

where E_1 is the sender, Brueghel; m_1^i ($i = 1, 2$) is the message (i.e., the story of the painting T_1 [$i = 1, 2$], in which $T_1 =$ "The Parable of the Blind," $T_2 =$ "The Fall of Icarus"); R_1 is the recipient Baudelaire, who becomes the sender E_2 as he sends the message m_2 . The messages m_1 and m_2 are perceived by the receiver R_2 who employs a linguistic metalanguage in order to compare them. The recipient R_2 proposes to resolve the issues described above.

To compare it is necessary to express the m_1^i by LO_1^i ($i = 1, 2$), which is metalinguistic with respect to m_1^i , yet it remains a "discourse object" with regard to a metalanguage ML in which one compares the LO_1^i with LO_2^i . LO_1 and LO_2 are both by nature linguistic and are structured in our ML along the principles of the modal logic of perception and of text theory (represent the intensional structure of a "textualized world" [represented or created] by LO_1 and LO_2 [$i = 1, 2$] respectively).

In the first stage of analysis I shall consider $L'O_2$ instead of LO_2 . $L'O_2$ represents LO_2 in the *isotopy* "-me" ("not me") (i.e., only those passages of the poem in which the poet does not appear as a person of the story). In "The Complaints of an Icarus," which is written entirely in the first-person singular, one supposes that one has, on the one hand, *me = Icarus*, and on the other, *me = the poet*. $L'O_2$ will contain only the part where one has *me = Icarus*. This is necessary so that the comparison may be made from the same point of view (external). Let us admit that at this stage of the analysis $L'O_2$ constitutes the reception of LO_1 . On this level Baudelaire is the R_1 of the communication formula. The comparison between LO_1 and LO_2 ($i = 1, 2$) responds to point (1) above. For LO_1 and LO_2 ($i = 1, 2$) to be comparable, we shall segment the texts in "units of reading." These "units of reading" are textual significant which are not pertinent to this analysis, which aims at the level of content. We will therefore attach to each unit its corresponding meaning which accords to the method explained in the following paragraphs. The theoretical framework of this study is the modal logic, from which I shall use the semantic level—the *theory of the possible worlds*.

I shall use two different definitions for the concept of "possible world," and a third one which allows the passage from one definition to another. These two definitions may be found in two types of modal logic: the logic of perception and that of actions. Following the above communicational schema where R_1 and R_2 are present (R_1 having the function of the reader), the first level of analysis is situated in the framework of the logic of perception. In this logic a "possible world" is defined as a "possible state of affairs," that is to say, a totality of propositions in which for every proposition p one has either p or $\sim p$. This framework serves for comparing LO_1 and LO_2 , which then lead to the answer to point (1), and prepare the objects of our investigation for answering the points (2) and (3).

This analysis is confined to the study of the "story" of pictures which is a "narration" by its very nature. The reading of the poems is linear and each reading of a succession of "narrativises" segments this succession. One may suppose (see Propp, Greimas, van Dijk) that every narrative discourse is an "action discourse" (the converse is not valid). We can study the narrative discourse by using a logic of actions. To the "logic of actions" belong the notions of "agent," "activity," "desire," and "freedom," when referring to action. According to this logic, we shall give a second definition of "possible world," which will help us to answer especially questions (2) and (3) above. To treat the possible worlds (considered state of affairs) within the logic of actions, we have to extract from these worlds the individuals and their characteristic properties. Thus we arrive at a third definition of "possible world": a class of individuals, characterized by a certain number of properties. () With the help of this definition we will reply to point (2).

The logic of actions operates with individuals as well as with agents and with the properties that belong to the actions. The introduction of the deontic operators of permission and the epistemological operations B (belief) and K (know) as well as the combination of these operators (the combination is allowed because all the operators refer to the same individuals) leads us to an answer to the point (3).

