel for one other important reason: Prospero needs Ariel. His reason alone cannot restore order and he cannot effectively rule over his island without his spirit. Where Caliban brings out the worst in Prospero, Ariel keeps him in tune to his higher virtues, his "nobler reason 'gainst (his) fury" (V.i.26-28). Not only is Ariel the essential actor in their art, but he also serves as the master's conscious. Likewise, the most intellectual of men need their spirituality not only to animate their work, but also to help keep their passions in check. Again, the most advanced of civilizations need religious institutions not only to inspire great art and science, but to serve as a moral force in society, to prevent the corrupt natures of mankind from destroying order.

Prospero cannot free his spirit until he has subdued the rebellious Caliban, anymore then the state can liberate the church until its authority is unimpeachable and society in order. Yet, Ariel's freedom is essential, and it cannot be delayed much longer. Prospero has already demonstrated once that there is potential for abuse in his control over Ariel. Three times he denied Ariel's insistence that he knew his history, calling him a liar and a "malignant thing" (257). Prospero asserts his superiority with such force and passion that the spirit's replies become nearly inaudible. The muse is not allowed more than a few words at a time, while his master leads him through the historical and logical justification of his slavery.

If he seemed "moody" or over reactive in that first demonstration of his potential, Prospero seems unduly cruel and vengeful in his second demonstration. At the end of the ritual of remembrance, the spirit thanks his "master" (293). Ariel recognizes Prospero as what he wishes to be acknowledged as-- a benevolent master. But Prospero's next words make the audience shiver, as he
warns the spirit, "if thou murmur'st, I will rend thee to an oak and
peg thee in his knotty entrails till thou hast howled away twelve
winters" (294–296). Prospero threatens to do more than return him to
his old prison—after all, a stout oak is stronger and more rigid
than a pine. But the image of Prospero splitting a tree and then
nailing his spirit to the timber is absolutely chilling. Prospero not
only has the power to redeem; he has the power, and potentially the
will, to crucify. Shakespeare, perhaps, is expressing a fear that
the state might not necessarily create a civilization that would allow
the human spirit to rise to its purest and highest form. Instead, if
it took extreme measure to establish and control order in society, the
state might find itself forcing the church to inaudibility and
sacrificing the human spirit. Finally, Prospero promises to leave the
spirit there for another generation of winters; the cries of humanity
would fall on a cold and sterile generation of civilization.

Prospero needed Ariel while he learned to rule his island, and
needs him still to restore the natural order of power. He can then
apply what he has practiced in the world beyond his island. When
Ariel's his term of service is over, Prospero will leave to rule a
civilized state. Ariel will remain on the island, free to roam this
domain. At the personal level, an individual needs both intellectual
direction and a spiritual transformation for his soul's salvation.
But the mind and the spirit must condition one another to bring about
that salvation, which will set the spirit free. At another level,
Shakespeare recognizes that the institutions of the state and of the
church needed one another, as the state learned how to effectively
rule a stable society. Together, they could restore a well ordered
civilization, where the human soul can realize its highest virtues.
There appears to be a definite order to Shakespeare's universe, and
the state is clearly justified as the dominant order here. But
Shakespeare warns that there is a potential for abuse in this
relationship; when the state has established itself unimpeachably, and
no longer needs the church, it should leave religion on the "island,"
setting it free in the domain of the individual's mind. Otherwise,
the power of the enlightened state could do more harm to the church and to the spirit of mankind than the impotence of ignorant superstition.

Not to worry, though, for Prospero proves to be enlightened enough to realize the fundamental importance of Ariel's liberalization. He promises that if the spirit "will be correspondent to command and do (its) spiriting gently" (297-298) then he will "after two days...discharge thee" (299). But the audience, and Prospero, already know that Ariel will do as promised. Prospero has not lead him through the remembrance ritual for nothing; we can see Ariel's transformation throughout the ritual in the way he responds. Immediately after his challenge for freedom, Ariel responds to Prospero as an equal— he does not use any title or formality in addressing his master. As Prospero begins reciting his history, Ariel returns Prospero to the position of a "great sir" (I.ii.199) responding with "I do not, sir...No, sir...Sir, in Argier...Ay, sir" (256, 259, 260, 268). After the history lesson is completed, Ariel acknowledges Prospero once again as his superior, saying "I thank thee, master...Pardon, master. I will be correspondent to command" (294, 296-297). After Prospero has promised him his liberty, Ariel restores Prospero as the ideal master he wishes to be recognized as, exclaiming, "that's my noble master!" (299).

Prospero's logical argument of history has shown Ariel that reason is the just and natural master over the spirit. But it is Ariel who show us that this order is also necessary. His next words, "What shall I do? Say What? What shall I do?" (300), not only recognize Prospero's authority-- they seek guidance in that authority. Just as Prospero needs Ariel to be his servant, Ariel needs Prospero to be his master for at least another two days, until "the time be out."

57
"A Pregnant Bank" and the Vegetative Soul

Where, like a pillow on a bed,
A pregnant bank swelled up to rest
The violet's reclining head,
Sat we two, one another's best.

Our hands were firmly cemented
With a fast balm which thence did spring,
Our eyebeams twisted, and did thread
Our eyes upon one double string:

So 't'intergraft our hands, as yet
Was all the means to make us one,
And pictures on our eyes to get
Was all our propagation.

As 'twixt two equal armies fate
Suspends uncertain victory,
Our souls, which to advance their state
Were gone out, hung 'twixt her and me.

And whilst our souls negotiate there
We like sepulchral statues lay;
All day the same our postures were,
And we said nothing all the day.

If any (so by love refined
That he soul's language understood
And by good love were grown all mind)
Within convenient distance stood

He (though he knew not which soul spake,
Because both meant, both spake the same)
Might thence a new concoction take,
And part far purer than he came.

This ecstasy doth unperplex,
We said, and tell us what we love:
We see by this it was not sex,
We see we saw not what did move:

But as all several souls contain
Mixture of things, they know not what,
Love these mixed souls doth mix again
And makes both one, each this and that.
A single violet transplant,
The strength, the color, and the size
(All which before was poor and scant)
Redoubles still and multiplies.

When love with one another so
Interinamates two souls,
That abler soul which thence doth flow
Defects of loneliness controls.

We then, who are this new soul, know
Of what we are composed and made,
For that atomies of which we grow
Are souls, whom change can invade.

But O, alas, so long, so fard
Our bodies why do we forbear?
They are ours, though they are we; we are
Th' intelligences, they the spheres;

We owe them thanks because they thus
Did us to us at first convey,
Yielded their forces, sense, to us,
Nor are dross to us, bu allay.

On man heaven's influence works not so,
But that it first imprints the air;
So soul into the soul amy flow
Thought it body first repair.

— John Donne "Ecstasy"

John Donne's The Ecstasy is an ingenuous dramatic monologue about the spiritual fusion between the narrator and his lover. In it Donne uses the Petrarchian theme of Platonic love but he twists it a bit by stating that physical love is almost as important as spiritual love. Petrarch, as far as we know, never consummated his love with Laura, while Donne certainly did with his love. Also, the narrator achieves a oneness of mind with his lover; therefore the soul becomes liberated from the body.

The first two lines of the first stanza are "Where, like a pillow on a bed
/ A pregnant bank swells up to rest..." True to Donne's form, this passage is
obviously sexual. It anticipates a physical love theme which will be further developed later in the poem. The word violet in the third line is important for several reasons. A violet is purple, which, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, connotes regality and virtue. Flowers are also often equated with femininity, which already sets up a portrait of the narrator’s lover. In addition, the metaphor of the violet is used again in a slightly different manner which will be discussed further in depth later in the paper.

The second stanza introduces a scene where the narrator and his lover are staring into each other’s eyes. “Our eyebeams twisted, and did thread / Our eyes upon one double string.” This introduces a theme of the two lovers becoming one. It is further developed in the first two lines of the third stanza: “So t’ intergraft our, as yet / Was all the means to make us one.”

The fourth stanza introduces a strange metaphor of war.

As ’twixt two equal armiees fate
Suspends uncertain victory,
Our souls, which to advance their state
Were gone out, hung ’twixt her and me.

The basic meaning in this passage is that the souls of the two lovers leave their bodies to go to a neutral area between them. Donne here uses a personification of fate as the person who is holding the balance of victory. The lover’s souls (or soul) want to be victorious over the confines of the individuals’ bodies.

The next two stanzas set up a metaphor which equates the staring motionless lovers to “sepulchral statues.” Donne then images an ideal
observer is watching the lovers. This observer understands perfectly what is happening to them because he is "love refined" and he understands the "soul's language." This observer would note that souls of the lovers have fused to the point that their voices could not be distinguished. "...though he knew not which soul spake, / Because both meant, both spake the same..."

John Donne then focuses more closely on the lovers, where they are engaging in a conversation, or as stated later in the poem, a "dialogue of one," about the ecstasy. The lovers' ecstasy "unperplex" (unties or unravels) the binding ties between body and soul. The lovers then argue that the motivations of this relationship is not sex but rather this spiritual union. "We see by this it was not sex, We see we saw not what did move;" The lovers continue by stating that the soul contains a "mixture of things." This is a reference to the Neo-Platonic Renaissance belief that the soul has three parts--the rational, sensual, and vegetative. Donne here implies that just as an individual's soul contains a mixture of things, the lovers' souls mix to form a larger soul. "Love these mixed souls doth mix again / And makes both one, each this and that."

