Locke on Nominal vs. Real Essence, and the Identities of Substances: Why a Mass of Matter and an Oak Tree Can Be in the Same Place at the Same Time

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Abstract

In a 2007 paper, Dan Kaufman argues that there is a major tension between Locke's account of identity and his account of the real and nominal essences of substances. I argue that Kaufman's criticism hinges crucially upon a failure to recognize that the properties associated with a nominal essence need not be limited to the instantaneously observable features rooted in one of what Kaufman terms an “individual real essence.” Locke's two theories are indeed consistent.

In his 2007 paper, “Locke on Individuation and the Corpuscular Basis of Kinds,” Dan Kaufman argues there is a major inconsistency in the views presented in Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Kaufman claims there is a contradiction between Locke's views on identity and his account of the distinction between the real and nominal essences of substances. The real essence of a substance, according to Locke, is the makeup of its particulate parts in nature; this fundamental constitution is not precisely known to us, although it underlies all of the substance's observable qualities. Locke emphasizes that human beings divide substances into kinds on the basis of a variety of observable features. The nominal essence of
a substance refers to those properties that are essential to it insofar as it is considered a member of that named kind. To illustrate the alleged problem with Locke’s account, Kaufman presents the example of an oak tree and the particulate mass of matter that composes it. From Locke’s opening remarks on the identities of “things” in Chapter XXVII of Book II, it follows that an oak tree and the mass of matter that constitutes it at a given moment are two different things, and they can coincide in the same place and time provided they are of different “kinds.” Intuitively, the different kinds they exemplify are simply those indicated by the names “oak tree” and “mass of matter,” respectively. Yet Kaufman believes that Locke’s discussion of real and nominal essence, in light of Locke’s corpuscular understanding of the basis of qualities, commits Locke to the claim that it is impossible for any $x$ and $y$ to share the same real essence and yet differ with respect to any of their nominal essences. In other words, no two coinciding substances, like an oak tree and its constituent mass of matter, can be of different kinds.

Yet Locke neither is, nor should be, committed to such a claim. After explaining Kaufman’s criticism in more detail in Section I, I argue in Section II that Kaufman’s argument fails to take into account that the properties associated with a given nominal essence need not be instantaneously observable features rooted entirely in any one of what Kaufman refers to as an “individual real essence.” It is for this reason that two things like an oak tree and the mass of matter that constitutes it at a particular instant can share an individual real essence in that instant and yet be characterized by two different nominal essences associated with two different sets of properties. The alleged tension can be resolved. As I explain in Section III, this realization helps to clarify the entirety of Locke’s discussion of the identities of substances. Locke’s theories of the essences and identities of substances are not only compatible, but in fact intimately related. This does not mean, however, that Locke’s account is wholly compelling. I address some particularly pressing difficulties in Section IV.

I. Kaufman’s Challenge
Locke’s statements in Chapter XXVII of Book II do indeed commit him to the claim that an oak tree and the mass of matter constituting it at a given moment are two distinct things of different kinds. Locke states that it is impossible for “two things of the same kind [to] exist in the same place at the same time.”4 He also writes that “one thing cannot have two beginnings” in place and time.5 As Vere Chappell had already argued in “Locke on the Ontology of Matter, Living Things, and Persons,” it follows from these principles and from Locke’s own descriptions of the persistence conditions for trees and masses that they are not identical things.6 A mass of matter, for Locke, is a particular collection of conjoined particles; the same mass cannot survive a loss, replacement, or addition of parts.7 Yet the persistence conditions for organisms involve continuation of the same life, according to Locke.8 A tree can survive the loss of a few particles and remain the same tree.9 It would, however, be constituted by a new mass of matter, since its constituent particles would not be the same. Given his view that no one thing can have two beginnings in place and time, Locke must hold that a tree and the mass of matter constituting it at a given time are not the same identical thing. They must be two things of different kinds because they do coincide.10

Kaufman refers to Chappell’s interpretation of Locke, according to which a mass and an organism are two non-identical coinciding things of different kinds, as the “Coincidence Interpretation.”11 Kaufman writes that in order to defend Locke’s metaphysical system as consistent, the defender of this interpretation must be able to account for what the two different kinds are, exemplified by a mass and an organism, that allow them to coincide. The intuitive answer, he agrees, would be that those two kinds are simply mass and organism, respectively.12 Yet the great difficulty, according to Kaufman, is that Locke’s discussion of real and nominal essence does not allow for an organism and the mass constituting it at a given time to be of different kinds at all, because these substances share the same “individual real essence,” and no two things of the same individual real essence can differ with respect to any of their nominal essences.

