Daniel E. Ryan (CAS '07) is
majoring in Philosophy with a minor in Political Science and
intends to pursue a career in law or academia after graduation.
This paper was written for Professor Swartz' CC204: The Individual
and Modernity.
There seems to be nothing more certain than the fact that you
are currently reading this sentence – or are you? The doubt
expressed here is not about the verity of the external world,
but rather reservation about the validity of your assumption
that you are you. Language, culture, and embodiment perpetuate
this impression as patently obvious, but is this conviction
well-grounded? Surely, you awoke this morning, and just as obvious,
you are currently reading this paper. However, modern science,
specifically neuroscience, casts considerable doubt on the notion
that humans have a unitary or core self. Yet, it seems irrefutable
that we each have a feeling of selfhood, in that we have a memory
and consider ourselves to be the same person over time. How
are we to reconcile these immensurable positions?
The development of our sense of self has long been understood
as a function of two forces: nature and nurture. Yet, no consensus
has been achieved about the relative importance of these two
influences . Standing at the forefront of biology, cognitive
science, and neuroscience is the question: to what extent are
humans formed by their environment, and to what extent by their
genes (Pinker 5–58, 73–102)? I believe that neither approach
gives sufficient attention to the attribute that is most peculiar
to humans: reflexivity. By reflexivity, I refer to the ability
for a consciousness to have itself as content, or to be self-aware.
I believe this capacity plays a crucial role in the development
of the human psyche and engenders dynamic beings – it is why
we are the only species on Earth to have a history apart from
our phylogeny. Thus, the focus of this inquiry is to determine
what, if anything, can be said for the role that self-reflection
plays in selfhood by considering the extant information in neuroscience,
sociology, and philosophy.
The Naysayers
While there is considerable disagreement about what the self
is, there is as much dispute over whether the self even exists.
Some contend that the idea of the self is merely the product
of Western culture, and that current conceptions of the self
are rooted in a rich philosophical and theological tradition.
Tracing its origins back to Hellenistic philosophy, the notion
of the self as a distinct and definite entity was further developed
by Augustine of Hippo, and by a number of early-modern and Enlightenment
philosophers, particularly René Descartes and John Locke
(Berrios 10–15). Greater emphasis was put on the self with the
rise of modernity and political liberalism, and our current-day
conceptions were profoundly influenced by 19th century theorists
such as Karl Marx, Max Weber, and Emile Durkheim (Berrios 21
and Rose 225). Discussing the “Western sense of self” is difficult
and imprecise, as the self has a varied “historical character
and is not fixed” (Smith 49–50). There are ideas quite similar
to general Western conceptions of selfhood found in other cultures;
however, many consider these parallels to be a “linguistic trope”
that should be seen as a way of talking about people and not
as an accurate representation of how people actually are (Berrios
9, 23). Michel Foucault, a prominent continental theorist on
the self, argues that there is no elemental self, but rather
“the self is coerced into existence” through social agencies
and culture at large, especially through punishment (Callero
118 and Foucault 29–30). Though Ulric Neisser’s theory proposing
five selves or sources of self-knowledge is difficult to countenance,
he believes we navigate the social world with a “self-concept
or conceptual self,” which is composed of many perceptions and
formed by the various social roles that we play (Neisser 4–5).
One can read Erving Goffman as taking this view even further,
concluding that the self is very much like an actor. We take
on multifarious roles imparted by different social situations,
but, in the final analysis, all of our role-playing is just
a vain performance – even in solitude we act for ourselves.
Is the self then a mere product of culture, and a construct
of language? This notion of the self as a purely social phenomenon
was propounded in social thought during the early 20th century,
specifically by the school of symbolic interactionism.
Symbolic Interactionism
Symbolic interactionism, which finds its genesis in the teachings
of George Herbert Mead, is a “relatively specialized social
psychological theory addressed primarily to problems of socialization,”
maintaining the mutual-dependence of the self and society (Stryker
1–2). For Mead, the self “arises in social experience;” therefore,
until a person is involved in social interaction (“conversation
of gestures”), he or she does not possess a self-consciousness,
and consequently does not have a self. Selfhood comes about
only through the “reflexive process” in which a person is “both
[the] subject and object” of a thought. Mead believes that this
perspective can only be formed through “tak[ing] the attitude
of another and act[ing] toward[s] himself as others act.” Thus,
the creation of a human self is an inherently “social process,”
and requires “the pre-existence of the group,” without which
the “stimulus” and “response” necessary for creating a sense
of self would be lacking (Mead 136–171). In other words, without
social interaction, man does not have the capacity for reflexivity
or self-consciousness.
