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The
Brownstone Journal >>
Issues >> Vol.
VIII Spring 1999
The Failure of Conflict Management
at the Gate of Heavenly Peace: Tinanmen Square
Jennifer Young (CAS XX) is a sophomore
studying Mass Communications. She will spend the next semester
in China, where she hopes to obtain an internship in public
relations or advertising.
Overview
June 4, 1989 was a day that marked the ultimate failure of the
Chinese Communist Party’s conflict resolution strategies for
dealing with student and worker demonstrations. In the early
morning, soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army killed about
500 democracy supporters (Landsberger 179). Another several
thousands were wounded.
Less than a day later, in spite of the Chinese government’s
attempts to block media coverage, footage of Tiananmen Square
Massacre aired on the television sets of millions of witnesses
around the world. China has cemented her infamous reputation
for denying her citizens basic human rights.
“Tiananmen” translates as “the gate of heavenly peace. Ironically,
it came to represent the repressive actions of a government
that turned a potentially positive conflict into one with devastating
repercussions, including the death of hundreds, the wounds of
thousands, and a tarnished reputation at home and abroad.
Presented with several opportunities to improve communication
and relations with Beijing students and workers, Party officials
chose instead to avoid dealing with the conflict openly. Unprepared
to answer calls for democratic reforms such as increasing the
freedom of speech and putting an end to the government’s corruption,
officials repeatedly ignored student attempts at dialogue.
Students began marching to Tiananmen in April with non-confrontational
requests to discuss reform with Party leaders. But weeks of
the government’s unresponsiveness and backhanded editorials
in the official press escalated the conflict. The number of
demonstrators swelled, and a confrontational approach was applied
with the intent of forcing the government to respond.
Students were hoping for that response to be recognition of
their newly formed autonomous student government and a dialogue
with Party leaders. But weak attempts of communication failed;
the last session, on May 18, was terminated because students
felt as though they were attending a lecture rather than engaging
in dialogue. The Premier had refused to discuss the demonstrators’
demands (Florcruz 151). Conflicting statements to the press
show that an intragroup struggle among Party leaders would determine
the students’ fate. One leader within the party opposed taking
a hard-line approach, but he was defeated; on May 20, the government
responded to the growing movement by declaring martial law.
After this announcement, student leaders had to face their own
intragroup conflict. Some suggested evacuation. Beijing students
appealed to students from other cities to retreat. In the end,
the radicals insisted on continuing the occupation of the square,
and several thousand protesters remained at Tiananmen (Kristof
182).
Throughout the next two weeks, martial law was not enforced–until
the morning of June 4.
The Intergroup Conflict: Positions and Interests
Students involved in the pro-democracy movement put forth their
first petition on April 18, listing seven demands: 1) reevaluate
leader Hu Yaobang; 2) renounce the 1987 anti-bourgeois liberalization
campaign and the 1983 anti-spiritual pollution campaign; 3)
increase freedom of the press; 4) publish the salaries and net
worth of Party and government leaders and relatives; 5) rescind
the Beijing municipal government’s ban on public demonstrations;
6) increase state funding for higher education; and 7) provide
objective news coverage of the current student demonstrations
(Wagner 49). Although these demands represented underlying interests
in opposition to those of the government, the stage was new
set for positional bargaining.
The students’ goals were based on their interest in seeing past
wrongs of the Party addressed, a sense of equity and truth,
the desire to improve conditions at their universities, and
the ability to express their opinions. Hu had passed away a
few days before, on April 15. His death affected a large number
of students: many admired and espoused Hu’s support of “further
experimentation with political reform” (Saich 30). When Hu opposed
taking a hard-line approach with demonstrators in December 1986,
Deng and other conservative Party members forced him to resign
(Saich 30). By asking the Party to reevaluate Hu, the students
were also asking that officials accept political reform as a
positive goal rather than criticism of the Communist leadership.
Their requests to renounce the 1987 and 1983 government campaign
served the same purpose. In demanding freedom of the press,
the disclosure of officials’ earnings, and the right to public
demonstrations, young people were seeking to hold the government
accountable for its actions and supporting the people’s right
to know the truth. Freedom of the press and the right to demonstrate
would also allow a greater freedom of expression, whether to
support or oppose the Party line. These initial demands did
not reflect motives to overthrow the Communist Party or its
leadership. However, the students’ presentation of these interests
as a set of positions may have prompted the government to respond
negatively from the start.