The description of a "possible world" is made with the help of non-modal logic. (PL — propositional logic); with the help of modal logic we study the relations between the different "possible worlds" a binary relation R (whose formal properties: transitivity, reflexivity, symmetry vary according to the type of logical system) serves to express all the possible worlds W_1 which are in the relation R with a given world W, or (there exists a possible world W in the relation R with W). The relation R introduces a structure of the set of possible worlds corresponding to a "universe of discourse."

In this study, the object of the investigation consists of "finite texts" (containing a finite number of statements). Considering only one interpretation of a certain moment, we can describe a given world exhaustively (the world represented by the statements of each text).

Let us consider the operators Necessary (N) and Possible (P), defined as follows:

Definition 1. $\forall (NF_i, w) = 1$ if and only if $\forall (F_i, wk) = 1$ in all $wk \in W$ and $w R w k$.

Definition 2. $\forall (PF_i, w) = 1$ if and only if there exists a $wk \in W$ and $w R w k$ and $\forall (F_i, Wk) = 1$.

These two definitions will be used later when we use the binary relation R and in which for the four worlds we have produced from the four objects

under study, we shall define a world which is in the relation R with each of these worlds.

In this paragraph we will introduce some ideas from the logic of perception. In the framework of this logic, a possible world is defined as a "possible state of affairs" at a given point in time (the moment in which one is talking). The perception is constructed as a relation between the recipient and the object, and refers to propositional attitude of an individual R with respect to an object (text).

One considers "a perceives that p" in all possible states of affairs compatible with that which a perceives and "it is the case that p" (p is true). With the introduction of the quantifiers " $(\exists X)$ = there exists at least one statement X of the kind that" and the concept of identity, one can write: (2) $(\exists X)$ [R perceives that $(a = x) \& (a = x)$].

In (2) the first equation says that the expression a is attributed to one and only one statement in all the possible worlds that are compatible with that which R perceives and the second equation quantifies the referential uniqueness of a. Following the philosophical tradition we shall call "sense-data" those objects perceived by the senses which represent—according to Hintikka—the "intensions" of these objects. The intensional entities make it possible to become aware of the manner in which the references are individualized. An intensional entity is therefore a particular means to individualize an object, to specify an individual, to talk about a statement. The characteristic traits of intensional entities are attributed to the "sense-data." Quine says that "any two ways of characterizing one and the same intensional entity (in ordinary modal contexts) must be analytically (necessarily) equivalent. 'i = j' implies necessarily 'i = j' if i and j are intensional entities." By analogy, if two "sense data" are identical, they are perceived as identical.

In our case LO_1 and $L'O_2$ are ordered sets of "sense data" (the propositions of a discourse) and we represent them as intensions. One will therefore represent a possible world by its intensions [(2) shows that these intensions are also propositions], in the following manner: Let $w = [a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n]$, associate with each LO_i and $L'O_i$ a possible world $wTej$ ($j = 1, 2, 3, 4$), called "textualized world." If the description of $wTej$ implies inconsistency in the PL (i.e., one has p and $\neg p$ in the same $wTej$) we label with $wTej$ ($i = 1, 2, \dots, n$) and $j = (1, 2, 3, 4)$ the greatest sub-unit of $wTej$ which can be described with PL. This implies that in $wTej$ we can have P and P cannot coexist. We call $wTej$ a sub-world of the world $wTej$ and write it as $wTej = j w_1Tej$. Here we are able to answer the point (1).

Next we shall represent the "individuals" of $wTej$, ($j \in [1, 2, 3, 4]$ and $i = 1$) and the elements of $wTej$ which constitute the properties of these individuals. Hence we arrive at a second definition of possible worlds: w is a possible world, characterized by (a) a family (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n)

of actual individuals (which exist in the textualized sub-world), (b) a family $(A, B, C \dots)$ of properties that characterize these individuals (one from the other). Thus, we have

	A	B	C	D	E
x_1	a_1	0
x_2	a_1'	0
x_3	c_1	d_3
x_4	c_1'	d_3'

where a_1, a_1', c_1, c_1' etc., are the elements defined in $wTej$.