Donne then returns to the metaphor of the violet, but he uses it in a different manner. Here, he uses it as a metaphor for the growth of the soul, which before was "poor and scant" but after the lovers' union "redoubles still and multiplies." For the next couple of stanzas, Donne stresses the perfection and attributes of this new soul. "That abler soul which thence doth flow / Defects of loneliness controls."

The next stanza, as A.C. Partridge states in his book John Donne: Language and Style, is the turning point of the poem. Donne asks, "But O,
alas, so long, so far / Our bodies why do we forbear," or what’s the point in putting up with our bodies? He answers by equating the relationship between the bodies and the soul in Dantine terms. "...we are / Th’intelligences, they the spheres." In other words, the rational part of the soul (or intelligence) is the master of the body, and the body is the means in which the soul operates. He continues by stating that he and his lover ought to thank their bodies because their bodies were what brought them together in the first place. Donne even goes so far as to say that his relationship with heaven is not as strong as his relationship with his lover because it lacks the physical element. "So soul into soul may flow / Though it to body first repair."

In the next two stanzas he continues to stress the importance of the body. He does this by comparing the process of attaining a state of ecstasy to the process of sexual reproduction.

As our blood labors to beget
Spirits as like souls as it can,
Because such fingers need to knit
The subtle knot which makes us man,

So must pure lovers’ souls descend
T’affections and to faculties
Which sense may reach and apprehend;
Else a great price in prison lies.

Donne states that love is the junction between the spiritual realm and the physical realm, and like childbirth, a relationship must start with the body before a soul, like a child, is separated from the body. Donne states that any other method to attain ecstasy besides through the body is wasteful. These stanzas directly challenge Petrarch’s Platonic
unconsummated idea of love.

Donne ends the poem by acknowledging that this exalted state cannot last forever. He does this by returning to the perfect observer. The concluding line of this poem seems to be purposely ambiguous. It can be interpreted in two manners. One, that this state of ecstasy cannot last forever. This is because the individual souls return to the bodies. Secondly, it can be interpreted that after the physical act of love the souls remain united on the spiritual plane.
King of Pain

In John Milton's *Paradise Lost* (IV, 58-62), Satan, upon looking at the sun of Paradise, laments his own prideful fall. He says, "O had his powerful Destiny ordain'd/ Me some inferior Angel, I had stood/ Then happy; no unbounded hope had rais'd Ambition" (58-61). This is an interesting accusation of Satan, placing the blame on God's benevolence in creating Satan as a distinguished Angel above the rest. He attributes his fall to overwhelming ambition, and it is clear he recognizes this as a primordial sin. He claims that had he been "inferior" he still would have been happy. What this suggests, in effect, is that his overriding ambition has prevented his present happiness. Interestingly, though, Satan recognizes the power of God as all-encompassing (otherwise why would he place the blame of his excessive pride on God?), and the question arises why Satan, recognizing his weakness in the face of the omnipotence of God, dares fight the strength of his Creator.

Satan acknowledges, "But other powers as great/ Fell not, but stand unshak'n, from within or from without, to all temptations arm'd" (63-65). Satan questions why he is the only one to fall from pride and ambition. Not only does this foreshadow the fall of Adam and Eve, but it also hints at a quality that is intrinsic in Satan's nature as well as the race of fallen man. Satan understands sin as an indigenous
quality of human nature, and if this is the case, why does he not gain God's forgiveness by recognizing his faults. The answer to this is a simple word: pride. In this way, Milton marks the distinction between cognition and action. Although Satan understands God's will, he is reluctant to renounce his worldly lifestyle of pride and revenge and embody God's ethics. This is reminiscent of Claudius in Shakespeare's Hamlet. Although Claudius recognizes that he regrets his actions, he is not willing to relinquish the consequences: "My words fly up, my thoughts remain below. / words without thoughts never to have go" (Hamlet, III, 97-98). On the part of Satan, this appears to be a case of sour grapes: Satan understands that he cannot win the grace of God, so he attempts to prevent others of the same through his persuasive rhetoric.

Satan asks himself, "hadst thou the same free Will and Power to stand?/ Thou hadst: whom hast thou then or what to accuse,/ But heav'n's free Love dealt equally to all?" (66-68). Satan's logic and rhetoric are slippery in this excerpt; he says, in effect, that if he is created equal to all of God's creations, then his fall is not his own but God's fault for initially endowing him with free choice. While this argument sounds feasible on the surface, the underlying principle is grounded in self-deception. Satan utilizes his powers of rhetoric to rationalize his headstrong desires. Satan, in invoking the phrase, "heav'n's free Love dealt equally," implies that if God had not been "equal" then the
problems would have been solved. In this way, Satan attributes the evils of sin to equality. Satan uses the language of 18th century philosophers like Rousseau (free will, equality) in order to support his specious argument.

Satan continues in his logic, "Be then his (God's) Love accurst, since love or hate, / To me alike, it deals eternal woe" (69-70). Satan's syllogism is that God's love granted him free will which allowed for his fall, which accounts for his woe and despair in hell. God, therefore, is the sole responsible party because his love allowed for dissent. This concept of love is reminiscent of Dante's in the Divine Comedy where all aspects of life -- heaven, hell, and purgatory -- are created through God's divine love. Curiously, though, Satan also says that God's hate, too, causes him anguish since his expulsion from heaven leads him to live eternal damnation. This implies that hate and love are intrinsically related, or, in fact, that the two merely are extensions of each other. But this is a textual contradiction of the Biblical passage, "God is love." This, then, begs the question: Does God hate? Or is this merely Milton's way of showing the effective and persuasive nature of Satan's rhetoric, that even we begin to doubt doctrine. Either interpretation, it evokes skepticism concerning previously foregone convictions.

Satan then tells himself, "Nay curs'd be thou; since against his thy will/ Chose freely what it now so justly rues. / Me miserable" (71-73). Even he, the master rhetorician, cannot convince himself that he is free from
blame. The use of the word "justly" illustrates that Satan believes his punishment of eternal damnation is properly warranted. The previous excuses, then, are merely that -- a way for Satan to somehow skirt the issue and rationalize and sublimate his guilt. At this point, we as readers feel compelled to empathize with Satan's plight, for we as humans must contend with this very issue on a daily basis. This principle of knowing what is wrong but still engaging in it is a fundamental concept of sin... that of free will. In fact, it may be the case that Milton himself identifies with Satan as a revolutionary leader fighting a losing battle as he did in his protests against Cromwell.

Satan then reflects:

... which way shall I fly
Infinite wrath, and infinite despair?
Which way I fly is Hell; myself am Hell;
And in the lowest deep a lower deep
Still threat'ning to devour me opens wide;
To which the Hell I suffer seems a Heav'n. (73-78)

Satan is torn between the fact that he knows if he continues his path of ambition and pride then he will bury himself deeper in the depths of Hell and the accompanying wrath of God, and that if he repents, he will live in infinite despair because he has admitted defeat. Either way for him, Satan will reside in a personal hell, whether it be geographically in Hell or Heaven. Hell, to Satan, is a bottomless pit in which the forces of gravity work as an agent to drag him into a lower state of depravity, in both his and God's perspective. But Satan has internalized this conflict, ("myself am Hell").
Milton implies through this that hell, in effect, is understanding the laws of God but being trapped by selfish pursuits to continually violate them. If this is the case, we all live a personal hell in our daily lives. Through this metaphor, Milton suggests that Satan, however evil he may be, is merely human and propelled by the same motivations as we are.

Satan then advises himself, "O then at last relent: is there no place/ Left for Repentance, none for Pardon left?/ None left but by submission" (79-81). Satan realizes that the path of righteousness is renunciation of selfish indulgences and that the free will allows us also to make a conscious choice to "take up our cross and follow Him" (Matthew 17:24-25), and that submission of our personal desires is the only way to salvation. But Satan states, "that word (submission)/ Disdain forbids me, and my dread of shame/ Among the Spirits beneath, whom I seduc´d/ With other promises and other vaunts/ Than to submit, boasting I could subdue/ Th´Omnipotent" (81-88). Satan clearly realizes that the only force which prohibits him from repenting is the thought of the shame of admitting defeat to his followers. Satan embodies stubborn pride, and rather than admitting his weakness he would rather live in eternal misery. Satan's ambition, then, merely serves to lock him into a prison in which he holds the key to escape. The only barrier between him and salvation is his self-respect, but moreover, the respect of his vigilantes. This is the classic case of the maxim: "Pride goes before a fall."
In fact, Satan verbalizes this internal conflict: "Ay me, they little know/ How dearly I abide that boast so vain/ Under what torments inwardly I groan" (86-88). His use of the word "vain" is key to this excerpt; in one sense Satan uses the word to signify futile, but at the same time it hints at his vanity. Satan feels the need for false bravado. On one hand he enjoys the power that accompanies ruling the kingdom of Hell, but he cannot publicly admit that their campaign against God is foolish and ill-advised. The internal conflict Satan expresses reiterates the notion of Milton's Hell -- the struggle between knowing the good but embracing the evil.

