ONE SIZE DOESN’T FIT ALL: MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION, DUE PROCESS, AND THE DANGERS OF PROCEDURAL COLLECTIVISM

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INTRODUCTION

Given the manner in which complex litigation has evolved over the last forty years, it is surprising that no one has previously coined the phrase “procedural collectivism.” That phrase, after all, effectively describes what has taken place during that time: what are, in their pristine substantive form, individually held rights that have no pre-litigation connection whatsoever are routinely grouped together for purposes of collective adjudication. This is often done regardless of whether the individual claimants desire such a grouping or even whether such a grouping will hurt the interests of those claimants more than help them.

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“Procedural collectivism,” we should emphasize, does not refer to all forms of aggregate litigation. We do not intend to include, for example, aggregate litigation in which all aggregated parties determine for themselves how to protect or pursue their own legal rights in the course of the litigation. Rather, we refer solely to representative litigation in which the rights of purely passive claimants are adjudicated by selected parties, supposedly possessing parallel or at least similar interests, who litigate on behalf of those passive participants.

There are two forms of such litigation: class actions and multidistrict litigation (“MDL”). While class actions have generally been somewhat on the decline in recent years, MDL practice has become so pervasive as to be almost routine. Both courts and scholars have expressed concern about what they see as the pathologies of the modern class action, among which is the threat posed by the controversial procedure to the constitutionally protected interests of those passive claimants. The Constitution protects such interests under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which guarantees that neither life, liberty, nor property may be deprived without due process of law. The clause is triggered in the class action context because the absent class members’ claims are deemed “chooses in action,” which are classified as protected property interests.

There are legitimate reasons why the Due Process Clause is needed to police the class action process. All too often, neither representative parties nor their attorneys give sufficient attention to the interests of absent claimants. But in important ways, the current practice of MDL actually makes the modern class action appear to be the pinnacle of procedural due process by comparison. At least in the class action context, the choice of representative party is controlled by explicit rule-based requirements. The representative parties’ claims must

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1 See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 20 (permissive joinder); id. 22 (interpleader); id. 24 (intervention).
2 See Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 Wash. U. L. Rev. 729, 731 (2013) (“The class action device, once considered a ‘revolutionary’ vehicle for achieving mass justice, has fallen into disfavor.” (citation omitted)).
3 See infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
4 See, e.g., Martin H. Redish et al., Cy Pres Relief and the Pathologies of the Modern Class Action, 62 Fla. L. Rev. 617, 641-51 (2010).
5 U.S. Const. amend. V.
6 See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 429 (1982) (“The . . . Due Process Clause[] protect[s] civil litigants who seek recourse in the courts, either as defendants hoping to protect their property or as plaintiffs attempting to redress grievances.”); Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 439 (1951) (“There is no fiction . . . in the fact that choses of action . . . held by the corporation, are property.”).
7 See, e.g., Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 828-29 (9th Cir. 2012) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (“Facebook users [aside from the named plaintiffs] who had suffered damages from past exposure of their purchasers got no money . . . . Class counsel, on the other had [sic], got millions.”), cert. denied sub nom. Marek v. Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8 (2013).
share significant common issues with the claims of the absent parties.8 Their claims must also be typical of those of the absent parties, and they must adequately represent those absent parties.9 Moreover, these determinations are usually made in the context of a transparent process of adversary adjudication.10 Finally, in at least the bulk of modern class actions—those brought pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3)—absent class members are given the right to opt out of the proceeding in order either to pursue their own claims individually or choose simply not to pursue them at all.11

In stark contrast, MDL involves something of a cross between the Wild West, twentieth-century political smoke-filled rooms, and the Godfather movies. The substantive rights of litigants are adjudicated collectively without any possibility of a transparent, adversary adjudication of whether the claims grouped together actually have a substantial number of issues in common, whether the interests of the individual claimants will be fully protected by those parties and attorneys representing their interests, or whether the individual claimants would have a better chance to protect their interests by being allowed to pursue their claims on their own.12 Another important difference between class actions and MDL is that unlike class actions, all plaintiffs grouped together in MDL have what are called “positive value” claims, meaning claims that are sufficiently large to stand on their own.13 This is so by definition, because MDL covers only those plaintiffs who have already filed their own individual actions.14 In contrast, numerous absent class members have “negative value” claims, meaning their claims are insufficient to stand on their own,15 and most of them have probably never even thought about bringing suit in the first place. Thus, often far more will be at stake for the passive member of an MDL than for the absent member of a class. Finally, whereas relatively few class actions are mandatory, all MDLs are mandatory.16 The plaintiff whose claim is grouped together with countless others is given no choice in the matter.

8 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
9 Id. 23(a)(3)-(4).
10 See In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 307 (3d Cir. 2008) (“In deciding whether to certify a class . . . the district court must make whatever factual and legal inquiries are necessary and must consider all relevant evidence and arguments presented by the parties.”).
11 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2).
12 See infra notes 203-206 and accompanying text.
13 See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 905 (1987) (recognizing that some class members have independently unmarketable claims).
14 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012) (allowing consolidation of pretrial proceedings “[w]hen civil actions . . . are pending in different districts” (emph`sis added)).
15 See Coffee, supra note 13, at 905.
16 See infra notes 156-157 and accompanying text (describing the mandatory nature of MDL).
One might respond that while the collective adjudicatory procedure in class actions will end in a final resolution which bars class members from future pursuit of their individual claims, the same is not true in the case of MDL. On the contrary, claims are grouped together solely for purposes of “pretrial” activities, including pleading motions, discovery and summary judgment. Actual trials, to the extent they take place, will usually be conducted either on a voluntary basis in the transferee court or on an individual basis in the district in which the individual plaintiff filed suit. But even casual observation reveals that the notion that MDL is purely a preliminary procedural device is more theoretical than real. It is the rare multidistrict proceeding indeed that ever returns its members to their individual districts for adjudication on the merits. But even if we were to take the process at face value as merely a collectivist form of pretrial practice, the interference with the individual litigant’s control of the adjudication of her own claim remains substantial. There are usually many different pretrial strategies that litigants can choose, but for the overwhelming number of unwilling participants in an MDL, that choice is, as a practical matter, removed from them and their chosen attorney.

Moreover, given the often extremely loose connection among the claims of the individual plaintiffs, it is certainly conceivable that some plaintiffs will have stronger claims and/or stronger fact situations than others, yet due to MDL, they are all brought down to the lowest common denominator. And they are represented by attorneys whom they have not chosen or likely even met and who have never been formally adjudicated to adequately represent their interests. Also individual plaintiffs have no meaningful opportunity to challenge either the legitimacy of their inclusion in the multidistrict process or the propriety of the representation chosen for them by judges in the judicial equivalent of a smoke-filled room.

To be sure, scholars have long debated the merits of MDL. But what seems to have been lost in the shuffle in all of that scholarly debate is any

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17 See infra notes 59-62 and accompanying text (describing the mechanics of MDL).
19 See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
20 See infra note 93 and accompanying text (describing court-appointed counsel’s substantial control over the MDL).
21 See Joan Steinman, The Effects of Case Consolidation on the Procedural Rights of Litigants, 42 UCLA L. Rev. 967, 976 (1995) (observing that, while some courts “have acknowledged the substantial disenfranchisement of nonlead counsel,” they have nevertheless “upheld the lead counsel system”); infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text (describing a party’s uphill battle when challenging transfer).
22 Others have analyzed MDL and even critiqued plaintiffs’ lack of autonomy, but none has done so primarily from a due process perspective. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating Together: Social, Moral, and Legal Obligations, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 87, 91 (2011) [hereinafter Burch, Litigating Together] (“My prescriptive objective is to enable plaintiffs to litigate together and self-govern through social norms and deliberative democracy ideals, such as arguing, bargaining, and voting.”); Roger H. Trangsrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort
serious discussion of MDL’s serious undermining of the individual plaintiffs’ right to procedural due process. The Due Process Clause requires that before property rights may be taken away by governmental practice, the individual must be given some form of fair procedure by which she can protect her property interests.23 At its core, that protection has been construed to require some form of “day in court,” during which the litigant has the opportunity to plead his case openly before a neutral adjudicator.24 There appear to be two methodologies and rationales for this constitutional guarantee: what can be called the “paternalism” and “autonomy” models.25

The paternalism version of due process demands that those who represent the legally protected interests of individual litigants adequately represent those interests in good faith.26 The importance of this version of the constitutional guarantee has long been recognized in the shaping of the modern class action.27 It may be seriously questioned whether such paternalism fully satisfies due process concerns when the litigant is available to legally protect his own interests and wishes instead to choose his own representative to litigate on his behalf.28 Such an individualist-based choice flows from a conception of due process as protecting a form of “meta”-autonomy—in other words, an individual’s autonomy in choosing how to exercise his liberty to participate in the governmental process. And governmental decision-making includes the judicial process as much as it does the legislative or executive processes.29

The debate between paternalism and autonomy as the ultimate rationale for the day-in-court ideal has great relevance to the class action debate. However, the dispute between these alternatives turns out to be purely academic in the context of MDL, because that process miserably fails the dictates of the due process right to one’s day in court from either perspective. From the perspective of the paternalism model of the day-in-court ideal, the failure of MDL procedure to provide any opportunity for a transparent, adversary-based adjudication of the adequacy and accountability of the chosen representative

Cases, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 69, 69 (calling attention to plaintiffs’ lack of autonomy in mass trials).

23 See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermilk, 470 U.S. 532, 547 (1985) (holding that a public school board deprived an employee of due process by not providing him with a “pretermination opportunity to respond”).

24 See infra Part III.A (describing the day-in-court ideal).


26 See id. at 140.

27 See infra notes 181-184 and accompanying text.

28 See infra notes 203-206 and accompanying text (questioning whether a steering committee can protect the interests of a plaintiff whose interests conflict with those of the majority).

29 REDISH, supra note 25, at 4 (“No one can doubt that the adjudication in the courts is as much a part of the governing process as are the actions of the legislative or executive branches.”).
parties and attorneys as representatives of all of the non-participating litigants constitutes an unambiguous violation of the constitutionally dictated right to one’s day in court.\textsuperscript{30} The crude, almost random process by which claims are grouped together only compounds those due process problems.\textsuperscript{31}

Nor does MDL fare any better from the perspective of the autonomy rationale. Individual litigants who possess positive-value claims—and have already demonstrated the desire to pursue those claims on an individual basis—are forced into a process in which their substantive rights will be significantly affected, if not effectively resolved, by means of a shockingly sloppy, informal, and often secretive process in which they have little or no right to participate, and in which they have very little say concerning the propriety of their inclusion in the process in the first place. It is difficult to comprehend how this process could even arguably be deemed to satisfy the Due Process Clause’s day-in-court ideal, regardless of the assumed underlying rationale for that guarantee.

One might respond that the individual litigants do have the right to opt out of any settlement reached in the course of the MDL,\textsuperscript{32} and therefore their due process rights have not been compromised. But it should be recalled that even if a litigant does withdraw from the collective settlement, his right to control adjudication of his own claim will have been substantially compromised by the collective, lowest common denominator control of the pretrial process, including all important discovery and pretrial motions.

More importantly, wholly apart from this serious due process concern, the option to remove oneself from a proposed settlement does not solve the significant constitutional problems to which MDL gives rise. First of all, the settlement has been determined on a one-size-fits-all collectivist basis, helping those plaintiffs with weaker individual cases while harming those plaintiffs whose individual claims are factually or legally stronger than the median.\textsuperscript{33} Yet when making the decision of whether or not to accept the settlement, the individual litigant has no idea of where his claim fits into this pecking order. While the individual plaintiff might reach out to his chosen attorney for advice as to whether or not to accept settlement, it must be recognized that the collective settlement may well have compromised the relationship between individual attorney and his client. The attorney knows at this point that if her client accepts the settlement, she will receive a fee while doing virtually nothing to have earned it. If, on the other hand, the client chooses to opt out of

\textsuperscript{30} See infra notes 197-202 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{31} See infra notes 203-206 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{32} Lori J. Parker, \textit{Cause of Action Involving Claim Transferred to Multidistrict Litigation}, 23 \textit{CAUSES OF ACTION} 185 § 25 (2d ed. 2003) (“Opting out is the option available to plaintiffs who do not wish to accept a class settlement.”).
\textsuperscript{33} See S. Todd Brown, \textit{Plaintiff Control and Domination in Multidistrict Mass Torts}, 61 \textit{CLEV. ST. L. REV.} 391, 412-13 (2013) (arguing that a collectivist, democratic settlement vote can reduce “fair compensation for those who believe they have suffered a loss”).
the settlement, any fee is now rendered uncertain and at best would come only after the attorney invests substantial effort to bring the individual litigation to a successful resolution. This potentially conflicting interest gives rise to the serious danger of a conflict in the attorney’s fiduciary obligation to her client.34 It is true that, at least as a doctrinal matter, the due process calculus has in its modern form always included consideration of utilitarian concerns.35 Thus, one might argue that this seemingly indefensible undermining of the individual’s right to his day in court when his legally granted rights are at stake may be justified by the pragmatic need to limit the expenditure of governmental resources required by numerous individual litigations. But no court has even attempted to make that calculus, much less balance it against the significant interference with the individual litigant’s right to his day in court. This is so, for the simple reason that no court appears to have even considered, much less ruled upon, a due process challenge to MDL. In any event, surely at some point there must be a floor on the individual’s right to his day in court, lest the due process guarantee be rendered little more than a cynical sham. The sweeping deprivations of an individual’s ability to protect his legal rights brought about by MDL cannot be justified by naked concerns of pragmatism if the concept of due process is to mean anything.