Let us give some definition:

Definition 3. Let us consider a world W_0 and an individual X with the following properties: $Y (NF_e, W_0) \rightarrow i$, where $F_e G (A_1 B_1 \dots)$ if and only if $wTej, j = (1, 2, 3, 4)$ and as possible traits the properties which characterize at least one individual of one of the $wTej$.

We call X "the potential individual," or virtual actualized by X_1, X_2, X_3, X_4 , and the world W_0 "the virtual alternative" of the $wTej$'s, $j = (1, 2, 3, 4)$.

Definition 4. We define a world W_0 with an individual with the properties $F_i = (A, B, C \dots)$ satisfying the condition $V (F_i W_1, Tej) = 1$ for $j = (1, 2, 3, 4)$ and $V (NF_i,) = 1$. We shall call the "archetype" of the individuals X_1, X_2, X_3, X_4 , and the W_0 the alternative of the worlds w_1Tej . From the definition 3 and 4 it results that we represent each individual by its properties and:

- (a) each individual X_i is such that $X_0 \leq X_i \leq X$,
- (b) $W_0 \leq w_1Tej \leq W_0, j = 1, 2, 3, 4$,

Taking into account the fact that we are in "textualized worlds," where the representation of the universe of discourse is finite, the individuals are completely described by their properties. Thus we can construct X_0 (the archetype) and this serves to respond to point (2). X_0 is actualized in a world that has become a real world by means of "textualization." Through the actualization the archetype becomes X_1 or X_2 or

X_3 or X_4 (we shall see that $X_1 = X_2$ and $X_3 = X_4$) according to the properties added to it. The individual actualized by the archetype will be an agent, because he is actualized in a narrative text. This implies that among the properties which describe this individual at least one must be an action. If the archetype is not an agent to start with, then at least one of the properties added has to be an action.

We may now move on to the third definition of a possible world: a course of events (see the following paragraph) which results in the logic of actions (Vaina,).

A logic of actions presupposes a logic of change. Change is a transformation of a state. There is change at the moment when one state of facts ceases to be or begins to be. The logic of change involves a temporal operator T (time is envisioned as a totality discrete by its moments). T is a binary relation defined by the totality of the possible worlds, (T signifying "next"). The vocabulary of that logic is the same as that of PL to which T is only added. In order to form expressions, T functions as any binary connective, with the assumption that T is stronger than other connectives. The axioms of this system are the axioms of PL to which we add:

$$A_{T1} (pvqTrvs) \longleftrightarrow (pTr) \vee (pTs) \vee (qTr) \vee (qTs)$$

$$A_{T2} (pTq) \& (pTr) \longleftrightarrow (pTq \& r)$$

$$A_3 (p \longleftrightarrow (pTqv \sim q))$$

$$A_y (pTq \& \sim q)$$

With the T system we describe the changes from one moment to another, but we cannot describe the actions or the omissions of actions. In order to describe the actions in terms of starts of affairs and of their changes we have to specify:

- (a) "the initial state" — the state of the world at the moment in which the action begins.
- (b) "the final state" — the state of the world after action has been performed.
- (c) "the state" of the world if the agent were not to exist.

We call the state (b) "the result of the action" at (a) and (c) the acting situation or the "opportunity of the action."

The opportunity of the action calls for the correlation between the state of facts which results from an action and a hypothetical state which would have been for the agent. We define this correlation with the help

of a binary connective "I" which coordinates the world with the agent and the world without the agent (or that which it would have been without the agent).

The characteristic axioms of I are identical to those of T (we change T for I). The expressions formed with the help of I are called I-expressions. The T-expressions and the I-expressions can be combined with the help of connectives of PL and we call them TI-expressions. The axiomatic system of TI-expressions is the system TI of which the axioms are the same as those of PL, T, and I. The computation " $\cdot T (-I)$ " serves to describe an action. Let p and q be two elementary states and (p & q) the initial state of the world. An expression of the form " $p \& q T (p \& q | p \& q)$ " describes the action of an agent who allows one of the two states to disappear and produces the other. We define the composition of n elementary actions which are attributable to an agent as "the course of a total action"—which constitutes the third definition of "possible world."

