Stacy Williams (CAS XX) is
majoring in Anthropology. Following graduation with honors,
she hopes to attend the University of Texas at Arlington for
a MA in TESOL. Written for Professor White's AN307: Turkey and
Middle East Perspectives.
The events of 1915 are painfully significant for thousands
of people throughout the world. For those who lost family members
the Armenian massacre is still a sensitive subject, but is at
the same time a topic of controversy and debate on an international
scale. As a result of the deeply personal nature of the disagreement,
the present debate lacks an outsider’s perspective. Depending
on which side one represents, some historical events may be
emphasized or even left out entirely. This already creates an
unsteady foundation for any debate, as the facts themselves
are steeped in controversy. The arguments of those supporting
Turkey and the Armenians must be seen within the context of
the events and social environment leading to the relocations.
Rather than attempting to sort out the victor of the ongoing
battle, this paper seeks to examine the context of the question
for an understanding of the different perspectives themselves.
By enlarging the scope of the arguments and examining the source
of past actions and present disputes, the debates can be seen
for what they are; a clash between two nation-states seeking
legitimization.
Before the Ottomans, the Armenians had been under outside domination
for over one-thousand years (Uras 1988, 319). Although the Christian
Armenians were free to worship and legislate under the Ottoman
millet system, they were a minority subject to the weakening
offices of the sultan and caliph. Violent conflict between Armenians
and Turks began under Abdülhamit II during the 1890s, although
many Armenian supporters trace clashes even to the beginning
of the Turkish migrations from Central Asia. The position of
the Ottomans in the sunset of their reign was a result of a
long process of modernization that had begun nearly two centuries
before.
In the eighteenth century, the empire was beginning to fragment
from domestic and foreign pressure. With a system of tax collection
that relied on the power of local notables (ayan), the government
became increasingly in debt. European powers had also begun
to surpass it in technology and military power. As it began
to lose territory, the Ottoman sultans agreed to submit control
of the economy and government to foreign influence in what is
called today the capitulations (Zürcher 2005, 11). As territory
after territory was lost to the European powers and Russia,
the Ottomans faced a crisis. Sultan Selim III had attempted
to regain power over the empire by modernizing the military
and decreasing the influence of the ayan. However, in doing
so he created many enemies and was deposed by his own military
(24). France, Russia, Britain, and Greece continued to challenge
Ottoman supremacy even with the continued attempts at modernization
(and Westernization) by Sultan Mahmoud II.
An interesting paradox during this time is that the Turkish
reliance on western reform models were meant to preserve the
empire from foreign control. The ripples of the French Revolution
had caused a series of reactions in Europe and had also made
their way to the Ottomans, influencing the Tanzimat Era of 1839-1871.
Just as the Armenians would later be inspired by the notions
of a national identity, the Young Ottomans (intellectual reformists)
attempted to unify the increasingly unstable empire through
the introduction of Pan-Ottomanism. This included a change in
identity that sought to unite the populace under the Ottoman
Empire, which emphasized ties of citizenship beyond those of
religion or ethnicity.
As French models of law, military, and principles began to seep
into intellectual circles, it encountered an elite culture composed
of Arabic and Persian influence. The Ottoman language and literature
permeated the higher classes, creating an immense separation
from the lower classes who were dominated by Turkish culture.
The Anatolian Peninsula, already heavily influenced by Arabo-Persian
traditions, was now seeing the entrance of Western culture that
held the promise of progress, but also comprised a military
threat to the power of the ruling parties.
The foreign threat from the Russians, British, French, and Greeks
and the increasing influence of reformers desiring a parliamentary
democracy caused Sultan Abdülhamit II to tighten his grip
on the country. Fearing the loss of his power, Abdülhamit
instated a new unifying ideology, Pan-Islamism, with which he
attempted to strengthen his and the caliph’s positions as the
defenders of Islam. Already a Christian minority, this no doubt
caused the Armenians to feel even more alienated. The Balkans
also rejected a unification based on either religion or Ottoman
citizenship, and instead began to develop their own desire for
independence. The struggle of another Christian population to
form its own nation-state aroused separatist sentiment in the
Armenians. It was at this time that the Dashnakzoutiun and Henchak
organizations were formed.
These two radical nationalist organizations were formed by Armenian
students in 1887 and 1890. Some members of these associations
attempted to engender international attention by carrying out
terrorist attacks in rebellion against Ottoman rule. Kurdish
nomadic tribes, who had long been living in conflict with their
sedentary neighbors, were employed by the state in order to
quell this inner threat. Originally sent to simply put down
the insurgents, the government lost control of their actions.
Between 1894 and 1896, these Hamidiye units were involved in
the slaughter of thousands of Armenians in reaction to various
incidents including the threatening of the Ottoman Bank’s headquarters
in Istanbul. After 1896, the government regained control and
violence between the two forces ceased (Zürcher 2005, 83).