Language is paramount in symbolic interactionism. According
to Mead, “thinking always takes place by means of some sort
of symbols” (Mead 146). These symbols are developed from social
acts (such as gestures), internalized, and eventually emerge
as meaningful to those who interact with them. Language, in
brief, is “a system of significant symbols,” which “permits
use of the standpoint of others in order to view oneself as
object” (Stryker 37–8). Thus, language is a prerequisite for
a mind and a self, as Mead defines both by the capacity for
reflexivity (Mead 136).
However, the findings of cognitive science and linguistics show
inherent flaws in Mead’s scheme. His account undercuts the intrinsic
construction of the human mind, which we now know naturally
“possesses a rich internal structure” (Bergesen 357). His theory
also insists that the “the language process is essential for
the development of the self” and the mind (Mead 91, 135). Yet,
many studies now confirm that “complex mental operations” occur
in infants, suggesting that the mind does indeed exist before
social interaction. Noam Chomsky’s Universal Grammar reverses
Mead’s conception of language by maintaining that there is an
ingrained capacity for language and syntax in the human brain,
and that it is this part of the mind leads to social interaction,
not vice versa (Bergesen 358–60).
Neuroscience
The self can also be examined from the perspectives of psychology
and neuroscience, where one finds dispute over whether or not
a unitary consciousness exists. Studies of schizophrenics support
the idea that human consciousness is a hodgepodge created by
a number of “distinct consciousness-making mechanism[s] somewhere
in the brain.” The disease appears to have a physiological basis,
and is characterized by barriers in communication between different
regions of the brain. Furthermore, it is plausible that in non-schizophrenic
people a “self” is created when various aspects of consciousness
work together to form “a complex entity constructed out of independently
conscious parts” (O’Brien 109–18). In his polemical book on
human nature, The Blank Slate, Steven Pinker makes a bolder
claim: cognitive neuroscience proves that human behavior “comes
from an internal struggle among mental modules with differing
agendas and goals” (Pinker 40).
Because of the complexity of the enterprise, neuroscience has
shied away from addressing how this “sense of self” is actually
created “within the brain.” Jack Panksepp proposes the possibility
that one part of the brain, where a number of “basic emotional
circuits converge,” may actually be “the primordial form of
consciousness in mind/brain evolution” (Panksepp 199–200). Other
neuroscientists also conjecture about a center of selfhood existing
in the brain; however, there does not appear to be any real
consensus among them about the location of this center. In short:
“[m]ore data must be accumulated and, along with this course,
new and refined models will emerge” (Kircher 466).
While an overall agreement among contemporary theorists concerning
consciousness does not yet exist (O’Brien 109), experiments
in brain bisection do provide some evidence that the mind is
constituted by multiple consciousnesses. When the brain is divided
in half by severing the corpus callosum (the part of the brain
that links the two hemispheres), it consists of two autonomous
entities; “each hemisphere can exercise free will without the
other one’s advice or consent” (Pinker 43–154). The two hemispheres
are not on equal footing: only the left-hemisphere is able to
give verbal testimony (Nagel 156) and seems to be the dominant
half (Pinker 43). Nagel concludes that such experiments should
make us “skeptical about the concept of a single subject of
consciousness as it applies to ourselves,” as even normal brains
are characterized by the “cooperation” of two independent “control
systems” (Nagel 163–4).
A Step Back
So far, it seems somewhat dubious to believe in a unitary, core
self. It should also be noted that I have not even considered
the possibility of a dualistic explanation for the self, since
“the evidence is overwhelming that every aspect of our mental
lives depends entirely on physiological events in the tissues
of the brain” (Pinker 41). Moreover, it is difficult to believe
in a unified consciousness. Yet, people do have conceptions
of selfhood that seem quite naturally singular. For the most
part, we feel like the same person over time: we all feel that
there is an “I” that controls how we act. Where then does this
sense of selfhood come from? The answer to this question is
found neither in our inherent nature, nor social interaction,
but alternatively, in a fusion of the two.