It would be interesting to follow a case where one has one agent, with that where one has two agents in the world. In this case the description of the action becomes the description of the interaction between the two agents. (This generalization will be made in the paragraph 10 of this paper.)

7. We gave three definitions for the concept of a possible world: (I) "possible state of affairs," a definition in the framework of the logic of perception and which illustrates the relation which is established between the reader and the text. We called this world the "textualized world." Next we organize the world in a scene which contains (II) a set of individuals defined by a certain number of properties (common or not). This structuring of the text (of texts) according to the "isotopy" "individuals" allows us to arrive at the narrative form of the text where individuals can become agents by choosing from their properties those which are actions, and then rewriting the text as the compound of these actions (the course of actions) (III).

8. Let LO_1 ("The Parable of the Blind" by Brueghel) = a chain of blind people, each hooked to the other by long sticks, allowing themselves to be guided by the person in front, who is falling into a pit. The foremost one, already fallen, still stirs, the second, caught unawares, falls also. There is a tendency to fall which is suggested by the crossing of the sticks, and the blind move forward with an awkward and lost appearance, unaware of the fall which unavoidably awaits them. Their look is directed toward the sky. In the background of the painting there is a motionless peasant looking down to the earth, ignorant of the tragedy (the death) of the blind. The landscape amplifies the sense of calmness and contentment; a cow, a church, underline the atmosphere of peace of the picture. The trees are immobile—no movement is suggested—the world seems set in its serenity.

We represent the text as follows: $WTel:al =$ "the blind" (the blind



who advance with an awkward and stupid appearance), a_2 = "the eyes raised" (the eyes raised), a_3 = "dark" (for the blind there is no light), a_4 = "motion" (tendency to fall), a_5 = "death" (the first is fallen into the pit, the second, taken unaware, also falls), a_6 = "vague restlessness" (the first still moves, tries to escape perhaps); b_1 = "peasant" (the peasant), b_2 = "eyes inclined" (the peasant looks at the earth), b_3 = "light" (light), b_4 = "static" (the trees are petrified, everything is immobile), b_5 = "life" (the cow, the peasant, the church, the house), b_6 = "calm" (gentle light, no movement is suggested, the earth set in its serenity).

The terms written in parenthesis represent the lexical units (from the description of the painting). Those preceding the parenthesis are the intentional representations of these units. The a_i and b_j , $i = 1, \dots, 6$, $j = 1, \dots, 6$, symbolize the verbal terms (the text). Thus the "textualized world" $wTe_1 = [a_1, a_2, a_3, a_4, a_5, a_6, b_1, b_2, b_3, b_4, b_5, b_6]$.

At a close look at wTe_j , we see that $b_1 = \sim a_1$ (not blind); $b_2 = \sim a_2$ (the eyes raised), $b_3 = \sim a_3$ (dark = light), $b_4 = \sim a_4$ (movement = not static), $b_5 = \sim a_5$ (not death = life), $b_6 = \sim a_6$ (non-restlessness = calmness). Thus we notice that for $wTe_j = [a_1 - a_6]$ and $w_2Te_j = [b_1 - b_6]$ the sub-worlds of $w_1Te_j \cap w_2Te_j = \emptyset$, and $wTe_1 = W_1Te_1 \cup W_1Te_2$. When looking at the picture we notice moreover that the two sub-worlds are here represented distinctly.