In response to the petition, Party leaders refused to acknowledge
the demands of demonstrators (Wagner 49). It became clear that
the government was sending the students a message reflecting
its position, “We will not meet or negotiate with you.” This
determined stance was based on the desire to retain authority,
maintain the privileged lifestyles of officials and their relatives,
and prevent possible expansion of the movement into general
chaos. By correcting its position on Hu or the campaigns of
recent years, the government would be admitting it had made
a mistake. In the eyes of Party officials, an admittance of
previous wrongdoing would weaken their present authority; thus,
it was not a viable option.
Frustrated by the lack of response, student demonstrated in
front of the Party compound at Xinhuamen on April 19 and 20.
On April 20, police beat several students with clubs. The next
day, the official news agency reported that four officers were
injured but failed to mention student injuries (Florcruz 136).
A week later, on April 27, the students formed an autonomous
student government and narrowed their focus to include three
demands: 1) dialogue between elected student leaders and government
officials; 2) investigation of the police beatings of students
on April 20; and 3) an apology from the official news agency
for distorted reporting of the student movement, as well as
a guarantee of accuracy in the future (Wagner 53). These demands
were rooted in the students’ interest in a sense of equity and
truth as an opportunity to voice their opinions and discuss
reforms.
Both parties treated the conflict as an occasion for positional
bargaining. According to Fisher and Ury, “Behind opposed positions
lie shared and compatible interests, as well as conflicting
ones” (42). In the case of the Chinese government and the students,
a number of shared interests existed: preventing chaos and allowing
the government to retain most of its authority. But most importantly,
both sides hoped that China would have a prosperous future as
a respected member of the world community.
Causes of Conflict
Initially, the intergroup conflict between the Chinese Communist
Party officials and student demonstrators was engendered by
disagreements over data, interests, and values. Students opposed
the Party’s the Party’s negative portrayal of Hu and wanted
it to be corrected. They also wanted the government to allow
truth to be presented to the public by the news media, instead
of requiring the government’s approval prior to printing or
broadcast stories. Furthermore, the students’ interest in democratic
values of freedom of press and peaceful demonstration directly
conflicted with the party’s desire to control all information
and curb all criticism. To put the contrast more sharply, students
believed in freedom and equity under the democratic auspices,
whereas the Chinese government’s position indicated its intention
to preserve traditional power and authority.
Party officials were unwilling to alter the official evaluation
of Hu’s case. Moreover they had expertise in dealing forcefully
with those who dare to criticize any of the Party line commands:
whether in the form of newspaper and television coverage or
demonstrations, criticism was suppressed, except when it served
their needs. Their primary interest was to maintain their position
of power, and they valued control over the people above all
else. By refusing to respond to the demonstrators’ demands,
the Party sought to invalidate the movement.
The conflict began to spread into the relationship between the
opposing parties and the structure of meetings. Students would
not respect a government that refused to open a channel of communication
even after formal petitions had been presented. They found fault
with a system that allowed the government to neglect the citizens’
requests continuously and distort facts in the media. From the
beginning of the conflict, the government strained its relationship
with the students by slow and incomplete responses to their
demands (Wagner 49). When the students organized an autonomous
student government, the Party refused to recognize it as a legitimate
group (Lansberger 167). The Party officials consistently applied
the so-called “avoidance conflict style” when presented with
the students’ requests. Later, the government made a decision
to go into an open confrontation by using military force to
suppress the movement.
The students, in turn, first attempted to appease the officials
by decreasing the number and scope of demands, but soon became
more confrontational and uncompromising. As the weeks progressed,
the demonstrators’ slogans displayed statements criticizing
the government and its leaders, rather than offering creative
solutions to resolve the conflict (Florcruz 154). As both parties
moved towards increasingly confrontational styles of dealing
with the situation, the conflict’s escalation seemed unavoidable.
