In an interview about "celle qui fut la Belle Héauville," Rodin, in speaking of beauty, says: "Dans l'Art est beau uniquement ce qui a du caractère. Le caractère, c'est la vérité intense d'un spectacle naturel quelconque, ... et pour l'artiste digne de ce nom, tout est beau dans la nature, parce que ses yeux, acceptant inégalement toute vérité extérieure, y lisent sans peine, comme il livre ouvert, toute vérité interieure." Describing therefore its objects with "énergie" and "évidences," art becomes true, and by this truth offers itself again and again as subject to the artist. To be inspired by a work of art means for the artist to create an original work, not to copy. A cogent example is Baudelaire: the artistic inspirations there being more numerous and evident than anywhere else.

In this study I shall compare the poems "The Blind" and "The Lamentations of an Icarus" by Baudelaire to the Bruegel paintings "The Parable of the Blind" and "The Fall of Icarus," which seem to have been the sources of inspiration for the poet. The purpose of this comparison between the "story" of the paintings and poems is (1) to compare their structure, (2) to show evidence of the common basic theme (for each painting and corresponding poem) and perhaps a new common theme for all four objects under study, (3) to disentangle the attitude of Baudelaire with respect to this common base. The return of the poet to himself in each of the poems makes it possible to discover a precise solution to point (3). From here we see an essential difference between the way in which the painter, as opposed to the poet, describes his object: the point of view of Bruegel is that of an "engaged outsider," while that of Baudelaire is from the inside owing to the fact that he assumes the position of a character (as in a play).

The following schema for communication may be considered the basis of this investigation:

```
E1 -> R1 -> E2 -> R2
```

```
m1
```

```
m2
```
This analysis is confined to the study of the "story" of pictures which is a "narration" by its very nature. The reading of the poems is linear and each reading of a succession of "narratives" segments this succession. One may suppose (see Propp, Greimas, van Dijk) that every narrative discourse is an "action discourse" (the converse is not valid). We can study the narrative discourse by using a logic of actions. To the "logic of actions" belong the notions of "agent," "activity," "desire," and "freedom," when referring to action. According to this logic, we shall give a second definition of "possible world," which will help us to answer especially questions (2) and (3) above. To treat the possible worlds (considered state of affairs is) within the logic of actions, we have to extract from these worlds the individuals and their characteristic properties. Thus we arrive at a third definition of "possible world": a class of individuals, characterized by a certain number of properties. With the help of this definition we will reply to point (2).

The logic of actions operates with individuals as well as with agents and with the properties that belong to the actions. The introduction of the deontic operators of permission and the epistemological operations B (belief) and K (know) as well as the combination of these operators (the combination is allowed because all the operators refer to the same individuals) leads us to an answer to the point (3).

The description of a "possible world" is made with the help of non-modal logic (\( \mathcal{L} \) = propositional logic); with the help of modal logic we study the relations between the different "possible worlds" a binary relation \( R \) (whose formal properties: transitivity, reflexivity, symmetry vary according to the type of logical system) serves to express all the possible worlds \( W_i \) which are in the relation \( R \) with a given world \( W \), or (there exists a possible world \( W \) in the relation \( R \) with \( W \)). The relation \( R \) introduces a structure of the set of possible worlds corresponding to a "universe of discourse."

In this study, the object of the investigation consists of "finite texts" (containing a finite number of statements). Considering only one interpretation of a certain moment, we can describe a given world exhaustively (the world represented by the statements of each text).

Let us consider the operators Necessary (N) and Possible (P), defined as follows:

Definition 1. \( V(NF_i, w) = 1 \) if and only if \( V(F_i, wk) = 1 \) in all \( wk \in W \) and \( wRwk \).

Definition 2. \( V(PF_i, w) = 1 \) if and only if there exists a \( wk \in W \) and \( wRwk \) and \( V(F_i, W_k) = 1 \).

These two definitions will be used later when we use the binary relation \( R \) and in which for the four worlds we have produced from the four objects.
under study, we shall define a world which is in the relation R with each of these worlds.

In this paragraph we will introduce some ideas from the logic of perception. In the framework of this logic, a possible world is defined as a "possible state of affairs" at a given point in time (the moment in which one is talking). The perception is constructed as a relation between the recipient and the object, and refers to propositional attitude of an individual R with respect to an object (text).