Baudelaire's poem, "Les Aveugles," constitutes $L'O_2 =$ ("pariels aux mannequins"; "vaguement ridicules"; "terribles, singuliers, comme des sonnambules"; "dardant on ne sait us leurs globes tenebreux. Leurs yeux, d'ou la divine etincelle est partie, / Comme s'ils regardaient au loin, restent leves / Au ciel; on ne les coit jamais vers / les paves / Pencher reveusement leur tete appesantie. / Ils traversent ainsi le noir illimite / Ce frere du silence eternel. / O cite . . . tu chantes, ris et beugles. / Eprise du plaisir jusqu'a l'atrocite . . .").

Following the same approach as the above, we shall have $wTe_2 = a_1 =$ "the blind" (globes tenebreux, les yeux d'ou la divine etincelle est partie), $a_2 =$ "eyes raised" (leurs yeux comme s'ils regardaient au loin, restent leves vers le ciel, on ne les voit jamais vers les paves pencher reveusement leur tete appesantie; dardant on ne sait ou leurs globes tenebreux), $a_3 =$ "dark" (le noir illimite), $a_4 =$ "motion" (pareils a des mannequins ils traversent le noir illimite), $a_5 =$ "death" (le noir illimite, ce frere du silence eternel), $a_6 =$ "vague restlessness" (singuliers comme les sonnambules, vaguement ridicules), $b_1 =$ "city" (la cite), $b_2 =$ "life" (cite, chanter, rire, beugler), $b_3 =$ "debauchery" (eprise de plaisir jusqu'a l'atrocite), $b_4 =$ "aggressiveness" = chanter, beugler).

We see that here we have only one pair of oppositions: $b_2 = a_5$ (not death = life). In comparing w_1Te_1 with wTe_2 we find a $w_1Te_1 wTe_2$ isomorphic to w_1Te_1 . We apply the notion of isomorphism in the following acceptance. If $A = \bigcup_{i=1}^n a_i$ and $B = \bigcup_{j=1}^n b_j$, A is isomorphic to B if

there exists a bi-univocal correspondence between a_i and b_j , which maintains the meaning. We note by $w_2Te_2 = wTe_2 - w_1Te_2$. In comparing w_2Te_2 with w_2Te_1 we see that the only common element is the element "life." From the fact that the opposition "life" versus "death" is the strongest opposition in the whole text, on the one hand, and from the fact that the elements of one sub-world have to be compatible one with another (consistency), on the other hand, we could conclude that although "death" is compatible with the same terms for both authors, life for Brueghel is associated with light, calm, static; whereas for Baudelaire life is associated with aggressiveness, debauchery, noise.

9. We shall compare next Brueghel's "The Fall of Icarus" and "Les Plainles d'un Icare" by Baudelaire.

Let $LO_1 =$ "The Fall of Icarus" by Brueghel (to the right of the picture the drama unfolds: Icarus, fallen, has disappeared under the water; to the left on the side of a hill there is a tranquil worker, a shepherd, and a fisherman. They all look elsewhere, indifferent to the drama of Icarus). A ship sails calmly on the sea totally ignoring Icarus.

LO_1 is as above, with $wTe_3 = C_1 =$ "worker" (the shepherd, the fisherman, the worker), $C_2 =$ "peace" (the worker tends the soil, the shepherd supported on his staff looks at the sky, the dog, the sheep, the fisherman), $C_3 =$ "indifference" (they look elsewhere, indifferent to the drama of Icarus), $C_4 =$ "life" (the shepherd, the worker, etc.), $C_5 =$ "mediocrity" (tending the soil, fishing, and the routine work of the shepherd; $d_1 =$ "Icarus" (Icarus), $d_2 =$ "death" (Icarus disappeared under the waters), $d_3 =$ "unknown" (everyone ignores his tragedy), $d_4 =$ "desire to know" (one says that Icarus, the son of Dedalus, escaped with his father from a labyrinth which hid the path to knowledge), $d_5 =$ "destroyer" (the start—the sun made the wax melt which held the wings of Icarus), $d_6 =$ "the Fall" (Icarus falls into the sea).