Common Ground: The Narrative
Nature and nurture convene, oddly enough, in storytelling. Chomsky’s
Universal Grammar suggests that there is an innate capacity
in the human brain for language. Furthermore, “[r]ecent advances
in cognitive neuroscience suggest that the creation of a narrative
in the human central nervous system is mediated by a regionally
distributed neural network”(Young 75). In short, our brains
seem to be naturally wired to organize our experiences into
narratives. A number of disorders, called “dysnarrativia,” impair
the sufferer’s ability to create self-narratives, and are characterized
by damage to the neural network. These pathologies differ extensively,
but they are each rooted in specific parts of the brain. For
example, a damaged amygdalohippocampal system leads to a person
creating fanciful narratives, which often contradict themselves.
People with these disorders have baffling senses of self, and
“illustrate the inseparable connection between narrativity and
personhood.” In short: “[i]ndividuals who have lost the ability
to construct narrative, however, have lost their selves” (Young
75–8).
Another psychological condition called confabulation causes
people to create entirely erroneous narratives, but unwittingly.
The stories they tell seem sincere and believable, but are entirely
fallacious – “made up out of whole cloth.” More important, “[c]onfabulators
have no idea they are making it all up” (Dennet 50-252). Such
people have no idea who they are – their senses of self do not
cohere in any way to their actual experiences. This intuition,
that confabulators have lost their senses of self despite overt
appearances, further suggests an intimate connection between
selfhood and the ability to create accurate narratives.
Yet, the narrative depends on language, and language depends
on society: “one cannot be a self on one’s own, but only together
with others, as part of a linguistic community” (Zahavi 58).
Though there is an innate structure in the brain for and a human
proclivity towards language, “the narrative is not a natural
form of cognition” (Callero 124). The ability to create narratives
is developed at approximately age three (Neisser 5), and seems
to be necessary for “sustain[ing] a sense of stability and predictable
understanding in the world” (Callero 124). Nikolas Rose gives
a succinct account:
When our culture provides us with life narratives couched in
psychological terms, our lives really do becomes psychological
in their form. Selfhood, and beliefs about the attributes of
the self, feelings, intentions and the like, are properties,
not of mental mechanisms, but of conversations, grammars or
speaking. They are both possible and intelligible only in societies
where these things can properly, grammatically be said by people
about people (Rose 237).
It seems that our understanding of the self as a narrative is
very much a mixture of both the social and the bio-inherited.
Is our sense of self merely just an internal story? If so, it
is likely an inaccurate one. Pinker suggests that the self “is
a spin doctor,” and that “our conscious minds do not control
how we act but merely tell us a story about our actions.” Furthermore,
there is evidence that “the left hemisphere constantly weaves
a coherent but false account of the behavior chosen without
its knowledge by the right” (Pinker 43). Human memory presents
a further difficulty: “[a]ll memories are suspect, at the neural
level” (Young 79). Though Neisser believes that the self is
more than just a narrative, he confesses, “[t]he fallibility
of memory has led some contemporary theorists to argue that
the self is nothing but a constructed narrative, and a self-serving
one at that” (Neisser 5).
Self-Reflection
As mentioned earlier, I believe self-reflection to be a crucial
factor in the development of one’s sense of self. Putting aside
for the moment the difficulty of a fragmented self reflecting
upon itself, I turn to two inquiries that appear to confirm
my hypothesis.
Investigation 1: Sedikides and Skowronski
In the first study, ninety students were asked to list all the
sources they used “in order to gain self-knowledge or increase
self-understanding.” To avoid the bias of prior studies, the
researchers had two undergraduates categorize the 227 different
items listed by the ninety students involved in the study. The
two students derived eleven categories from the responses, encompassing
the three main sources of self-knowledge from the existing literature
on the self: social comparison, reflected appraisal, and self-reflection.
Self-reflection was “the most pervasive of the three,” accounting
for 59% of the responses (Sedikides 249–51).
A second study involved providing students with an arbitrarily
ordered list of the categories from the first study. The students
were then asked to rank them in order of importance in determining
self-knowledge. Again, the categories which describe self-reflection
as a source of self-knowledge (“Remembering yourself in past
interactions with other people,” and “Comparing yourself with
the way you were in the past”) were predominant (Sedikides 252–4).