One considers "a perceives that p" in all possible states of affairs compatible with that which s perceives and "it is the case that p" (p is true). With the introduction of the quantifiers "(∃x)(x) = there exists at least one statement X of the kind that" and the concept of identity, one can write: (2) (∃x)(x) R perceives that (a = x) & (a = x).

In (2) the first equation says that the expression a is attributed to one and only one statement in all the possible worlds that are compatible with that which R perceives and the second equation quantifies the referential uniqueness of a. Following the philosophical tradition we shall call "sense-data" those objects perceived by the senses which represent—according to Hintikka—the "intensions" of these objects. The intensional entities make it possible to become aware of the manner in which the references are individualized. An intensional entity is therefore a particular means to individualize an object, to specify an individual, to talk about a statement. The characteristic traits of intensional entities are attributed to the "sense-data." Quine says that "any two ways of characterizing one and the same intensional entity (in ordinary modal contexts) must be analytically (necessarily) equivalent. i = j implies necessarily i = j if i and j are intensional entities." By analogy, if two "sense data" are identical, they are perceived as identical.

In our case L01 and L02 are ordered sets of "sense data" (the propositions of a discourse) and we represent them as intensions. One will therefore represent a possible world by its intensions [(2) shows that these intensions are also propositions], in the following manner: Let \( w = [a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_n] \), associate with each L01 and L02 a possible world \( \text{wTej} (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) \), called "textualized world." If the description of \( \text{wTej} \) implies inconsistency in the PL (i.e., one has p and not p in the same wTej) we label with \( \text{wTej} (i = 1, 2, \ldots, n) \) and \( j = (1, 2, 3, 4) \) the greatest sub-unit of wTej which can be described with PL. This implies that in wTej we can have P and not P cannot coexist. We call wTej a sub-world of the world wTej and write it as wTej = j wTej. Here we are able to answer the point (1).

Next we shall represent the "individuals" of wTej, \( j \in [1, 2, 3, 4] \) and i = 1) and the elements of wTej which constitute the properties of these individuals. Hence we arrive at a second definition of possible worlds: w is a possible world, characterized by (a) a family \( \{x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_n\} \) of actual individuals (which exist in the textualized sub-world), (b) a family \( \{A, B, C, \ldots\} \) of properties that characterize these individuals (one from the other). Thus, we have

\[
\begin{align*}
A & \quad B & \quad C & \quad D & \quad E \\
1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 \\
x_1 & a_1 & 0 & \ldots & \ldots \\
x_2 & a_1 & 0 & \ldots & \ldots \\
x_3 & c_1 & d_3 & \ldots & \ldots \\
x_4 & c_1 & d_3 & \ldots & \ldots \\
\end{align*}
\]

where al al cl cl etc., are the elements defined in wTej.

Let us give some definition:

**Definition 3.** Let us consider a world Wo and an individual X with the following properties: Y (NF, Wo) —i, where FeG (A1, B1, . . .) if and only if wTej, i = (1, 2, 3, 4) and as possible traits the properties which characterize at least one individual of one of the WTej.

We call X "the potential individual," or virtual actualized by X1, X2, X3, X4, and the world Wo "the virtual alternative" of the WTej's, j = (1, 2, 3, 4).

**Definition 4.** We define a world Wo with an individual with the properties Fej = (A, B, C, . . .) satisfying the condition V (F, Wj, Tej) = 1 for j = (1, 2, 3, 4) and V (F, no) = 1. We shall call the "archetype" of the individuals X1, X2, X3, X4, and the Wo the alternative of the worlds wTej. From the definition 3 and 4 it results that we represent each individual by its properties and:

(a) each individual X1 is such that X01 ≤ X1 ≤ X,
(b) W0 ≤ wTej ≤ Wo j = 1, 2, 3, 4,

Taking into account the fact that we are in "textualized worlds," where the representation of the universe of discourse is finite, the individuals are completely described by their properties. Thus we can construct X00 (the archetype) and this serves to respond to point (2). X00 is actualized in a world that has become a real world by means of "textualization." Through, the actualization the archetype becomes X1 or X2 or
of a binary connective "I" which coordinates the world with the agent and the world without the agent (or that which it would have been without the agent).

The characteristic axioms of I are identical to those of T (we change T for I). The expressions formed with the help of I are called I-expressions. The T-expressions and the I-expressions can be combined with the help of connectives of PL, and we call them TI-expressions. The axiomatic system of TI-expressions is the system TI of which the axioms are the same as those of PL, T, and I. The computation "T (I, T)" serves to describe an action. Let p and q be two elementary states and (p ∨ q) the initial state of the world. An expression of the form "p & q? (p & q ∨ p & q)", describes the action of an agent who allows one of the two states to disappear and produces the other. We define the composition of n elementary actions which are attributable to an agent as "the course of a total action"—which constitutes the third definition of "possible world."