When the dust settles, then, there appears to be no way that the MDL process, at least as currently constituted, can satisfy the requirements of due process. In short, MDL is unconstitutional. This does not necessarily mean that the process is incapable of revision in order to satisfy due process by including measures demonstrating some respect for the rights of the individual litigants who are being herded into the process. But one cannot even reach that issue until one first decides that the process, as presently constituted, is unconstitutional. The Procrustean Bed that is MDL, whereby the claims of each individual are crudely and artificially reshaped into fitting some generic lowest common denominator, unambiguously violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The purpose of this Article is to establish just that.

In the first section of this Article, we explore the history and structure of MDL. The second section explains the mechanics of the process, thereby revealing the serious dangers to individual rights to which this form of procedural collectivism gives rise. In the third section, we discuss the nature of the due process problems from the perspective of constitutional doctrine and theory. In the final section, we consider possible means of revising the multidistrict process in order to preserve the system’s beneficial goals while showing greater respect for the integrity of the individual and his right to his day in court.

35 See infra Part III.D (discussing the background and implications of this utilitarian calculus in the MDL context).
I. HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION

Congress enacted the Multidistrict Litigation Statute in response to the first modern mass litigation in the early 1960s, which stemmed from allegations of price-fixing in the electrical equipment industry. Large-scale litigation was quite daunting in an era when fax and copy machines were just coming into widespread commercial use, and personal computers and the Internet were decades in the distance. Chief Justice Earl Warren created the Coordinating Committee for Multiple Litigation of the United States District Courts to coordinate discovery among the electrical equipment antitrust cases. His project was successful and his idea legislatively codified; MDL was born.

MDL refers to “coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings” in related cases taking place before a single federal district judge. Since its inception in the late 1960s, MDL has become more and more common, to the point where today its use could almost be called routine. Over the same period, the number of mass torts and antitrust cases has also grown, almost exponentially. Also during that time, class actions became popular and then tapered off somewhat as a method of providing a national solution to mass litigation. The majority of MDLs occur in products liability and antitrust cases, but the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation approves consolidation in a wide variety of substantive legal areas.

The Panel, made up of seven federal judges, decides whether an individual lawsuit is better suited to group

38 Yvette Ostolaza & Michelle Hartmann, Overview of Multidistrict Litigation Rules at the State and Federal Level, 26 REV. LITIG. 47, 49 (2007).
39 See id. at 48-50.
43 See Andrew D. Bradt, The Shortest Distance: Direct Filing and Choice of Law in Multidistrict Litigation, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 759, 781-84 (2012) (summarizing developments that are making it harder to certify class actions); Klonoff, supra note 2, at 731.
treatment for pretrial purposes. If several cases are found to share at least one common factual question and the panel determines that consolidated proceedings will be relatively convenient for the parties and save judicial resources, the Panel may transfer those cases to a specified federal district judge, who will preside over coordinated pretrial matters in one consolidated action. The Panel may do so sua sponte, which means that seven federal judges can decide on their own to move thousands of cases into one forum. Since 1968, they have decided to do so in over 400,000 cases involving millions of individual claims.

The Panel can only transfer cases into an MDL for pretrial matters; the transferee court’s jurisdiction extends only that far. But as a practical matter, for almost all cases transferred into an MDL, there is no trial, let alone post-trial matters, left to conduct back in the transferor district. Settlement is the endgame in almost all instances. To get there, the transferee court appoints a small group of attorneys to strategize, conduct discovery, and try test cases on behalf of the group of plaintiffs. This appointed group is frequently called a steering committee; it steers the strategy for discovery and guides the course for all other pretrial matters. The steering committee effectively replaces the plaintiffs’ chosen representatives and is expected to represent the interests of all plaintiffs in the MDL, no matter how varied they may be. Every claimant enters MDL having made the decision to hire a particular lawyer and file suit against a particular defendant in a particular jurisdiction. But once her case is transferred to an MDL, the district judge decides who will really represent her interests in the MDL. Suddenly, all of the decisions the claimant made about exercising her rights through litigation—which lawyer to hire, when and where

45 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a), (d).
46 See id. § 1407(a).
47 Id. § 1407(b).
48 Id. § 1407(c)(1).
51 See infra note 133.
52 See infra notes 133-137 and accompanying text (describing the transferee judge’s incentive to encourage a settlement).
53 See Eldon E. Fallon, Common Benefit Fees in Multidistrict Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 371, 373 (2014) (“The committees occupy leadership roles in the litigation—conducting documentary discovery, establishing document depositories, arguing motions, conducting bellwether trials, and in general, carrying out the duties and responsibilities set for in the court’s pretrial orders . . . .”).
54 Id.
55 Id.
to file a lawsuit, and against whom—have been replaced by decisions made by federal judges and court-sanctioned attorneys.

II. THE MECHANICS OF MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION

At the present time, close to 100,000 individual suits are part of an active MDL.56 By at least one estimate, close to one third of all pending federal civil cases are part of an MDL.57 On the order of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, individual suits that share “one or more common questions of fact”—a “lenient”58 standard—may be transferred to “any district” for all pretrial matters.59 The chosen district may even be one that neither has personal jurisdiction over the parties nor constitutes a legally authorized venue for the individual suits.60 That court then has complete jurisdiction over all pretrial matters, including discovery, motions for class certification, Daubert motions, dispositive motions such as summary judgment, and pretrial settlement.61 Centralized management of numerous cases in an MDL aims to avoid duplicative discovery and increase efficiency in factually similar cases.62 At the conclusion of pretrial procedures, cases transferred by the Panel into a single MDL proceeding are supposed to be remanded to the districts in which


57 Bradt, supra note 43, at 762. Others estimate the number to be smaller, closer to fifteen percent of all civil litigation, which is still quite significant. See Fallon, Common Benefit Fees, supra note 53, at 373 (citing Heyburn & McGovern, supra note 41, at 26).

58 Bradt, supra note 43, at 786; see also Marcus, supra note 37, at 2269 (“The Panel’s willingness to combine cases, and its confidence that combination will be for the advantage of the litigants as well as serve judicial economy, is sometimes striking.”).


60 See Bradt, supra note 43, at 786 n.156; Fallon, Common Benefit Fees, supra note 53, at 371.

61 See In re Korean Air Lines Co., 642 F.3d 685, 699 (9th Cir. 2011) (“A district judge exercising authority over cases transferred for pretrial proceedings ‘inherits the entire pretrial jurisdiction that the transferor district judge would have exercised if the transfer had not occurred.’” (quoting 15 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDUE § 3866 (3d ed. 2010)); In re Phenylpropanolamine Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1231 (9th Cir. 2006) (observing that a transferee judge’s power “includes authority to decide all pretrial motions”).

62 “Centralization under Section 1407 is thus necessary in order to eliminate duplicative discovery; prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings, including with regard to class certification; and conserve the resources of the parties, their counsel and the judiciary.” In re Baycol Prods. Liab. Litig., 180 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1380 (J.P.M.L. 2001).
they were originally filed—the transferor districts. In practice, however, consolidation into an MDL more often than not leads to settlement, not remand. This is especially true in the realm of products liability suits. This Part describes the process by which cases become part of an MDL. It explains MDL case management and the scope of MDL courts’ authority.

A. Initiating MDL

As of late 2013, 462,501 individual actions had been consolidated into 1230 MDLs. The Panel identifies pending civil actions that share one or more common questions of fact. It uses its transfer powers to “avoid duplicative or possibly overlapping discovery . . . whenever there is a prospect of overlapping classes,” and to “eliminate the possibility of colliding pretrial rulings by courts of coordinate jurisdiction.” By statute, consolidation and transfer of multiple actions into a single MDL is appropriate when it “will be for the convenience of parties and witnesses and will promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions.” The Panel seems to focus primarily on the question of whether transfer will be more efficient than allowing the suits to proceed independently. In making this determination, the Panel relies on the parties’ attorneys to advise it about facts and circumstances relevant to “whether and where transfer should be effected in order to secure the just and expeditious

63 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (“Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred unless it shall have been previously terminated . . . .”).


65 Ninety percent of pending cases that are part of an MDL are products liability claims. Bradt, supra note 43, at 784 (citation omitted).

66 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 49.

67 John F. Nangle, From the Horse’s Mouth: The Workings of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 66 DEF. COUNS. J. 341, 341 (1999) (“[U]nder Section 1407, [the Panel] has the responsibility of . . . identifying civil actions pending in different federal courts involving one or more common questions of fact . . . .”).

68 Marcus, supra note 37, at 2270 (quoting In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 405 F. Supp. 316, 319 (J.P.M.L. 1975)).


70 The Judicial Panel and the Conduct of Multidistrict Litigation, supra note 69, at 1009 (“[T]he Panel has made the likelihood of significant judicial savings the operative factor in transfer decisions.”).
resolution of all involved actions.”

When it perceives that consolidation will save judicial resources, “transfer is almost inevitable.”

Common questions of fact do not have to predominate over other questions, and arguments against transfer because of the existence of non-common issues are unlikely to prevail.

A party dissatisfied with the Panel’s decision may move for reconsideration. On appeal, transfer orders are reviewable only by an extraordinary writ to the court of appeals possessing jurisdiction over the district court handling the MDL. However, an order denying transfer may not be the subject of an appeal.

When the Panel decides to create an MDL, it designates a specific federal district court and a specific federal district judge to preside. The Panel’s choices are not guided by any particular set of factors; they are not cabined by statute or by the Multidistrict Rules of Procedure. The selected judge (the “transferee judge”) and court (the “transferee court”) need not already have one of the consolidated cases on their docket, though parties may lobby the Panel for a specific court or judge on that basis. The Panel might choose a particular judge for his or her experience with similar cases or other MDLs. The condition of a potential transferee court’s docket appears relevant, as do the distribution of MDLs throughout the country, the location of relevant

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71 Nangle, supra note 67, at 343.
72 The Judicial Panel and the Conduct of Multidistrict Litigation, supra note 69, at 1003.
73 Id. at 1006 (“The Panel’s response has been to transfer all the cases and leave to the transferee judge any problems created by noncommon facts or conflicting interests among parties on the same side of a case.”). This is in contrast to Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, in which common questions of law or fact must predominate. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2565-67 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting that the majority opinion imported a predominance requirement into Rule 23(a)(2), which requires potential classes to share common questions of law or fact).
74 J.P.M.L. R. P. 11.1(c).
76 Id. (“There shall be no appeal or review of an order of the panel denying a motion to transfer for consolidated or coordinated proceedings.”); Ostolaza & Hartmann, supra note 38, at 62.
78 Ostolaza & Hartmann, supra note 38, at 57-59.
80 See, e.g., id. at 835 (listing districts to which the parties lobbied for transfer).
81 Ostolaza & Hartmann, supra note 38, at 60.
82 Id.
evidence, and the “willingness and motivation” of the potential transferee judge.83

Prior to consolidation, most of the parties’ disagreements have tended to focus on where the consolidation will take place; parties have preferred particular venues and district judges.84 When lobbying for transfer to a specific district, parties may not argue about applicable district and circuit law in potential courts (which may be more favorable to the plaintiffs or the defendants in a given set of facts); they are limited to administrative and convenience arguments.85 Plaintiffs might strategically file cases in a particular district and then argue that the Panel should assign the MDL to that district because cases are already pending there. If those cases have advanced further in the discovery process, such that a particular presiding judge appears to be leading the pack of cases to be transferred, this strategy might prove effective. On the other side, defendants might argue that creation of an MDL is premature or that, because only a few plaintiffs’ lawyers are involved, the parties can informally coordinate the cases without formally consolidating them.

After the Panel creates an MDL, later-filed “tag-along” cases that share common questions of fact with the previously transferred cases may be added to the MDL.86 A party to a tag-along case may seek a transfer order from the Panel,87 which then reviews the complaint and docket sheet before issuing a conditional transfer order.88 Or, if the defendants agree not to object, tag-along cases can be filed directly in the transferee court, without regard to whether

83 Bradt, supra note 43, at 787. See Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth) § 22.33 (2004) (“[T]he Panel looks for an available and convenient transfer forum, usually one that (1) is not overtaxed with other MDL cases, (2) has a related action pending on its docket, (3) has a judge with some degree of expertise in handling the issues presented, and (4) is convenient to the parties.”) (internal citations omitted).