Therefore $w_1Te_3 = [c_1, c_2, c_3, c_4, c_5]$, and $w_2Te_3 = [d_1, d_2, d_3, d_4, d_5, d_6]$; $wTe_3 = w_1Te_3 \cup w_2Te_3$ and $w_1Te_3 \cap w_2Te_3 = \emptyset$.

Let $LO_2 =$ "The Complaints of an Icarus" by Baudelaire. ("Les amants des prostituées sont heureux, dispos et repus"; "astres non pareils, / Qui tout au fond du ciel flamboient"; "j'ai (Icare) voulu de l'espace / Trouver la fin et le milieu; / Sous je ne sais quel oeil de feu / Je sens mon aile qui se casse; / Et brûlé par l'amour du beau, / Je n'aurai pas l'honneur sublime / De donner mon nom a l'abime / Qui me servira de tombeau"). $wTe_4 = C_1 =$ "Lovers of harlots" (les amants des prostituées), $C_2 =$ "life" (ils sont), $C_3 =$ "indifference" (dispos, repus), $C_4 =$ "mediocrity" (ils sont hereux, dispos, repus), $d_1 =$ "Icarus" (Icarus in the title, then "aile brisse, brûlé par un oeil de feu), $d_2 =$ "death" (l'abime me ser-ira de tombeau), $d_3 =$ "fall" (l'aile qui se casse), $d_4 =$ "desire to know" (j'ai voulu de l'espace trouver la fin et le milieu), $d_5 =$ "destroyer" (les astres non pareils, oeil de feu, l'amour

du beau), $d_6 =$ "unknown" (je n'aurai pas l'honneur sublime / De donner mon nom a l'abime). Let $w_2Te_4 = [c_1 - c_5]$ and $w_1Te_4 = [d_1 - d_4]$; then $wTe_4 = w_1Te_4 \cup w_2Te_4$ and $w_1Te_4 \cap w_2Te_4 = \emptyset$, w_1Te_4 and w_2Te_4 represent the two disjunct sub-worlds of wTe_4 . w_2Te_4 symbolizes life, mediocrity, indifference and w_1Te_4 symbolizes death, desire to know, and so on. In comparing wTe_3 and wTe_4 we see that w_1Te_3 and w_1Te_4 and w_2Te_3 and w_2Te_4 are isomorphes, with the only difference that Baudelaire—for whom the work of a paysan is the image of poetic work—chooses another symbol (the lovers of prostitutes) in order to represent the satisfied mediocrity. Although having the same semantic content (the elements are represented by the same intensions) on the level of "sense-data," the sub-worlds w_2Te_2 and w_1Te_3 and w_1Te_4 are different. One explains this difference by re-integrating $L'O_2$ in LO_2 . We notice that in LO_2 Baudelaire confesses this astonishment on the elements of the sub-world wTe_2 , when he says, "Contemplez-les, mon ame ils son vrainment affreux." Baudelaire describes this plane with fidelity and in the end he identifies himself with the blind. This identification, which requires that the confrontation takes place not between "the blind" and "life" but between "us" (the blind + me) and life, had to be represented as compatible with the life which surrounds him. w_2Te_2 and w_2Te_4 are compatible and complete one another reciprocally, since in the aggressive city which "chante" and "beugles," "eprise de plaisin les entrance" one can find also the lovers of the prostitutes cheerful and satiated (les amants des prostituees dispose et repus).

One concludes therefore that Baudelaire does not intend to describe passively the work of Brueghel, and remain only on the level of R_1 , but that he is inspired by the painting from which he borrows the pretext in order to produce a personal invention according to his interior mythology and to express himself, by an M_2 as an E_2 (sender of a new message, his message).

10. We have seen in the previous paragraphs that the poet, free to choose the sub-world in which he places himself, chooses w_1Te_2 (isomorphic to w_1Te_3). This suggests reorganization of these sub-worlds in accordance with the individual that inhabits them in order to find the traits which are pertinent for the individual from whom the "actual individuals" emerge. We will show which are the "paths" of actualization of these individuals in w_1Te_1 , w_1Te_2 , w_2Te_3 , w_1Te_4 (in this way we answer point [2]).