Locke presents his view of essence as an alternative to the classic view held by the Aristotelians, who “suppose a certain number of
those Essences, according to which, all natural things are made, and wherein they do exactly every one of them partake, and so become of this or that Species.” Locke insists instead:

The other, and more rational Opinion, is of those, who look on all natural Things to have a real, but unknown Constitution of their insensible Parts, from which flow those sensible Qualities, which serve us to distinguish them one from another, according as we have Occasion to rank them into sorts, under common Denominations.

There is thus a key distinction for Locke between real and nominal essence. Real essence refers to that unknown constitution of corpuscular parts in nature, from which observable qualities spring. Locke explains that we group the objects of our experience under certain names that emphasize different observable characteristics we take to be important or noteworthy. For example, anything we consider to be a sample of the metal “gold” will display a certain color, malleability, solubility in aqua regia, et cetera. We, as human language users, designate these characteristics as the necessary “properties” associated with the nominal essence of “gold.” Locke believes there is some corpuscular feature or features at the level of the real essence of a sample of gold that ground its observable characteristics. Yet it is only what we observe of that sample, and not its real essence, that can provide us with a basis for classification.

With this much, Kaufman agrees. However, he interprets Locke’s distinction between real and nominal essence to imply that the formation of any nominal essence involves merely picking and choosing from among the observable characteristics already possessed by a substance in light of its corpuscular real essence. Each particular example of a substance in nature, Kaufman explains, has an individual real essence, and all of the properties of any nominal essence that substance could be said to possess must be observable characteristics that derive from that individual real essence’s particulate constitution:

Nominal essences are the “Workmanship of the Understanding” (3.3.14), according to Locke. Among the reasons for this label is that despite the fact that the qualities included in the nominal essence are produced by the individual real essence of a body, it is we who
decide which qualities to include in the nominal essence. Thus, Locke believes that in the formation of nominal essences, both we and the individual real essence play the crucial roles. \(^{17}\)

While we have the choice of which qualities to include as necessary properties of a substance’s nominal essence, these properties will, according to Kaufman, be limited to a selection of those observable features that are rooted in the individual real essence of the substance. Kaufman explains, “Given Locke’s commitment to corpuscularianism, nothing other than the individual real essence of an individual could serve as the basis for the observable qualities which go into the creation of the nominal essence of a kind.” \(^{18}\) Given that kinds are a class of nominal essence, Kaufman concludes:

Necessarily, for any x and y, if x and y have the same individual real essences, then for any kind K, either (i) both x and y are members of K or (ii) neither x nor y are members of K. \(^{19}\)

This is true, Kaufman argues, because whatever observable qualities would be required for membership in a given kind (as necessary properties of the kind’s nominal essence), two individuals x and y of the same individual real essence will either both display or both fail to display these qualities.

Kaufman finds this result to contradict the claim that an oak tree and the mass of matter constituting it at a given time can be two distinct things of different kinds. Kaufman emphasizes that the oak tree and mass are composed of numerically-identical material parts arranged in a numerically-identical manner. \(^{20}\) In other words, they share the same individual real essence. \(^{21}\) Kaufman concludes that the tree and mass should not then be able to differ with respect to any of their nominal essences, although that is precisely what would be required in order to say that they are two coinciding things of different kinds. Kaufman takes this to be a fundamental and “intractable” problem. \(^{22}\) He concludes there is a deep tension between Locke’s views on the essences and identities of substances.

II. A Response to Kaufman

Locke’s theories can be successfully defended against this attack.
Locke’s way of thinking does allow for the possibility that two different nominal essences can characterize two distinct, coinciding things. Kaufman’s error lies in supposing that the formation of a nominal essence involves merely picking and choosing from among the observable features rooted in some one individual real essence. Locke makes no such claim explicitly, and his description of our “complex ideas” of substances encourages an outright rejection of this supposition. The nominal essence of an oak tree, for example, can include properties such as those describing its growth and behavior over time that are not instantaneously observable and cannot be explained in terms of the constitution of just one individual real essence.