Power and Its Applications
In the strife which was to result in the Tiananmen Square Massacre,
the concept of power played a key role. Power may take several
different forms, depending on the context and the status of
the contending parties. Party officials did not feel compelled
to respond to the students’ demands, partly because they questioned
the significance of the students’ power. The Chinese Communist
Party had an immense power arsenal, consisting of its formal
authority, information power, resource control, procedural power,
sanction power, and habitual power. As members of the Chinese
government, the Party officials also controlled information
through their tight regulation (and censorship rights) of the
media, including the press (Hornik 111). The government had
direct command over the military. It also determined the procedures
for specifying when it was “legal” to petition the government,
regardless of what the Constitution said. For example, demonstrations
such as those staged by the students were deemed “illegal.”
The government possessed sanction power in that it can punish
the dissenters in any way it finds appropriate. Finally, the
government had habitual power: citizens were used to waiting
for governmental permission and encouragement before expressing
criticism. Even then, many instances occurred in which the government
arrested intellectuals who offered their criticism “too enthusiastically.”
In contrast to the government officials, the students initially
had only the nuisance and personal power. While they were a
cause of great annoyance throughout their demonstrations and
especially during the May 15th visit of Mikhail Gorbachev, they
could not counter the consolidation of power within the Party.
Although the students had impressive charismatic ability, as
evidenced by the support of workers and other Beijing residents
as well as the favorable accounts of them in foreign publications,
it was not sufficient. In essence, the students were attempting
to bargain for a transfer of some formal authority and information
power to ordinary citizens.
Given the tremendous imbalance of power between the students
and the Chinese government, as between the Party and the people,
the Party should have used its authority in positive and integrative
ways. However, instead of employing it to transform the confrontational
conflict into a collaborative effort and improve both the government’s
policies and its image among its people and abroad, the officials
misused their power by threatening protesters, telling lies
in the press, and resorting to violence to end the conflict.
They abused their power in order to preserve it. At all costs,
“Deng insisted on keeping the ultimate reigns of power in the
hands of the party, at all levels, and that meant limiting reforms”
(Hornik 114)
Best Alternative To Negotiated Agreement (BATNA)
“The better your BATNA, the greater your power.”
-Roger Fisher and William Ury in Getting to Yes
As William McCarthy wrote in response to the above statement,
“O this is good advice, but it does not take us very far” (120).
Considering the disproportionate distribution of power between
the government and ordinary citizens, the only realistic BATNAs
for the students were to end demonstrations, leave the country,
or continue demonstrating until the government agreed to negotiate
an agreement.
Ending the demonstrations would not have necessarily spared
the students imprisonment, or even execution, at the hands of
their government. In addition, they would have wasted weeks
of hard work only to reinforce the government’s habitual power.
In order to weaken it by restructuring the government and the
existing laws, the student needed the officials’ cooperation.
Without it, they could not have expected a change.
As to the second alternative, most students could not afford
to move to other countries. To do so required obtaining expensive
passports and foreign visas, as well as gaining acceptance and
financial aid at foreign universities. Moreover, this would
have meant only a temporary solution, since students would eventually
have to return to China and face the same restrictive policies.
Thus, for lack of other feasible alternatives and unable to
negotiate with the government, students chose to continue their
demonstrations. They saw this as the only possible way to bring
about change within the government–or at least to compel the
officials to hold a dialogue with them. Although students were
aware that the government could use force, they thought it unlikely
because they had garnered the support of over a million people
during the demonstrations. They also remembered that the government
did not use force after the martial law had been declared.
The government hoped that the movement would lose momentum and
die out. Alternatively, it could employ police and the military
to subdue the protesters. Party members preferred for the movement
to wither away on its own, which explains why they waited almost
two months to apply force. If their expectations were fulfilled,
the government could avoid “losing face,” but the movement would
lose credibility.
In the end, the government officials did decide to use violent
means, for what Deng “feared most... was a possible alliance
between the discontented workers and the intelligentsia and
thus, a full-fledged urban uprising” (Florcruz 130). Rather
than risk having more citizens exposed to the pro-democratic
values of the protesters or give in to the demands for change,
the Party decided to extinguish the movement with military force.