This incident, in addition to Abdülhamit’s unpopularity
with the intellectuals, loss of territory in the war with Russia,
and restrictive regulations, caused widespread dissatisfaction
with the sultan’s rule. In 1908, the Young Turks overthrew the
government and stripped Abdülhamit’s power, instating themselves
as authorities in the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP).
The period of Young Turk rule was a time of great instability
within the empire. Comparably, during the Republic, the one-party
state was dominated by the charismatic Atatürk, and the
offices of sultan and caliph were still present with many supporters.
The bureaucrats and religious leaders who had profited from
Abdülhamit’s use of Islam to regain control opposed the
western-friendly CUP. Additionally, the CUP was deeply split
between different groups vying for power. Finally in 1913 after
the loss of the Balkans, the CUP launched a successful coup
d’état and tightened their grip on the state, placing
Talât Pasha, Enver Pasha, and Cemal Pasha in power over
the Committee, army, and national politics. Although inner turmoil
had been temporarily resolved, the Triumvirate still had to
contend with the opposition of the old regime forces in addition
to the conflict in the Balkans, an influx of Muslim refugees
from their lost territories, and increasing international tension.
Adding to their worries, an inner circle of the CUP allied with
Germany at the beginning of World War I in an attempt to end
their diplomatic isolation after the Balkan Wars (Zürcher
2005, 108-111).
During this time, the Dashnakzoutiun and Henchak parties kept
their eyes on the goal of an independent Armenian nation. Fearing
that their cause would be marginalized by the international
war, they began courting Russia for support. Just across the
eastern border, Russia was home to thousands of Armenians who
were brought back into contact with their neighbors during the
Ottoman-Russian war of 1877-1878 (Karal 1975, 10). The Russians,
enemies of the Ottoman Empire, heightened their connection with
the Ottoman Armenians with the San Stefano (Ayastefanos) Treaty
of 1878. In it, the Russians stipulated that a state of Armenia
existed, it was in need of reform, and its security was threatened
by the Kurds and Circassians. They also established themselves
as the guardians of the region (Uras 1988, 448). Although the
treaty was modified in the Congress of Berlin, the Russians
had established themselves as the confidants of the Armenians.
After Armenian appeals for independence had been rejected by
the government, they then began to barter with the czar, offering
their loyalty for a future nation-state. They knew that it was
in Russian interest to have the Armenians as supporters in the
war against the Ottomans.
Thousands of volunteers joined the Russian compatriots and were
allegedly making plans to attack the Turkish forces from the
rear as they advanced against the Russian army (Uras 1988, 865).
Revolts were also used by Armenian separatists in attempts to
weaken the empire. The position of the Turkish side is that
the revolts in Van, Bitlis, Mus, Erzurum, and Kars were organized
against the army by Armenians (chiefly deserters from the Turkish
army) who had been roused by the anti-Turkish propaganda of
the two revolutionary organizations. Although clashes were known
to exist between the Armenian and Ottoman forces, accounts of
the events leading up to the revolts differ when examining the
other side. Armenian supporters claim that, rather than provoking
the deportations, the revolts were not premeditated and were
instead defensive actions against the threat of Turkish violence
(Dadrian 1999, 12-16). They also claim that weapons found in
the possession of Armenians were bought to escape harassment
by Turkish gendarmes, and are not evidence of insurgency (Dadrian
1999, 13). Although the activities of the Dashnakzoutiun and
Henchak organizations before the beginning of relocations appear
to be well-documented in sources such as Esat Uras, the culpability
of these groups is not mentioned by Armenian supporters.
The growing danger of the Armenians that threatened the very
ranks of the military itself added to the instability of the
empire and aroused fear of the Turkish government. Besides engendering
Russian protection, the Armenians sought to attract the attention
of the foreign community through terrorist activities. With
the foreign powers’ eyes centered on the war, they feared that
their cause would be forgotten. Many scholars, including Halidé
Edib, thought that their actions were an attempt to goad the
government into action that the Armenians could use to engender
sympathy (Edib 2003, 234). In April 1915, before the deportations
began, warnings were issued by the government to the Armenian
Patriarchate to stop revolts and attacks on Muslim villagers
and soldiers; however, incidents continued to occur (Uras 1988,
868).
With the capitulations in the near past, the recent loss of
Ottoman territory, and the foreign powers staking their claims
on Anatolian soil, this new threat of Armenian revolutionists
triggered what would later come to be called the “Sevres Syndrome,”
a term recently created to represent the Turkish fear of partition.
With war in the Balkans, the population became increasingly
homogenous as other populations were being solicited by the
foreign powers and the Muslims fled towards the center of Anatolia.