84 Bradt, supra note 43, at 786-87.

85 See Nangle, supra note 67, at 343 (“[T]he panel does not consider the litigants’ dissatisfaction with past or anticipated rulings of the transferee court. Nor does the panel consider the governing appellate law of the transferee district. And most emphatically, the panel does not sit in review of decisions of the transferee court.”).


87 The Panel may conditionally transfer the tag-along into the MDL for fifteen days, allowing the parties an opportunity to oppose the transfer. Ostolaza & Hartmann, supra note 38, at 63. When any transfer request is pending before the Panel, the potential transferor district court’s authority is not affected—it can rule on pending pretrial motions, including motions to remand to state court. Until an effective transfer order is entered with the clerk of the transferor court, this remains true. Nangle, supra note 67, at 342-43; see J.P.M.L. R. P. 7.1.

88 Nangle, supra note 67, at 342.
personal jurisdiction and venue would be proper in that court absent the
MDL.89

B. MDL Management and Steering Committees

A single MDL can involve thousands of plaintiffs and thousands of
lawyers.90 Rather than deal directly with scores of attorneys, transferee courts
appoint a limited number of lawyers to serve on “steering committees” to
manage the litigation.91 Because “[t]he purpose of consolidation is to permit a
trial convenience and economy in administration,”92 they assert, a failure to
designate lead counsel would be inefficient and counter to the very idea of
MDLs. As a result, “the litigation is run in many ways by a relatively small
number of counsel appointed to the case-management committees established
by the court.”93

Counsel appointed to management or leadership roles act on behalf of other
counsel and parties, not just the clients who retained them.94 MDL judges have
total discretion to designate various leaders or committees among the involved

89 Bradt, supra note 43, at 795-96.
90 Eldon E. Fallon, Jeremy T. Grabill, & Robert Pitard Wynne, Bellwether Trials in
Multidistrict Litigation, 82 Tul. L. Rev. 2323, 2339 n.74 (2008) [hereinafter Fallon et al.,
Bellwether Trials]; see, e.g., In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 594 F.3d 113, 116 (2d Cir.
2010) (per curiam) (involving an MDL “brought by thousands of plaintiffs”).
91 Though transferee courts appoint committees to represent both plaintiffs and
defendants, “in practice, the [Defendants’ Steering Committee] is generally selected by the
defendant itself with the approval of the court.” Fallon, Common Benefit Fees, supra note
53, at 373.
396, 398 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (quoting In re Air Crash Disaster at Florida Everglades on
December 29, 1972, 549 F.2d 1006, 1014 (5th Cir. 1977)); In re Korean Air Lines Co., 642
F.3d 685, 700 (9th Cir. 2011) (“In discretionary matters going to the phasing, timing, and
coordination of the cases, the power of the MDL court is at its peak.”).
93 Bradt, supra note 43, at 791; see Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Group Consensus,
Individual Consent, 79 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 506, 508-10 (2011) [hereinafter Burch, Group
Consensus] (“Presently, plaintiffs in nonclass aggregation have few opportunities for
participation, voice, and control. . . . Realistically, lawyers drive multidistrict litigation.”);
William W. Schwarzer, Alan Hirsch & Edward Sussman, Judicial Federalism: A Proposal
to Amend the Multidistrict Litigation Statute to Permit Discovery Coordination of Large-
Scale Litigation Pending in State and Federal Courts, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1529, 1547 & n.110
(1995) (asserting that “[a]ggregation tends to diminish plaintiffs’ control over their claims”
and citing an example in which nine lawyers or law firms represented over 10,000
claimants); Lawrence L. Jones II, MDL Primer: Multi-District Litigation 101, JONES WARD
liti.html, archived at http://perma.cc/LHS6-AW36 (“After the [Plaintiffs’ Steering
Committee ("PSC") is appointed by the court, the lawyers on the PSC will control the
litigation for all of the non-PSC members. All case strategy and much of the day-to-day
work is completed by the PSC and the various ‘sub-committees’ created by the PSC.”).
94 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 10.221 (2004).
attorneys—they are not required to use any particular titles or assign any particular duties. These designations fall into four general categories: liaison counsel, lead counsel, trial counsel, and committees of counsel.95 “Liaison counsel” is essentially an administrator located near the transferee court who facilitates communications between the court and other counsel; this designee need not be an attorney.96 “Lead counsel” is responsible for “formulating . . . and presenting positions on substantive and procedural issues.”97 This attorney (or attorneys) presents written and oral arguments to the MDL court, works with opposing counsel on discovery issues, conducts depositions, hires expert witnesses, manages support services for the MDL, and ensures that schedules are kept.98 “Trial counsel” function as the principal attorneys at trial, and they coordinate the other members of the trial team.99 “Committees of counsel,” often called steering, coordinating, management, or executive committees, are appointed when there are sufficient dissimilarities among group members to warrant representation of those disparate interests on a larger litigation leadership team.100

The transferee judge has complete control over designating attorneys to play specific roles in the MDL.101 In some cases, attorneys can apply to be on a steering committee or to take on another leadership role.102 Though MDL judges entertain objections to applicants or nominees,103 selection to committee

95 Id.
96 See id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 See Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing Multi-District Litigations, 63 VAND. L. REV. 105, 118-19 (2010) (mentioning that judges are “free to pick the lawyers they want[] because the standards governing appointments of attorneys to managerial positions are extremely weak” and few if any attorneys appeal unfavorable appointment decisions, much less win a reversal).


103 See In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290, 297 (6th Cir. 1988) (describing the process by which attorneys were appointed to the Lead Counsel Committee, the plaintiffs’ failure to show cause why certain attorneys should not be appointed, and declaring, “[i]n complex cases, it is well established that the district judge may create a Plaintiffs’ Lead Counsel Committee”) (citing In re Air Crash Disaster at Florida Everglades on December 29, 1972, 549 F.2d 1006, 1014-15 (5th Cir. 1977); Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc., 557 F.2d 759, 773-74 (9th Cir. 1977); Farber v. Riker–Maxson Corp., 442 F.2d 457, 459 (2d Cir. 1971)); San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel, 1989 WL 168401, at *5-11 (describing the purpose of the plaintiffs’ steering committee; the main criteria for membership thereon; the primary responsibilities of the committee; and procedures for application and nomination to the committee, including written objections to potential members).
is not the result of a traditional adversary process refereed by the court. In selecting counsel for leadership roles, the transferor judge may consider factors such as “physical (e.g., office facilities) and financial resources; commitment to a time-consuming, long-term project; ability to work cooperatively with others; and professional experience particular to this type of litigation.” Among attorneys, “[t]here is often intense competition for appointment by the court as designated counsel, an appointment that may implicitly promise large fees and a prominent role in the litigation.” Attorneys sometimes make side agreements about who will lobby to be appointed to a leadership role. These pre-formed coalitions, which may be influential in establishing an MDL in the first place, often determine who ends up on the steering committee. Of course, this backroom dealing is not transparent to individual claimants, and may not be open to first-time MDL attorneys, either.

Membership on the steering committee entails an enormous amount of work, but it can also come with a huge payoff—certainly larger than the contingency fee expected from representing one or even several individual plaintiffs—because attorneys who do work for the common benefit of the group typically receive a portion of every single plaintiff’s payout. In re Zyprexa Products Liability Litigation provides one example of how MDL courts commonly establish attorney compensation structures for the council appointed to steer the litigation. There, the MDL court capped attorneys’ fees and created a common benefit fund, generated by a mandatory set-aside from all settlements and judgments in the MDL, to compensate members of the plaintiffs’ steering committee. The court also established fee restrictions and appointed special settlement masters with discretion to order reductions or increases of fees in negotiated settlement agreements.

Appointment to the steering committee often reaps subsequent career benefits as well. After an attorney is selected for one steering committee, she may call herself an experienced MDL litigator the next time she participates in an MDL. That credential makes the next transferee judge more likely to

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104 But see Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth) § 10.224 (2004) (“[A]n evidentiary hearing may be needed to bring relevant facts to light or to allow counsel to state their case for appointment and answer questions from the court about their qualifications . . . .”).

105 San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel, 1989 WL 168401, at *6.


107 Id.

108 See Brown, supra note 33, at 398 (“In some cases, participants will agree to the entire composition of the steering committee and iron out any objections before presenting a list to the judge.”).

109 594 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam).

110 Id. at 115.

111 Id. at 116. For more details about fee arrangements for steering committee members, see discussion, infra Part II.E (discussing the methods by which steering committees are compensated).
appoint her to a subsequent steering committee. The pattern repeats. Because the transferee judge has complete control over appointment to leadership roles, and there is fierce competition for those lucrative positions, experience in a prior MDL can tip the scales in favor of one attorney over another. In this way, the group of powerful MDL plaintiffs’ attorneys remains relatively small, and newcomers face formidable barriers to entry that they cannot overcome on their own accord. Due to this positive feedback loop, if an individual plaintiff hires his local attorney for any reason other than the attorney’s MDL experience, the odds of that local attorney being selected for a leadership role are quite low. Claimants are unaware of this when they retain counsel and decide to file a lawsuit, because unless they are tag-along plaintiffs, they are unaware that they will eventually be transferred into an MDL.

The existence of a steering committee lowers barriers to entry for tag-along plaintiffs, which may cause huge increases in the number of plaintiffs in a single MDL. When attorneys appointed by the court will do the bulk of the work, the cost of participation to the individual claimant is lowered. The claimant might even file pro se, foregoing the cost of retaining a lawyer of his own, with the knowledge that a court-sanctioned attorney will litigate his case on his behalf, and that the case will likely never emerge from the MDL. Tag-along plaintiffs who file directly into an MDL do not have to make the same kind of investment as other plaintiffs, so it is possible that their claims are not strong enough to warrant filing individual lawsuits. If so, tag-along plaintiffs could dilute the overall strength of plaintiffs’ claims, which could result in a weaker bargaining position for all the plaintiffs when settlement negotiations begin.

In the unlikely event that individual cases are remanded back to their jurisdictions of origin, the discovery conducted by the steering committee restricts what the individual claimant and her lawyer can do upon remand. Because one of the fundamental ideas behind consolidation into MDL is to avoid duplicative discovery, on remand, transferor courts are hesitant to grant additional discovery requests. As a more formal matter, transferee courts

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112 See Stanwood R. Duval, Jr., Considerations in Choosing Counsel for Multidistrict Litigation Cases and Mass Tort Cases, 74 L.A. L. Rev. 391, 392 (2014) (“[P]revious experience in an MDL or other complex litigation is always considered.”).

113 See id.

114 See id. at 392-93 (remarking on the danger of repeat MDL plaintiffs’ attorneys becoming an “exclusive club”).

115 For example, during the twelve-month period ending September 30, 2013, the Panel transferred 5521 cases into MDLs, whereas 40,988 actions were filed directly in transferee courts during that time. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 49.

116 See, e.g., Pavlou v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., No. 98Civ.4526, 2004 WL 912585, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. April 29, 2004) (affirming, on remand from MDL, a magistrate judge’s order limiting potential deponents and topics of deposition because “[p]laintiffs had sufficient opportunity to seek discovery during the MDL proceedings. To rule otherwise would
have authority to enter pretrial orders that "govern the conduct of the trial" back in a transferor court. Furthermore, decisions made before trial can be outcome-determinative; they dictate viable arguments and strategies. In these ways, even though the consolidated proceedings are restricted to pretrial matters, the steering committee exercises real and enormous influence over the direction of an individual's claim.

C. Bellwether Trials

As the Supreme Court made explicit in Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, a transferee court's authority extends only to pretrial matters; it cannot try a transferred case without the parties' consent. Within the limits of § 1407 and Lexecon, though, MDL courts often work to obtain consent from some parties to conduct "bellwether" trials, which serve as a means of gathering information about the strengths and weaknesses of each side's arguments and often facilitate global settlement negotiations. Bellwether trials are an expected element of the information-gathering process undertaken in transferee courts. These bellwether trials are, for the most part, information-gathering tools; while they of course bind the immediate parties, they are not binding on other parties in the MDL. However, their holdings can be used offensively as collateral estoppel by plaintiffs in future cases.

117 Fallon et al., Bellwether Trials, supra note 90, at 2329 n.17 (quoting In re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Prods. Litig., 169 F.R.D. 632, 636 (N.D. Ill. 1996)); see Marcus, supra note 37, at 2264 (citing Stanley A. Weigel, The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, Transferor Courts and Transferee Courts, 78 F.R.D. 575, 577 (1978)) (quoting Judge Weigel, an original member of the Panel, who "opined that the transferee judge's orders must be respected by the transferor judge").


119 Id. at 28 (holding that a transferee court "has no . . . authority" "to assign a transferred case to itself for trial"). This limitation does not extend to cases brought under Section 4C of the Clayton Act; the Panel can consolidate actions brought under that provision and transfer them for both pretrial and trial. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(h) (2012).

