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The
Brownstone Journal >>
Issues >> Vol.
VII Spring 1998
China’s Intervention in the Korean
War
Kitty Tam (CAS XX) is a junior in the
College of Arts and Sciences, double-majoring in political science
and international relations. Her primary focus is on U.S. foreign
policy. She discovered an interest in human rights and economic
development while studying abroad and traveling through Europe.
After graduation, she would like to work for a development agency
before going to law school. She would like to thank Professor
Carole Lambert for keeping her on the right path.
The Korean War was a watershed event for both the United
States and China. One year after Chairman Mao Tse-tung established
his government, he found himself engaged in combat against
American military forces. The situation represented a costly
and indecisive struggle that exacerbated Sino-American relations
for over two decades. Mao and the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) saw the Korean War as a crisis that invoked a threat
to China's national sovereignty but also as an opportunity
to display her ability to rules. The CCP's decision to enter
the war was based on the belief that the outcome would determine
their status in the postwar world.
China made the decision to intervene for several reasons.
Indeed, the CCP had an immediate concern over national security.
However, China had other geostrategic considerations as well.
For example, resolving the Taiwan conflict, a long-term policy
consideration, was seen by the CCP as the last step for their
power consolidation. Another long-term consideration was China's
relationship with North Korea and Kim Il-sung. Furthermore,
each of these factors were influenced by the evolving Sino-soviet
and Sino-American relationships.
Mao formally established the People's Republic of China on
October 1, 1949. The Korean crisis presented a concern for
national security to Mao because North Korea shared a common
border with China. The Yalu River, located along the border
of Mainland China and the Korean Peninsula, was of enormous
economic importance to China as Japan had built a system of
dams and reservoirs during their occupation of Manchuria,
the province located north of the Korean peninsula. Not only
did the province contain vast mineral deposits and raw materials,
but also transportation via the Chinese Eastern Railways.
As Russia and Japan have proven in the past, control of this
region meant the economic and, subsequently, political control
of China.
If national security was the primary basis of China's decision
to intervene, it would be accurate to say that Communist China
acted defensively. The 38th Parallel was the dividing line
separating the northern Soviet zone and the southern American
zone, which was first stipulated in post-World War II peace
settlements. As stated in America in the Age of Soviet Power,
Mao's decision to cross the 38th Parallel and display aggression
toward the Korean Communists signaled his conviction that
the U.S. would inevitably attempt a military overthrow of
his regime. The developments beginning December 1949 between
Mao, Joseph Stalin, and Kim Il Sung, however, reveal that
Mao had made other considerations. Three varying accounts
have been given by Nikita Khrushchev, foreign Prime Minister
of the Soviet Union; Chen Boda, Mao's political secretary;
and Shi Zhe, Mao's interpreter. The three accounts give some
insight into whether Mao gave the starting signal to Kim,
which, if he did, would suggest that Mao was thinking offensively
and not defensively.
According to Khrushchev's memoirs, Mao approved Kim's suggestion
and thought that the US would not intervene in Korea's internal
conflict. If Khrushchev's testimony can be believed, Stalin
was hesitant to allow the aggression while Mao supported the
attack on the South. Chen Boda, during the 1989 interviews
before his death, said that Mao had no knowledge of Kim's
plan. This would have meant that Mao's decision to intervene
in the war after it had begun was in the name of national
security.
Shi Zhe described the Moscow meeting that he attended as Mao's
interpreter:
“Then Stalin asked Chairman Mao’s opinions about Kim's plan.
Chairman Mao did not answer immediately. After a while, he
said: “The Americans might not come in because this is Korea's
internal affairs, but the Korean comrades need to take America's
intervention into account.” Chairman Mao had anticipated that
Kim Il-sung would attack the South no matter what happened.
Shi Zhe's account seems to be the most convincing among the
three accounts: with domestic economic reconstruction and
land reform desperately needed in China, it would have been
illogical for Mao to plan or even promote political instability
in a neighboring country, as Khrushchev suggested.
Moreover, there is even less reason to believe that Mao played
an active role in helping Kim plan the attack on South Korea.
Mao needed the Korean crisis to be settled promptly because
any upheavals in East Asian would hinder economic growth and
disrupt commercial trade. On the other hand, it would hard
be to believe Chen's statement that Mao and Stalin never discussed
the Korean conflict during Mao's stay in Moscow from December
1949 to February 1950. The meeting created closer cooperation
between the two as they concluded their talks with the Sino-Soviet
Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance. Closer
Sino-Soviet relations ended the political isolation of the
CCP and established their global status. In the midst of the
Cold War, closer Soviet relations helped set the stage for
an American confrontation.