From the epistemological point of view, the actual individuals have a number of known properties; thus they can be the source for the construction of the possible individuals (the archetype and the virtual individual) which are theoretical constructions.

Let $x_1 =$ the blind of LO_1 , $x_2 =$ the blind of $L'O_2$, $x_3 =$ Icarus of LO_1 and $x_4 =$ Icarus of LO_2 and the following properties: $A =$ the

desire to know, B = death, C = the dark, C' = light, D = the fall, E = the direction of the movement before the fall. Each of these properties is represented by the elements of the worlds represented by the texts. We have:

	A	B	C	C'	D	E
x ₁	a ₂	a ₅	a ₃			sur la terre (on the ground)
x ₂	a ₂ '	a ₅ '	a ₃ '			sur la terre (on the ground)
x ₃	d ₄	d ₂		d ₅	d ₆	vers le soleil (toward the sun)
x ₄	d ₄ '	d ₂ '		d ₅ '	d ₆ '	

We see that x_1 , the archetype, is characterized by A and B; he is therefore an individual who desires to know, but instead of acquiring into knowledge he acquires death. It is legitimate to say that the individual "passes" into death, because he is described by the initial state and by the final state as an entirely actualized agent and that whatever the mode of actualization of the initial state may be (desire to know), the final state is death.

The terms C, C', D, E signify two different ways of "attempting to know." The first is knowing by groping (the blind man whose eyes are raised "darting one doesn't know where" always remaining on the ground (E) and traversing the dark (non-knowledge) of life towards death. The second is knowing by a vertical movement; to detach oneself from the earth in order to go towards knowledge (the light), but the inevitable fall provokes death. The second path to discover knowledge (that followed by Icarus) is much more tragic than the first (that of the blind) because in this case, the individual flies towards the light (knowledge), but, in the moment in which he approaches too much, that same light (knowledge) destroys and kills him.

Let p = Icarus flies, q = he wants to know, l = he has broken wings, r = the fall of Icarus, o = the death of Icarus, m = remaining unknown. p, q, k, l, r, o, m, are the states of facts which constitute an "enlarged world" because the adjunction of cultural information to the states given by w_2Te_3 and w_1Te_4 .

In considering a world with two agents (Icarus and the destroyer = the stars), we can study their interaction. Thus we have:

$$(p \& q \& k \& r \& l \& o \& m) T (p \& r \& k \& l \& r \& o \& m) I$$

$$(p \& q \& k \& l \& r \& o \& m (I p \& q \& k \& l \& r \& o \& m$$

$$(I p \& r \& k \& l \& r \& o \& m)))$$

The first expression describes the initial state of the world, the second the final state with the two agents, the third describes what the state of the world would have been if there had existed only one agent (Icarus), the fourth describes what would have been the state of the world if there had existed only the other agent (the destroyer) and the last expression describes the state of the world without any agent.

We see that the only case in which the knowledge (k) would have been possible for Icarus was when the other agent, the stars, did not exist, and it is always in this case only that he would not have remained unknown. We arrived for one of the complaints of the poet expressed in the poem:

En vain j'ai voulu de l'espace
Trouver la fin et le milieu
Sous je ne sais quel oeil de feu
Je sens mon aile qui se casse

The "l'oeil de feu = les astres non pariels = l'amour du beau" is the agent which prevents him "from finding of space the end and the center" represents the geniuses of "Phares," perhaps.

The situation of the "me" in the poems results from the comparison of LO₂ with L'O₂ and of LO₂ with L'O₂. In the first case one has (LO₂ -- L'O₂) "pariels aux mannequins, vaguement ridicules, terribles, singuliers comme des somnambules, dardant on ne sait ou leurs globes tenebreux." "Hebété" implies "non darder," since "darder" signifies a conscious action having a precise goal.