Satan concludes this passage with the despair of this internal conflict and paradox: "While they adore me on the Throne of Hell/ With Diadem and Scepter high advanc' t/ The lower still I fall, only supreme in misery; such joy Ambition finds" (89-93). The contradiction lies in the fact that while Satan thrives on mass manipulation he realizes the futile truth that he is weak in comparison to God's omnipotence, and his weakness lies in his overabundant pride. His followers exalt him as the King of Hell, but he understands that this is merely profitless exaltation by blind fools; Satan is only supreme in his excessive internal torment. His ambition has made him not the King of Hell as his followers profess, but, rather, the King of Pain.
Irrational Hope and Dormant Fear: The Fates of Faust and Don Giovanni

FAUST:
Oh, if I had wings to lift me from this earth, to seek the sun and follow him!
Then I should see within the constant evening ray the silent world beneath my feet, the peaks illumined, and in every valley peace, the silver brook flow into golden streams. No savage peaks nor all the roaring gorges could then impede my godlike course. Even now the ocean and its sun-warmed bays appear to my astonished eyes.
When it would seem the sun has faded, a newborn urge awakes in me. I hurry off to drink eternal light; before me lies the day, behind the night, the sky above me, and the sea below. A lovely dream; meanwhile the sun has slipped away. Alas, the spirit's wings will not be joined so easily to heavier wings of flesh and blood...

...Two souls, alas, dwell in my breast, each seeks to rule without the other. The one with robust love's desires clings to the world with all its might, the other fiercely rises from the dust to reach sublime ancestral regions.

Faust Vor Dem Tor 1074-1091; 1112-1117

DONNA ELVIRA:
Stay here then, ingrate!
Wallow in your crimes,
A horrible example of iniquity!

LEPORELLO:
If her grief fails to move him,
His heart is of stone, or he has none at all.

DON GIOVANNI:
Hurray for women.
Hurray for wine!
The substance and glory of humanity!

Don Giovanni Act II Finale

Both Don Giovanni and Faust expend their greatest energies ministering to their powerful ambitions. Challenging every element of life that threatens to impede their progress, they
create in their wake trails of confusion and death. Yet despite their similarly murderous behavior, they are subject to contrary fates: Faust achieves salvation while Don Giovanni faces eternal damnation. One simple explanation for this dissimilarity of fates is that Faust and Don Giovanni belong to different social, or cultural fictions, each with its own system of justice. This explanation, however, defines these two men only in terms of the specific moral systems to which they are immediately subject; it confines them to the (aforementioned) social world of their texts. According to such a definition, Don Giovanni would be simply the pariah of a society in which hubris and presumption, and actions pursuant to such humors, merit final damnation. Faust, in turn, would be the champion of a society in which such reckless ambition is condoned—even to the degree that destruction which it precipitates is qualified, or permitted.

To escape the limitations of such a text-bound interpretation, one must first suppose that the final fates of Don Giovanni and Faust are not simply the results of the final judicial strokes of provincially divine moralities. Rather, one must understand that these contextual judgments are symbolic indicators of each character's inner-condition sui generis—regardless of their external surroundings or value systems. These judgments are markers representing not just the state in which Don Giovanni and Faust will eternally dwell, but that state in which they have already spun out their lives. In other words, Don Giovanni, because of the dormancy of his moral conscience, as represented in the "Restati, barbaro!" trio in the final scene of Don Giovanni, always enacts his own damnation, while Faust, because of his commitment to an irrational hope, as defined in the Sunset Speech and ensuing "two souls" speech (p.67-9) in the "Vor Dem Tor" section of Faust, always experiences his own salvation.

At the core of both men's characters are absolute drives. Each yearns to know, or possess all of that which he has determined to be the most important element, or elements, of life. Don Giovanni craves constant sensory gratification.
Hearty meals, wine, spirited dancing, and women—any and all, are the single objects of his desire. Faust's desire, on the other hand, consists of two elements. First, he desires to transcend somehow the boundaries of human existence. He possesses a soul that "fiercely rises from the dust" (p.69.ln.1116). This soul strives not simply to be ever working towards, or to pattern its existence after the example of, but to actually "reach sublime ancestral regions" (p.69.ln.1117)—to enter the realm of the divine creator, of eternal omniscience. Second, co-existing with his desire to escape humanity, there is within him another soul, one charged "with robust love's desires" that "clings to the earth with all its might" (p.69.ln.1114). The desire of his first soul, in order to press beyond the limits of humanity with least resistance, must now engineer some sort of reconciliation with his second, contrarily focused, world-bound soul. He seeks to remedy his sense of ambivalence.

Yet the simple presence of Faust's desire to overcome ambivalence, or Don Giovanni's fancy for passionate indulgence, is not unusual or extraordinary per se. In Don Giovanni, for example, Don Ottavio reveals a passionate desire for Donna Anna. "Grant me my reward," he implores her (epilogue.p.37), desiring, on one level, her hand in marriage, but more urgently, the physical consummation of their love. In Faust, Margaret voices a desire to overcome her conflicting passions—her ambivalence—when she sings a song beginning "My peace is gone/ My heart is sore." She simultaneously feels love for Faust, and pain from not being near him, and, like Faust, she desires to remedy this ambivalence—"To be at his side,/ To clasp and enfold him/ And hold him tight." (p.231).

What makes Don Giovanni's and Faust's desires more consequential that those of their comrades, is the nature the two men's uniquely oriented value systems—or, in Kantian terminology, non-categorical, consequence-based value systems. Both believe that what they yearn for is exactly what they need. Neither of them adheres to any social imperatives or moralities.
that would fetter their desires with counterweights—doubts or second thoughts. This parallel alignment of desire and sense of need is unlike Don Ottavio's uneven alignment, which subordinates his desire to a conscience derived from social convention: "A lover must yield to the desires/ Of one who adores him" (p. 37). Margaret's sensibility is similarly divided. She at first does not consummate her love for Faust because her conscience—fortified by the dictates of her mother—require her not to do so: ". . . and if [my mother] even found us there together,/ I should die in terror on the spot" (p. 239). Because each man's conscience is congruent with his yearnings, Don Giovanni and Faust operate on a more extreme, less ambiguity-laden level than do those such as Ottavio and Margaret, who are bound by restraining impulses.

Though both Don Giovanni's and Faust's senses of need correspond to their desires, the degree of this correspondence in Don Giovanni is much higher than in Faust. Don Giovanni's sensibility is completely unified. He not only lacks a conscience that would hold his desires in check, but lacks any restrictive conscience whatever. As he reveals in the "Restati, barbaro" trio, he is purely amoral. When Donna Elvira, an anguished victim of his "crimes," honestly confronts him, Don Giovanni cannot find in his being even a modicum of guilt, or compassion for her. Elvira's display of sincere emotion merely amuses him. Accurately pinning him as an iniquitous criminal, she passionately exclaims, "Stay here then, ingrate!/ Wallow in your crimes,/ A horrible example of iniquity!" (p. 34). But the moral impact and earnest passion of her words nearly drown in the boisterous strength of Don Giovanni's praise of life: "Hurray for women,/ Hurray for wine!/ The substance and glory of humanity!"

At the same moment, as if to mediate between the two, Leporello sings a message of reason. In the "If. . . then" terms of a proof, he sets a trap of logic, which, though not directly condemnsatory, allows Don Giovanni to rhetorically condemn himself. "If her grief fails to move him," Leporello explains,
"His heart is of stone, or he has none at all." Don Giovanni, with his "Hurray for women..." then springs the trap on himself—heedless of any moral tension and of any potentially dangerous or harmful consequences of his behavior. Further, that Don Giovanni easily sings such a mindless ode to indulgence in the face of—and what's more, in beatiful harmony with—Elvira's vengeful condemnations and Leporello's moral judgments, suggests that he is immune, and blind to any sort of contradiction to his personal understanding. It is as if he has both no qualms about flaunting his disgraceful disposition, and no shame—even in the face of searing moral retribution.

Without any self-restraints or inner-contradictions, Don Giovanni here acts as he pleases, creating a prodigious tension—in the form of intolerable "crimes" and heinous "iniquities"—between himself and his society, between his will and those of his conscience-bearing acquaintances. Because he creates such friction with these people and causes destruction that ordinarily would have remained, at least to some degree, within his own self in the form of conscience, or at least of social tact, Don Giovanni sets himself apart from his fellows. He proves himself to be not subject to (or graced with) the same personal problems and inner-conflicts with which ordinary human beings struggle. He operates outside of the realm of humanity. Not simply "inhuman," he is both more than and less than human at the same time: He embodies only the predatory, erotic aspect of human nature. As if everything in life were something to be consumed, he describes, for example, Martin's musical piece, Una Cosa Rara, as "a delicate dish" (p.33). Because he is not subject to the weaknesses of such non-predatory human aspects as compassion and pity, he can dance around these feelings without falling prey to their demands—he is more than human. In turn, because he knows only one aspect of human nature, the other aspects in him lie dormant. He is therefore not fully functional, or complete—he is less than human.