120 The method of selecting cases for bellwether treatment varies among MDLs. The process can involve grouping like cases and selecting from each group, allowing plaintiffs and defendants to propose cases featuring their strongest arguments, or some other process determined by the transferee court. See Fallon et al., Bellwether Trials, supra note 90, at 2343-51 (describing the selection process); see also In re Vioxx Prod. Liab. Litig., 869 F. Supp. 2d 719, 723 (E.D. La. 2012) ("Millions of documents were discovered and collated. Thousands of depositions were taken and at least 1,000 discovery motions were argued. After a reasonable period for discovery, the Court assisted the parties in selecting and preparing certain test cases to proceed as bellwether trials."). There is no explicit requirement that cases selected for bellwether trials be typical of all claims.

121 Bradt, supra note 43, at 789-90; Fallon et al., Bellwether Trials, supra note 90, at 2337-38.
subject to the normal limits on that doctrine.\textsuperscript{122} Cases selected as bellwether trials are usually tried by members of the appointed leadership team, not by the attorneys of record in the individual cases.\textsuperscript{123} As such, bellwether trials give coordinating counsel an opportunity to “organize the products of pretrial common discovery, evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of their arguments and evidence, and understand the risks and costs associated with the litigation.”\textsuperscript{124}

Assuming the claims selected for bellwether treatment are “typical” of the group of claims, bellwether trials facilitate settlement by valuing cases in a way that can be extrapolated to other claims.\textsuperscript{125} The utility of a bellwether verdict depends on whether the tried claim is a truly representative test.\textsuperscript{126} But even if the transferee court conducts several bellwether trials in an attempt to account for claims of different strengths, they cannot account for all the unique features of all claims in the MDL. Relying on the results of bellwether trials to evaluate settlement offers can over- or undervalue individual claims, and there is no telling which is occurring more often.

If cases in an MDL are remanded to their jurisdictions of origin, bellwether trials may be useful for their creation of “trial packages,” which local counsel can use in subsequent trials.\textsuperscript{127} These packages typically include items such as discovery documents, background information, expert reports, deposition and trial testimony, information about potential witnesses, court rulings and transcripts, and coordinating counsel’s work product.\textsuperscript{128} But bellwether trials’

\textsuperscript{122} Cf. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (holding that earlier SEC action could be used offensively as collateral estoppel in later shareholder derivative suit).

\textsuperscript{123} See Fallon et al., \textit{Bellwether Trials}, supra note 90, at 2360 n.121 (noting that members of the steering committee tend to represent a significant number of plaintiffs, have extensive knowledge of the subject matter, and offer their cases to be tried as bellwether cases).

\textsuperscript{124} \textit{Id.} at 2338.

\textsuperscript{125} Alexandra Lahav, \textit{Bellwether Trials}, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 576, 577-78 (2008) (explaining that bellwether trials “assist in valuing cases and to encourage settlement”).

\textsuperscript{126} This is appropriate given the origin of the term “bellwether”:

The term bellwether is derived from the ancient practice of belling a wether (a male sheep) selected to lead his flock. The ultimate success of the wether selected to wear the bell was determined by whether the flock had confidence that the wether would not lead them astray, and so it is in the mass tort context.

\textit{In re} Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d 1016, 1019 (5th Cir. 1997). \textit{See also} Fallon et al., \textit{Bellwether Trials}, supra note 90, at 2324.

\textsuperscript{127} Fallon et al., \textit{Bellwether Trials}, supra note 90, at 2325 (“At a minimum, the bellwether process should lead to the creation of ‘trial packages’ that can be utilized by local counsel upon the dissolution of MDLs.”); \textit{see id.} at 2340 (“Ultimately, the availability of a trial package ensures that the knowledge acquired by coordinating counsel is not lost if a global resolution cannot be achieved in the transferee court.”).

\textsuperscript{128} \textit{Id.} at 2339.
primary function is to facilitate settlement in the transferee court. Bellwether trials prioritize fact-finding and force appointed counsel to develop their theories of the case. These “contribution[s] to the maturation of disputes” “can naturally precipitate settlement discussions” because each side has “test driven” its theories before juries. Jury verdicts inform both sides about the relative strengths and weaknesses of their various strategies and arguments. Knowing the persuasive value of bellwether trials when it comes to negotiating a possible global settlement, “coordinating council often pull out all the stops,” making bellwether trials “exponentially more expensive for the litigants and attorneys than a normal trial.” The more expensive the bellwether trial, the more likely the parties are to rely on its outcome in assessing the value of the remaining claims, because the parties have more riding on the bellwether trial being a useful tool. Similar to the preference for appointing experienced MDL litigators to leadership positions, reliance on bellwether trials is a self-reinforcing feature of MDLs.

Bellwether trials are not perfect predictors. Even if the transferee court conducts multiple bellwether trials that are representative of several subgroups of claims, the most useful bellwether cases for the greatest number of plaintiffs are not the extraordinary claims. So although the process of trying bellwether cases facilitates global settlement, by design it does not account for the unique characteristics of a particularly weak or strong claim.

D. Settlement

Settlement is the fate of almost all cases that are part of an MDL. Approximately 97% of MDL cases terminate in transferee districts; thus, relatively few are remanded back to the districts in which they were originally filed. Parties to MDL cases and the transferee judges who preside over them face tremendous pressure to settle. Because a primary objective of consolidation into MDL is to avoid multiple federal judges having to deal with the same issues, some judges perceive failure to achieve a global settlement as

129 “The notion that the trial of some members of a large group of claimants may provide a basis for enhancing prospects of settlement or for resolving common issues or claims is a sound one that has achieved general acceptance by both bench and bar.” *Chevron*, 109 F.3d at 1019.

130 Fallon et al., *Bellwether Trials*, supra note 90, at 2342.

131 See id. (explaining that bellwether trials let attorneys gain an understanding more grounded in reality due to the presence of a jury).

132 Id. at 2366.

133 As of September 30, 2013, 462,501 individual actions had been subjected to § 1407 proceedings. *Statistical Analysis*, supra note 49. The Panel remanded 13,432, or about 3%, of those. Id. 359,548 actions terminated in the transferee court. Id.; see Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, *From Class Actions to Multidistrict Consolidations: Aggregate Mass-Tort Litigation After Ortiz*, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 775, 801 (2010) (observing several MDL settlements that “suggest that the MDL process has supplemented and perhaps displaced the class action device as a procedural mechanism for large settlements”).
a failure. Transferee courts tend to take an active role in settlement negotiations. They appoint special settlement masters and take a hands-on approach. As Judge Fallon described, it is “not unusual” for a transferee court to “encourage a global resolution of the matter before recommending to the Panel that the case be remanded.” Individual litigants, whose personal litigation goals may or may not be monetary, face pressure to accept defendants’ monetary offers because their attorneys work for contingency fees.

Currently, the aggregate settlement rule governs global MDL settlements. It requires that each claimant give “informed consent” to a settlement, based on knowledge of the settlement terms, including other claimants’ payouts. However, that safety valve may be short-lived. The American Law Institute (“ALI”) recently published *Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation*. The ALI proposal would allow clients, at the time they retained representation, to agree to be bound by an aggregate settlement approved by supermajority vote of all claimants. Clients could empower their lawyers “in advance, to negotiate binding settlements on their behalf as part of a collective resolution of claims.” Although the ALI proposal is just that—a proposal—it demonstrates the pervasiveness of settlement in MDLs and the apparent consensus that facilitating global settlement is a certain function, if not the main purpose, of consolidation into an MDL.

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134 See Marcus, supra note 37, at 2265 (“Almost inevitably, transferee judges are likely to feel that they have some responsibility to attempt to resolve the cases they have gotten—‘The other judges are relying on me to finish this job.’”).


136 See, e.g., *In re Patenaude*, 210 F.3d 135, 139-40 (3d Cir. 2000) (describing transferee courts’ resistance to remand unless “all avenues of settlement were exhausted”). Transferee courts even “may require individuals to attend settlement conferences.” *In re Korean Air Lines Co., Antitrust Litig.*, 642 F.3d 685, 699 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing *In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int’l Airport, Denver, Colo., on Nov. 15, 1987, 720 F. Supp. 1433, 1436 (D. Colo. 1988)*).


138 See Burch, *Group Consensus*, supra note 93, at 516-17 (citing the September 11th Victims Compensation Fund as an example of claimants whose goals transcended financial compensation); Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, *Consent Versus Closure*, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 265, 312-13 (2011) (arguing that tort law “is not simply a device for transferring wealth”).

139 Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 138, at 296.


141 Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 138, at 293.

142 *Id.*
E. **Attorney Compensation**

The huge responsibility placed on members of court-selected steering committees comes with potentially huge payoffs. Transferee courts structure compensation plans for lead counsel that reflect their responsibility to and efforts on behalf of the group. The courts justify that exercise of authority in the following way: """"[I]f lead counsel are to be an effective tool the court must have means at its disposal to order appropriate compensation for them. The court’s power is illusory if it is dependent upon lead counsel’s performing the duties desired of them for no additional compensation.""""143 To compensate appointed counsel, courts set up common benefit funds from which they will later withdraw lead counsel’s fees and costs.144 They also enter orders requiring some portion of all claim payments, including settlements and judgments arising after cases are transferred back to their original jurisdictions, to be paid into the common benefit funds.145 The “common benefit fee” comes from the fee that would be paid to the claimant’s selected attorney—not from the claimant’s portion.146 In this way, MDL splits the attorney fee the plaintiff agreed to at the outset between retained counsel and appointed counsel. The contingent percentage of the plaintiff’s recovery remains the same, but the retained counsel must share that percentage with the steering committee.

Transferee courts also establish how much lead counsel will be paid from the common funds. Many rely on a Fifth Circuit case, *Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.*,147 which established a twelve-factor guideline for determining a reasonable fee for each committee member.148 In allocating fees, ...
courts must “conform to ‘traditional judicial standards of transparency, impartiality, procedural fairness, and ultimate judicial oversight.’”\(^\text{149}\) They do so with input from lead attorneys, but ultimate discretion lies with the transferee court,\(^\text{150}\) whose cost awards are subject to abuse of discretion review by the appellate court.\(^\text{151}\) The transferee court cannot abdicate its responsibility of closely scrutinizing fee awards to appointed counsel.\(^\text{152}\) Not surprisingly, given the large number of cases and attorneys involved, cost and fee allocation is a complicated and time-consuming part of MDL management. It can be difficult if not impossible for the transferee court to adequately predict what the nature of lead counsel’s expenses will be as the MDL progresses, so all players must remain flexible and engaged in this part of MDL management. If they are not actively involved along the way, dissatisfied plaintiffs (or their retained attorneys) may forego their opportunity to object to costs incurred and then requested by the steering committee.\(^\text{153}\)

### III. MDL’s Due Process Difficulties

As the foregoing description of MDL procedures illustrates, a case transferred into an MDL proceeding looks drastically different from a typical lawsuit, and presumably these procedures are not what the individual plaintiff expects when he files his claim. Despite this elaborate set of procedures and

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150 Fallon, *Common Benefit Fees*, supra note 53, at 387. District courts derive authority to establish these structures from their equitable powers. *Id.* at 379-80 (explaining how courts derive this equitable authority from Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). Settlement agreements also sometimes give express consent to the transferee judge setting common benefit fees. *See id.* at 378-80 (“[S]ettlements usually contain[] a specific agreement addressing the court’s authority regarding attorneys’ fees.”).

151 *In re San Juan Dupont Hotel Fire Litig.*, 111 F.3d 220, 228 (1st Cir. 1997). *See High Sulfur Content Gasoline*, 517 F.3d at 227 (“We must determine whether the record clearly indicates that the district court has utilized the *Johnson* framework as the basis of its analysis, has not proceeded in a summary fashion, and has arrived at an amount that can be said to be just compensation.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

152 *See High Sulfur Content Gasoline Prod. Liab. Litig.*, 517 F.3d at 227 (admonishing the district court for “abdicat[ing] its responsibility to ensure that the individual awards recommended by the Fee Committee were fair and reasonable”).

153 *See, e.g., San Juan Dupont Hotel Fire Litig.*, 111 F.3d at 228 (“[A]ll litigants must share in their mutual obligation to collaborate with the district court *ab initio* in fashioning adequate case management and trial procedures, or bear the reasonably foreseeable consequences for their failure to do so.”).
the enormous number of cases involved in MDL, the constitutional validity of this process has gone almost completely unexamined. In the name of efficiency, MDL—including its attendant procedures—has been embraced virtually without question.\textsuperscript{154} This unqualified acceptance assumes that consolidation into MDL is totally benign and that individual claims retain their individualism even when they are temporarily adjudicated in a group with like cases. It also assumes—without any basis—that MDL procedures satisfy procedural due process.

