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The
Brownstone Journal >>
Issues >> Vol.
XII Spring 2005
Prospects for Democratic Consolidation
in Timor-Leste
Trustee Scholar Kevin Bryan
(CAS 05, GRS 05) is enrolled in a dual BA-MA program in which
he will earn degrees in Economics & International Relations.
Soon after East Timor gained independence from
Portuguese colonial authority in 1974, the nation's development
of a Marxist-leaning government worried Suharto's regime in
Indonesia, leading to Indonesia's brutal 1975 invasion and annexation
of the nascent state. Under the government of B.J. Habibie,
Indonesia reconsidered its policies on East Timorese independence
in January 1999, and a UN-sponsored referendum on independence
in August 1999 was approved by 78 percent of East Timorese voters.
A rampage by pro-Indonesia militias, aided by Indonesian military
regulars, followed the vote and devastated the infrastructure
of East Timor, leading to an exodus of 200,000 Timorese to the
western side of the island (Smith 1). President Habibie invited
the United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET)
to restore calm. This transitional peacekeeping authority, in
the face of strong democratic pressures from East Timorese elites
and poor alike, held and monitored parliamentary elections in
late 2001 (King 347). On 20 May 2002, Timor-Leste achieved full
independence, with a presidential-parliamentary democratic government
led by President Jose Alexander "Xanana" Gusmão
and Prime Minister Marí Alkatiri (1).
Timor-Leste gained independence from colonial
authority in 1974 and experienced a brief glimpse of democracy
before its 1975 annexation by Indonesia. Because the nation
is essentially an interrupted third-wave democracy, data on
democratic consolidation and regression from other third-wave
democracies launched in similiar scenarios will be analyzed
to produce a quantitative diagnostic. The 31 nations that became
democratic or began their transition to democracy between 1975
and 1991 (of which six have since retreated from their democratic
experiment), as identified in Samuel Huntington's The Third
Wave, provide the data set (2).
While many states have evolved into democracy between 1991 and
2004, among them South Africa, Russia, the Baltic States, Armenia,
Mexico, Georgia and Indonesia, the short durations of their
democracies make them less useful as statistical predictors
of Timor-Leste's prospects for consolidation, and thus they
are not included in the model.
While remaining aware of the "electoral
fallacy," this paper uses Schumpeter's definition of democracy
as a state with free, fair, periodic and contested elections
with suffrage granted to nearly all of the adult population
(Huntington 1997, 7). A stable democracy shall be, as Lipset
defines it, "uninterrupted democracy" for twenty-five
years with no major political movement "opposed to the
democratic rules of the game" (Lipset 1959, 73). The development
of liberal society is also a worthy goal, and benign autocracy
may be a prerequisite for democracy, but I accept Larry Diamond's
argument that "in today's world," liberal autocracy
"is a misnomer" since only two tiny states (Antigua
& Barbuda and Tonga) could qualify as such (Diamond 1999,
5; also Zakaria 89-119). That is, any nation that would be liberal
must also be democratic. Therefore, this paper limits itself
to the continued existence of democracy in Schumpeter's procedural
sense and will not discuss the potential development of valuable
liberal rights and civil society.
The question at hand is not whether Timor-Leste
will transition to democracy—the nation has already held free
and fair multiparty elections, with representation in the 88-seat
parliament reflecting twelve separate parties—but whether that
democracy will evolve into a liberal democracy or regress toward
authoritarianism. Grim statistics seem stacked against the world's
newest state. This paper will examine six areas of special concern
which may hinder Timor-Leste’s democratic consolidation: ideological
division between the country's Eastern (Firaku) and Western
(Kaladi) halves, a per capita GDP far lower than Huntington
and Lipset's so-called "democratic transition zones,"
a short transition period between authoritarianism and full-fledged
democracy, an economy potentially subject to the 'Resource Curse,'
and cultural neighbors with a poor history of liberal democratic
development. The specific considerations of democratic consolidation
in states with a small size—usually an advantageous trait—will
also be considered.