It would be interesting to follow a case where one has one agent, with that where one has two agents in the world. In this case the description of the action becomes the description of the interaction between the two agents. (This generalization will be made in the paragraph 10 of this paper.)

7. We gave three definitions for the concept of a possible world: (I) "possible state of affairs," a definition in the framework of the logic of perception and which illustrates the relation which is established between the reader and the text. We called this word the "textualized world." Next we organize the world in a scene which contains (II) a set of individuals defined by a certain number of properties (both common or not). This structuring of the text (of texts) according to the "isotopy" "individuals" allows us to arrive at the narrative form of the text where individuals can become agents by choosing from their properties those which are actions, and then rewriting the text as the compound of these actions (the course of actions) (III).

8. Let LO1 ("The Parable of the Blind" by Brueghel) = a chain of blind people, each hooked to the other by long sticks, allowing themselves to be guided by the person in front, who is falling into a pit. The foremost one, already fallen, still sits, the second, caught unawares, falls also. There is a tendency to fall which is suggested by the crossing of the sticks, and the blind move forward with an awkward and lost appearance, unaware of the fall which unavoidably awaits them. Their look is directed toward the sky. In the background of the painting there is a motionless peasant looking down to the earth, ignorant of the tragedy (the death) of the blind. The landscape amplifies the sense of calmness and contentment; a cow, a church, underline the atmosphere of peace of the picture. The trees are immobile—no movement is suggested—the world seems set in its serenity.

We represent the text as follows: WTei:al = "the blind" (the blind
who advance with an awkward and stupid appearance), $a_2 = "the eyes raised"$ (the eyes raised), $a_3 = "dark"$ (for the blind there is no light), $a_4 = "motion"$ (tendency to fall), $a_5 = "death"$ (the first is fallen into the pit, the second, taken unaware, also falls), $a_6 = "vague restlessness"$ (the first still moves, tries to escape perhaps); $b_1 = "peasant"$ (the peasant), $b_2 = "eyes inclined"$ (the peasant looks at the earth), $b_3 = "light"$ (light), $b_4 = "static"$ (the trees are petrified, everything is immobile), $b_5 = "life"$ (the cow, the peasant, the church, the house), $b_6 = "calm"$ (gentle light, no movement is suggested, the earth set in its severity).

The terms written in parenthesis represent the lexical units (from the description of the painting). Those preceding the parenthesis are the intentional representations of these units. The $a_i$ and $b_j$, $i = 1, \ldots, 6, j = 1, \ldots, 6$, symbolize the verbal terms (the text). Thus "textualized world" $wT_{e_1} = \{a_1, a_2, a_3, a_4, a_5, a_6, b_1, b_2, b_3, b_4, b_5, b_6\}$.

At a close look at $wT_{e_1}$, we see that $b_1 = -a_1$ (not blind); $b_2 = -a_2$ (the eyes raised), $b_3 = -a_3$ (dark = light), $b_4 = -a_4$ (movement = not static), $b_5 = -a_5$ (not death = life), $b_6 = -a_6$ (non-restlessness = calmness). Thus we notice that for $wT_{e_1} = \{a_1, a_6\}$ and $wT_{e_2} = \{b_1, b_6\}$ the sub-worlds of $wT_{e_1}$ and $wT_{e_2}$.

Baudelaire’s poem, “Les Aveugles,” constitutes $L'U_2 = "(""partiels aux mannequins"; "sombres ridicules"; "terribles, singuliers, comme des somnambules"; "dardant on ne sait ou leurs globes tenebremeux. Leurs yeux, d’où la divine étiolée est partie. / Comme s’ils regardaient au loin, restant leves au ciel; on ne les voit jamais vers les paves Penchent de leur tête appesante. / Ils traversent ainsi le noir illimité / Ce frere du silence éternel. / O cite... tu chantes, dis et beugles. / Eprise du plaisir jusqu’a l’atrocity...")"