This contributed to Turkish nationalism, which had been growing
since the influence of the French Revolution. As later exemplified
by the reforms of Atatürk, the Pan-Turanist conception
of the nation-state included a cleansing of foreign influence,
including the Arabo-Persian traditions of the Ottoman elite.
The ideal of Pan-Turanism was in the process of developing as
the Triumvirate struggled to hold the nation against mounting
opposition. The creation of a national identity that more faithfully
reflected the Central Asian roots of the Turkish majority was
already being supported by scholars such as Halidé Edib
and Ziya Gökalp. Some contemporary scholars claim in support
of the Armenian side that this emerging Pan-Turkish movement
motivated the Triumvirate to eradicate the Armenians, furthering
Turkish notion of homogeneity. Zürcher rejects this, arguing
that the pan-Turkish movement began in 1917, but that an Ottoman-Muslim
movement had begun with the population flux (Zürcher 2005,
117). Armenian separatists and insurgents no doubt activated
the “Sevres Syndrome,” as the already threatened country now
faced an additional division from within its own borders.
The deportations began in June under the Temporary Law of Deportation.
It is interesting to note that the Turkish supporters fall silent
on the actual details of the deportations, whereas their challengers
emphasize the accounts of witnesses and survivors. According
to Armenian sources, males and females were separated, the men
were killed, and the women and children were made to walk to
Syria under harsh conditions (Graber 1996, 101). It was during
this stage that the majority of deaths occurred.
The issue around which all others center is whether or not the
incidents of 1915 constitute “genocide.” Articles II and III
of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide
define genocide as the “intent to destroy, in whole or in part,
a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such” (Office
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, website). In order
for the Ottomans to be found guilty of genocide, the political
factors of Armenian insurgency (if it does exist) will have
to be disregarded as secondary to an animosity against the Armenians
as a different ethnic and religious group. According to the
Turkish Embassy in the US, any massacres that took place were
the result of inter-tribal conflict (making reference to the
Kurdish population in the area) and were not state controlled
or endorsed (Turkish Embassy, website). However, Armenian scholars
claim that they were the objects of systematic annihilation
based on their minority status as Christians and non-Turks.
They further declare that the massacres were orchestrated by
the highest officials of the CUP (Dadrian 1995, 235). The Turkish
government, on the other hand, rejects this analysis. They cite
the Armenian revolts and communications with Russia as the impetus
for the relocations, and not any prejudice relating to ethnicity
or religion (Ilkin 1999, 61–62).
The historical accounts of the time used as sources of information
to support the Armenian side are also a source of debate. In
fact, a number of Armenian supporters cite British accounts
from the time. However, the Turkish government counters that
foreign sources cannot be used, as Britain, France, Russia,
and Greece were enemies of Turkey in WWI. Thus, any such resources
immediately are suspected of being wartime propaganda. In particular,
the eyewitness reports of Henry Morgenthau have been highly
controversial. Morgenthau, an American ambassador to the Ottoman
Empire, described the Young Turks as instating a policy of race
extermination against the Armenians (Ilkin 1999, 69). Turkish
supporters claim that he desired to engender widespread hatred
against the Turkish enemy, but Armenian supporters object to
the dismissal of his entire body of evidence, as was confirmed
by many other eyewitnesses (Dadrian 1999, 37–42).
The questions of who died and how are also central to the allegation
of genocide. Whereas the Armenians emphasize that the killings
were centered on the Armenian population, the Turkish government
highlights the massacres of Muslims to show that there were
deaths on both sides (Turkish Embassy, website). They also cite
the general scarcity of resources, disease epidemics, and harsh
weather as factors that affected all citizens of the empire
during the war (Karal 1975, 15). The actual number of Armenian
deaths also varies widely from 300,000 to upwards of two million.
The general position of Armenian supporters is that 1.5 million
perished (Dadrian 1999, 20), while the Turkish government claims
that this is false, as fewer than 1.5 million lived in the Anatolian
Peninsula (Turkish Embassy, website).
After WWI, Armenians began to call for reparations. The Triple
Entente arrested and tried 140 high Ottoman officials for crimes
against the Armenians in 1919, while they had control of Istanbul
and Ottoman documents. However, the charges were found to be
unsubstantiated after examination of evidence collected by Haig
Khazarian (an Armenian appointed by the British) and the detainees
were released (Ilkin 1999, 59). Turkish supporters point out
that no documents have been found ordering a massacre or a genocide
and that those tried by Britain in 1919 were not convicted (Zürcher
2005, 115).
However, Armenian supporters respond that this is not because
there were no documents, but because these records were burned
before the Triumvirate of Cemal, Enver, and Talât Pasha
fled the country after the armistice. These three, in addition
to Bahaettin Sakir, left for Odessa in response to threats of
the Entente to bring them to court for the treatment of the
Armenians. All except Enver were killed by Armenian assassins
and never appeared in court (Zürcher 2005, 134). The censorship
of the Turkish government has also been blamed for the absence
of incriminating papers (Dadrian 1999, 29).