Political Divisions in 2001 Timor-Leste Elections. Click
to view full-size graphic. |
Ideological Divisions
In Timor-Leste's first two elections, a political cleavage along
geographic lines emerged (Appendix
A). The Firaku region, consisting of the four eastern provinces,
gave the majority FRETILIN party 67 percent of the vote, while
the Kaladi region, made up of eight provinces in the west, including
the exclave of Oecussi, gave FRETILIN only 46 percent (King
753; see map at right). FRETILIN, the Revolutionary Front for
an Independent East Timor, is closely identified with President
and national hero Xanana Gusmão, as well as with the
anti-Indonesian struggle for independence. Most of FRETILIN's
leaders were born in Firaku, and some in Kaladi provinces believe
that the current political leadership underrepresents the fifty
percent of Timor-Leste's population from Kaladi (Smith 3, also
Shoesmith 247).
Cleavages among rich and poor areas, or among
rural and urban areas, are common in many democracies, but political
divisions along ethnic or regional lines in a nascent democracy
can have devastating consequences. Ten third-wave democracies
had significant regional divisions in their early elections,
and three of these states—Nigeria, Pakistan and Sudan—regressed
to authoritarianism (see Appendix
B). In the cases of Nigeria and Sudan, ethnic divisions,
exacerbated by a centralized democracy, have led to civil wars.
Beyond these three, Romania, Turkey and India have all seen
significant intercommunal violence after creating or restoring
a democracy with regional divisions (Huntington 1991, 254).
Regional differences such as those between
Kaladi and Firaku tend to flare up under democracy for three
reasons. First, a democratic system carries at least the ideal
of universal representation, and groups that feel underrepresented
will lose faith in an early democracy. Second, especially when
regional governments have power or when regional elections are
held before national elections, regional parties will form and
reinforce any existing cleavages (Diamond 1999, 156). Third,
when natural constituency bases already exist in the form of
an ethnic or regional division, politicians will exploit them
as they run for reelection. If one region or ethnic group grows
to distrust the other major players and feels that democracy
is not an effective path for achieving its goals, then the developing
democracy is in danger.
This said, the dangers from regional fragmentation
in Timor-Leste are minor at this point. After nearly five hundred
years of colonialism, most Timorese in both Firaku and Kaladi
speak either Tetum (the language spoken in Dili, the capital)
or Portuguese (Smith 3). The strong tribal divisions of Nigeria
or Papua New Guinea do not exist. Furthermore, the most popular
politician in Timor-Leste, President Xanana Gusmão, is
committed to a functioning, multiparty state rather than simply
the retention of power by FRETILIN, the party to which he is
traditionally linked. In the 2002 presidential election, Gusmão
not only chose not to accept an endorsement from FRETILIN, but
also accepted the endorsement of nine minority parties, all
of which were opposed to FRETILIN in the parliament (Shoesmith
243). Despite strong protests against this stance by FRETILIN
leaders, including Prime Minister Alkatiri, Gusmão announced
during his presidential victory speech that he promised to work
for the good "of the whole nation" and not simply
the good of those who most strongly supported the independence
struggle (Shoesmith 244). The presence of such a well-known
leader working to counteract developing political cleavages
and encourage national unity will dilute the potentially antidemocratic
effects of the Faraku-Kaladi split. Even more importantly, voters
in Kadali who avoided voting for FRETILIN tended to vote for
ASDT, a party allied in parliament with FRETILIN, rather than
for an opposition party such as Partido Democrático or
Partido Social Democrata (King 754).
Democratic Transition
Zones
Samuel Huntington has written of democratic transition zones,
or income levels where democracy is most likely to take hold.