Following the same approach as the above, we shall have $wT_{e_2} = a_1 = "the blind"$ (gloves tenebremeux, les yeux d’où la divine étiolée est partie), $a_2 = "eyes raised"$ (leurs yeux comme s’ils regardaient au loin, restant leves vers le ciel, on ne les voit jamais vers les paves penchent de leur tête appesante; dardant on ne sait ou leurs globes tenebremeux), $a_3 = "dark"$ (le noir illimité), $a_4 = "motion"$ (pareils a des mannequins ils traversent le noir illimité), $a_5 = "death"$ (le noir illimité, ce frere du silence éternel), $a_6 = "vague restlessness"$ (singuliers comme les somnambules, vaguement ridicules), $b_1 = "city"$ (la cite), $b_2 = "life"$ (cite, chanteur, rire, beugler), $b_3 = "debauchery"$ (eprise de plaisir jusqu’a l’atrocity), $b_4 = "aggressiveness"$ (chanteur, beugler).

We see that here we have only one pair of oppositions: $b_2 = a_5$ (not death = life). In comparing $wT_{e_1}$ with $wT_{e_2}$ we find a $wT_{e_2}$ isomorphic to $wT_{e_1}$. We apply the notion of isomorphism in the following acceptance. If $A = \{a_1, a_2, a_3, a_4, a_5, a_6\}$ and $B = \{b_1, b_2, b_3, b_4, b_5, b_6\}$, $A$ is isomorphic to $B$ if
there exists a bi-univocal correspondence between ai and bj, which maintains the meaning. We note by \( W_T e_2 = w T e_2 - w_1 T e_2 \). In comparing \( w_2 T e_2 \) with \( w_2 T e_1 \) we see that the only common element is the element “life.” From the fact that the opposition “life” versus “death” is the strongest opposition in the whole text, on the one hand, and from the fact that the elements of one sub-world have to be compatible one with another (consistency), on the other hand, we could conclude that although “death” is compatible with the terms for both authors, life for Breughel is associated with light, calm, static; whereas for Baudelaire life is associated with aggressiveness, debauchery, noise.

9. We shall compare next Breughel’s “The Fall of Icarus” and “Les Plaines d’un Icare” by Baudelaire.

Let \( L O_1 \) = “The Fall of Icarus” by Breughel (to the right of the picture the drama unfolds: Icarus, fallen, has disappeared under the water; to the left on the side of a hill there is a tranquil worker, a shepherd, and a fisherman. They all look elsewhere, indifferent to the drama of Icarus). A ship sails calmly on the sea totally ignoring Icarus.

\( L O_1 \) is as above, with \( W T e_3 = C_1 = “worker” (the shepherd, the fisherman, the worker), \( C_2 = “peace” (the worker tends the soil, the shepherd supported on his staff looks at the sky, the dog, the sheep, the fisherman), \( C_3 = “indifference” (they look elsewhere, indifferent to the drama of Icarus), \( C_4 = “life” (the shepherd, the worker, etc.), \( C_5 = “mediocrity” (the shepherd, the worker, etc.), \( C_6 = “death” (the shepherd disappeared under the waters), \( d_1 = “Icarus” (the sun made the wax melt which held the wings of Icarus), \( d_2 = “the Fall” (Icarus falls into the sea).

Therefore \( w_2 T e_3 = [c_1, c_2, c_3, c_4, c_5] \) and \( w_2 T e_2 = [d_1, d_2, d_3, d_4, d_5, d_6] \). \( W T e_3 = w_1 T e_3 \cup W T e_2 \) and \( w_1 T e_2 \cap W T e_2 = \emptyset \).