The plain language of § 1407 and the Supreme Court’s decision in \textit{Lexecon} have probably contributed to the unquestioning acceptance of the constitutionality of MDL, because both emphasize that transferee courts have jurisdiction solely over pretrial matters.\textsuperscript{155} But consolidation into MDL, originally envisioned as a temporary transfer to facilitate convenience and avoid duplicative discovery, now all but guarantees that transferred cases will never return to their original jurisdictions for trial. The Panel’s transfer orders are mandatory, one-way tickets to transferee districts—“black holes.”\textsuperscript{156} They are non-transferrable and non-negotiable.\textsuperscript{157} Instead of being temporarily and conveniently consolidated for discovery, individual claims become part of a massive group of cases plodding toward settlement. Although it is true that transferee courts have jurisdiction only over pretrial matters, individual claims are fundamentally transformed by virtue of their consolidation into MDL. And transfer back to the original jurisdiction—in the rare instances in which it actually takes place—cannot “save” the constitutionality of what happens in the transferee district.

Each claimant in an MDL has an individually held, constitutionally protected property right at stake. Those rights are guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, which protects life, liberty, and property against deprivation absent due process of law.\textsuperscript{158} The “property” at stake in an MDL is the “chose in action.” This historically established concept refers to the right to sue to enforce a legally protected claim, even the unlitigated right to sue.\textsuperscript{159} Under the

\textsuperscript{154} See Marcus, \textit{supra} note 37, at 2248 (“The Panel’s activities have generally not caused the sort of controversy the class action produced.”).


\textsuperscript{156} See Fallon et al., \textit{Bellwether Trials, supra} note 90, at 2330 (“Indeed, the strongest criticism of the traditional MDL process is the centralized forum can resemble a ‘black hole,’ into which cases are transferred never to be heard from again.”).

\textsuperscript{157} “Imagine you are minding your own business and litigating a case in federal court. Opening your mail one day, you find an order—from a court you have never heard of—declaring your case a ‘tag-along’ action and transferring it to another federal court clear across the country for pretrial proceedings. Welcome to the world of multidistrict litigation.” Gregory Hansel, \textit{Extreme Litigation: An Interview with Judge Wm. Terrell Hodges, Chairman of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation}, 19 ME. B.J. 16, 16 (2004).

\textsuperscript{158} U.S. CONST. amend. V.

\textsuperscript{159} Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441, 444 (1850) (defining a “chose in action” as a right “which can be realized only by suit”).
Fifth Amendment, then, MDL claimants cannot be deprived of their rights to a chose in action without due process of law. MDL is a collection of individual lawsuits; it is not a vindication of some kind of substantively established group-held right. The constitutionality of MDL must therefore be assessed from the perspective of each litigant on an individual basis. As in other consolidated representative litigation (for example, class actions), MDL raises concerns about whether collectivization unconstitutionally modifies the claimants’ individually held rights.

In MDL, individual litigants, for all practical purposes, lose a substantial degree of control over the procedural fate of their claims. For example, for the overwhelming number of claimants, the lawyers they hired are not selected for the court-appointed steering committee, which drives strategic and tactical decisions. This impedes their ability to exercise control over the direction and course of their litigation. The lack of assurance that the selected attorneys can and will provide full and fair representation for each individual claimant is also unconstitutional because it does not comport with even the procedural protections afforded to absent class members in a class action, which are constitutionally dubious to start.

This Part expands on these ideas and assesses whether the changes inherent in forced transfer into an MDL comport with the constitutional guarantees of procedural due process. It concludes that MDL fails to satisfy those guarantees. It begins with a discussion of the day-in-court ideal as the constitutional baseline for procedural due process. It argues that the day-in-court ideal is the sine qua non of constitutional due process—the basic structure upon which the adversarial system is built. Scholars disagree about the theoretical justifications for the day-in-court ideal, but no matter whether one subscribes to the autonomy model of the day-in-court ideal or is satisfied with a paternalistic notion of one’s right to his day in court, MDL fails to provide a constitutionally adequate opportunity to litigate.

A. The Constitutional Baseline: Due Process and the Day-in-Court Ideal

Before delving into the constitutional merits of MDL, it is important first to identify the constitutional mandate against which MDL should be measured. In any given adjudication, the constitutional inquiry concerns exactly what process is “due.” The Due Process Clause, on its face, does not provide a straightforward answer to that question, nor to the question of who gets to provide the answer. In attempting to answer the question of what procedures the Due Process Clause demands, the Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed a “deep-rooted historic tradition,” a principle that is “as old as the law” and

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161 See supra Part II.B (explaining the selection process and power of steering committees).

162 Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846 (1999) (internal quotation marks
of universal justice”: “no one should be personally bound until he has had his day in court.”

The so-called day-in-court ideal is at the heart of constitutionally guaranteed procedural due process, according to the Court, and is central to the American conception of the adversarial model of litigation. Litigants, judges, and scholars frequently refer to the right to an individual day in court when they analyze whether due process requires, or forbids, a certain procedure. In some ways, “an individual day in court” has become a reflexive, shorthand description of what due process means. For a variety of reasons, MDL severely undermines the day-in-court ideal by depriving individual litigants of their opportunity to protect their interests through the litigation process. But before one can successfully indict MDL as a due process violation, one must first establish two things: (1) What does the day-in-court ideal specifically encompass? and (2) In what way does deprivation of one’s day in court undermine the set of constitutionally dictated normative precepts encompassed by the concept of procedural due process? It is to answering these questions that our analysis now turns.

At the outset, it is important to define what an individual day in court entails. The right to one’s own day in court means a right to meaningful control over litigation strategy and goals, including choice of legal representative. It requires a “full and fair opportunity to litigate,” which means, as one of us has written, a “full opportunity to prepare [one’s] own arguments and evidence.” At base, meaningful participation in the adjudicatory process—the day-in-court ideal—includes, in the words of a respected scholar, “the right to observe, to make arguments, to present evidence, and to be informed of the reasons for a decision.”

163 Mason v. Eldred, 73 U.S. 231, 239 (1867). See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892-93 (2008) (pronouncing the general rule that persons are not bound by cases in which they are not parties); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940) (“It is a principle of general application in Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process.”).

164 Martin H. Redish & William J. Katt, Taylor v. Sturgell, Procedural Due Process, and the Day-in-Court Ideal: Resolving the Virtual Representation Dilemma, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1877, 1890 (2009) (“‘Autonomy’ means that the individual has the right to choose how to fashion his own representation and to participate in the process as he sees fit.”); see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”) (internal quotations omitted).

165 Taylor, 553 U.S. at 892.


The Supreme Court has identified the “two central concerns of procedural due process” to be “the prevention of unjustified or mistaken deprivations and the promotion of participation and dialogue by affected individuals in the decisionmaking process.” The day-in-court ideal takes account of both of these concerns. First, an individual day in court helps achieve accurate outcomes (thus avoiding “unjustified or mistaken deprivations”) because the stakeholders—those who will be most affected by the outcome and are the most motivated to protect their own rights—participate in the decision-making process. In addition, individual participation is inherently valuable in a democratic system because it legitimizes the adjudicating entities in the minds of the litigants. It fosters citizens’ roles in democratic governance, which includes a legitimate, authoritative judiciary.

**B. The Foundations of Due Process Theory**

Recognition of these and other benefits of an individual day in court does not, in itself, reveal the complex set of values underlying this procedural guarantee. Understanding the theoretical grounding for the day-in-court ideal helps one to grasp the importance of the tradition and determine the constitutional floor of procedural due process. Procedural due process can be thought to foster a variety of non-mutually exclusive values. But in reverse engineering the day-in-court ideal as a manifestation of procedural due process, it is necessary to recognize a foundational conceptual dichotomy in due process theory. On the one hand, one may employ due process theory as a means of deciding which particular procedures are required to provide the individual whose constitutionally protected interests are at stake with a full and fair opportunity to defend those interests—in other words, exactly what

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169 See Solum, supra note 167, at 259 (“[P]rocedural fairness requires that those affected by a decision have the option to participate in the process by which the decision is made.”).

170 See Alexandra D. Lahav, *Due Process and the Future of Class Actions*, 44 Loy. U. Chic. L.J. 545, 554 (2012) (“Dignitary theory dovetails with social-psychological studies of procedural justice finding that people perceive outcomes as more legitimate when the participants are given the opportunity to be heard.”); Redish & Katt, supra note 164, at 1893-94 (“[I]ndividual participation in the litigation process as a means of vindicating his rights adds legitimacy to judicial outcomes.”); Solum, supra note 167, at 274 (“Procedures that purport to bind without affording meaningful rights of participation are fundamentally illegitimate.”).

procedures are essential to the exercise of the individual’s right to her day in court. On the other hand, one may draw on due process theory in order to decide whether, in a particular situation, the individual has a constitutional right to her day in court in the first place. Those are not identical questions. Indeed, the theoretical analysis required to answer each of them is, in certain ways, fundamentally different.

When a court decides whether a particular procedure is required by due process in the course of an adjudicatory hearing, the traditional debate has been between the purely utilitarian approach adopted by the Supreme Court in its decisions in *Mathews v. Eldridge* and *Connecticut v. Doehr* on the one hand, and the so-called “dignitary” interest in permitting the individual to feel an appropriate level of respect from his government, on the other hand. Under the utilitarian test currently in vogue in the Supreme Court, a court is to balance competing utilitarian concerns: (1) the extent to which the procedure in question increases the likelihood of an accurate decision, (2) the nature of the individual’s interest at stake, (3) the extent to which use of the procedure would burden government, and (4) the extent to which the use of the procedure would burden the other party or parties. In contrast, the dignitary model, advocated by certain scholars, places primary emphasis on an inquiry into the extent to which the procedure is necessary to allow the individual to believe that he has had a full and fair opportunity to plead his case, regardless of the impact of that procedural opportunity on the reaching of an accurate decision.

One does not reach constitutional questions about the need for specific procedures, however, until one first concludes that the individual has a right to her day in court in the first place. It is generally assumed that before the individual’s property interests may be undermined or taken away at least some form of governmental process is required. Here too, however, there exists a significant dichotomy as to the underlying rationale for that right. And, it is important to note, the choice between those theoretical alternatives is likely to have significant practical consequences for the shaping of a litigant’s due process right to her day in court. That dichotomy is between the “paternalism” rationale for the day-in-court ideal and the “autonomy” rationale for the individual’s right to her day in court. Under the former rationale, the sole concern is that individual litigants’ interests are, in fact, adequately protected

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174 *Id.* at 10-11.
176 *See Mathews*, 424 U.S. at 333 (“This Court consistently has held that some form of hearing is required before an individual is finally deprived of a property interest.”).
177 *See supra* note 25 and accompanying text.
by an advocate—whether or not of the individual’s choosing—whose interests overlap with those of the absent parties and who possesses the resources and experience to advocate effectively on behalf those absent parties whose legal rights and interests are being adjudicated.\textsuperscript{178}

Under the paternalism rationale for the day-in-court ideal, whether the absent party consents to the choice of advocate is irrelevant. In some situations, of course, it will be impractical, if not impossible, for the absent party to exercise choice even if she were permitted to do so. But under the exclusive focus on paternalism, the individual litigant’s choice is irrelevant: the key is not whether the absent party has made a choice, but rather solely whether the absent party’s legally protected interests have in fact been adequately represented. In effect, the paternalism model of the day-in-court ideal views the representative as a type of guardian, exercising protective authority over his wards who are categorically presumed to be unable to protect those interests themselves.

In stark contrast to the paternalism model of the day-in-court ideal is what can appropriately be described as the “autonomy” rationale for one’s right to her day in court. The autonomy model views resort to the litigation process as simply one of several means by which the individual in a liberal democratic society is permitted to participate in the governmental process—whether executive, legislative, or judicial—in an effort to protect her own interests.\textsuperscript{179} In exercising the right to participate in the governing process, the individual is universally given the right to choose (within outer limits set by the law designed to preserve societal order and safety) how most effectively to influence decisions of a democratically shaped government. For example, government may not choose a representative to speak on behalf of the individual if she prefers either to choose her own representative or represent her interests herself. Nor can government tell the individual how to shape her appeal for governmental change in law or policy.\textsuperscript{180} Such participatory choices are an essential part of the legitimizing function performed by preservation of the individual’s right to seek to influence governmental decision-making. And this form of “meta”-autonomy (i.e., autonomy as to how to participate in the processes of democratic self-government—or, if you will, democratic “autonomy”) logically applies to an individual’s efforts to influence the judicial branch to protect his rights or interests as much as it does to the individual’s attempts to influence the other branches of government. All three branches are, after all, part of a democratic government whose Constitution is committed to recognition of the individual as an integral whole, worthy of respect.

\textsuperscript{178} See Redish, supra note 25, at 140.