Leporello's statement in the "Restati, barbaro" trio accurately defines Don Giovanni's simultaneous more than—less
than character. The Don's callous and villainous behavior, explains Leporello, indicates that "his heart is of stone, or he has none at all". Either his sensibility, represented in synecdoche form by the physical "heart," is so conditioned that he is absolutely untouchable by the non-predatory aspects of human life such as compassion and pity; he is super-human. Or, on the contrary, he is somatically maimed--missing his heart, and because of this, the compassionate part of him is altogether non-existant; he is less than human.

Faust, on the other hand, does not operate outside of the bounds of humanity. This is primarily because unlike Don Giovanni, he does possess a conscience. It does not resemble Ottavio's, however, or Margaret's. It is neither based on a sense of socially-dictated need nor on popular moral imperatives. Rather, his conscience is a result of his own personal reasoning and experience. Like Don Giovanni, he believes that he does need exactly what he desires to obtain--his metaphysical omniscience and simultaneous inner-unification. But unlike Don Giovanni, he believes that he can never possibly consummate this desire. Just as his ambitious soul encourages him to strive, his earth-bound soul convinces him that such striving is fruitless. "Alas," he laments, "the spirit's wings will not be joined/ so easily to heavier wings of flesh and blood."(p.69.ln.1091). His conscience is his sense that it is irrational and potentially self-destructive to align his sense of need with such a doomed desire.

The co-existence of this consciousness of the impossibility of ever achieving his ends, and his yet immutable desire to somehow exceed his human limitations, creates inside him a terrible tension he himself defines immediately following the first part of the Sunset Speech. He explains that not only do "two souls, alas, dwell in [his breast]"--the "fiercely rising" soul and the soul that "clings to the earth," but that "each seeks to rule without the other". His desire, the production of the soul that "fiercely rises," manifests itself in Faust wish to have "wings to lift [him] from this earth"--wings that would
enable Faust forever to follow the "eternal light" of the sun and to finally escape his life of internal divisions. His conscience, the work of the soul that "clings to the world with all its might," would have him bow in dutiful reverence to the throes of the "savage peaks" and "all the roaring gorges," the forces of earthly nature that remind Faust of his limitations as a human being.

Whereas Don Giovanni, unchecked by any sense of inner-tension, projects all conflict into the field between himself and the external world, Faust's abundance of inner-tension locates the conflict primarily in the confines of his own sensibility. Don Giovanni's tensions begin to destroy his environment. Faust's, however, at first threaten to destroy Faust himself. When a Spirit admonishes Faust that Faust's project to unify his two souls with some sort of new, extra-human understanding is of no avail ("You're like the spirit that you grasp./ You're not like me. p.35), he turns his striving in the other direction. He decides to achieve this inner-harmony no longer through unification, but through death, the absolute negation of all inconsistencies. "Approach the brink serenely and accept the risk/ of melting into nothingness," he soliloquizes as he reaches for his poison-filled "goblet of pure crystal." Later, while having chosen to live, his ambivalence is still too powerful for him to entertain without despair. To preserve hope, though he knows such a hope is finally only a "lovely dream," (p.69.ln.1089), he projects his tension outward. And like Don Giovanni, he begins, though not deliberately, to destroy vital elements of his environment.

But there are two differences between Faust's pattern of destruction and Don Giovanni's. First, although he tries to, Faust never departs from his essence; he always operates within the limitations set by human nature. To achieve satisfaction, Faust is determined to achieve either his ideal end—an inner-unity through omniscience, or, the same unity through a non-existence, or death. In other words, Faust desires to be either more or less than human. But because he does not soon die, and
does not experience the pleasure of omniscience, he never reaches the state toward which he strives. Unlike Don Giovanni, his escape from humanity is always ever potential, and never consummated.

Second, when Don Giovanni murders the Commandant, fustigates Masetto, or attempts to rape Donna Anna, he does so only to the disadvantage of his victims and their peers, and to none of his own. However, when Faust murders, his own inner-landscape feels the full effect of each murderous deed. He couches the language of his Sunset Speech in terms of the natural world around him not simply for picturesque enhancement of his argument, but because his physical, natural surroundings are in fact the very objects of his his earth-bound soul's desire--the soul that "clings to the world with all its might": Fueled with powerful desire, Faust poisons Margaret's mother, kills Valentine, and indirectly sentences Margaret--the very object of his immediate longings--and her child, to death. At this point, however, Faust faces the retribution of his world-bound soul. For he has murdered an essential element of that world which this soul so ardently "clings to with all its might". "Oh, if only I had not been born!" (p.319), he screams, feeling the pull of this soul as he laments the now inevitable death of Gretchen and the painful existence his life has become. Whereas when Don Giovanni satisfies his desires, he destroys his surroundings and increases the division between himself and humanity, when Faust feeds his hubris, his conscience, in turn, is violently awakened. With every move he makes, his inner-division increases.

It is because this division is internal that Faust is saved, and because Don Giovanni does not possess any such division that he is damned. Salvation and damnation here are not the results of good or bad deeds, of consciously righteous or diabolic intention, but of embrace (Faust) or denial (Giovanni)--consciously or not--of one's essential nature. Faust does not consciously engineer his salvation. In fact, he saves himself by attempting to do just the opposite, to acquire
"wings to lift [him] from this earth," to divide himself from his nature. The more ardently he tries to escape his limitations, the more fiercely he increases his inner-divisions and the more he is bound to the essential and irrational inconsistencies that define the human nature of which he is, as much as he disdains to be, part. This nature—his (as with all human beings) simultaneous understanding, or awareness of his mutability, and yet a will to live, a hope for the future—Faust unintentionally, yet deeply, embraces.

So rich is his embrace that he not only embodies the two essential elements of humanity, but he embodies them in their extremes. First, he wants not simply to exist, but to exist forever, to "seek the sun and follow him" (p. 67.ln.1075). Second, and in opposition to the first, he is extremely conscious that he is finally subordinate to the power of time. "Meanwhile," he sighs, with a pang of nostalgic melancholy, "the sun has slipped away" (p. 69.ln.1089). As if saying, "Meanwhile, my life is slipping away," he ends his dream of the eternal moment echoing an awareness of his own mutability. Here Faust is so preoccupied with temporal cycles that night to him is not simply the absence, or the opposite of day, but the end of day, and a further reminder of his own death to come. Don Giovanni, on the other hand, has no concept of time. He consumes every moment, never wary of consequence, and never fearful of his fate. Even in his final moments, although he experiences pain and anguish ("What torment, oh me, what agony! / What a Hell! What a terror!") he does not repent; he cannot. The act of sincere repentance presupposes a fear of consequences, and such a fear is germinated only by the root of all human fears—the fear of death. If he had repented, somehow awakening in himself the yet dormant presence of his non-predatory elements, he would have secured (in the terms of this argument and opera) his salvation. For his sense of mutability, together with his appetitive desires, would have produced, if just for a moment, the ambivalence—the irrational co-existence of opposing drives within him—that would have drawn within him the division that
as yet he had unconsciously has projected away from himself. Only after he denies his final chance to repent and is falling into Hell does fear in him finally awaken. Indoctrinated into the human realm just long enough to taste his mortality before perishing, he exclaims in terrible wonder, "What strange fear,/ Now assails my soul!". But until now, he has remained unified within himself, and so not only blind to his condition, as the "Restati barbaro" trio reveals, but damned--cut-off from the same human essence that Faust, in his extraordinarily anguished division into "two souls," cannot help but embody.
The Overture: An Introduction

In Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart’s Don Giovanni, the overture serves a dual function. Not only does it mirror the action which takes place in Acts I and II (before the Finale of II), but it also illustrates the complex nature of Don Giovanni as he pursues his conquests, and his insight into the distinct natures of his victims, ranging from the common peasant-girl to the aristocratic gentlewoman.

The overture begins in measure 1 with an ominous, forboding d minor chord followed by a blunt transition into a crashing A7, signalling to the audience the mode of opera seria. The strings in measure 5 begin a slow, pulsing inner rhythm of minor, minor sevenths, and diminished chords which suggest an eerie, diabolic heartbeat. Floating on top of this rhythmic cadence are a series of alternating D and A octaves imitating a slow, calculated footstep. This is the pace of Don Giovanni. He succumbs to his instinct, the beating of his heart as he spies his next victim.

This section resolves on a d minor chord in measure 11, echoing the initial chord of measure 1, but then the first violins begin a hauntingly sweet melody which exudes false tenderness. This is a melody of aristocratic smoothness, Don Giovanni’s (questionable) seduction of Donna Anna as Act I opens. It is seductive and sensuous at the same time as it is stately and poignantly unembellished. Adding a darker shading
to this section, the second violins twist a serpentine melody underneath the primary melody of the first violins, suggesting the true, base intentions of Don Giovanni's seduction. His heartbeat (or animalistic desires) that pulses in the initial measures gives way to a slimy sinuous strand of intertwined notes. His actions, however sweet they may appear (as in the melody of the first violins), have darker, diabolical undertones which resonate to us as we listen to his story. But the foundation of this passage is rooted in the bass line of the viola, cello, and bass, echoing the common simplicity Leporello's opening aria "Notto e giorno." All this suggests that it is possibly only Leporello who has the ability to placate the devilish powers of Don Giovanni.