A third study asked participants to rate the categories on a
seven-point scale according to importance. The results from
this study were slightly-less definitive, though self-reflective
and reflected appraisal were the dominant groups. Furthermore,
the top category was again, “Remembering yourself in past interactions
with other people” (Sedikides 255–6).
The final study attempted to factor in differences in personality
types, and determined that despite different orientations toward
the world (internal vs. external), “[o]verall, participants
rated self-reflection categories as more important than social
categories,” leading one to posit a “perceived primacy of self-reflective
processes in self-knowledge.” However, the apparent gap between
the importance of self-reflection and social comparison found
in all four studies may have been influenced by the “participants’
unwillingness to admit that they conform to social pressures”
or from the American “ideal of individualism” (Sedikides 262–5).
Thus, even if the perceived sources of self-knowledge directly
correlate with the real sources, it is not possible to call
them universal. The pithy remark by W.I. Thomas is particularly
applicable to this investigation: “Things perceived as real
will be real in their consequences.” In other words, if people
consider self-reflection to be an important part of forming
their self-concept, it will consequently be a determining factor,
especially in light of contemporary narrative-based theories.
Investigation 2: Bell, Wieling, and Watson
The second inquiry concerns a much smaller sampling of people
who were examined over a two-year period. Ten students were
interviewed about their lives at a university by several interviewers
with an emphasis on the problems the students encountered during
their first two years of college. In the end, the transcripts
from the interviews were assessed by two independent researchers
who then “ranked individuals on the basis of developmental change.”
They concluded that the students who developed most “had a higher
percentage of self-reflecting content in their discussion[s].”
In contrast to other studies on self-reflection, there was no
indication of a relationship between high levels of self-reflection
and depression. Rather, their results suggested that “self-reflecting
is a component of healthy adolescent development” (Bell 451–65).
While neither of these studies are particularly authoritative
in their pronouncements about the significance of self-reflection,
I think their conclusions are correct. Self-reflection allows
one to change one’s behavior in a way that no other mental faculty
can, and as the research suggests, its influence on the development
of the self is profound. It is hoped that future research of
the neurological basis for reflexivity and the development of
self-conscious A.I. will lead to more definitive conclusions.
Conclusion
What, then, is the nature of the self? It seems that the character
of the self is simply yet to be determined, but it is likely
to be neither a purely physical, nor purely social phenomena.
Clearly, language is an essential part of the creation of our
self-concept, as a narrative cannot exist without words. Here,
we find the necessary condition for the self is a combination
of nature and nurture.
Self-reflection is also a combination of physiological and social
elements, and I believe that it is this capacity that is most
crucial in the formation of the self. Even if the self is nothing
more than a concatenation of distinct modules working together
to create the appearance of a unified consciousness, the conglomerate’s
ability to reflect on itself seems to be absolutely essential
to the existence of any sense of selfhood. Andrew Weigert and
Victor Gecas write of reflection:
Without the ability to self-objectify, society would not be
possible; we would not be able to engage in role taking, to
live by the rules we create, to exercise self-control over our
impulses, to judge our conduct and that of others, or to retell
storied experience that became the meanings of our lives (Weigert
280).
Thus self and society are coeval, and “[a]t its core the self
is defined by the reflexive process, the universal human experience
of self-objectification” (Callero 128).
Yet, there also may be a physiological aspect of the self, as
intimated by the research of Panksepp. Perhaps the self is characterized,
at least in part, by the “supervisory system in the prefrontal
lobes and anterior cingulate cortex,” and this aspect of the
brain makes us feel in control (Pinker 43). Maybe our feeling
of selfhood is just the perception of memories in the form of
a narrative, perpetuated by embodiment, language, and temporality.
Still, none of these theories suggest a truly core self – all
of these models are modular, and present human consciousness
as compound. The notion of the unitary self appears to be a
thing of the past, along with idea dualism. Nagel conjectures
that perhaps the “simple idea of a single person will come to
seem quaint some day,” adding that it is “also possible that
we shall be unable to abandon the idea no matter what we discover”
(Nagel 164). Clearly, it has to be one of these two hypotheses.
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