Crushing it in this way, it was thought, might even inhibit
future demonstrators. Although there would be unfavorable coverage
of the event in the international media, the Party was able
to control the press in China. Failing to take into account
the long term consequences such as the loss of public support,
the growth of urban discontent, and the delayed acceptance of
China to the WTO, the government opted for a short-term solution
of adopting violent means with the protesters.
The Conflict Escalator
At several points in time, both the government and the students
had missed opportunities to moderate the conflict. However,
it was usually the government that initiated the escalation
of hostility by misusing its power and refusing to communicate
with elected student leaders.
From the start, Party officials attempted to ignore or dismiss
the demands of the students. This blunt refusal to listen gave
the students a reason to demonstrate at Zhongnanhai, the Chinese
Communist Party compound, on April 19-20. As a result of these
demonstrations, the police repeatedly beat several students
with clubs (Wagner 50). China’s official news report mentioning
only the beating of four officers and not alluding to any victims
among students further dramatized the situation.
After Hu’s memorial service on April 22, a crowd of about 50,000
chanted for Premier Li Peng to meet them in front of the Great
Hall of the People (Wagner 50). In a historically significant
gesture, three students knelt on the steps of the Great Hall
for forty-five minutes during the chants. Their actions reflected
the customary ritual for presenting petitions during dynasties
of the past (Wagner 51). The Party leadership’s lack of a response
further decreased the possibility of reaching an agreement with
the students.
On April 26, an editorial based on a speech by Deng appeared
in the official newspaper. The People’s Daily (Landsberger 166).
The piece labeled the student as a “planned conspiracy... whose
real nature was to fundamentally negate the leadership of the
Chinese Communist Party” (Wagner 55). Also present in the article
was a thinly veiled threat that “those who deliberately create
rumors and spread slander must be held criminally responsible
in accordance with the law” (Wagner 55). Instead of intimidating
the demonstrators, the harsh tone of the editorial presented
a challenge to them and took the conflict to a higher level
of direct confrontation.
The government ordered police blockades outside Tiananmen on
April 27, but over 100,000 protesters marched past them into
the Square (Florcruz 139). Finally, on April 28, government
leaders agreed to meet with representatives of the official
student union on the condition that students return to the classrooms
(Landsberger 167).
However, by this time, the students had already elected leaders
to serve in an autonomous student government called the Beijing
Students’ Autonomous Federation (BSAF) (Landsberger, 167). The
government refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the BSAF,
let alone engage in dialogue. This action convinced the students
that the government did not consider their elected leaders as
serious negotiation partners.
A hunger strike began on May 13. Students demanded a dialogue
with Party leaders, the reevaluation of the student movement,
and retraction of the April 26 People’s Daily editorial (Landsberger
170). Finally, on May 18, Premier Li Peng and other government
officials met with an elected student leader. However, Li refused
to discuss the student’s demands. Many sources have described
the event as a one-sided “lecture” given by Li (Florcruz 151).
This meeting provoked more negative feelings on both sides.
The mutual lack of respect became clear.
Martial law was declared the morning of May 20. In response,
residents of Beijing who supported the student and worker demonstrations
streamed out into the streets and attempted to block the army
from entering the city (Kristof 180). At this point, the students
were no longer fully in charge of the actions of their supporters.
Finally, on the evening of June 3, several soldiers were beaten
by angry residents of Beijing who found weapons and ammunitions
in vehicles entering the city. This enraged the government leaders
and brought the conflict to its breaking point. On June 4th,
whether as a planned event or as a retaliation for the injury
to the soldiers, troops were ordered to take control of the
city using any necessary means on June 4.
Intragroup Conflicts
In his article “Negotiating Inside Out,” Robert Fisher states:
“In every negotiation involving an organization, internal negotiations
have a major impact on external ones” (71). The military action
of June 4th reflected the result of an intragroup conflict among
high-ranking Party officials: Central Military Commission Chairman
Deng Xiaoping, Premier Li Peng, and General Secretary Zhao Ziyang.
Even before students began their demonstrations in April, there
was a definite split in the leaders’ views on the economic reform
policies, cultural liberalization, and increased acceptance
of democratic values (Kristof 172). While Zhao supported a more
liberal approach, Deng and Li hoped that China could reap the
harvest of Western technological advancements and economic growth
without accompanying cultural and political changes (Hornik
102).