\textsuperscript{179} See supra note 29 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{180} See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (individual has First Amendment right to display in public a jacket saying “Fuck the Draft” on the back).
In shaping the individual’s due process right in the context of procedural collectivism, the Supreme Court has, all but exclusively, emphasized the paternalism model of the day-in-court ideal: there is no requirement that the individual litigant be given the opportunity to choose how best to represent his own rights and interests, as long as those chosen to represent those interests can be assumed to do so adequately. The paternalistic version of the day-in-court ideal is explored in Redish, supra note 25, at 140-47. Thus, in both Hansberry v. Lee and Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, the Supreme Court found due process violated when a conflict in goals existed between the representative parties and the absent claimants. But the Court has never extended similar recognition to the individual litigant’s meta-autonomy right to choose how best to represent her own legally protected interests. For example, two out of the three categories of class actions authorized by the current version of Rule 23—a rule, after all, promulgated by the Supreme Court itself—are mandatory; members of the class are forcibly grouped together, even if they believe they are themselves better able to protect their own interests or even believe that they prefer not to pursue those interests legally. It is true that in one decision, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, the Court upheld a state class action against a due process challenge only on the express condition that absent claimants be given the right to opt out of the class. But while lower courts have on occasion read that decision broadly, careful reading of the Court’s opinion makes clear that the only reason for the requirement of a class member’s option to withdraw from the class was the constitutional infirmity of lack of personal jurisdiction which would have resulted without the absent claimant’s consent.

One can, of course, make a strong case to support the need for paternalism as a means of assuring a full and fair day in court in the absence of an individual’s ability to protect her own interests. It is in this manner that the

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181 The paternalistic version of the day-in-court ideal is explored in Redish, supra note 25, at 140-47.
182 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
184 Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 45; Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 626; see also Stephenson v. Dow Chemical Co., 273 F.3d 249, 260-61 (2d Cir. 2001), aff’d by an equally divided court, 539 U.S. 111 (2003).
185 See Rima M. Daniels, Monetary Damages in Mandatory Classes: When Should Opt-Out Rights be Allowed?, 57 Ala. L. Rev. 499, 499 n.1 (2005) (“Classes certified under 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) are known as ‘mandatory’ classes because absent class members have no inherent right to remove themselves.”).
187 Id. at 811-12.
188 See, e.g., Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386, 392 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. granted in part, 510 U.S. 810 (1993), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 511 U.S. 117 (1994) (holding minimal due process protection requires opportunity for plaintiff to remove himself from the class where forum court had personal jurisdiction over plaintiff).
189 Shutts, 472 U.S. at 811-12.
Due Process Clause may serve an appropriate guardian-like function. However, it would be dangerous to assume paternalism is a sufficient condition, as well as a necessary one. Where circumstances permit, due process is appropriately construed to provide the individual with autonomy to choose how—and indeed, if—to protect her own interests through resort to the adjudicatory process.

When one considers the implications of MDL for the Due Process Clause, it matters little, if at all, whether one chooses to view the paternalism model of due process as merely necessary or instead as both necessary and sufficient. From either perspective, MDL fails miserably. This is in stark contrast to the other well-known form of procedural collectivism, the modern class action. By both rule and judicial decision, class action procedure has taken care to assure that the paternalism model be satisfied. And while one of us has already severely criticized modern class action procedure because of its failure to satisfy the dictates of the autonomy model, at least under the most common form of class action—that created by Rule 23(b)(3)—individual class members are given the right to opt out of the class proceeding, thereby satisfying at least the minimum level of litigant choice and control demanded by the autonomy model. But as our analysis will soon demonstrate, MDL satisfies the guarantees of neither the paternalism nor autonomy models of procedural due process. The inescapable conclusion, then, is that as presently structured, MDL is unambiguously unconstitutional.

C. Applying the Day-in-Court Ideal to MDL

On the surface, MDL practice seems largely innocuous; the Panel merely temporarily transfers cases to a different district court for pretrial matters. But for a variety of reasons, transfer effectively amounts to the end of the road for the overwhelming majority of cases. This is troublesome from a constitutional perspective, because not even the most minimal protection of the day-in-court ideal from the perspective of either the paternalism or autonomy models is satisfied.

190 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)-(b) (requiring parties be “fairly and adequately protect[ed]” and allowing a class action if “prosecuting separate actions” “would substantially impair or impede [individual class members’] ability to protect their interests”); supra note 185 and accompanying text.
191 See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
192 See Redish, supra note 25, at 135-75.
193 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v) (“[T]he court will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion . . . .”).
194 See supra note 164 and accompanying text. It could be argued that an opt-out procedure is insufficient to satisfy the autonomy model because it preys on the inertia of class members, and that instead autonomy demands use of an opt-in procedure. That issue, however, is irrelevant to MDL, which provides for neither procedure.
Recall that unlike the class action, where most absent class members have not even considered individual suit and often possess claims not large enough to justify such suit, MDL applies only to claimants who have already chosen their own attorney and already filed suit. Yet with no formal, open, and adversary participation by those claimants, the transferee court selects the attorneys who actually drive the litigation. This means that transfer into an MDL is by no means innocuous when it comes to the due process right to an individual’s day in court. MDL plaintiffs in no sense meaningfully participate in, much less control, their day in court. Nor are there any assurances that those in charge of the litigation are adequately representing the interests of the individual claimants.

One key way that litigants control their day in court is by selecting their attorneys. This is often the first expression of their autonomy: they seek the advice of counsel when they consider whether to even file a claim. Lawyers are contractually and ethically bound to vigorously represent their clients’ interests—and no one else’s—in court. Indeed, it would undoubtedly be unethical for an attorney to represent two parties in the same litigation when those parties’ interests potentially differ. Permitting litigants to choose their representatives is central to providing a full and fair opportunity to litigate. The foundations of due process dictate that that choice belongs to the parties alone. But claimants forced into an MDL are deprived of that essential choice. By virtue of his case’s transfer into the MDL—a move that the plaintiff cannot prevent—his chosen lawyer will almost certainly not be the one actually representing his interests in the course of all the important MDL determinations. Rather, the lawyers on the court-appointed steering committee will take over and they will do so without the protective assurances of their adequacy, good faith, or the extent to which the interests of the absent litigants truly overlap. Thus, the method of choosing the attorneys who will represent the claimants in an MDL satisfies neither the autonomy nor the paternalism models of the day-in-court ideal.

When a transferee judge appoints a steering committee, she does so at her discretion, outside the strictures of any Federal Rule, statute, or adversary proceeding. Appointment to the steering committee comes after nothing more

195 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
196 Supra note 14 and accompanying text.
197 Sturm, supra note 171, at 1001 (“Lawyers’ control over the process detracts from the client’s sense of autonomy and responsibility.”).
198 “In fact, a party loses some control over litigation as soon as she is forced to share the litigating stage with even one other litigant.” Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the “Day in Court” Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 193, 198 n.16 (1992). “Indeed, the judicial willingness to sacrifice party control in the aggregation context seems inconsistent with the firm commitment to individual litigant control in the preclusion area.” Id.
199 See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
than a judge-designated period of nominations and written objections. A more formalized, uniform adjudicatory approach could conceivably parallel the adequacy of representation protection of Rule 23(a)(4), or the narrow “adequate representation” exception to the rule against nonparty preclusion. Without such safeguards, however, the process fails to guarantee that the appointed representatives will zealously advocate on behalf of absent litigants in the same way that their hired representative presumably would have.

The dangers of MDL from the perspective of the paternalism model are exacerbated by the extremely loose connection required among the claims. Wholly apart from the absence of a procedurally adequate method to determine the legitimacy of the attorneys in charge, there exist serious problems in having MDL satisfy the paternalism model of due process. Committee members’ obligations to the mass of plaintiffs may undermine or dilute an individual plaintiff’s unique interests, needs, or desires. If one plaintiff’s best interests conflict with the majority’s best interests (or even a small group’s interests), how can the steering committee vigorously represent both? Indeed, one may question how these potentially conflicting responsibilities can be handled ethically. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct define conflicts of interest between concurrent clients broadly, including even the “significant risk” of adverseness among clients. MDL plaintiffs often seek the same thing—the largest cut possible of the defendant’s limited funds. Their success can come at another plaintiff’s expense. This is similar to what happens when one lawyer represents multiple parties seeking to form a joint venture. In that scenario, the lawyer is “likely to be materially limited in the lawyer’s ability to recommend or advocate all possible positions that each might take because of the lawyer’s duty of loyalty to the others.” Thus, even if the chosen attorneys are fully competent and acting in good faith, it is impossible to be

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200 See supra notes 101-104 and accompanying text.
201 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) (“The representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.”).
202 See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 894 (2008) (“We have confirmed that, ‘in certain limited circumstances,’ a nonparty may be bound by a judgment because she was ‘adequately represented by someone with the same interests who [wa]s a party’ to the suit.” (quoting Richards v. Jefferson Cnty., 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996))).
203 See supra note 58 and accompanying text (describing the lenient standard by which claims are aggregated).
204 See Burch, Litigating Together, supra note 22, at 97 (examining “how to effectively and ethically represent multiple clients when one client’s best interest conflicts with the majority’s best interests”).
205 A concurrent conflict of interest exists if: (1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or (2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a) (1983).
206 Id. R. 1.7 cmt.
assured that in the one-size-fits-all practice of MDL, they will be able to effectively protect the rights of individual claimants.

In contrast, the modern class action demands close linkage among the claims, for the very purpose of assuring due process. MDL claimants, on the other hand, are left in “a procedural no-man’s-land,” at the mercy of the transferee judge and attorneys whose obligations are to the interests of many plaintiffs, which may not necessarily align with those of an individual plaintiff.

Moreover, the MDL judge’s selection of lead counsel is not subject to effective appellate review, even though the choice may turn out to be outcome-determinative in many ways, including whether a plaintiff’s claim will settle in the transferee court (and for how much), resolved on summary judgment, or be transferred back to the transferor jurisdiction. Repeat MDL plaintiffs’ counsel can work behind closed doors to lobby for specific attorneys to be named to the steering committee. This makes it extremely difficult for a newcomer attorney to receive enough support to be selected for a leadership role. The individual plaintiff’s wishes are easily lost in this series of smoke-filled rooms, and only a narrow group of plaintiffs’ attorneys are appointed to leadership roles.

Ignoring the claimant’s choice of lawyer disrespects the claimant and undermines the procedural autonomy that the Due Process Clause is intended to protect. Similarly, the established process of appointing lead counsel and ceding control to the court-appointed committees further undermines the paternalism model of the day-in-court ideal by failing to build in safeguards that assure the choice of adequate representatives who are able to zealously advocate on behalf of all claimants.

In addition to the fact that appointed counsel are selected by the court, rather than by the individuals they represent, MDL claimants do not enjoy a traditional attorney-client relationship with the members of the court-appointed

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207 See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
208 Burch, Litigating Together, supra note 22, at 95.
209 For an example of the criteria used to select members of a plaintiffs’ steering committee, see In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., No. MDL 721, 1989 WL 168401, at *6 (D. P.R. Dec. 2, 1988). There, the transferee court listed “physical (e.g., office facilities) and financial resources; commitment to a time-consuming, long-term project; ability to work cooperatively with others; and professional experience particular to this type of litigation” as the main criteria for membership on the plaintiffs’ steering committee. Id.
210 A recent survey of about ninety attorneys who practice in MDL cases indicates that snubbed attorneys resent this reality. As the surveyor wrote, “A substantial group of local plaintiffs’ counsel resent the panel’s role in facilitating national plaintiffs’ counsels’ ‘takeover’ of their cases. They criticize a repeat-player syndrome in the selection of plaintiffs’ MDL counsel.” Judge John G. Heyburn II, chair of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, responds: “We know that our orders can effectively disenfranchise some local plaintiffs’ counsel. In every case, we ask ourselves whether centralization sufficiently promotes justice and efficiency, so much so that we should inconvenience some for the benefit of the whole.” Heyburn & McGovern, supra note 41, at 30.
steering committee. The small group of attorneys chosen for leadership roles is charged with representing all of the possibly thousands of plaintiffs, whose cases have facts that are often only loosely linked. This arrangement treats plaintiffs as an indivisible group rather than as individuals who are integral wholes, worthy of respect. Individual claimants do not have a direct line to the steering committee in the way they would with their own lawyers. Steering committee members act as gatekeepers to discovery materials obtained from defendants.211 Even if they were to freely grant access to those materials, committee members constitute a hurdle that is absent from the traditional attorney-client relationship. This severely attenuated attorney-client relationship between each claimant and the steering committee “inhibit[s] a client’s ability to monitor her case as she would in an individual lawsuit.”212 This, too, violates both the autonomy and paternalism models of the day-in-court ideal.

If an individual plaintiff or her lawyer disagrees with a strategic choice made by lead counsel, she faces a steep uphill battle to reassert control over her representation.213 That can hardly be characterized as a “full and fair opportunity to litigate” on her own terms. Because claimants forced into MDL effectively lose their chosen representatives, and the appointed representatives’ loyalties are often likely to be divided, MDL falls far short of providing the “deep-rooted historic tradition” of an individual’s day in court.214 Due process demands much more.