In measures 15-17, the winds and strings repeat a series of sforzando C major chords resolving into softer g minor chords. Then the strings begin a stealthy creeping which results in a furious A major diminished chord resolving into yet another passage of stalking by the strings. Here, we can see the furtive efforts of Don Giovanni as he hides from Donna Anna after killing the Commendatore, as he evades Donna Elvira, as he attempts to escape the responsibility of his passionate actions. We hear a series of resolutions which are interrupted by another jarring chord, which suggests that Don Giovanni's attempts to disguise his actions merely results in chaotic repercussions.

Then, the overture turns to turmoil in measure 23; the flutes and first violins repeat a series of ascending and
descending scales, the rest of the winds sustain an ascending chromatic scale on top of this whirlwind, while the strings beat out the never-changing pulse, echoing measure 5. The chaos can no longer be contained, and the rising and falling scales seem to indicate the impending judgment that Don Giovanni will face. In fact, this theme repeats in the finale when the Commendatore offers the choice of salvation or damnation to Don Giovanni.

But in the overture, this turmoil abruptly transforms (on that pivotal note of d) into a frolicking, which suggests Don Giovanni's desire to continue the facade. The overture which was previously seria quickly changes into buffa. This is Don Giovanni's ultimate pretense of gaiety of intentions, his rendezvous with Zerlina, a melody of the common peasant. Although the brass and winds exert their grand, triumphant passage in measure 38, and the entire orchestra repeats a playful inversion of a D major chord (measures 48-55), the dark underside still surfaces 67 in a surprise diminished chord in the midst of frolicking liveliness. This is his true nature, which Don Giovanni's facade of gentility can never fully eclipse. Although the true fall of Don Giovanni's charade never completely manifests itself in the scheme of the overture, his dark center is an incessant underlying internal force which propels the overture and manifests itself in small bursts of lightless passages.

This cavorting movement within the overture plays upon the question of the stability of resolutions, which is
initially introduced in measure 15, as well as symbolically representing the chase as a motivating drive within the storyline -- Don Giovanni's chase of women as a commodity, Donna Elvira's pursuit of Don Giovanni as a lover, Donna Anna and Don Ottavio's quest for vengeance, as well as Don Giovanni's race against his own eternal damnation.

At the start of the buffa section, the chase is coquettish and lighthearted, at first it appears in unison (as in measures 48 to 55) as a frenzied strand of inversions building on a D major chord until it reaches its heightened resolution on the chord of A major. But before the passage has a chance to resolve, the violins sing a flirtatious strain which mocks the winds by taking the dominant note of the chord and lightly prancing away from it, but always harmonizing with it. This is Zerlina's "Andiam," a mild protest with a knowing twinkle in her eyes. The two appear to come together in measure 62, but then the unbridled terror pervades in measure 67 as the major chords switch to diminished sevenths, the chord which signals trouble and turmoil throughout the opera. This fury, (Masetto's comprehension of Don Giovanni's activities), temporarily subsides in measure 76, and the chase resumes between the winds and the strings, but this time the voice of the winds mimics the opening voice of the bass and cello (measure 12), the sluggish voice of Masetto as he masquerades as Don Giovanni, and the charming, eye-batting voice of the coquette.
The chase resumes with a polyphonic round of Leporello's theme introduced in measure 77, representing the confusion and turmoil as the characters pursue each other. Don Giovanni masquerading as Leporello, Leporello, as Don Giovanni, and Don Giovanni escapes before the chase can end. This evasion is represented in measure 99 as the somewhat playful round bursts into a regal, triumphant section which then returns to the heightened A major chord (similar to measure 46). What this suggests is a somewhat cyclic story line, because, in fact, the remainder of the overture shifts the themes introduced in the buffa section with subtle variations. This is significant in the scheme of the opera as well, because in his three pursuits (although each pursuit displays a different aspect of seduction -- Donna Anna, in the midst of the seduction, Zerlina, at the start of the chase, and Donna Elvira, the jilted lover), Don Giovanni uses the same techniques on each but gradually looses his vitality and is forced to concede to damnation.

The same transformation occurs within the structure of the overture. The themes that are initially presented in a major key undergo a metamorphosis and eventually are broken down by diminished and minor chords as well as shortened and interrupted by other themes. For example, in the reprise of the chase in measure 128, the orchestra begins as it does in measure 85 with minor chord variations, but then Mozart upsets the original structure and inserts the coquettish theme of the violins, while the viola, cello, and bass repeat a series of
descending slow arpeggios, suggesting chaos and the onset of the loss of Don Giovanni's magnetic charm. The resolutions become interrupted, to the point of where, in measure 277, the passionate D major frenzy ends abruptly without resolution and the Leporello/chase scene theme, which also doubles as an evasive maneuver, interrupts the final ending cadence.

This brings us to the final measures of the overture. The chase theme dwindles to just the first violins in measure 282, then dissolves altogether in measure 286 while the winds begin a calm resolution to their final C major chord. This comes as a surprise to us as a listener, but this element of surprise is exactly what propels the entire overture. While most classical forms of music revolve on the A B A form, the overture breaks that mold and ends in B, melding into the opening scene of Act I. Mozart leaves the final scenes of Don Giovanni as a surprise to the listener, merely foreshadowing his doom with the A form of the overture, as it repeats in the Finale of Act II. Technically, the overture never ends until the last note of the finale of Act II, which suggests to us that Don Giovanni is a powerful force which will never cease until completely destroyed.
A Timely Utterance: The Fear in Wordsworth's Hope

In his the preface to his *Lyrical Ballads*, Wordsworth defines his poetic project as one of missionary quality. He intends to combat the evils brought about by civilization—the blunting of "the discriminating powers of the mind"(p.161), and the setting-in of a "savage torpor". He wants to bring "immediate pleasure" to his readers, to awaken them into embracing what he has found to be the "beauty and dignity" of the human mind. Wordsworth actually translates these intentions into verse in *Intimations of Immortality*. He uses his own experience as a model for describing to his readers the manner of perceiving life he believes is most rewarding. However, while his verse in this poem is primarily hopeful, it yet suggests an underlying disquiet—a certain troubled anticipation of death. And though Wordsworth argues that one can learn to embrace a "faith that looks through death"(ln.185), he quietly hints, all the while, that he himself is finally unable to do so.

Wordsworth begins the poem by describing what he perceives to be a substantial inconsistency between the past and the present, an incongruity between maturity and childhood. "It is not now as it hath been of yore"(ln.6), he says. At one time, the world was unified in its "glory and freshness"; all seemed to be "apparelled in celestial light"(ln.14). Now, though physically dwelling in the same world, he is blind to certain aspects of his existence. He faces what he feels is the worst consequence of growing old—a blunted perception. "The things which I have seen I now can see no more." ln.9), he says, distressed at the now fragmented state of his life. No longer is everything bathed in a single light. There is now division, for example, between "night [and] day". He loses the fluid, continuous perspective of the dreamer ("every common sight/ to me did seem...a dream"), to the uncertain, varying perspective of the man who must constantly search for what he no longer possesses ("Turn wheresoe'er I may...").
In the second strophe, Wordsworth identifies the missing aspect of his life, the absence of which is creating for him such uneasiness. "There hath past away a glory from the earth" (ln. 17), he explains. While he can still recognize the beauty of "waters on a starry night," or the loveliness of a rose, he can no longer experience, or "feel" this beauty. In the third strophe, Wordsworth then explains how he drops down into the nadir of his uneasiness and how he then suddenly, miraculously, leaps up into happiness once again: he is possessed by a thought of "grief", which is immediately displaced by a panacean numen of sorts, a "timely utterance" (ln. 23) that finally relieves him of his distress. Wordsworth then devotes the final eight strophes of the poem to explaining the conceptual dialectic surrounding his numinous moment of salvation, the moment of the "timely utterance".

In the explanation, beginning at the end of strophe IV, Wordsworth's anxieties begin to take shape—at first in the form of grief and resentment. He begins strophe V by explaining his first perception—prior to his perspective-altering "utterance"—of the aging process. Birth, he explains, is a separation from a previously eternal state. Growing old is not a maturation, but a decay, a process of estrangement from man's essential nature. "Heaven lies about us in our infancy! / Shades of the prison-house begin to close / Upon the growing Boy" (ln. 68). People spend their lives as "inmates" of earth, learning all their lives to imitate the ways of all of their predecessors—or previous inmates, and growing ever more "palsied" (ln. 104) and more distant from the "bliss" (ln. 41) and "glory" (ln. 5) of youth.

Because he here devotes strophes V, VI, and VII to glorifying, nearly worshipping ("The Youth, who... still is Nature's Priest" ln. 71-2) the child, his anxiety—though present—is obscured. It materializes only in the shadow of his prodigious praises of youth. His anxiety here is even more difficult to recognize because it is not direct, but takes the form of resentment at being severed from the glories of childhood. Wordsworth's illustrations of the extreme good-bad
polarity between child and man most clearly indicate this resentment. Images representing the progression of adult life, for instance, such as the closing "shades of the prison-house," or the drearily and mechanically rhymed "a wedding or a festival/ A mourning or a funeral" (ln. 93-4), appear, at best, dreary and restrictive when postured against the dynamic energy of youth "trailing clouds of glory" (ln. 64).