Beginning in the latter part of 1949, Kuomintang Taiwan became
the top policy consideration for the CCP. In December 1949,
Chiang Kaishek, leader of the Kuomintang party, was displaced
out of office and retreated to the island of Taiwan, where
he planned to reform the Kuomintang government and build up
a base for future action. In reality, Chiang's corrupt and
inefficient regime was losing American support and had little
choice but to leave the Mainland. A quick settlement of the
problem was critical because the CCP perceived Sino-American
relations through American policy towards Taiwan. Like Korea,
the main question involved American intervention and what
form this intervention would take.
From the U.S. perspective, Taiwan was also of geostrategic
importance since the island was a potential wartime base for
air operations and for control of adjacent shipping routes.
However, Truman still wished to distance himself from the
unpopular Chiang. On January 13, 1950, Secretary of State
Dean Acheson refrained from including Taiwan and South Korea
from the U.S. Western Pacific “military defense perimeter.”
On the domestic front, attacks were made against Truman and
the State Department for “losing China.” These attacks made
during policy debates abruptly changed Truman's policy. Truman
announced that since the ''occupation of Formosa (Taiwan)
by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security
of the Pacific area. America's Seventh Fleet would shield
the island from the main1and.'' The order for the neutralization
of the Taiwan straits was issued on June 27, 1950, two days
after North Korea attacked South Koreans. Truman gave the
order to prevent the CCP forces from invading Taiwan and extirpating
the Kuomintang. MacArthur flew to Taipei and stood alongside
of Chiang Kai-shek to display his support. The U.S. offended
the CCP by interfering in China's civil war and favoring Chiang's
regime once again.
The CCP risked the chance of losing support of the Chinese
people if they did not respond to the American threat. Even
worse, the failure to support North Korea would have encouraged
remaining reactionaries on the mainland and the forces in
Taiwan. Once the war began, Chou gave his analysis of the
American policy towards the conflict: “For us, the Korea question
is not simply a question concerning Korea, but it is related
to the Taiwan question. The U.S. imperialists have adopted
a hostile attitude toward us and set up their defense line
in the Taiwan Straits while paying lip service to non-aggression
and non-intervention.” Chou's immediate analysis and response,
given on June 28, 1950, displayed the intensified anxiety
of the CCP. Mao no longer had to speculate whether or not
the U.S. would intervene militarily in East Asian politics.
The Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Straits proved to Mao that
the U.S. would challenge the CCP's power. Acheson expected
to eventually recognize the People's Republic of China, but
he did not want to give the CCP the satisfaction just yet.
Relying on the New York Times for information about the U.S.,
Mao's advisors were convinced that the U.S. would unify Korea
by overthrowing the Korean Communists and proceed to do the
same to the CCP. Hence. the national security of Manchuria
was not the only reason for intervening in the Korean War.
The Taiwan Straits was another region where American hostility
was felt equally strong.
Although Taiwan was Mao’s overriding concern, he decided that
the “liberalization” of Taiwan would not be implemented until
the spring and summer of 1951. It is important to discern
that the outbreak of the Korean War itself did not prevent
the CCP from ''liberating'' Taiwan in 1950. The decision by
Mao to postpone the operation was a rational one. China did
not have the military capabilities to challenge the U.S. in
both Taiwan and South Korea. It would have been unfavorable
to confront the U.S. in Taiwan.
First of all, the CCP would have had to fight on both land
and sea. They would have also been far from their resources
and supplies if that fought in the southeast region of China.
Secondly, should the Taiwan invasion fail, there would be
serious repercussions. The CCP risked losing economic and
political control in the coastal, southern, and inner regions
where reactionaries against the Communists still existed.
A more notable reason for delaying the Taiwan invasion was
the lesson the CCP learned from their defeat in Quemoy.
A Sino-American confrontation was certainly not inevitable.
However, given the events developing in Taiwan, Korea. and
Indochina, the trusteeship of Japan by the U.S. as well as
the political atmosphere of the U.S., a confrontation to determine
power relations was highly probable. Favorable, strategic
conditions for China to intervene in the Korean War do not
justify tile decision to intervene, but they can serve as
reasons for the CCP to confront the U.S. in Korea rather than
Taiwan. For one, fighting the U.S. forces after they had crossed
the 38th Parallel would display the Western imperialists as
the aggressors and appeal to international sympathy. Geostrategically
speaking, the mountainous Korean peninsula would reduce the
mobility of American military equipment. In addition, Manchuria,
China's industrial heartland, is situated next to the peninsula.
Supplies for military operations would be accessible critical
advantage during warfare. Moreover, fighting a war to ''Resist
America, Aid Korea'' would help Mao and the CCP raise the
overall low morale of the population and arouse some sense
of national unity for the recently established government.