Let \( L O_2 \) = “The Complaints of an Icarus” by Baudelaire. (“Les amants des prostituées sont heureux, dispos et repus”; “astres non-pareils, / Qui tout au fond du ciel flamboient”; “j’ai (Icarus) voulu de l’espace / Trouver la fin et le milieu; / Sous je ne sais quel oeil de feu / Je sentis mon âme qui se casse; / Et brûlé par l’amour du beau, / Je n’aurai pas l’honneur sublime / De donner mon nom a l’abime / Qui me servira de tombeau”), \( W T e_4 = C_1 = “Lovers of harlots” (les amants des prostituées), C_2 = “life” (ils sont), C_3 = “indifference” (dispos, repus), C_4 = “mediocrity” (ils sont heureux, dispos, repus), d_1 = “Icarus” (Icarus in the title, then “alle bâise, brûlé par un oeil de feu”), d_2 = “death” (l’âme me servira de tombeau), d_3 = “fall” (l’âme qui se casse), d_4 = “desire to know” (j’ai voulu de l’espace trouver la fin et le milieu), d_5 = “destroyer” (les astres non pareils, oeil de feu, l’amour du beau), d_6 = “unknown” (je n’aurai pas l’honneur sublime / De donner mon nom a l’abime). Let \( w_2 T e_4 = [c_1 - c_5] \) and \( w_1 T e_4 = [d_1 - d_4] \), then \( W T e_4 = w_1 T e_4 \U W T e_2 \) and \( w_1 T e_4 \cap w_2 T e_4 = \emptyset \). \( w_1 T e_4 \) and \( w_2 T e_4 \) represent the two dispersive sub-worlds of \( w T e_4 \). \( w T e_4 \) symbolizes life, mediocrity, indifference and \( w_1 T e_4 \) symbolizes death, desire to know, and so on. In comparing \( W T e_3 \) and \( W T e_4 \) we see that \( w_1 T e_3 \) and \( w_2 T e_4 \) and \( w_1 T e_3 \) and \( w_2 T e_4 \) are isomorphs, with the only difference that Baudelaire—for whom the work of a paysan is the image of poetic work—chooses another symbol (the lovers of prostitutes) in order to represent the satisfied mediocrity. Although having the same semantic content (the elements are represented by the same intensions) on the level of “sense-data,” the sub-worlds \( w_1 T e_2 \) and \( w_1 T e_3 \) and \( w_1 T e_4 \) are different. One explains this difference by re-integrating \( L O_2 \) in \( L O_2 \). We notice that in \( L O_2 \) Baudelaire confesses this astonishment on the elements of the sub-world \( w T e_2 \), when he says, “Contemplez-les, mon ami, son anéantissement affreux.” Baudelaire describes this plane with fidelity and in the end he identifies himself with the blind. This identification, which requires that the confrontation takes place not between “the blind” and “life” but between “us” (the blind + me) and life, had to be represented as compatible with the life which surrounds him. \( W T e_3 \) and \( w_2 T e_4 \) are compatible and complete one another reciprocally, since in the aggressive city which “chants” and “beagles,” “éprise de plaisir les entr’ouverture one can find also the lovers of the prostitutes cheerful and satiated (les amants des prostituées disent et repus).

One concludes therefore that Baudelaire does not intend to describe passively the work of Breughel, and remain only on the level of \( R_1 \), but that he is inspired by the painting from which he borrows the pretext in order to produce a personal invention according to his interior mythology and to express himself, by an \( M_2 \) as an \( E_2 \) (sender of a new message, his message).

10. We have seen in the previous paragraphs that the poet, free to choose the sub-world in which he places himself, chooses \( w_1 T e_4 \) (isomorphic to \( W T e_2 \)). This suggests reorganization of these sub-worlds in accordance with the individual that inhabits them in order to find the traits which are pertinent for the individual from whom the “actual individuals” emerge. We will show which are the “paths” of actualization of these individuals in \( w_1 T e_1, w_1 T e_2, w_2 T e_3, w_1 T e_4 \) (in this way we answer point [2]).

From the epistemological point of view, the actual individuals have a number of known properties, thus they can be the source for the construction of the possible individuals (the archetype and the virtual individual) which are theoretical constructions.

Let \( x_1 = \text{the blind of } L O_1 \), \( x_2 = \text{the blind of } L O_2 \), \( x_3 = \text{Icarus of } L O_1 \) and \( x_4 = \text{Icarus of } L O_2 \) and the following properties: A = the
desire to know, B = death, C = the dark, C' = light, D = the fall, E = the direction of the movement before the fall. Each of these properties is represented by the elements of the worlds represented by the texts. We have:

\[
\begin{array}{cccccc}
A & B & C & C' & D & E \\
\end{array}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{cccccc}
x_1 & a_2 & a_3 & 0 & & \\
\text{sur la terre} & \text{(on the ground)} & & & & \\
\end{array}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{cccccc}
x_2 & a'_2 & a'_3 & 0 & & \\
\text{sur la terre} & \text{(on the ground)} & & & & \\
\end{array}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{cccccc}
x_3 & d_4 & d_5 & d_6 & & \\
\text{vers le soleil} & \text{(toward the sun)} & & & & \\
\end{array}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{cccccc}
x_4 & d'_4 & d'_5 & d'_6 & & \\
\text{vers le soleil} & \text{(toward the sun)} & & & & \\
\end{array}
\]

We see that , the archetype, is characterized by A and B; he is therefore an individual who desires to know, but instead of acquiring into knowledge he acquires death. It is legitimate to say that the individual "passes" into death, because he is described by the initial state and by the final state as an entirely actualized agent and that whatever the mode of actualization of the initial state may be (desire to know), the final state is death.