Timor-Leste, if it were to coalesce into a successful and stable
democracy, would be the poorest nation ever to achieve such
a feat. All four third-wave democracies with a per capita GDP
of under US$1000 regressed to authoritarianism (Huntington 1991,
272). India's democracy fell in 1975, Nigeria's in 1984, Sudan's
in 1989, and Pakistan's in 1990. Since 1991, coups have overturned
democracies in Niger and Sao Tomé and Príncipe,
both of which also rank among the very poor. Of the twelve third-wave
democracies that democratized with per capita PPP GDP under
US$2500, five saw their democracies fail. The only third wave
democracy with a per capita GDP above US$2500 to fail, Peru,
had incomes only slightly above that barrier and had its democracy
fall in 1992 in the wake of significant economic decline. The
most recent estimates give a per capita PPP GDP in Timor-Leste
of US$500 (3).
Of the five potential dangers for democratic consolidation in
the world's newest democracy, none are more worrisome than Timor-Leste's
low income.
Huntington's transition zones identify three
specific bands. When per capita GDP is under US$1000, coup attempts
are common and usually successful. Between US$1000 and US$3000,
coup attempts occur but rarely succeed. When incomes are beyond
US$3000, a "coup-attempt ceiling" has been reached
and coup attempts almost never succeed (Huntington 1991, 7).
Zakaria claims that the best transition zone for a stable democracy
is a per capita PPP GDP of $US3000 to $US6000 (Zakaria 69).
Larry Diamond cites research on post-World
War II democracies by Adam Przeworski which argues that while
affluent countries can typically weather brief periods of high
inflation or economic decline without a challenge to the democratic
system itself, citizens in middle-income and especially poor
countries will often be willing to "try" a non-democratic
system in the wake of a failed economy(Diamond 1999, 80). Because
of the concentrated economic effects of unemployment, large
numbers of adults unable to find jobs present new democracies
with a particularly precarious situation. Unemployment in the
capital, Dili, reached 70 percent during 2002, and antidemocratic
mobs of unemployed young adults formed on 5 December 2002 chanting
"Oust Prime Minister Alkatiri." (Shoesmith 251) Timor-Leste's
high rates of poverty and unemployment make economic growth,
and a somewhat smooth distribution of that wealth, essential
if democracy is to take hold. As Seymour Lipset says, "Only
those with nothing to lose revolt" (Lipset 1959, 78).
The Short Transition
Period
Lipset notes that by 1990, the number of former colonies of
European nations other than the United Kingdom, that had become
democracies was zero (Lipset, 1993, 5). This was not a coincidence.
As Fareed Zakaria theorizes in The Future of Freedom,
the establishment of respect for the rule of law, usually under
a colonizer or an illiberal ruler, is an essential prerequisite
of stable democracy (Zakaria 89). Further, the "effective
capacity to command, regulate and extract" taxes is critical
to a functioning state, and without a state, no modern democracy
is possible(Linz and Stepan 10). Timor-Leste is a colonial legacy
of the Portuguese Empire, an empire that produced six independent
nations in the latter half of the twentieth century, including
Timor-Leste. The post-colonial legacy of the other five provides
a sobering reminder of the poor state of social development
that the Portuguese imparted onto their colonies: Cape Verde
suffered a military coup in 1980, Guinea-Bissau saw her freely
elected leader toppled in a 1998 coup, Mozambique was in civil
war from 1975 until 1990, Angola was in war from 1975 until
2002, and Sao Tomé's democratic leader was deposed in
a 2003 coup.
An immediate transition from extreme illiberalism—defined
in this paper as a nation which democratizes with a Freedom
Forum Civil Liberties score of five or lower (on a scale of
one to seven, with seven being the worst)—to democracy is especially
dangerous. Five of the nineteen third-wave democracies that
democratized without a gradual transition to greater civil liberties
collapsed and returned to authoritarianism. Suriname was the
only third wave democracy to collapse after democratizing with
a relatively higher level of civil liberties, and democracy
was restored in that nation within a year due partly to the
rapid response of civil society (Freedom House).