Strictly speaking, phrases like “oak tree” and “mass of matter” directly signify not mind-independent material objects, according to Locke, but ideas: “Words in their primary or immediate Signification, stand for nothing, but the Ideas in the Mind of him that uses them.”23 “Oak trees” and “masses of matter” are examples of Lockean complex ideas, and more specifically, substances.24 Locke explains that the necessary properties associated with the nominal essences of substances are themselves whatever ideas we see fit to associate for the sake of identifying substances as we find useful or desirable:

The measure and boundary of each Sort, or Species, whereby it is constituted that particular Sort, and distinguished from others, is that we call its Essence, which is nothing but that abstract Idea to which the Name is annexed: So that every thing contained in that Idea, is essential to that Sort. This... I call it by a peculiar name, the nominal Essence, to distinguish it from that real Constitution of Substances, upon which depends this nominal Essence, and all the Properties of that Sort...25

The complex ideas of substances are, according to Locke, built up of simple ideas.26 These simple ideas include not only primary and secondary sensible qualities such as extension and color, but also a wide variety of active and passive powers.27 Locke offers as examples the power of gold to be melted, the power of the sun to blanch wax, and the power of loadstone to draw iron.28 Locke explicitly insists that such simple ideas of powers “make a principal Ingredient in
our complex Ideas of Substances.” Yet a power is a feature that may not result entirely from the constitution of any one individual real essence because a power refers to an ability to “make, or... receive any change.” Locke explains that when we attribute powers to substances, “the Power we consider is in reference to the change of perceivable Ideas.” A Lockean idea of power is a simple idea resulting from both sensation and reflection. To develop the idea of gold’s power to be melted, for example, would require one to make a series of observations of a changing sample of gold and then to reflect on those observations.

Kaufman takes one individual real essence to be one particular arrangement of corpuscular particles. The exercise of a power might actually require a change from one such individual to another. For example, the idea of an oak tree could include powers like the ability to grow in height, the ability to take up water and nutrients from the soil, and the ability to drop its leaves in the fall. An oak tree remains the same tree after absorbing iron and magnesium from its soil overnight. Yet strictly speaking, the corpuscular real essence of the tree before and after is quite different. Exercise of this power requires a change from one individual real essence to another, and so this power of which we have an idea is not an observable characteristic rooted in one individual real essence. This power can, however, be one of the properties included in the nominal essence of an oak tree, so long as the idea of this power is one of those simple ideas contributing to the complex idea of that substance.

Locke was clearly not averse to understanding simple ideas, not only of powers specifically but even of qualities, to be indicative of change over time. For example, Locke’s short list of primary qualities includes not only figure and extension, which can intelligibly characterize objects at given instants, but also motion. A simple idea of motion, developed from experience as Locke’s empiricism requires, would not be formed on the basis of an observation occurring at one instant; a Lockean idea of motion must be an idea of something occurring over a span of time. Since even simple ideas can refer to processes occurring over time, the complex ideas of substances built up from those simple ideas may also refer to processes occurring over spans of time. A particular “constant regular motion” is in fact one of
the ideas Locke himself lists as a component of our idea of the sun, which he offers as a prime example of a substance.\textsuperscript{34}

Given that an individual real essence is one precise, unchanging arrangement of particles, an individual real essence can be the real essence of a substance only at some specified instant. An oak tree and the mass of matter constituting it at time $t$ share an individual real essence only at some one time, $t$. It is problematic for Kaufman's interpretation that an instantaneous individual real essence would not even be capable of displaying one of the primary qualities, namely that of motion. Yet if the properties of substances are restricted to observable features rooted in some one individual real essence, and no one individual real essence can itself possess the quality of motion, then Locke should be unable to describe our idea of the sun as having the quality of a particular motion as one of its constituent ideas, and thus as one of the properties of its nominal essence. If Kaufman is correct, then the \textit{Essay} is even more deeply conflicted than Kaufman claims.

One might attempt to defend Kaufman's interpretation by appealing to the distinction between determinate and determinable qualities; one individual real essence might not be moving in a particular way, but perhaps it has whatever corpuscular features are required for the ability to move. Yet this does not explain how the complex idea of the sun can include a determinate "constant regular motion, at a certain distance from us" as one of its constituent simple ideas.\textsuperscript{35} What is important to take away from this discussion of the quality of motion is that Locke makes room for even simple ideas to refer to processes occurring over spans of time; a simple idea of a quality or power need not be descriptive of some sensible object in a given instant. When Locke states that the complex ideas of substances are collections of ideas "observed to exist united together," Locke is not saying that all of the characteristics of a substance must be features existing together in one place and time.\textsuperscript{36} The essential properties of a named substance need not all be instantaneously observable features rooted in some one individual real essence of an example of that substance. According to Locke, we carve up the natural world as we observe it into named substances as we please, attributing to these substances any properties
of which we can form a simple idea.