Deng represented the more forceful of Zhao’s challengers, for
he held a great deal of power from various sources. As an alder
and the person responsible for appointing Zhao to his first
position in the Party, Deng had considerable formal authority
and expert power over Zhao. Thus, Deng and Li defeated Zhao
in the internal power struggle. As a result, martial law was
declared against the demonstrators on the morning of May 20,
1989, and the tragic events of June 4 followed.
The students, too, had their share of acute disagreement among
leaders. Different student groups adopted varying views as the
demonstrations continued. The students had not intended to lead
demonstrations that ensued after their initial submission of
demands to the government. As the conflict escalated, various
decisions as to what demands to raise and whether the occupation
of the Square would continue divided the student leadership
(Florcruz 159). As late as May 30, some student leaders from
Beijing urged fellow protesters to leave Tiananmen. They were
opposed, however, by the students who had just arrived from
surrounding areas. The leading voices decided to remain (Florcruz
159).
Could the Massacre Have Been Prevented?
One may well wonder whether either party might have submitted
their dispute to mediation, arbitration, or litigation, which
represent other modes of conflict resolution. In this situation,
the government staunchly refused to negotiate with the students,
let alone give any power to a third, mediating party. The Party
officials assumed that because they had enough power to do away
with the demonstrations, they would make no concessions to the
protestors. The government would not have submitted the dispute
to arbitration, for it would have been too concerned with the
possibility of being found in the wrong. In terms of litigation,
the courts were controlled by the Party and would not have provided
an objective means for resolution. These last two alternatives
serve rather as illustrations of the mediation and arbitration
concepts than conceivable choice for the Chinese government.
The responsibility for what happened in Tiananmen Square, however,
does ultimately rest with the Party officials since it was they
who ordered the soldiers to use violence at their discretion.
Because both parties approached the situation as positional
bargaining, it would have been difficult to avoid confrontation
and escalation of hostility. After Party officials wrote the
April 26 editorial, signs of destructive conflict were clear.
The Party was making threats to criminally punish those who
took part in demonstrations. By May 20, the officials had voted
to use force against demonstrators. After the soldiers were
beaten on June 3, the government had to adhere to its earlier
menacing promises and act according to its position. They had
became slaves to it.
Ultimately, in the massacre at the “Gate of Heavenly Peace,”
many students and Beijing civilians lost their lives, while
the survivors lost faith in their government. The Party forfeited
popular support and turned the world’s spotlight onto its abuses
of power. Perhaps the conflict could have been resolved to bring
mutually beneficial changes to the laws and government of China.
However, the Party’s focus on seemingly sharply opposed positions,
rather than actual common interests, prevented this outcome.
TBJ
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Fisher, Roger. "Negotiating Inside Out. Negotiation Theory
and Practice." Ed. J. William Breslin. Cambridge: Harvard,
1995. Pp. 71-79.
Fisher, Roger, and William Ury. Getting to Yes. New
York: Penguin Group, 1991.
Florcruz, Jaime. "Long Live the Students!" Massacre
in Beijing: China's Struggle for Democracy. New York: Time
Inc., 1989. Pp. 123-159.
Hornik, Richard. "The Road to Reform." Massacre
in Beijing: China's Struggle for Democracy. New York: Time
Inc., 1989. Pp. 97-121.
Kristof, Nicholas D. "How the Hardliners Won." New
York Times Magazine 12 Nov. 1989.
Landsberger, Stefan F. "Chronology of the 1989 Student
Demonstrations." The Chinese People's Movement. Ed. Tony
Saich. New York: M.E. Sharpe. 1990. Pp: 164-189.
McCarthy, William. "The Role of Power and Principle in
Getting to yes." Negotiation Theory and Practice. Ed. J.
William Breslin. Cambridge: Harvard, 1995. Pp. 115-122.
Saich, Tony. "When Worlds Collide." The Chinese People's
Movement. Ed. Tony Saich. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1990. Pp. 25-49.
Wagner, Marsha L. "The Strategies of the Student Democracy
Movement in Beijing." Tiananmen: China's Struggle for Democracy,
Ed. Winston Yang, Baltimore: University of Maryland School of
Law. 1990. Pp. 43-80.
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