In Strophe VIII, Wordsworth's glorifying and nostalgic evocation of childhood mounts to its greatest heights. He nearly deifies the child. Having moments ago been "nature's priest," Youth now becomes "Thou best Philosopher" (ln. 110), "Mighty Prophet!", and "Seer blest!" (ln. 114). When Wordsworth then calls the child an "Eye amongst the blind,/ That, deaf and silent, read'st the eternal deep" (ln. 111), he is not only playing upon the similar title "Seer," but is asserting that the child is the capital Eye, the central sensory organ, the nexus of all the visionary activity that is so essential to a happy and rich existence. Amidst all this exaltation, Wordsworth also brings the contrast between childhood and maturity into its greatest relief. After defining the realm of the aged—the deaf, silent, and blind—as being the "the eternal deep", he deems the little child "glorious in the might/ Of heaven-born freedom on thy being's height" (ln. 121-2). Such a heaven-evoking "height", contrasted with "eternal deep", immediately creates, in concrete terms, an infinitely huge gap between young and old. "Height" further secures its distance from "the eternal deep" of men by evoking the heavenly images of strophe II: the "rainbow," "Moon," "heavens," "sunshine," and "starry night"—the natural, eternal elements of the childhood world that Wordsworth longs to re-capture.

At this moment, when his attack of growing old and his panegyric to youth simultaneously gather their fiercest momentum, he immediately introduces the nexus at which these two arguments meet, the paradox that "child is the father of the man," and here gives it its most searing application. No longer satisfied to simply discuss the child in the third person, he
directly questions the youth. Using the terms of the paradox, he asks, "Why with such earnest pains dost thou provoke/ The years to bring the inevitable yoke...?" (ln.113). Not waiting for an answer, and still riding atop his wave of excited thought and emotion, he hurries into the next lines, grievously prophesying to childhood its inevitable fate: "Full soon thy Soul shall have her earthly freight,/ And custom lie upon thee with a weight,/ Heavy as frost, and deep almost as life!" (ln.126-29).

Something then happens to Wordsworth between strophes VIII and IX. It is as if this is the moment that he has previously described in strophe III when a "timely utterance" brings relief to his pains. Here his grief suddenly turns to hope, his resentment to new strength. "O joy!" he exclaims, "that in our embers/ Is something that doth live" (ln.129-30). He turns his previous logic upside down: Instead of mourning the loss of youth, he embraces the fact that he was once young. Further, he feels that he can use this memory of youth as a means to, or a portal through which he can connect himself once again to the eternity "that is our home" (ln.65). "But for those first affections, / Those shadowy recollections, / Which, be they what they may, Are yet the fountain light of all our day" (ln.148-51).

Now armed with his new perception of life, Wordsworth no longer needs to preoccupy himself with enumerating the problems of aging—he can concentrate wholly on praising "the eternal Silence" and the "truths that wake/ To perish never" (ln.155-56) to which he will always be closely tied. No matter how old he grows, he will always have a connection with eternal "fountain light" (ln.150). Now tapped into the "primal sympathy" (ln.181), he possesses a faith that enables him to confront death itself—to "look through death" (ln.185). Yet that amidst all of his new joy Wordsworth even mentions his mutability, suggests that he is more than just trivially concerned with death. Further, when he mentions death, he does so not with ambivalence, but

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1 originally "looks through death". I removed the "s".
with a mild defiance, or recalcitrance--suggesting that he is here releasing the pressure built-up from a long-time worry. Now it becomes clear that Wordsworth's reason for meditating so thoroughly (in strophes V--VIII) on losing the past is not entirely that he misses the "vision splendid" of youth and so resents the blunted perception of adulthood. He dwells upon his past greatly because he cannot bear to confront the future; he cannot, until his "timely utterance," even begin to face the prospect of his own death.

With the motivation for his anxiety now more clearly revealed, Wordsworth's "timely utterance" of strophe III takes on new significance. First, the word "timely" indicates--as it did in the first reading--that the "utterance" occurs at a suitable, or appropriate time. But because of this newly revealed preoccupation with death, the progress of time, and consequently, the word "timely," now carry new baggage, new significance. "Timely" now clearly possesses implications of a "lifetime"--a temporal sequence in which death is the final moment. When coupled with Wordsworth's explanation in strophes IX--XI of exactly what his "timely" utterance has revealed to him, the word "timely" indicates the presence of another paradox in the temporal relationship of child to man. First, as Wordsworth explains, childhood is the door into an eternity. Second, as the "timely utterance" has revealed to him, a man can tap into this eternity through constantly recollecting his childhood. However, the paradox that Wordsworth does not directly state, but that "timely" now suggests, is that as the man grows older, though the eternal element is always on the other side of the door, the door itself becomes smaller and smaller in relation to the man's gradually increasing life span. In other words, though Wordsworth can secure his immediate salvation, he can only do so within the boundaries, the "timely" boundaries, that time imposes. He is finally subject to a time-born element--death--that is beyond his control.

In strophes V--VIII, before he discovers, or is blessed with, an alternate way of perceiving life, he diverts his fear
of death into complaining about the obvious inconsistencies and troubling consequences of growing ever-distant from youth. But now, even though he perhaps wants to, he can no longer complain. For when he first experiences his new perception, he so strongly advocates what seems to be a sort of salvation for himself and for his readers, that he must swallow his later realization that the problem of death has only dissipated, but not disappeared. To grieve again would be to shatter his final hope, to admit to himself and to his readers that the internal divisions brought by aging are finally immutable. So when his initial rejoicing of strophes IX and X turns to calm, and his elation gives way to realization that he is still only mortal, he says, "The Clouds that gather round the setting sun / Do take a sober colouring from an eye/ That hath kept watch o'er man's mortality" (ln.196-99).

This could be simply an example of Wordsworth's newly augmented perception of the world. But to describe the colouring of the clouds, he uses the word "sober" instead of "serious" or "grave". "Sober," in addition to denoting a somber feeling, implies, as neither "serious" nor "grave" do, a lack of mirth and joy. Also, these three lines explain that Wordsworth has not simply been aware of, but "hath kept watch o'er" man's mortality. Like a watchman, he is employed by, or has some form of investment in, what he watches over. But also like a watchman, his subject of observation preoccupies him. All other concerns become secondary. So Wordsworth, by indicating that he watches over "man's mortality," implies that his participation in life itself is somewhat detached. He is still preoccupied with death. Further, "eye" is no longer capitalized as in the youthful "Eye" of childhood, and the youthful "clouds of glory" are now clouds that gather as the sun sets—as life peters out. These two examples reveal that Wordsworth, though quietly, and not in so many words, is still intent on the notion of decline, even amidst this final exaltation.
So while Wordsworth can help his reader to combat the fragmentation and divided sense that accompanies adult life, and to even "look through" death, he cannot secure for his reader—or for himself—an escape from the threat of death's final sting.

Thanks to the human heart by which we live,
Thanks to its tenderness, its joy, and fears,
To me the meanest flower that blows can give
Thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears.

The last four lines of the poem are a sort of "sober" compromise between his new-found joy and his sense of mutability. No matter how much deeper than the realm of concern and emotion his introspection and his awareness of the glorious and splendid eternity can carry him, he knows that he will finally die. In the last line, he states that his thoughts surpass the sadness of "tears." But his arrangement of the words speaks otherwise. He deliberately avoids evoking a sense of transcendent hope as a last line such as "Thoughts that oft so tears surpass" would do. Instead, his last word is "tears," rhymed with another less-than-joyous word—"fears". And as "tears" lingers in the reader's mind when the poem ends, so perhaps an actual tear stands ready at the corner of Wordsworth's eye, waiting patiently to fall as soon as his evocation of the past finally, and inevitably, comes to an end.
DURKHEIM

THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE

Durkheim views society as a self-generated whole, having its own identity with designs that are neither dependent on, nor necessarily synonymous with the individuals within it. Society is to Durkheim a self-generated force that supersedes the individuals it encompasses. This notion is the fundamental premise upon which his investigation of the most primitive, pure forms of moral\religious impetus is based. This investigation is the topic of his master work *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, and is the subject of this essay. I shall, during next couple of pages, attempt to answer three basic questions: (1) *in what sense, according to Durkheim, is religion a socially-produced phenomenon?*, (2) *how does he exclude the supernatural, the divine, etc?*, (3) *and why is magic not religion?* In so doing I shall hopefully lay the groundwork necessary to provide a concept of Durkheim's definition of the divine.

With regards to the first question I believe it essential to understand that Durkheim argues that the religious experience is a real one, and that he views the arguments of the reductionist attitude towards religion as false. The construction and elaboration of religious symbolism, and the impulse that causes it to occur, are the result of real external stimuli, and is not simply a false logic used to describe the world. Durkheim contends that religion is born from the feeling that one is acted on and influenced by a deeper, stronger force than the self. That force, according to Durkheim, is that of society. It is a reaction to, and cure for the tension that arises between the collective self and
the private individual. "Society has all that is necessary to arouse the sensation of the divine in minds, merely by the power that is over them; for to its members it is what a god is to his worshippers"(236). Religion is a mirror image of social interaction. Religious experiences are real because the chemistry of the group has the power to transport the individual to a realm of intense feelings. The individual unconsciously surrenders his private-self completely to the power of the collective. In primitive society the power of these experiences is so strong and the dichotomous relationship between the self and the collective, the mundane and the powerful is so distinct that the world is immediately split into two basic categories: the profane and the sacred. Durkheim contends that all religions possess this dualistic view. It is the first distinction, upon which all the rest are based. Religion supplies the symbolic framework that acts as mediator between the sacred world and the profane world, the realms of the social and of the self.