The interpretation of Locke defended in this section is consistent with a corpuscular understanding of the basis of observable characteristics. The ideas of many powers will be derived from series of observations made over intervals of time. Each instantaneous observation will be an observation of the primary and secondary qualities that are rooted in the particulate constitution of matter. For example, the observation that a tree has grown a foot in height will consist of a collection of instantaneous observations of the color and figure of the tree. If the color and figure observed at multiple distinct instants are characterized by the proper difference, then the tree is understood to have grown. These instantaneously observable qualities have their basis in the corpuscular features of some individual real essence. Yet a tree one foot and two feet in height are not the same corpuscular individual. To identify a growing tree as one substance and to attribute to it the power of growth is to identify a property of the “tree” that is not rooted entirely in any one of its individual real essences, even though all of the observable qualities enabling us to form the idea of such a power over time must derive from corpuscular features at the level of real essence.

Thus, Dan Kaufman is incorrect when he states that Locke is committed to the claim that, given any \( x \) and \( y \) which share the same individual real essence (at any instant), and given any kind \( K \), \( x \) and \( y \) are either both members of \( K \) or both not members of \( K \). An “oak tree” and the “mass constituting it at time \( t \)” share, at time \( t \), the same individual real essence. Yet the non-identical sets of properties associated with each of their nominal essences need not be chosen from among the qualities observed to result from the constitution of that single individual real essence at time \( t \). Locke thinks we form our ideas of substances from whatever simple ideas we wish, even incorporating ideas of change over time into our ideas of substances. All of those constituent simple ideas then become essential properties of the substance’s nominal essence; “That therefore, and that alone is considered as essential, which makes a part of the complex Idea the name of a Sort stands for, without which, no particular Thing can be reckoned of that Sort, nor be intituled to that name.”37 The nominal
essence of an oak tree includes, for example, powers to perform behaviors over intervals of time, while the nominal essence of the mass constituting the tree at time $t$ need not include any such powers. Note that it is unimportant that these two things do indeed exist for different spans of time; the ideas of different properties belonging to each of their nominal essences are sufficient to individuate them. Because the two different nominal essences of these things constitute their different kinds, we can coherently say, contrary to Kaufman’s accusation, that an oak tree and the mass constituting it at a given instant are two distinct things of different kinds, coinciding in space and time. The alleged contradiction between Locke’s views on identity and his views on real and nominal essence can be resolved.

III. Locke on Identity, Revisited

The realization that Locke thinks nominal essences do include properties that are not instantaneously observable features rooted in any one individual real essence helps to clarify not only Locke’s remarks on spatiotemporal coincidence and kinds, but the entire Chapter XXVII of Book II, on “Identity and Diversity.” Locke’s conceptions of the nominal essences of substances and of the persistence conditions for individuals over time are tightly linked. Locke realizes that the identity of a substance like an oak tree or a horse cannot consist in corpuscular sameness over time. He explains that a tree is considered the same tree even as it grows from a small seedling to a much larger plant, and a horse remains the same horse throughout its lifetime even while it gains and loses weight. The identity of these substances remains the same, “though, in both these Cases, there may be a manifest change of the parts.” Locke realizes there must therefore be some difference between the oak tree, the identity of which remains stable over time, and the mass of matter that constitutes it at some given moment:

[That difference] seems to me to be in this; that the one is only the Cohesion of Particles of Matter any how united, the other such a disposition of them as constitutes the parts of an Oak; and such an Organization of those parts, as is fit to receive, and distribute
nourishment, so as to continue, and frame the Wood, Bark, and Leaves, etc. of an Oak, in which consists the vegetable Life.\textsuperscript{41}

Locke is not arguing here that what makes something an oak tree and not a mere mass of matter is just a precise arrangement of parts that enables life at that moment, as opposed to some other jumbled arrangement of particles that does not, because at any instant, as he notes, there will be one arrangement of mere matter that constitutes the tree.\textsuperscript{42}