Thus the blind are equal to "pariels aux mannequins" where "to dart" means the desire to know, seems that the poet feels himself to be the same as the blind but he is no longer experiencing the desire for knowledge.

The final phrase of the poem, "Je dis: Que cherchent-ils au ciel, tous ces aveugles?" places Baudelaire again outside the text (as the first verse) as a sender, whose "enonce" signifies that he is aware of the impossibility of knowing (see also the following paragraphs). What is left for him is to cross through the boundless, dark "pariel a un mannequin" a conclusion similar to that in the "Complaints of Icarus" where after the me-Icarus he introduces me-poet who has "les bras rompus" from having embraced the clouds and who "en vain a voulu de l'espace trouver la fin et le milieu."

11. Applying the doxastic operators B (belief) and K (knowledge) and the operator P ("it is permitted") and in noting that $x_1 = x_2 = x_3 = x_4 = Y$ and a = the poet, we shall express the relation between a and Y. We saw that by (PyK this is: every individual believes that he is permitted to know [or it is possible to know] but $Ka \sim (Pk)$ and also $Ka \sim (P [Ba (Pk)])$. As "a" identifies itself, with the blind and with Icarus, thus to &, from

Ka (P [By (Pk)]) we infer that "a" is superior by his lucidity in confronting life: he knows that it is not allowed (possible) either for him or for the others, to believe in the possibility of knowledge. His lucidity derives from the fact that he has tried to know, he has been an Icarus and like Icarus he failed to achieve his goal. Thus we have also responded to point (3) of the first paragraph.

12. "Oh, Cite!—pendant qu'autour de nous tu . . ." of LO₂ shows the incompatibility of the poet with w₂Te₂ which is situated "around" him; the same as with "me = bras rompus" of w₁Te₄, it results in the impossibility of *me* to identify with "les amants de prostituées," a fact which underlies the condition of the "tragic hero" of the poet who is not integrated either to one world (that of mediocrity) nor the other (that of those who seek knowledge). He is aware that there isn't any solution and he says so himself when in talking about all "the blind" and about "all the Icaruses":

Le ciel! couvercle noir de la grand marmite
Ou bout l'imperceptible et vaste humanité

This shows the transformation of R₁ into E₂ and also motivates the choice of the paintings by Brueghel as source, since "la portion éternelle de beauté sera en même temps voilée et exprimée, sinon par le mode, au moins par le temperament particulier de l'auteur." And for Baudelaire the beautiful—his beauty—is "quelque chose d'ardent et de triste . . . je ne conçois guère un type de beauté où il n'y ait du malheur."

PART 3

POETICS, MYTHOPOETICS, SEMIOTICS OF SIGNS

Aristotelian Poetics as a Science of Literature by Lubomír Doležel	125
La poésie des titres by Ivan Fónagy	139
Some Remarks Concerning Trediakovskij's <i>Tilëmakhida</i> by D. Freydlank	157
The Structure of Tjutčev's Poem "Pesok sypučij po koleni" by Anatoly Liberman	165
Die Stadt ohne Tod by Uku Masing	169
Tolstoy's "Triplets": An Approach to Biography and Creativity by Krystyna Pomorska	176
M. Bulgakov and F. Dostoevskij in Relation to Mythopoetic Thought by Elena Semeka-Pankratov	181
Sverxčelovek i revoljucioner v svete romanov Dostoevskogo i dvux ego čitatelej by Vittorio Strada	208
Stixotvorenje Pasternaka "V bol'nice" by Kirill Taranovskij	221
Russian Sentimentalists' Rhetoric of Fiction by I. R. Titunik	228
K voprosu o tekstovoj omonimii: <i>Putešestvie v stranu Gulngnmov</i> i "Kolstomer" by Thomas Venclova	240
On Visual Quotations in the Verbal Artistic Text: Intermodal Intertextuality by Thomas Winner	255
Semantic Shifts in Epic Composition: On the 'Modal' Poetics of the <i>Mahabharata</i> by David Zilberman	267