The supernatural, the divine, etc. does not have to be included in this distinction. It is possible, argues Durkheim, to have a sacred realm without a God. He uses Buddhism as an example of this. The sacred in Buddhism is ultimately Nirvana, an amorphous sacred totality, which possesses no real symbolic deity. Buddha was technically a man who ceased to have any influence on the world once he reached Nirvana. He ceased to be his self, and became completely unified with the whole. Durkheim concludes that we cannot define religion as being primarily the worship of deities, for the presence of the supernatural is not a necessary condition for the existence of religion.

The presence of magic is also not a valid parameter by which to define religion. This is because, unlike religion, magic is not group oriented. It is practised by the individual acting alone for his\her own utilitarian purposes.
There is no "church of magic." Despite the fact that magic, like religion, has rites and beliefs, and is often inextricably intertwined with the other, it is not the same. Magic does not have time for "pure speculation," and both magic and religion have a considerable amount of antagonism towards one another. Religion is defined and directed by the collective where as magic is done by the individual.

With this in mind, we can now begin to understand how Durkheim came up with his working definition of religion, which reads as follows:

A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden--beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a church, all those who adhere to them. (62)

In sum, religion according to Durkheim is a social glue, an integrating agent that binds individuals into "moral communities." It gives the individual a context by which to associate with the group. It is religion's distinction of the sacred world that provides society's moral authority. Without it, society could not be properly unified.
MODERN PROPHETS

In looking at religion over time, Max Weber denotes a cyclic introduction of new religious ethics with the emergence of a prophet. However, the religious cycle ceases to revolve in recent days, and less qualified sources seem to provide the new modern day ethics. Weber favors a return to religious ethics, but, feels that "under the technical and social conditions of rational culture, an imitation of the life of Buddha, Jesus, or Francis seems condemned to failure for purely external reasons" (p.357).

These reasons exist in the very fabric of religion's origins. Weber discovers an inherent irrationality at the root of religion's foundations. This irrationality consistently conflicts with modern day's reigning rationality, and Weber calls it a lost battle.

The modes of religious behavior "originally grew out of magical presuppositions" (p.327). The first religion was a magic that accounted for the strange phenomena primitive people could not logically explain. In their communities, people "permanently suffering, mourning, diseased, or otherwise unfortunate, were . . . believed either to be possessed by a demon or burdened with the wrath of god" (p.271).

The first church directly resulted from these superstitions. As early communities "left all individual interests out of consideration," people suspected to be cursed, possessed, etc., were ostracized from feasts and other community gatherings in order to protect the rest of the clan from any further divine wrath (p.272). Forced to look elsewhere for assistance, people looked to sorcerers/spiritual
advisors. They perceived that the magicians possessed "superhuman" and magical powers, and often formed followings after them. Weber writes of this occurrence:

The prestige of particular magicians, and of those spirits or divinities in whose name they have performed their miracles, has brought them patronage, irrespective of local or of tribal affiliation. Under favorable conditions this has lead to the formation as a religious 'community,' which has been independent of of ethnic associations(p.272).

These religious communities evolve into "organizations of trained personnel under a head determined in accordance with some sort of rules;" in other words, they became the first churches(p.272).

The significance of the magician figure continues as religion matures. Weber theorizes that "the magician has been the historical precursor of the prophet"(p.327). Both legitimizes their rule "through the possession of a magical charisma"(p.327). Weber defines this charisma as "an extraordinary quality of a person, regardless of whether this quality is actual, alleged, or presumed"(p.295). With this quality comes "charismatic authority", which "rests upon a belief in the sanctity or value of the extraordinary"(p.297). Most importantly, "charismatic authority is irrational," marking religion's core aspect(p.296).

Under charismatic authority, the prophet carries a sacred message in which "to direct a way of life to the pursuit of a sacred value . . . to systemize and rationalize the way of life:"(p.327).

According to the values supplied by the prophet, new communities form, within which develop "a religious ethic of brotherliness"(p.329). Once the religious ethic of brotherliness settles, the cycle of, prophesy - charisma - sacred message - new values, finishes its round. The
cycle will begin again whenever the values lose coherency to their times and/or situations.

Unfortunately, Weber senses a demise in this cycle due to the rational conditions of the modern world. "These conditions are remote from brotherliness and must serve as means or as ends of rational action" (p.339). Tension with economics, tension with politics, and simply the increasing complexity of life, contradicts the religious ethic of brotherliness. "The religion of brotherliness has always clashed with the orders and values of this world," Weber notes, adding that "the split has usually become wider the more the values of the world have become rationalized and sublimated in terms of their own laws" (p.330).

Weber sees this clash most evident in the economic sphere of life. "A rational economy," he defines, "is a functional organization oriented to money-prices which originate in the interest-struggles of men in the market" (p.331). Money, "the most abstract and 'impersonal' element that exists in human life," requires its own exclusive set of rules which apply nowhere outside of the economic realm (p.331). Therefore, "the more the world of the modern capitalist economy follows its own immanent laws, the less accessible it is to any imaginable relationship with a religious ethic of brotherliness" (p.331).

The situation is similar in the political sphere, as it also ascribes to a personal set of rules. In politics, "the whole course of the state's inner political functions, of justice and administration, is repeatedly and unavoidably regulated by the objective pragmatism of 'reasons of state'" (p.334). Previously, "the gods of locality, tribe, and polity were
only concerned with the interests of their respective organizations," and justice was dealt on much more personal level(p.33) But when "barriers of locality, tribe, and polity were shattered by universalist religions, by a religion with a unified God of the entire world," a much larger and less adaptive system was erected(p.333). "The 'reasons of state' thus follow their own external and internal laws" and displace the religious ethics of brotherliness(p.334).

Yet these two conflicts merely indicate a larger problem. "As economic and rational political actions follow laws of their own," it must follow that "every other rational action within the world remains inescapably bound to worldly conditions"(p.339). Thus, the more rational actions begin to dominate, the less irrational religious ethics have to do with the world. People will no longer see religion's relevancy to their lives as they forget the irrational altogether and drown in the culture of the rational. Instead people opt for the rational values of their culture in attempt to derive meaning in their lives. "For this very reason," Weber warns, "culture's every step forward seems condemned to lead to an ever more devastating senselessness"(p.357).

In conclusion, it is interesting to see how another social scientist, William James diverges from Weber's opinions in his similar study of "personal religion" in his book The Varieties of Religious Experience. Personal religion differs from other religion in its inward focus, which is unaffected by increased rationality in the world. James, like Weber, sees a non-religious culture engulfing the world, but does not claim to feel its adverse effects. "Here, in the heyday of science's authority," the new mind-cure religion, "carries on an
aggressive warfare against the scientific philosophy, and succeeds by using science's own peculiar methods and weapons"(p.120).

In fact, James devoted much of his study to the religion to "the second born" in which "man must die to the unreal life before he can be born into the real life"(p.165). To truly do this, death in the unreal life must include an "absolute disenchantment with ordinary life" and have the "whole range of habitual actions may . . . come to appear so ghastly a mockery"(p.156). The mundane world full of only rational values as Weber describes it, would indeed catalyze such sensations.

However, the clearest break from Weber resides in James' consideration that "in important respects [Walt] Whitman is of genuine lineage of the prophets"(p.87). James still believes in prophets and cites "that many persons to-day regard Walt Whitman as the restorer of the eternal natural religion"(p.85). This is a concept Weber has lost all hope for.
Sigmund Freud describes the struggle between the individual and his or her community in his book *Civilizations and Its Discontents*. Freud illustrates that the goal, or thread, of the individual and the thread of society are closely interwoven, yet inherently headed in different directions...and the result is a large knot.

It begins once the individual realizes a sense of self, or when the ego is separated from the external world. Freud calls this "a disengagement of the ego from the general mass of sensations." (p. 14, *Civilizations and Its Discontents*) This separation occurs through the absence of pleasure for the ego. For example, Freud tells us of a baby being deprived of his mother's breastmilk. The baby is realizing outside objects that are opposed to his instinctual desires. The ego acts in accordance with the "pleasure principle," and the "frequent, manifold and unavoidable sensations of pain and unpleasure" (p.14) is what becomes recognizable to the ego as the outside world. Immediately, society is distinguished through pain to the ego, which is defined as pleasure seeking.