Locke is instead drawing attention to the differences between our ideas of masses and of oak trees. A mass, according to our idea of it, is simply a configuration of particles at some instant. Yet our idea of a tree includes certain abilities, which Locke calls collectively the “disposition” to “continue” to support the same life over time. The exact parts of a tree may change, but something that remains a tree must have the continued ability to “receive, and distribute nourishment.” Continued possession of various powers through time is, as part of the very idea of an oak tree, intimately tied to its identity. As we already saw, Locke takes every constituent idea of our complex idea of a named substance to be a necessary property of its nominal essence.\textsuperscript{43} Locke also emphasizes that “Existence itself” is the key to a thing’s identity; a thing is the same so long as it continues to exist.\textsuperscript{44} We can easily answer the question of what it takes for a named substance to continue to exist by referring to the properties of its nominal essence. That thing must continue to display the qualities and powers associated with the nominal essence applied to it in order to retain its identity as an example of that substance.

Thus for Locke, identity is relative to some nominal essence. Locke considers this to be the key insight of his theory of identity; “such as is the Idea belonging to that Name, such must be the Identity: Which if it had been a little more carefully attended to, would possibly have prevented a great deal of that Confusion, which often occurs about this Matter.”\textsuperscript{45} If we accept Kaufman’s interpretation of Locke, then we cannot make sense of even the broadest aspects of Locke’s theory of identity. According to Kaufman, Locke must hold that the properties of nominal essences are qualities observable at some one instant.\textsuperscript{46} If
this is true, then Locke should have no reason to say that an oak tree and the mass constituting it at a given time are different things with different names at all, because their observable qualities in that one instant will be exactly the same. The things identified by the names “tree” and “mass” do indeed have different identities according to Locke, because they have different persistence conditions. Given that Lockean identity is relative to nominal essence (we can only refer to the continued identity of named things insofar as they continue to be of that sort), their identity is easily accounted for when we realize that different persistence conditions are entailed by their different nominal essences, which, in the case of the tree, includes powers governing characteristic behaviors through time, and for the mass, a lack thereof.

It is indeed intuitive to think that a named thing’s properties, its persistence conditions, and its identity over time are all intimately linked. When we distinguish between an oak tree and the mass of matter constituting it at time \( t \), we do take ourselves to be making a meaningful distinction. We take these things to be different precisely because our ideas of them involve very different conceptions of their behavior over time. We realize that an oak tree will be composed of very different arrangements of matter throughout its lifetime. Yet when we refer to a mass of matter at time \( t \), we are referring to something that is unique to one instant of time and which would not remain the same in light of any modification of its parts. Locke’s willingness to account for oak trees and the masses constituting them at given instants as different things, thereby entailing they have different nominal essences, different persistence conditions, and different identities, should be considered a merit and not a fault of Locke’s account.

IV. Difficulties with Locke’s View

While Locke’s accounts of the essences and identities of substances do allow for one consistent theory, that theory has at least one major problem. Locke explicitly claims that every component simple idea of the complex idea of a substance becomes a necessary property of that substance’s nominal essence. Thus, a substance can no longer be called the same substance as soon as it ceases to display any of
that substance’s necessary properties. Yet consider, for example, the idea of a swan. According to Locke’s own example, the idea of this substance includes, among other characteristics, “white Colour, long Neck, red Beak, black Legs” as well as “a power of swimming in the Water, and making a certain kind of Noise.” Yet it is quite easy to imagine an object that ceased to display any one or even multiple of these characteristics, which we would nonetheless continue to identify as a swan. Imagine a swan that loses its feet in an accident, or has its beak taped shut so that it can no longer make noise. What is unclear is how many of these properties an object must cease to display before it ceases to be a swan. What is truly essential to a swan’s continued identity is not so clear and simple as Locke’s account would suggest.

One might attempt to salvage Locke’s theory by objecting that we have not correctly identified anyone’s idea of a swan in general; these are characteristics of some or even most swans, but they are not the essential characteristics that really make something a “swan” in anyone’s mind. Yet it is unclear that there actually is even one characteristic that every single example of what we would want to consider a swan has in common, especially if we are looking for a set of characteristics not fully shared by any examples of some other named thing we would want to distinguish as different, like a duck or a flamingo.