With the recovery of the national economy being the domestic
priority, prolonged fighting on the mainland would not only
be hindered, but present China as a weak state.
The relationship between the CCP and North Korea give further
reasons for China's intervention in the war but also suggest
reasons for Mao not to help Kim Il- sung. The two seemingly
had a congenial but somewhat uneasy relationship. Historically,
Communists from both nationalities had close ties. In fact,
during the Chinese civil war, North Korea was a strategic
base for the Chinese Communists in the northeast. Korean Communists
offered supplies and manpower in the north-east as wel1. This
strengthened the position of the CCP extensively. Thus, ''Resist
America, Assist Korea'' might not have been simply propaganda.
The CCP had a favor to return to the North Koreans. Equally
influential was the fact that a victory for South Korea, allied
with the U.S., would have created more difficulty in foreign
relations for the Chinese Communists by having an unfriendly
neighbor.
The major reason for uneasiness between Mao and Kim, which
the U.S. failed to realize while being so concerned over Communism
was the fact that they were both nationalists. Both were looking
out for their own national interests and prestige in the global
context. Kim was always aware that Korea was perceived on
a subsidiary level compared to China. Subsequently. he could
not fully trust Mao. This fact supports the possibility of
a double-entendre in a quotation from World Culture, a CCP
magazine: ''North Korea's friends are our friends. North Korea's
enemy is our enemy. North Korea's defense is our defense.
North Korea's victory is our victory.” ‘Enemy’ is used as
a singular term compared to ‘friends.’ It implies that there
is only one enemy: the United States. The obvious meaning
which the CCP perhaps wanted the Chinese people to believe
is that the Chinese Communists must help their fellow Communist
neighbors. However, the phrase 'North Korea's victory is our
victory' may indicate that there were further Chinese interests,
particularly in determining the political status of China.
The belief that the Communists perceived American intervention
in Korea as a threat to China's sovereignty is the emphasis
of China Crosses the Yalu by Allen S. Whiting. Whiting's major
support for this theory is the Inchon landing by the American
X Corps on September 15, 1950 because this military expedition
turned the position of American forces from the defensive
position to the offensive. Inchon is located just south of
the 38th Parallel. After the successful landing, American
troops were marching toward the Yalu and near Manchuria. Even
if the United States kept their word and not invade China,
their presence in the region would have created tension and,
consequently, impeded productivity in the industrial area.
On October 3, 1950, Chou Enlai warned that the crossing of
United States or United Nations forces through the 38th Parallel
would be considered as aggression toward North Korea. According
to Dean Acheson's response: “Chou's words were a warning,
not to be disregarded, but, on the other hand, not an authoritative
statement of policy.” The statement made by the Chinese used
strong terms such as ''intolerable'' and emphasized, “we cannot
ignore.”
However, the CCP did not clearly state what would be its action
in response to the American attack across the 38th Parallel.
As a result, the U.S. State Department did not heed to Chinese
warnings. Instead, the Truman administration saw the success
of the Inchon landing as an opportunity to erase the border
of North between South Korea and reunite the country. On October
7, the General Assembly of the United Nations passed the resolution
authorizing MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers,
to “take all appropriate measures to ensure a stable situation
in the whole of Korea.” The resolution meant that the UN forces
would move toward the Yalu.
On October 13. 1950, the CCP Politburo made the decision to
enter the Korean War, despite hesitance from Stalin.
From October14 to October 25, 1950, China cautiously mobilized
and moved 350.000 ''volunteers'' of the PLA Fourth Field Army
into Korea. Nationalists was the driving force in the minds
of both the CCP and Korean Communists: defeat would have meant
not only the loss of power and prestige, but the loss of sovereignty.
Hence, Mao was willing to sacrifice the millions of men, including
his own son. To an extent, fighting in the Korean War was
in defense of a threat to national security. It was also an
opportunity to challenge the western imperialists, as they
described their enemies, in order to obtain political prestige
in the latter part of the twentieth century.
National security was a vital part of the decision made on
October 13. Yet other events that occurred since the Chinese
civil war also played a vital part in the decision. The consolidation
of power for the CCP, which depended on the resolution of
the Taiwan conflict, was a major policy consideration. China's
relations with North Korea played a secondary consideration.
Mao's goals were the economic reconstruction of China and
the supremacy of his regime over all Chinese territory. Both
the outbreak of the Korean War and the deployment of the Seventh
Fleet in the Taiwan Straits obstructed these goals. The events
that led to the Sin-American confrontation as well as the
Korean War itself heightened China's status in the postwar
world, ended their political isolation and displayed to the
U.S. that there was another Communist power contending in
the Cold War. TBJ
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