The terms C, C', D, B signify two different ways of "attempting to know." The first is knowing by grooping (the blind man whose eyes are raised "darting one doesn't know where" always remaining on the ground (E) and traversing the dark (non-knowledge) of life towards death. The second is knowing by a vertical movement; to detach oneself from the earth in order to go towards knowledge (the light), but the inevitable fall provokes death. The second path to discover knowledge (that followed by Icarus) is much more tragic than the first (that of the blind) because in this case, the individual flies towards the light (knowledge), but, in the moment in which he approaches too much, that same light (knowledge) destroys and kills him.

Let p = Icarus flies, q = he wants to know, l = he has broken wings, r = the fall of Icarus, o = the death of Icarus, m = remaining unknown. p, q, k, l, r, o, m, are the states of facts which constitute an "enlarged world" because the adjunction of cultural information to the states given by \( w_2 T_{e_2} \) and \( w_2 T_{e_4} \).

In considering a world with two agents (Icarus and the destroyer = the stars), we can study their interaction. Thus we have:

\[
(p \& q \& k \& l \& r \& o \& m) T(p \& r \& k \& l \& r \& o \& m) T
\]

\[
(p \& q \& k \& l \& r \& o \& m (l \& p \& q \& k \& l \& r \& o \& m))
\]

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The first expression describes the initial state of the world, the second the final state with the two agents, the third describes what the state of the world would have been if there had existed only one agent (Icarus), the fourth describes what would have been the state of the world if there had existed only the other agent (the destroyer) and the last expression describes the state of the world without any agent.

We see that the only case in which the knowledge (k) would have been possible for Icarus was when the other agent, the stars, did not exist, and it is always in this case only that he would not have remained unknown. We arrived for one of the complaints of the poet expressed in the poem:

"En vain j'ai voulu de l'espace
Trouver la fin et le milieu
Sous je ne sais quel oeil de feu
Je sens mon aile qui se casse"

The "l'oeil de feu = les astres non parles = l'amour du beau" is the agent which prevents him "from finding of space the end and the center representing the genius of "Phœbe," perhaps.

The situation of the "me" in the poems results from the comparison of \( \text{LO}_2 \) with \( \text{LO}_2' \) and of \( \text{LO}_2 \) with \( \text{LO}_2' \). In the first case one has \( \text{LO}_2 \rightarrow \text{LO}_2' \) "parlai aux mannequins, vaguement ridicules, terribles, singuliers comme des somnambules, dardant on ne sait ou leurs globes tenebres." "Hebeté" implies "non darder," since "darder" signifies a conscious action having a precise goal.

Thus the blind are equal to "parlai aux mannequins" where "to dart" means the desire to know, seems that the poet feels himself to be the same as the blind but he is no longer experiencing the desire for knowledge.

The final phrase of the poem, "Je dis: Que cherchent-ils au ciel, tous ces aveugles?" places Baudelaire again outside the text (as the first verse) as a sender, whose "enonce" signifies that he is aware of the impossibility of knowing (see also the following paragraphs). What is left for him is to cross through the boundless, dark "parlai aux mannequins" a conclusion similar to that in the "Complaints of Icarus" where after the me-Icarus he introduces me-poet who has "les bais rompus" from having embraced the clouds and who "en vain a voulu de l'espace trouver la fin et le milieu."

11. Applying the doxastic operators B (belief) and K (knowledge) and the operator P ("it is permitted") and in noting that \( x_1 = x_2 = x_3 = x_4 = Y \) and a = the poet, we shall express the relation between a and Y. We saw that by (PyK this is: every individual believes that he is permitted to know [or it is possible to know] but Ka-(P) and also Ka-(P [Ba (P)]) As "a" identifies itself, with the blind and with Icarus, thus to & , from
Le ciel couvert de noir de la grand marmite
Ou bout l'imperceptible et vaste humanité

This shows the transformation of $R_1$ into $E_2$ and also motivates the choice of the paintings by Brueghel as source, since “la portion éternelle de beauté sera en même temps voilée et exprimée, sinon par le mode, au moins par le temperament particulier de l'auteur.” And for Baudelaire the beautiful—his beauty—is “quelque chose d'ardent et de triste... je ne conçois guère un type de beauté où il n'y ait du malheur.”

PART 3

POETICS, MYTHOPoETICS, SEMIOTICS OF SIGNS

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