Timor-Leste, despite being born of Portugal's
mangled empire and Indonesia's authoritarian occupation, is
not in significant danger of having democracy fail because of
underdeveloped legal and civil society. During the three-year
UN transition period, a multinational force of 8,000 developed
the rudiments of a legal and political system, giving Timor-Leste
a great advantage over many post-colonial states (Smith 3).
By the time elections were held in 2001, Timor-Leste had a Freedom
Forum Civil Liberties score of three, the same as the Philippines.
Strategic voting, such as voting for one party at a regional
level and another at a national level, signifying a highly developed
sense of the workings of democracy, was common in the 2001 and
2002 elections (King 749).
The Resource Curse
The Resource Curse thesis argues that high levels of extractable
natural resources can "provid[e] a handicap to development
rather than a blessing" (Auty 276). This happens because
heavy industry (HCI) for processing raw materials tends to grow
relatively slower than per capita income, but remains protected
because of the vested interests benefiting from the rents of
an autarkic, resource-based economic policy. Further, these
vested interests, especially in a small country, often have
tremendous political influence and can hinder democratic developments
that might challenge the status quo (Auty 275). In an already-democratic
state, the extraction of natural resources can become a rallying
cry for nationalists. Rapid capital inflows from the extraction
industry can appreciate the currency and stifle the development
of non-extractive industries. Of the five third-wave democracies
with significant natural resources, two have failed and two
more have significant political strife as a result of their
endowment (4).
Timor-Leste possesses significant oil and gas
deposits in the Timor Sea, just south of the nation. A treaty
signed with Australia in 2003 signaled the beginning of extraction
in the area, with a net windfall to the Timorese government
of up to US$10 billion over twenty years (Australian Foreign
Ministry, "Timor Sea Treaty"). Should the optimistic
estimates bear fruit, Timor would see average annual royalties
equal to the nation's current GDP; thus, the potential for distortionary
effects is quite high.
Timor-Leste avoids many of the problems of
the Resource Curse. The nation uses the US dollar as currency,
so the common problem of currency appreciation is of no concern
(Seymour). Also, the Timor Sea Treaty to develop resources was
negotiated when Timor-Leste was under the control of the UNTAET,
which imposed financial austerity measures to try and curb immediate
wasteful spending of the endowment surplus (Seymour). However,
the UN is no longer in control, and the benefits or harm of
oil and gas development will be a result of the quality and
foresight of Timor-Leste's domestic leadership.
The External Environment
Hostile to Democracy
Huntington argues that "the international environment and
foreign actors played significant roles" in the development
of third-wave democracies (Huntington 1991, 273). He argues
that, for new democracies, having neighbors who are democratic
themselves and who favor the existence of the democratic regimes
in other countries, having close relations with existing democratic
governments, and being influenced by democratic countries are
critical to their survival (Huntington 1991, 274). Of the fifteen
third-wave democracies created with an external environment
hostile to democracy, five have failed. Of the sixteen third-wave
democracies created with an amiable external environment, only
one, Haiti, has failed thus far.
Timor-Leste's external environment is hostile
to democracy for two reasons. First, of the ten ASEAN nations,
only three—Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia—can claim
to be fully democratic, and none of these three are a stable
democracy. So-called "Asian Values," or being more
tolerant of authoritarian governments than most value systems,
are still predominant in the region, including Timor-Leste.
A poll in Timor-Leste six months before the 2001 elections asked,
"What does democracy mean to you?" Not a single respondent
replied "elections." Fifty-four percent in that poll
considered competition between parties to be either neutral
or a bad thing, perhaps reflecting the common sentiment that
inter-party conflict in 1974 sparked the civil war that served
as a pretext for Indonesia's 1975 annexation (King 347). These
are not attitudes conducive to democracy, and Timor's ASEAN
neighbors do not have a strong enough democratic history to
serve as a model. However, Australia has maintained close relations
with Timor-Leste since the latter's independence, and will perhaps
serve as the democratic influence necessary to sustain the new
state.