In the 1970s, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of
Armenia began carrying out terrorist attacks and assassinations
of thirty Turkish diplomats. Its aim and the aim of American
and French-Armenian propaganda were to force Turkey to recognize
the massacres as genocide and to create an Armenian state (Zürcher
2005, 277). Recently, increased pressure has been put on Turkey
as a result of their bid for EU membership. Over fifteen countries
have acknowledged that a genocide occurred, including France,
Germany, and Greece.
This limited discussion shows that the debate will not conclusively
be resolved without a compromise. Although one can view history
as a collection of unbiased facts, this dispute is undeniable
evidence that historical “facts” can appear drastically different
depending on what sources are cited. As stated previously, it
is not the aim of this paper to place blame on either side,
but rather to fill in the canvas around the event itself. The
context of the Armenian and Turkish perspectives should be used
to further an understanding of the two sides, who are both attempting
to defend their nations’ identities from a perceived aggressor.
Armenians today finally reside in their own independent state
after thousands of years of foreign rule. They have had but
momentary tastes of independence in their history. Although
their origins are shrouded in mystery and myth, Armenians have
probably been living in the Anatolian Peninsula for over 2,000
years (Uras 1988, 319). After their first Persian rulers, they
were minorities under the Greeks, Romans, Arabs, Mongols, Byzantines,
Seljuks, Ottomans, and finally the Soviets. It was only in 1991
with the dissolution of the Soviet Union that the nation-state
of Armenia became a reality. Part of their attempt to rebuild
and strengthen their own distinct culture after the Armenians’
long history of domination and separation has manifested itself
in their demands for reparations.
The Turkish state has also been founded relatively recently.
Since the drastic changes of Atatürk separating the country
from their long Ottoman past, Turkey has been searching for
its identity. In opening its doors to the international community,
it is also on the defensive against those they fought against
for independence just a century earlier. The encroachment of
foreign powers hungry to get a piece of their territory caused
the Turks to view the Armenian activities as an attempt to divide
their country.
The “Sevres Syndrome” still exists in Turkey today. The current
Armenian debates fueled by international attention as Turkey
attempts to join the European Union further demonstrate the
Turkish fear of partition. Recently, the attempts of the reigning
Islamist party to hold discussions on the Armenian Question
came under fire by staunch nationalists in the judicial branch.
The nationalists fear that if Turkey is forced to acknowledge
the events of 1915-1918 as genocide, the Armenians will demand
eastern Anatolian territory. Thus, the Turkish government is
divided between those desiring a union with the EU and those
alarmed at the prospect of foreign control.
The factors surrounding the relocations and intense emotions
associated with any verdict make this debate deeply controversial
and complex. In examining the historical context of the current
disputes, the reasons behind the positions and attitudes of
both the Turkish and Armenian supporters can now be understood.
Both nations, having been threatened by foreign influence, now
wish to defend their cultures. The Armenians, in constructing
their new Republic after thousands of years of subjugation,
desire to legitimize and cultivate their nation-state. The Armenian
perspective is in conflict with that of the Turkish government,
which also seeks to uphold the cultural and physical unity of
its country as it attempts to enter the European Union. Historical
and circumstantial factors helped to form Turkish reaction in
World War I, as they do in the present. Although the external
facts appear to be the subject of debate, in reality, these
two nations are battling to legitimize their own unique histories
and identities to the international audience. It is unlikely
that the debates will soon be resolved, as they have become
the spark igniting deeper emotions of nationality – the true
core of the Armenian issue.
References
Dadrian, Vahakn N. The History of the Armenian Genocide. Providence:
Berghahn Books, 1995.
Edib, Halidé. House With Wisteria: Memoirs of Halidé
Edib. Charlottesville: Leopolis Press, 2003.
Embassy of the Republic of Turkey, Washington, D.C., “Armenian
Allegations of Genocide: The Issue and the Facts.” 2002 [cited
15 November 2005]. Available on the World Wide Web: <http://www.turkishembassy.org
/governmentpolitics/issuesarmenian.htm>.
Graber, G. S. Caravans to Oblivion. New York: Jon Wiley &
Sons, 1996.
Ilkin, Baki, “Appendix 1: Letter from the Turkish Ambassador
to America on the H.RES. 155 ‘United States Record on the Armenian
Genocide Resolution,’” The Key Elements in the Turkish Denial
of the Armenian Genocide: A Case Study of Distortion and Falsification.
Cambridge: The Zoryan Institute, 1999.
Karal, Enver Ziya. Question Armenian (1878-1923). Ankara: Imprimerie,
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Uras, Esat. Armenians in History and the Armenian Question.
Istanbul: Documentary Publications, 1988.
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