Another non-traditional feature of the relationship between appointed lead counsel and individual claimants is the compensation structure common among MDLs. In consolidated proceedings, “the attorney’s loyalty divides not only between clients, but also between clients and self-interest.”215 Compensation for attorneys who work on behalf of the group depends upon the value of every

211 See Fallon, Common Benefit Fees, supra note 53, at 373 (observing committee’s role in conducting and overseeing discovery).
212 Burch, Litigating Together, supra note 22, at 95 (advocating a plaintiff-consensus approach to managing non-class aggregate litigation).
213 See, e.g., San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel, 1989 WL 168401, at *10 (outlining the procedure to be followed when an individual plaintiff’s counsel disagrees with the PSC, stressing “that counsel must not repeat any question, argument, motion, or other paper propounded or filed, or actions taken by the PSC” and warning that “[f]ailure to abide by these terms shall result in sanctions against counsel personally”). In In re Bendectin Litigation, a group of plaintiffs complained that the transferee judge’s appointment of lead counsel denied them the right to freely choose counsel. None responded to the judge’s order to show cause why the selected attorneys should not be appointed. The Sixth Circuit found no error in the appointment, noting that the practice of appointing such committees is “well established” and the plaintiffs’ “failure below to object to such a procedure.” In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290, 297 (6th Cir. 1988).
214 See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
215 Burch, Litigating Together, supra note 22, at 98.
plaintiff’s settlement or judgment. As a result, lead counsel may push hard for settlement as opposed to remand, prefer a quick settlement in favor of a protracted discovery period, or advocate for settlement terms that may not be particularly favorable to some or many plaintiffs. The First Circuit has acknowledged existence of this “inherent conflict[] of interest” “between the PSC and individual plaintiffs in mass-tort MDLs.” But even after doing so, the court affirmed in substantial part an order awarding over $10 million to the appointed plaintiffs’ steering committee, in large part because the plaintiffs did not object soon enough. MDL plaintiffs, their chosen attorneys, and the appointed steering committee all want the largest common fund possible so that they can maximize their individual cuts. Still, how to allocate a common fund will usually be contentious, and at that point, plaintiffs’ and MDL counsel’s interests become adverse. Complicating matters further is the fact that at the same time, the retained attorneys who were not selected for a leadership role want to guard their fees. That goal may impact the nature of their advice about settling or agreeing to specific settlement terms. All of this is to say that MDL muddles the traditional relationship between attorney and client, creating new adverse incentives. It introduces additional tension between attorneys’ best interests and clients’ best interests.

At the most basic level, MDL plaintiffs are not “given a meaningful opportunity to present their case[s]” as demanded by the Due Process Clause. Individual claims lose their individual identities when they are clumped together in an MDL. Even if the transferee court were to employ a more exacting standard than § 1407 to group like cases together for purposes of conducting discovery or bellwether trials, gone is the chance for unique discovery requests or personalized (let alone risky) litigation strategy. The primary idea behind MDL is to “coordinate” pretrial proceedings and the court-selected steering committee or lead counsel is responsible for ensuring

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216 See supra notes 143-146 and accompanying text (discussing common benefit fund attorney compensation); see also Trangsrud, supra note 22, at 83 (“The inherent tensions of contingency fee representation have been intensified to such an extent by the mass trial that the adversary system may break down.”).

217 In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 111 F.3d 220, 238 (1st Cir. 1997).

218 Id. (“[D]espite reasonable notice of the obvious peril to their own financial interests, and their clear obligation to fend against it from the outset, appellants did not turn serious attention to the PSC cost reimbursement regime deficiencies until the Gordian knot could no longer be undone. . . . [T]he requested relief has been rendered impracticable, through appellants’ inaction . . . .”).

219 Id. at 227 (“[I]ntermece differences as to subsidiary matters—particularly the appropriate allocations from the common fund for their respective attorney fees and costs—are commonplace.”).


221 Section 1407 requires that there be “one or more common questions of fact” among cases that are to be consolidated into an MDL. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012).
that such coordination occurs. Rather than facilitating participation in
democratic governance, however, the practice of judicial selection of certain
attorneys to run an MDL hinders individuals’ ability to participate in the legal
system on their chosen terms.

One might argue that this concern about control over litigation strategy is
exaggerated because lawyers, rather than litigants, make most of the strategic
choices, anyway. While it may be true that an individual’s chosen
representative may make the strategic choices day to day, the very act of
choosing one’s representative is a clear expression of litigant autonomy
protected by due process. No matter the relative merits of the steering
committee compared to the litigant’s retained attorney, selecting a
representative to work towards an individual’s litigation goals is the
individual’s prerogative and, indeed, is the foundation of the day-in-court
ideal. MDL unconstitutionally undermines that choice.

It is true that theoretically, MDL only involves a temporary transfer for
pretrial purposes; claimants’ individual days in court await them back in the
transferor courts. It is also true that no one is forcing these claimants to accept
settlement offers in the transferee court; they can always hold out for remand
to their preferred jurisdictions, where they will have the opportunity to have
their personally chosen lawyers represent them, and can attempt to implement
their own strategies. But this view demonstrates an incomplete
understanding of the power of transferee courts. First, all players in an MDL,
including the judge, face enormous pressures to achieve a global resolution in
the transferee district. Not least of these pressures is the duration of the
litigation to that point, which is usually several years, at a minimum.
Second, even if a claimant does elect to wait for remand, the steering
committee has already dictated the direction of the suit. Transferor judges on
remand are disinclined to grant discovery requests that seem at all duplicative
of work the steering committee already did, or that seem like something the
claimant should have asked the steering committee to address. Transfer
judges make decisions about expert testimony that carry over to remand, as
well. In addition, transferee judges can and do rule on dispositive motions, so
there is no guarantee that all parts of the litigant’s claim will survive summary
judgment in the transferee district.

If the day-in-court ideal stems from a democratic commitment to
demonstrating respect for individual autonomy, then a set of procedures that

\[222\] See Manual for Complex Litigation (Fourth) § 40.22 (2004) (listing plaintiffs’
lead counsel’s responsibilities for coordinating pretrial proceedings).

\[223\] See supra notes 118-119 and accompanying text (emphasizing that a transferor
court’s authority extends only to pretrial matters; it cannot assign itself a case for trial).

\[224\] See Cory Tischbein, Animating the Seventh Amendment in Contemporary Plaintiffs’
years to conduct discovery alone.”); see also infra note 253.

\[225\] See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
undermines litigants’ choices cannot satisfy the constitutional demand for an individual’s day in court. In other words, a procedure cannot satisfy the right to a constitutionally dictated day in court if it does not protect the very values that gave rise to the constitutional right in the first place. MDL disrespects that individual autonomy. It does not provide claimants with the choices and control that are necessary to satisfy the individual’s right to a day in court.

D. Utilitarianism, Due Process, and MDL

We have already demonstrated the seemingly insurmountable due process problems to which MDL gives rise. However, the question arises whether a utilitarian calculus of due process would justify MDL because of the litigation efficiency it is assumed to provide. Respect for individual autonomy dictates the right to an individual day in court, but perhaps that right is not absolute. Like the right to free speech, the constitutional guarantee of a day in court may not be without limits; interests dictating such a right must be weighed against other interests when determining whether the government must provide a particular procedure or opportunity in a particular case.226 The day-in-court ideal is admittedly not always the most efficient way to adjudicate rights. Indeed, there always exists inherent inefficiency in guaranteeing procedural due process in the first place. Reflecting that reality, the Supreme Court has fashioned a utilitarian test for determining whether specific procedures are required in specific circumstances.227 But even a utilitarian view of due process cannot save the constitutionality of MDL.

Utilitarians argue that the paramount goal of all due process analyses must be accurate outcomes because they maximize social welfare.228 According to this approach, the process that is “due” is the one most likely to prevent unjustified or mistaken deprivations, at the lowest cost.229 To determine the value of a given procedure, these theorists rely on the procedure’s effect on accuracy and its relative cost compared to other available procedures.230 If a procedure is likely to produce more accurate outcomes, and the increased

227 See supra note 174 and accompanying text (outlining this test).
228 Mashaw, supra note 175, at 47.
229 See Bone, supra note 198, at 239 (“[A]n efficiency-based, outcome-oriented theory aspires to that level of accuracy that minimizes social costs, including the error costs of incorrect decisions and administrative or direct costs of adjudication itself, and it dictates that one should forego even substantial accuracy gains if one must invest even greater amounts to achieve those gains.”); Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 111 (1979) (“An act or practice is right or good or just in the utilitarian view insofar as it tends to maximize happiness, usually defined as the surplus of pleasure over pain.”).
230 See, e.g., Bone, supra note 198, at 239.
likelihood of accuracy is greater than the relative cost of the procedure, then the procedure is “due.”

E. The Mathews-Doehr Test

The Supreme Court endorsed a utilitarian view of the Due Process Clause in Mathews v. Eldridge. Mathews considered what process was due prior to deprivation of Social Security benefits. There, the Court emphasized, “[d]ue process, unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.” Rather, “[d]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” In laying out its oft-cited three-part test for identifying “the specific dictates of due process,” the Mathews Court specifically identified “the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards” as a key component of the due process inquiry. The Court proceeded to examine the “fairness and reliability” of the pre-deprivation procedures at issue. It referred to “the risk of error inherent in the truth finding process.” The Mathews Court also assessed the public cost of a particular procedure, including “the administrative burden and other societal costs.” Finally, it left open the possibility that “[a]t some point the benefit of an additional safeguard to the individual affected by the administrative action and to society in terms of increased assurance that the action is just, may be outweighed by the cost.” Accuracy may be the paramount interest, but at some point it is outweighed by the cost of achieving it.

The Court extended this utilitarian view of the Due Process Clause to include suits between private citizens in Connecticut v. Doehr. There it

231 See Robert G. Bone, Procedure, Participation, Rights, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1011, 1017 (2010) (“[F]ew people, if any, would think that reducing the risk of error is always important enough to justify substantial social investments that could otherwise be used to improve roads, schools, public health, and the like.”); Mashaw, supra note 175, at 48 (“[U]tility theory can be said to yield the following plausible decision-rule: ‘Void procedures for lack of due process only when alternative procedures would so substantially increase social welfare that their rejection seems irrational.’”); Solum, supra note 167, at 244–47 (describing and critiquing the “accuracy model”).


233 Id. at 335.

234 Id. at 343.

235 Id. at 344.

236 Id. at 347.

237 Id. at 348.

238 Id. at 348.

239 The Court altered the third Mathews factor slightly, describing it as “principal attention to the interest of the party seeking the prejudgment remedy, with, nonetheless, due regard for any ancillary interest the government may have in providing the procedure or forgoing the added burden of providing greater protections.” Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 11 (1990).
applied the *Mathews* test to a Connecticut statute that allowed prejudgment attachment of real estate without notice, a hearing, a showing of extraordinary circumstances, or a requirement that the party seeking attachment post a bond.\footnote{Id. at 4.} It concluded that the Connecticut statute did not satisfy due process, as measured by the *Mathews* three-prong analysis.\footnote{Id. at 24.} *Doehr* solidified the Court’s commitment to using utilitarian balancing to determine whether due process demands a specific procedure.

As already noted, the *Mathews* test was designed primarily, if not exclusively, to determine whether particular procedures are required by the Due Process Clause, rather than whether there is a right to a day in court in the first place.\footnote{See supra notes 172-175 and accompanying text (contrasting *Mathews* and *Doehr*’s emphasis on procedures with the dignitary model’s emphasis on an opportunity to plead a case).} In *Mathews*, the Court faced only the question of "what process is due prior to the initial termination of benefits, pending review."\footnote{Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333.} It outlined the elaborate procedures available to Social Security beneficiaries whose benefits are terminated, which included an evidentiary hearing after initial termination of benefits.\footnote{Id. at 339.} The *Mathews* test, then, was not fashioned in a case asking whether a day in court was required, but when it was. This is an important distinction. Though it clearly embraced a utilitarian approach to measuring procedural due process requirements, *Mathews* was not a case about an exception to the day-in-court ideal *per se*. The fact remains, however, that a utilitarian concern with burdens and efficiency always remains the elephant in the room in any due process analysis. It is therefore necessary to consider the extent to which efficiency concerns should be deemed to temper our stinging due process critiques of MDL.

The most immediate response to reliance on the utilitarian calculus is that it completely ignores any concerns with individual dignity or autonomy, which are properly deemed to provide the theoretical DNA of the Due Process Clause. Yet while respect for individual autonomy justifies the day-in-court ideal in the first place, the *Mathews-Doehr* test ignores it entirely. The *Mathews-Doehr* balancing test explicitly considers the likelihood that a particular procedure will produce more accurate decisions, which outcome-based theorists consider the paramount goal of process. This is a limited view of the goals of due process protections; indeed, “[r]ights in a utilitarian system are strictly instrumental goods.”\footnote{Posner, supra note 229, at 116.} But the *Mathews-Doehr* doctrine and its utilitarian supporters ignore the other benefits of individual participation in litigation, such as individual autonomy or dignity. Ignoring the effect on individual dignity is a mistake. For one thing, procedural rights have inherent

\[\footnote{Id. at 4.} \footnote{Id. at 24.} \footnote{See supra notes 172-175 and accompanying text (contrasting *Mathews* and *Doehr*’s emphasis on procedures with the dignitary model’s emphasis on an opportunity to plead a case).} \footnote{Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333.} \footnote{Id. at 339.} \footnote{Posner, supra note 229, at 116.}\]
value beyond maximizing social welfare. They also serve instrumental values because they facilitate social goods beyond accurate judicial decision-making, such as a vital, participatory democracy and governmental legitimacy. Were it to be applied to the day-in-court question, the *Mathews-Doehr* test might too easily dismiss an individual day in court simply because it would be more convenient, efficient, or easy for the government not to provide one. Conceptions of procedural due process that focus exclusively on outcomes and interest-balancing are underinclusive because they fail to account for the full breadth of values promised and protected by the Due Process Clause.