It is possible that Locke might concede we do not have any such sophisticated conception of what being a “swan” necessarily requires or entails in all instances; he might, however, deny that we need any such account. One major goal of Locke’s explanation of the distinction between real and nominal essence seems to be to show that the names we commonly use to designate various things do not necessarily pick out any perfectly rational, natural kind at all. According to Locke, we identify and name various entities in a somewhat arbitrary way as we find useful, and so the question of how many properties an object must cease to possess before it ceases to be a “swan” need only illustrate that our intuitions about commonly discussed kinds break down in unfamiliar and bizarre circumstances. Yet our strong intuition that a swan with only one leg, for example, is indeed a “swan” provides us with an important reason to reject Locke’s claim that all of the properties associated with a nominal essence are indeed necessary properties.
of any thing to which that name is applied. Locke’s theory of the connection between a substance’s identity and its nominal essence is consistent, but in order for the theory to be viable, it would need to be modified with a more sophisticated account of our understanding of the connection between an object’s membership in a named kind and its possession of the properties associated with the nominal essence of that kind.

V. Concluding Remarks

While Kaufman accuses Locke of a gross inconsistency with regard to his theories of the essences and identities of substances, his criticism hinges crucially upon a failure to recognize an important aspect of Locke’s thinking on these subjects. While Locke did believe that observable qualities are rooted in corpuscular features at the level of real essence, Locke did not hold that the properties associated with a nominal essence must be restricted to the types of instantaneously observable characteristics that can be rooted entirely in the particulate constitution of just one “individual real essence.”

This awareness resolves the alleged problem with Chappell’s “Coincidence Interpretation” of Locke’s remarks on spatiotemporal coincidence and kinds. According to Locke’s view, there can be two distinct coinciding things of different kinds so long as they are characterized by two different nominal essences that include non-identical properties. These properties can include powers to perform behaviors that occur over spans of time and require changes from one particulate individual to another. This clarification of Locke’s account of real and nominal essence also sheds new light on basic aspects of Locke’s theory of identity. For Locke, identity must be considered relative to some nominal essence; one must specify a named individual before one can ask, with respect to the necessary properties of that nominal essence, when that named individual begins and ends its existence. Locke can intelligibly distinguish between two things that share the exact same observable qualities at a given moment, like an oak tree and the mass of matter that instantaneously constitutes it, precisely because the nominal essences of these two things can, in light
of their different properties, entail different persistence conditions. Locke's accounts of the essences and identities of substances are not only consistent; they reinforce each other in important ways, even if the emerging conception is not totally compelling.

This clarification of Locke’s views raises an interesting and difficult question concerning Locke’s ontology. As has hopefully been made clear, Locke is more than willing to say that an individual real essence, as Kaufman understands it, can be associated with different sets of powers. Kaufman assumes that on Locke’s view, there can be nothing more to an object, on the most fundamental level of the real essence of the thing, than the instantaneous arrangement of its corpuscular parts. Yet it seems open to Locke to hold that these different powers might be grounded in some kind of fundamental disposition that only manifests itself in the long run. Alternatively, Locke might think there really is nothing more to matter itself than its particulate constitution as it can be described at each instant, and it is only our ideas of substances as they are derived from observations over time that involve the attribution of powers for change to collections of matter. This is a difficult question to resolve. Yet Kaufman is perhaps too hasty to assume that Locke’s ontology is one in which nothing but particular arrangements of particles, as they can be described at each instant, may exist at the level of real essence.

Notes
3 Ibid., III.vi.2-4.
4 Ibid., II.xxvii.1
5 Ibid.
7 Ibid., 24.
8 Ibid.
Locke is clearly partial to corpuscular explanations of qualities at the level of real essence, although Locke's philosophical commitment to corpuscularianism as the only possible characterization of real essence has been challenged, for example by Lisa Downing in “Locke's Ontology,” *The Cambridge Companion to Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. Lew Newman. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 352-380. Kaufman assumes for the sake of his essay that Locke is committed to a corpuscular understanding of real essence, and this can be assumed for the sake of this paper's argument as well.

Kaufman agrees that these two things should be considered substances, although he notes that certain other scholars have disagreed. Locke constantly refers to other organisms like men, horses, and swans as prime examples of substances (II.xxiii.3, II.xxiii.14).
37 Ibid., III.vi.5.
38 Ibid., II.xxvii.3.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid., II.xxvii.4.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid., III.vi.21.
44 Ibid., II.xxvii.3.
45 Ibid., II.xxvii.7.
46 Kaufman, 530.
47 Locke, III.vi.2.
48 Ibid., II.xxiii.14.