Second, the presence of Indonesian West Timor,
from which many of the devastating militias in 1999 were launched,
poses a security threat. Though Timor-Leste and Indonesia are
negotiating to disarm their mutual border, including the border
of the Timorese exclave of Oecussi which is entirely surrounded
by Indonesian West Timor, Indonesia still refuses to turn over
any suspects in the East Timorese killings that occurred from
1975 until 1999 (Smith 4). Hilton Root argues that regional
integration can check crony capitalism and poor governing in
new democracies, but as many nations in East and Southeast Asia
are unable to check cronyism and poor governance within their
own borders, it is unlikely that they will serve, in this respect,
as positive models for Timor-Leste (Root 125).
Small is Beautiful?
Small states, or states with a population under one million,
are far more likely to be democratic than larger states at equivalent
stages of economic and social development. At a per capita income
of US$500, small island states are 32 percent more likely to
be rated "free" by Freedom House than large states
(Ott 128). They are also more likely to have a democratic government
(Ott 242). Further, when they are democratic, small states are
more likely to retain their democracy (Ott 122). The reasoning
behind this is twofold: small states are less likely to have
ethnic cleavages, and elites in small states are more likely
to have contact with political leadership as a venue to air
grievances (Ott, 129).
Though its small size may give it some immunity
to some of the problems large democracies face, Timor-Leste's
size is not as great a democratic advantage as it seems from
this data. First, while Timor-Leste is small in population,
the regional split between Firaku and Kaladi is nonetheless
strong. Second, and more importantly, the benefits of stability
from small size often result from having total control on an
island, which provides a natural defensive barrier. Timor-Leste
not only shares its island with a historically hostile neighbor,
in the manner of Ireland and the United Kingdom, Cyprus and
Turkish Cyprus, and Haiti and the Dominican Republic, but also
has an exclave, Oecussi, completely surrounded by Indonesia.
The resulting border tension is far greater than on a typical
island nation.
Conclusion
That Timor-Leste is a functioning democracy five years after
the mass slaughter of 1999 is an impressive feat. However, should
the country solidify into a stable democracy over the next quarter
century, it would be a feat unprecedented in history. In order
to realize such a momentous achievement, Timor-Leste must avoid
the political development pitfalls of regional ideological division,
economic underdevelopment, underdevelopment of civil society
and government infrastructure, the Resource Curse and the tempting
lure of "Asian Values" authoritarianism. The history
of third-wave democracies shows that this will be a daunting
task. TBJ
Appendix
A: Timor-Leste Political and Economic Data
Appendix B: Consolidation Data
Tables for 31 Third Wave Democracies
NOTES
1. The government
of East Timor chose to enter the United Nations as the Democratic
Republic of Timor-Leste, and for reasons of colonial cleavages
prefers that name rather than East Timor. Thus, Timor-Leste
is used in this paper when referring to the post-2002 state.
The area before 2002 is referred to as East Timor. >>
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2. Huntington, The Third
Wave, p. 21. The thirty-one states are Argentina, Brazil,
Bolivia, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Mongolia, Namibia,
Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Senegal, South Korea, Spain, Sudan, Suriname,
Turkey, and Uruguay. The full data set compiled on these nations
can be found in Appendix B.
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3. Little accurate
data has been gathered about incomes in Timor-Leste. The CIA
estimates $500 US PPP in 2001, the World Bank offers no estimate
in their most recent publications on the nation, and the Asian
Development Bank estimates 2002 GDP at $494 US, though this
figure converts to US dollars using the average nominal exchange
rate over the fiscal year and does not adjust for PPP. >>
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4. Nigeria and
Sudan both failed, while Namibia and Bolivia both have had significant
political turmoil because of natural resource issues. Mongolia
has not yet had major problems as a result of natural resources.
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