Freud then states that from observing human behavior, it is ascertained that the purpose of life is to "strive after happiness; they [humans] want to become happy and to remain so." (p. 25) Happiness is described as two things: The absence of pain, and strong feelings of pleasure. The first problem in attaining this goal is that life for humans outside of themselves is full of pain-- it is that conclusion that has led to the development of ourselves. Second, intense happiness (by definition) is only known by contrast to its opposite, unhappiness or intense displeasure.
What we call happiness in the strictest sense comes from the (preferably sudden) satisfaction of needs which have been dammed up to a high degree, and it is from its nature only possible as an episodic phenomenon. (p. 25)

So happiness can only occur after a period of lacking, or absence of pleasure; and the more one lacks pleasure the higher sense of happiness ensues. Thus, intense happiness exists jointly and necessarily with unhappiness, or pain. It follows that the individual is dependent upon the external world for his or her happiness simply because it is his/her society that can provide the contrasting sensations of pain and unpleasure. Freud writes that suffering is easily experienced from three directions: From one's own body, from the external world, and from one's relations to others. Conversely, it is from these three paths that happiness is obtained.

Yet, Freud also explores the possibilities of avoiding pain altogether in order to achieve happiness. He mentions methods such as isolating oneself from the external world, becoming active within the community (joining the fight against nature), and influencing oneself (by intoxication, etc.). Freud speaks of sublimating (or substituting) one's instinctual drives with some form of creation. In other words, using sexual energy (and other instinctual energies) to create art, or solve a scientific problem. But the satisfaction gained from these activities is considerably less than satisfaction of these energies in their pure form:

But their intensity is mild as compared with that derived from the satiating of crude and primary instinctual impulses; it does not convulse our physical being. (p. 30)
In addition, in order to create and derive pleasure from creations, one separates him/herself from reality because the satisfaction obtained is achieved through an illusion. One is creating in order to escape the external world, and is distorting reality in the process. In the same way, Freud argues that religion uses the same method in order to ease the pain of life. For example, the Christian religion promises an afterworld and diminishes the importance attached to the reality of the present life. However, these methods of avoidance are ineffective or effective only in a mild degree in the long run, for happiness must have the contrast of displeasure in order to exist whatsoever. So the individual is woven into the tapestry of civilization in order to find what that civilization does not want to yield for the purpose of its own efficient existence.

But why does civilization cause unhappiness for its members in order to function? Freud states that civilization has two purposes, "namely to protect men against nature and to adjust their mutual relations." (p. 42) The higher degree to which these purposes are achieved ascertains what level of civilization a society has reached. He describes the history of civilization as resulting from two basic needs of man. The first is man's compulsion to work to "improve his lot on earth" (p. 53), and the second is "the power of love" which results in the establishment of a family. So civilization originates from two things: First, man desires to work to improve his life, and if others join in, it is more efficient and profitable, thus a group of people working together develops. Second, man desires to keep his sexual object near (woman), and woman desires protection for her children, hence a family develops. The result is a group of families living and working together...civilization. Once again, the very things that promise to aid man in his search for happiness are the seeds of his discontent. For we know that it is man's relations with others that is one
of the three ways unhappiness occurs. Man is setting himself up for a big fall by loving, for the possibilities of misfortunes concerning that love (i.e. losing a loved one, rejection) are endless. Sexual love is one of the most direct and intense forms of pleasure, and therefore must also be one of the most direct and intense forms of unhappiness.

In addition, though love is one of the founding threads of society, Freud says that "love comes into opposition to the interests of civilization; [and] civilization threatens love with substantial restrictions." (p.56) Freud points out that once families are established, the members become exclusive and attempt to remove themselves from their external environment. But civilization requires instinctual sublimations from men in order to work (energy to work is derived from libido energy), which negatively affects relations within the family because of women's resulting resentment. Civilizations develop strict laws concerning sex (or lack thereof) to protect its own existence. An aim-inhibited libido (affection rather than love) is favored by civilization, and adds to the hardships of man struggling to find happiness in pure forms.

Another twist in the threads of this knot is caused by the natural aggressiveness that exists within man. Freud argues that an aggressive instinct exists within all people, but this instinct is thwarted by the limitations society places upon its members. This aggressive instinct is also turned inwards, a death instinct of sorts. Freud claims this conflict between Eros and death, the fulfillment of one's desires and the complete sacrifice of all desires is the evolution of civilization. He discusses also the struggle between the superego and the ego; the superego acting as a harsh conscience for the ego, ending in the feeling of guilt. Guilt occurs either because of fear from an external or internal authority. Fear of an external authority is caused by a fear of loss of love for an action that has
been carried out. Fear of an internal authority is caused by an intended action and the inability to hide the intention from the superego.

There also exists a cultural superego, or conscience, that acts upon the whole community within a civilization. This theory is similar to Durkheim's notions of a collective conscience. Freud goes so far to mention the idea that a whole community could be neurotic because of the repression of desires and the masochistic tendencies such as a conscience etc., that result from living within a civilization.

So we see that the very founders of civilization are the causes of the strife within civilization. For people are dependent upon civilization in order to satisfy their desires, while civilization must regulate, curb and distort these desires in order to exist. Thus the interwoven threads of the individual and civilization are jumbled and confused from day one. Man needs civilization, and in so doing is the cause of his own discontent. But one must remember that it is from the contrast of discontent that contentment exists...so perhaps there is a pattern to the tapestry of existence after all.
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The poems of John Donne and of William Wordsworth, and the libretto of W.A. Mozart's DON GIOVANNI by Lorenzo da Ponte, translation by William Murray, were included in a course packet distributed for the Core Curriculum.

"...and from so little sleeping and so much reading, his brain dried up and he went completely out of his mind...."

- Cervantes
Biographies: The Goffmanian Backstage

Kathi Chaplar is an English major/vocal and piano performance minor. Kathi's works have recently been discovered with the lost fragments of the great epic Gilgamesh. Fortunately, these are some of the better preserved tablets, and, for the most part, are fairly comprehensible. Kathi would like to thank (...90 lines are missing here...) and her dog, Kasha, for all their love and support.

Jonathan Crow is rarely seen far from his security blanket and is prone to violent fits of rage when it is touched. In 1986, a nun trod on his blanket during a church bake-sale resulting in much bloodshed, and the scattering of rhubarb pie and parakeet feathers. Jon's therapy is now going along nicely, and he is generally sedate unless provoked by sudden movements or conservative politics. He wanted to entitle his paper "Donne Da Donne Donne DONNE!" but once the idea was brought up, he was promptly sedated.

Adrian Rowland Gould is majoring in Philosophy and minoring in Business Administration. 10 Years from now Mr. Gould envisions himself in a quaint fortified farmhouse in the south of France, having sold his multi-million dollar business, in order to spend the rest of his days collecting fine wines and rare antiquarian books.

Aremin Hacobin is a Biology major and hopes to some day practice Medicine in Boston, his hometown. Aremin interests include woodworking, basketball, weight-lifting and the BU social scene. He is also involved in many aspects of the local Armenian community.

Tara Hayes--young female from mountainous region seeks outdoorsy type to help her escape the approaching "fire season" after reading so many submissions and arriving at final decisions. She hopes that the Alexander Pope fragment from the "Essay or Criticism" --"words are like leaves; where they most abound,/ much fruit of sense beneath is rarely found." --won't be true of this publication.

Annie Heringer is an English major in CLA. She's the dark girl with a knack for Dominoes. She's a moonlighting salesgirl who knows no bounds.
She's the flash of red sequins in your peripheral vision; the laughing clown with the corn cob teeth in the corner of your nightmares; the shorn blue poodle that barks at her reflection in the puddle of bile your careless libido leave behind.

**Adelaide D. Juguilon**—20 year old Asian temptress, Taoist-Catholic poet, seeks a non-egotistical pipe-smoking gent to aid in the extermination of arrogant cabbage patch kids. Streep-wannabees and other vermin. Speech impaired Jumbo children need not apply.

**Angie Lee** is a megalomaniac International Relations major, who is having a relationship with a philosophy minor. In ten years, Angst (cute huh) envisions herself lying in bed contemplating where she will be in ten years (she promises, however, never ever to go into journalism or publishing of any magnitude). Her ultimate dreams is to own a Harley Davidson and cruise the badlands of the Dakotas as a mobile self-contained Core Professor unit.

**Shawn Loner** was a small quiet pale boy of about 5' 2" and 103 lbs. He sweated a lot. He had a dark passion for small white hairless mice, which he liked to strange in the profound still of the night. he wore the same flannel shirt six days in a row. He whined a lot. Unfortunately, Shawn is not able to experience this tender moment; he was found dead this morning, apparently the victim of a schizo transvestite terrorist action. All donations will go to the National Foundation for Aspiring Lumberjacks in Egypt, Maine. (The Editors are in no way responsible for the above events.)

**John Madura** is a freshman in the College of Engineering, majoring in Biomedical Engineering. His interests include reading, writing and music. His future is at present unknown.

**Lydia Moland** actually believes that the true expression of Taoism is watching Mike's cigarette smoke waft toward the fluorescent lights...She is eternally grateful to Professor Johnson for his patience, enthusiasm, and insight; and her goal in life is to have a talk show ("Late Nights with Lydia") with Mr. Rogers and Tina as permanent guests.

**Doug Pfeiffer** is a English major.
Joan Grace Ritchey is pursuing a double major in Philosophy and English with an acting minor. In her spare time, Joan is putting the finishing touches on her life long work of 19 years, entitled The Meaning of Life, which will be published and available to the general public by late December of this year.

Anne Rzasa was conceived in the Grand Canyon and so she is afraid of heights, gravity and dirt, but she has an insane fetish for 3-D glasses.

CORE WILL EXPAND YOUR MIND