An individual day in court demonstrates the government’s respect for the individual by giving her a chance to speak for herself. Thus, in the words of one scholar, “[a]llowing individuals the freedom to act on and to govern their own legal affairs is a political and moral good.” At the very least, then, utilitarianism cannot be deemed the only value underlying our nation’s commitment to due process. The choice of a form of forced wholesale justice, where the interests and needs of individual litigants are almost cavalierly ignored in favor of the myopic pursuit of efficiency, cannot possibly be deemed consistent with the dictates of due process, either as a normative or descriptive matter.

In any event, the day-in-court ideal does foster the utilitarian concern with accurate decision-making. The entire adversary system is premised on a notion of “litigation capitalism”: the litigants’ incentive to prevail gives that litigant the incentive to marshal the strongest possible case on her behalf. With both sides engaging in such a process, the passive adjudicator is informed in the most effective way possible. Where either the claimant or the defendant is denied an effective opportunity to present her case, the accuracy of the final decision is placed in serious doubt.

Viewed in this light, it is by no means clear that MDL actually fosters accuracy in decision-making. An individual claimant’s attorney, who is presumably familiar with the specific facts of her client’s case and is motivated solely to vindicate and protect those interests, is in the best position to assist the judge in reaching an accurate resolution of the litigation. In contrast, where MDL attorneys know little or nothing of individual plaintiffs’ cases when they control discovery or shape settlement, and the cases which have been herded together often are likely to have relatively little in common, accuracy in the resolution of individual suits is, at best, open to serious question.

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246 See Mashaw, *supra* note 175, at 48 (“As applied by the *Eldridge* Court the utilitarian calculus tends, as cost-benefit analyses typically do, to ‘dwarf soft variables’ and to ignore complexities and ambiguities.”).


248 Sturm, *supra* note 171, at 985 (“Adversarial presentation by parties’ lawyers enhances the likelihood of reaching a correct decision.”).
MDL management is unbound by specific rules, so transferee judges do not conduct the coordinated proceedings uniformly. Each transferee judge selects lawyers to hold leadership positions on her own terms. Appointment to the steering committee is not the result of an adversarial process, and it is not subject to any test for adequacy of representation. Similarly, bellwether trials occur without any guarantee that the tried cases are typical of the claims of the plaintiffs participating in the MDL. The results of those bellwether trials are then used to facilitate settlement and evaluate the strength of various arguments. Even if cases are transferred back to the districts in which they were originally filed, the work of the steering committee and the pretrial orders entered by the MDL judge permanently impact the ultimate resolution of the claims. Transferee judges cannot and do not make individual rulings on all issues for all cases consolidated into the MDL. The fact that these procedures are unregulated makes it impossible to evaluate their accuracy for purposes of the Mathews-Doehr test, but the process smacks of a mass-produced form of rough justice. An individual lawsuit in federal district court, on the other hand, is the most accurate procedure available. The “probable value” of individual proceedings is high, because individual litigation would ensure that each claimant exercised control over how his rights were asserted.

Even assuming that MDL procedures are not as likely to be accurate as individual litigation would be, it might be argued that the government’s interest in reducing litigation burdens justifies MDL. MDL seems attractive because it saves resources by forcing claimants to litigate as a group, instead of as hundreds or thousands of individuals in parallel actions. If MDL leads to outcomes that are at least as accurate as adjudication of individual claims does, then this cost saving is permitted under the utilitarian model of due process. Judge James F. Holderman put it this way: “Without the centralized control of a MDL transferee judge, the cost of duplicative discovery and e-discovery in each case consolidated as a MDL action for pretrial purposes would be a significant detriment to each case’s litigants and justice in America as a whole.”

Judge Holderman’s argument may be intuitively attractive, given the stated purpose of MDL and the sobering idea of thousands of cases stemming from one event. But assessments of the empirical benefits of MDL are not uniformly positive. Even members of the Panel recognize that “centralization does not benefit all parties equally and that, for some parties, it can be actually less efficient.” By several accounts, MDL takes much longer than individual litigation. It is also at times inconvenient, for both plaintiffs and

249 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
250 See supra notes 129-132 and accompanying text.
252 Heyburn & McGovern, supra note 41, at 32.
defendants. All this is to say that it is not at all clear that MDL, as it now functions, is actually advancing the government’s interests in efficiency and saving litigation resources.

Applying the Mathews-Doehr factors, then, MDL features an immeasurably high risk of inaccuracy or erroneous deprivations. At the same time, whether MDL actually advances the government’s interest in efficiency is uncertain at best. The private interest in vindicating an alleged wrong through a fair, reasonably accurate process outweighs the potential efficiency gains of MDL. This means that MDL does not survive the Mathews-Doehr analysis even assuming its relevance. Even assuming MDL is more efficient than individual litigation, the uncertainty surrounding whether MDL leads to erroneous deprivations or inaccurate results is too great a risk to take when constitutionally protected interests are at stake.

IV. IS MDL CONSTITUTIONALLY SALVAGEABLE?

For all of the reasons discussed in detail throughout this Article, MDL, as currently structured, must be deemed unconstitutional, because it infringes on individual claimants’ procedural due process rights. Measured in terms of autonomy, paternalism, utilitarianism, or dignitary theories, procedural due process demands considerably more protection of the individual litigants' interests than MDL provides. But this conclusion does not necessarily mean that it is impossible to fashion a similar coordination procedure possessing many of MDL’s benefits that nevertheless satisfies procedural due process. If so, however, Congress and the Panel would need to make significant changes to ensure that each MDL claimant is able to fully exercise his right to an individual day in court. The due process guarantee of a “full and fair opportunity to litigate” is not mutually exclusive with efficient, streamlined discovery and other pretrial procedures. But when they are in tension, due process calls for prioritization of litigant autonomy over efficiency. The tie goes to litigant autonomy because respecting individuals’ choices reaps benefits that advance the American notion of the relationship between government and governed that lies at the heart of our constitutional structure.

("[A]s compared to the processing time of an average case, MDL practice is slow, very slow); Fallon et al., Bellwether Trials, supra note 90, at 2325, 2330 (observing the “traditional delay associated with MDL practice” and that “[t]he relevant comparison is not between a massive MDL and an ‘average case,’ but rather between a massive MDL and the alternative of thousands of similar cases clogging the courts with duplicative discovery and the potential for unnecessary conflict”).

254 See In re “East of the Rockies” Concrete Pipe Antitrust Cases, 302 F. Supp. 244, 254 (J.P.M.L. 1969) (Weigel, J., concurring) (“[C]oordination and consolidation may impair, not further, convenience, justice and efficiency. . . . There are a number of inherent inconveniences in transfers for coordinated or consolidated pretrial. Some plaintiffs are temporarily deprived of their choices of forum and some defendants may be forced to litigate in districts where they could not have been sued. Considerable time and trouble are involved in the sheer mechanics of transferring and remanding.”).
The primary goal of this Article is not to prescribe one particular solution or “fix” for the constitutional problems described here. The key to avoiding constitutional difficulties, however, is to recognize that if the benefits of MDL are to be achieved, they must be achieved through the free choice of the individual litigants to take part in the collectivist process. This would satisfy the autonomy concerns of due process. In other words, to ensure due process, transfer into an MDL must be elective instead of mandatory. Claimants who choose transfer would benefit from the steering committee’s large-scale discovery and other features of MDL. Especially if they were hoping only to settle their individual cases, they very well may choose this option. But if they preferred a faster resolution, or wanted more than money, or did not care to travel, or trusted their retained lawyer more than a stranger from across the country, they might opt out of consolidation. Opting in or staying out, however, must be their prerogative. Under this approach, participating in an MDL would become a strategic choice rather than a forced path.

Moreover, in order to satisfy the paternalism due process concerns, other adjustments need to be made. First, Congress should establish a uniform procedure for selecting attorneys to serve in leadership roles. As it stands, each transferee court appoints steering committees according to its own procedures and criteria. Instead, appointment should be the result of a process open to all affected parties and their retained representatives. The process should be designed to ensure that the leadership steering committees are made up of attorneys with different backgrounds and whose clients represent a wide array of the claims involved in the MDL, similar to the typicality requirement for class actions. Attorneys should not be permitted to trade favors of support behind closed doors, and the group of plaintiffs’ attorneys who are appointed should not be a closed circle.

In order to reduce due process difficulties, transferee courts could also make changes to case management to ensure a more active, symbiotic relationship between steering committee members, other attorneys involved in the MDL, and the claimants. Communication between a plaintiff and the steering committee should be as fluid as it would be between the plaintiff and her retained counsel if her claim had not been transferred into an MDL. All retained plaintiffs’ attorneys, not just those appointed to leadership roles, should—to the extent feasible—have some opportunity to take part in strategic decisions. If an individual plaintiff prefers a different strategy or wants to make a specific discovery request, ways to provide such opportunities should at least be explored.

An even more radical solution might be to coordinate and share discovery among cases that feature at least one common question of fact, but to do so remotely, without transferring the cases into a single district court. The advent of electronic discovery, video conferencing, and cloud-based data sharing are already transforming discovery practices.255 Those technologies could facilitate

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the type of coordination and sharing that the MDL designers wanted in the first place. This type of cooperation could be more efficient, too.

Some of these suggested changes may seem burdensome, if not inefficient. They undoubtedly would require more time, effort, and creativity than the current procedures do, which may make MDL, as modified, less attractive. But constitutional rights cannot be sacrificed for mere convenience. These ideas are not meant to represent the perfect answer to MDL’s insufficient due process safeguards. Rather, they are designed to provide only a starting point for a much-needed conversation about reconciling the day-in-court ideal with the overwhelming nature of mass torts and similar cases, which are often swept into MDL.

CONCLUSION

Although Anglo-American jurisprudence does have a venerable history of representative litigation, it is important to understand the fundamental differences between the historically acceptable form of representative litigation on the one hand and the procedural collectivism of the post-1966 era on the other. Historically, the only form of binding representative litigation involved claims that were legally intertwined in a substantive, pre-litigation context. In those instances, the claims of the various plaintiffs are already linked at the point at which litigation begins—either by choice or by substantive law. In contrast, the modern forms of procedural collectivism—the class action and MDL—give rise to a far greater threat to the values embodied in the Due Process Clause. In these situations, substantive rights which are, in their pristine form, held solely by the individual, are lumped together—often quite crudely—in a manner which may significantly interfere with the individual claimants’ due process right to their day in court.

We are not so naïve as to believe that, in the modern day of complex litigation, it is feasible to avoid all forms of procedural collectivism. But there are ways to achieve the advantages of such collectivism without so blatantly undermining core procedural rights the way current MDL practice does. Indeed, with all of its serious drawbacks and problems, modern class action procedure provides a stark contrast to MDL practice. Whereas class action in every case requires a transparent judicial finding of adequate representation of the interests of absent claimants, MDL has no such requirement. Whereas in most class actions absent class members have the right to opt out of the proceeding, MDL provides no means either for withdrawing from the

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256 See REDISH, supra note 25, at 1-12.
257 See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
proceeding or even meaningfully challenging the legality or propriety of inclusion within it.\textsuperscript{258}

If our traditions and values of due process mean anything, the individual’s right to a day in court must be preserved, even within the broader framework of procedural collectivism. MDL unconstitutionally infringes the procedural due process rights of claimants forced into all-important consolidated pretrial proceedings against their will.

Surprisingly, this Article is the first to present a frontal assault on the constitutionality of MDL. In advancing this attack, the Article has sought to expose an extremely popular complex litigation procedure that today impacts a significant percentage of civil cases. MDL may seem to provide a cure-all to the difficulties of attempting to certify class actions on a massive scale, but it faces even greater constitutional roadblocks than does the modern class action. Despite its arguable efficiencies and perceived conveniences (which themselves are open to question),\textsuperscript{259} MDL stealthily transforms fundamental characteristics of numerous claims so that they are unrecognizable as distinct actions filed by individual plaintiffs. Moreover, it may well do so even against the will of those plaintiffs, without providing them with meaningful recourse to challenge either their inclusion in the collectivist process or the adequacy of their representation in that process. Upon close examination, while MDL promises respect for the individual day in court, it delivers only a “Wild West” form of rough group justice, on the court-appointed steering committee’s terms. Due process cannot tolerate such a system.

\textsuperscript{258} See supra note 21 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{259} See supra notes 252-254 and accompanying text.